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
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CHRISTIAN MODES
OF
THINKING AND DOING;
OR,
THE MYSTERY
OF THE
KINGDOM OF GOD IN CHRIST:

THOROUGHLY DISCUSSED, AND RECOMMENDED

IN TWO PARTS;

1, OF THE SUBJECT,


2, ——— RELATIONS

OF THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN CHRIST.

BY THE REV. JOHN PRING, B.A.

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. II.



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TO CORRECT

- Page 2, l. 18 and 19, *for or, read on.*
3, l. 17, *after belief, omit ;*
5, l. 20, *for have, read having.*
21, l. 33, *for reason, read the mind.*
53, l. 38, *after complete, read ,*
67, l. 17, *for prefatory, read desultory.*
79, l. 33, *for or, read for.*
119. l. 28, *read wisdom taken in a neutral sense ; the word*
being.
150, l. 36, *for reflexion, read reflexion.*
164, l. 12, *for reflexion, read reflection.*
179, l. 11, *after misfortune, omit ;*
234, l. 36, *for bountiful, read beautiful.*
236, l. 11, *for in, read to.*
281, l. 20, *for simple, read simpler.*
285, l. 15, *for effect, read affect.*
360, l. 31, *after much, read as.*
374, l. 20, *for or, read on.*

CHRISTIAN MODES
OF
THINKING AND DOING,
ETC.

PART I.
THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN CHRIST.

CHAPTER IV.
GOOD *OBJECTIVE* CHARACTERISTICS.

SEC. 4.
RELIGIOUS—ON CONSTITUENTS.

1, Faith or a Sense of Religion.—2, Grace or new Life.—3, Conscience or the Fear of God.—4, Devotion or the Love of God.—5, Resignation and submission to the Will of God.—6, Peace and Reconciliation.—7, Repentance and Reformation.—8, Fidelity and Obedience.—9, Worship; and 10, Communion.

—— “These things ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone.”—*MATT.* xxiii. 23.

THOUGH the religious characteristics accruing on incidentals, of which a sample has just been exhibited, may not be of the first necessity, they are, however, subservient to some of that kind; namely, to the good objective characteristics which of God are “made unto us wisdom and righteousness and sanctification and redemption” (*Cor.* I. i. 30), having their regard towards God, and their foundation in constituents as before described; and in comparison with which a pious consideration of persons and things sacred to God, with all the proper weight and authority

allowed them will be mere offerings of mint, anise and cummin: whereof it may be said as by the prophet, "Hear the word of the Lord, ye rulers of Sodom; give ear unto the law of our God, ye people of Gomorrah. To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? saith the Lord: I am full of the burnt offerings of rams, and the fat of fed beasts, and I delight not in the blood of bullocks, or of lambs, or of he goats. When ye come to appear before me, who hath required this at your hand, to tread my courts?" (Isaiah i. 10—12.) Good churchmen, as ye are, what signifies your keeping up a form of godliness, while ye deny and are even ashamed of the power thereof? It may be, that ye pay tithe of pig, goose, and honey, if not of potatoes, or even of barley and wheat: so be it: there is no harm in that. But other offerings will be required of you, besides any godly or religious characteristics or incidentals, or what is more perhaps, any of the MORAL characteristics or constituents; as temperance and chastity, mercy and humility, gratitude and fidelity, with many others before mentioned—when you come to appear before God; as another prophet says, "Wherewith shall I come before the Lord, and bow myself before the high God? shall I come before him with burnt offerings, with calves of a year old? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, or with ten thousands of rivers of oil? Shall I give my first born for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul? He hath showed thee, O man, what is good: and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and TO WALK HUMBLY WITH THY GOD?" (Mic. vi. 6—8) intimating, that besides an appearance before God with the richest incidentals in a man's disposal, and also with some of his highest moral endowments, it would still and more especially be required of him, to appear with the qualification of godliness on constituents, as humility towards God for example. But it will now be both seasonable and important to propose more than one example of this kind, follow-

ing the natural order of these first rate constituents as above specified, and,

§ 1. As it is well observed in the apostolic epistles, “he that cometh to God must believe that He is” (Heb. xi. 6): consequently in the way of godliness this will needs be the first object that we meet, namely the belief that He is; constituting what we call *Faith, or a sense of religion*—the similar, if not equal affinity of this godly principle with either of the two superior elements of the Kingdom, spirit and intellect above mentioned, rendering such a compound designation just in that respect, and the difference between the two notions being also less in matter than in degree; as both faith and a sense of religion will imply two and the same elements, like godliness in general; being the form and power, or mode and matter, or image and substance of belief; or conviction in the manner above described—only faith, the more particular form, mode or image; and a sense of religion, the more superficial. And as much as that may also be inferred from the forecited apostolic authority; which says, according to our translation, “Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen” (Heb. xi. 1); literally meaning, that faith is, 1, the form, mode, image or evidence of things hoped for; and, 2, the power, substance, or habit of hoping for such things, of indicating and reverting to them continually, as the shadow on a sun-dial indicates and daily reverts to the fleeting hours thereon described; the shadow on the dial resembling the form of faith however expressed, and the light which gives birth to the shadow, its life or substance; this the principle or pabulum, that the effect, form, or process of the life of faith; which are two things as distinct as thirsting and drinking. And that principle of faith is in relation to God’s word what thirst may be in relation to water: the Word being the well by the way (Ps. cx. 7), of which every creature draws in going to Godward, or in his progress towards perfection. The principle of faith is a light to direct, and an appetite

to impel every sincere candidate for eternity towards its deep flowing fountain: and man walking in a middle sphere between creatures that are not sensible of such an enjoyment, and others more sensible than he, has still great cause to be thankful for so high a privilege in the proportion in which he enjoys it.

In a practical view, this distinction may be worth remarking: and especially as some for want of observing it appear to think that creeds, and confessions, and other abstract forms of faith are every thing, while the living principle to which its true, perfect and practical form owes its existence shall be thought nothing of; and that true form likewise, perhaps, i. e. the word of God itself, in comparison with such abstract, or it may be, with some foolish counterfeit in vogue. It is no part for a work like the present, to enter into a critique on "fables and endless genealogies which minister questions rather than godly edifying which is in faith" (Tim. I. i. 4), but rather, to exhibit the true form of faith; to shew what that form, being the whole description of the kingdom of God in Christ, may be in all its dimensions from beginning to end: and consequently of the two forementioned elements the principle, power, matter, or substance of faith only will be the object of our present attention.

Faith then as a principle, or viewed in its simplicity, may be considered as life to Godward, or as a feeling of our divine relation; and a preternatural species of internal apprehension, distinguished by its force and intelligence from common sensibility, which is milder and more spiritual. In general the term will avail, perhaps, to denote all that can be meant by trust in God, belief in his word, attachment to his servants and service; and in short, a lively sense or perception of all that most particularly concerns us in relation to God, and for the sake of this relation; which is the proper subject of religion. And if the principle itself be not indeed preternatural, as aforesaid, it must at least be the property of an emancipated or

free spirit, which is quite as preternatural; the effect either way being a privilege to feel and apprehend the invisible things of God, and so to have a hand in our own formation or reformation as it may be, by the privity and consent that we are allowed to have in this work with our Creator and Redeemer, "as seeing Him who is invisible" (Heb. xi. 27). It is an improvement in wisdom, the principle whereby every living creature, and man especially, is instructed to seek its own good; as Moses remarked to the people of God, "This is your wisdom" (Deut. iv. 6), the wisdom of the people of God. And though every living creature has the gift to seek its own good, or what it takes to be such, men only in this world, and of them only the emancipated or chosen people of God, have the gift to consider who should be the best judge of this good, and to pray accordingly for his inward grace and outward providence, resigning themselves implicitly to the guidance of the one and to the dispensations of the other—believing, that we are nothing of ourselves or independent of Him, and have no separate expectation or interest; but that to serve ourselves, we must employ our lives and abilities whatever they may be in serving Him—that we are His instruments, and as such our only merit will consist in our subservience to his gracious designs—that we are in relation to Him as labourers and assistants who support themselves by their master's business, make his business their own, and find their account in its prosperity.

Such is the principle of faith: and such is the way to our Master's, or to any master's favour. There are few who have any objection to being looked up to by their servants in this manner, whatever objection some may have to realizing their servants' expectations. But God is not one of that sort: as he thinks his servants cannot be too greedy of their proper wages, that they cannot be too covetous of the true riches, nor covetous as they should be without building on the reward of their fidelity in a future state; so he will take care that their faith shall not be then deceived, nor their hope frustrated in any respect.

And if the uniform goodness of the Lord be constantly manifested in the prosperous course of the righteous, as by other means of grace, so by this especially, there is likewise no medium by which the same goodness being still uniform shines forth occasionally with a brighter evidence. Faith to the sinner is one while like the friendly rope thrown out to a shipwrecked mariner; by which he may save himself if he will: but he is not obliged to avail himself of it; he may be saved by faith if he will, or drown if he had rather. Another while it shall rather be like some friendly hand seizing the hapless wretch, as it were at the last moment, and rescuing him from a watery grave, when his strength was spent, and his life all but gone—divine mercy not being tied either to means or measures.

Therefore we owe it to ourselves to believe, and to believe rightly. We ought to believe rightly as well as to act rightly, the same being equally for our own interest. And were the operation or effect of faith even more indifferent to its subject, the believer, there is still One, be it also remembered, who would have the same right to expect it. As a species of godliness on constituents, faith is as much due to God who gives it as any other offering that we can make Him of his gifts in either department, that is, in either the incidental or constituent. Faith is the same valuable consideration with respect to God as credit, authority and other incidentals of the sort are with respect to mankind: so that faith, which in a human relation was lately proposed as a constituent, may be proposed as an incidental in the divine. In this last mentioned relation, or considered as an incidental, faith will be the credit and authority of the Creator among his intelligent creatures, but among the human more particularly. For of God's credit and authority with the heavenly host, there can be no doubt; witnessing as they must, with superior discernment, the excellence of his works and dispensations.

“Wisdom is justified of her children” (Matt. xi. 19): and also of her enemies it may be said, though with a

different feeling from faith properly so called ; as their feeling will partake more of fear and hatred, than of the admiration and confidence by which a true faith is characterised. Any one may believe in that way, as the apostle observes, "Thou believest that there is one God ; (says he) thou doest well : the devils also believe, and tremble" (Jam. ii. 19) ; but it is God's credit and authority in our own sphere, and with our own kind, that faith from man, as much his right as any human authority can be the right of any of those who claim it, that faith in which both the object or claimant and the subject or sentient, that is both God and man, are alike if not equally interested, that we are now particularly considering, and which seems most proper to be considered for an example of the characteristic. For if faith, or a sense of religion be creditable to God as its object, to man and other creatures, its subjects, it must be quite indispensable, since they all naturally run to ruin, and none can be saved without it.

Faith in the way of godliness is like a charitable construction in the way of morality sometimes ; if it be not indeed a part of charity. For faith well founded and sincere will contemplate the fairest side of every thing ; endeavouring to construe whatever happens to the honour of God on one hand, and with the help of charity, to that of his creatures on the other ; loving God and one's brother also (John I. iv. 21) ; delighting in God generally for wisdom in the natural, equity in the moral, and goodness in every department, especially to us, as the God of our salvation ; delighting in man, as the image of God, and a neighbour endeared to us by many tender associations.

And as faith resembles charity in her opinions or constructions, so likewise in her mode of expression, as being more potent than loud. It is a still small voice, but very penetrating, like that which God addressed to Elijah after the fire and the earthquake on Mount Horeb (Kings I. xix. 12), LITTLE AND PRECIOUS AS THE LAST DROP OF LIFE. To-day, therefore, (as St. Paul says,) "while it is called to-day"

(Heb. iii. 18) if ye will hear his voice, harden not your hearts" (Ps. xcv. 8).

The voice of God is the Word gone forth, his edited, insubstantial word—as great a mystery to us as our own: but of its discovery or acceptance we may form some idea from the hint of St. Paul. It is, that "God hath revealed the same unto us by his Spirit: for the Spirit searcheth all things; yea the deep things of God. For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God" (Cor. I. ii. 10, 11). The Spirit of God then being the true principle of our faith will enable us to receive its true form in the evidence that he gives of himself continually, or enables his intelligent creatures to collect for themselves from legitimate sources. And this evidence is not inconsiderable: it is more than some may imagine, though less than others who have never sought it by study or never studied for it. For study and evidence are to the soul what hands and eyes are to the body; though a man may make up his mind to want evidence for belief, as he may to want the properties of handling and seeing, or the ability to move, or to do any thing, when he only wants resolution or inclination; and that perhaps through his own fault.

So the man who wants faith will on the other hand be very likely to want resolution, and to want it also in cases where resolution is most required: as it happened to our Saviour's disciples once, when they thought themselves at the point of drowning, and came to their master in great agitation as he lay asleep in the ship, and awoke him, saying, "Lord, save us, we perish." And he saith unto them, "Why are ye fearful, O ye of little faith?" (Matt. viii. 25, 26.) Another might have reproached the disciples as cowards rather than as unbelievers; but Jesus knew well, that timidity in such extreme cases must proceed from the want of faith in Divine Providence as much as from any deficiency of natural courage, and lectured the disciples accordingly. Or a man may doubt once in his life,

and under some singular temptation, who is not generally deficient in the principle either of faith or resolution : and although a distrust of God's power and providence, though but for a moment, or a momentary suspension of the faith that we owe him every moment, be an offence like withholding any due incidental, as offerings or tithes for example, only more serious, it is still to be hoped, that after such a falling off our heavenly Father, who is all mercy and goodness, might take one by the hand again, as the object of his love took St. Peter, when the horrors of the deep had also triumphed over his habitual faith and resolution, and even common sense. One should think; that when a man found himself walking miraculously on the water, he would not be frightened for a bit of wind : and so one might think, that one who had experienced the kindness of Providence in the general course of his life would not be likely to mistrust it on a particularly trying occasion. Knowing, therefore, as Jesus did, the constitution of the human mind, (John ii. 24, 25,) with its natural and unavoidable infirmities, he would be neither surprised nor offended at a transient doubt in St. Peter, or in any other apostle or future witness of his heavenly mission. :

For no man is always even in his right senses ; how can he be expected then, to be always in his right belief ? Add to which, the principle of faith, like other constituents of the subject may also remain inert, or acting without effect wherever it exists, as infants live before they begin to feed ; and thrive, and run about : and therefore some may find no difficulty in our Saviour's expression of "these LITTLE ONES (meaning little children) who believe in me" (Matt. xviii. 6) : as we have reason to find, if not some difficulty, at least an oversight in the conclusion of some who will not distinguish between the principle of faith, and its form, exercise, or development, which are two things, as before observed.

But faith never to be developed is like a miscarriage, or what St. James would call dead, as where he says, "Faith

without works is dead" (Jam. ii. 17). This is not what we should call faith latent or repressed; but faith departed, extinct, or, as St. James says, "dead." Or faith may be just half dead, acting only in one sphere with effect; as it may be in the intellectual for example, when there will be most OBSERVATION of divine things; or in the spiritual, when there will be most ENJOYMENT. Or faith may issue in works without sentiment, or in sentiment without works; and that in relation either to God or man. It is the misfortune of some men, to want that effective faith or sentiment in prayer more than in some other good works when they have the grace to perform them; the misfortune of others to want it on trying occasions, as the apostles and St. Peter for example on the occasions lately mentioned. The firmest faith will have its oscillations, as the soundest mind will have its flights and misconceptions. They who never think may be always of one mind, if they can be said to have any. They for example who sit in the seat of the scornful, or in whom the principle of scorn has usurped the place of reflection, are not in much danger of doubting, and in still less danger of believing: David may doubt (Ps. lxxiii. 2, &c.), St. Peter may doubt (Matt. xxvi. 69), and any one may doubt who can believe: but scorers have not either the grace to doubt or the ingenuousness to believe; but abundant evidence at the same time for both parts, if that were all; "so that they are without excuse" (Rom. i. 20).

Indeed, as Paul and Barnabas observed, in their "sayings" at Iconium, the "living God is not apt to leave himself without witness among all nations, in that he does good, and gives us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness" (Acts xiv. 17). Of course, holy men, such as David and St. Peter could not doubt in the manner above mentioned for want of evidence: no more could the apostles generally—which appears by their not coming to Jesus as "the Pharisees also with the Sadducees came, and tempting him desired, that he would

shew them a sign from heaven" (Matt. xvi. 1). They did not say, Lord, give us stronger evidence, or, show us another miracle; but "Increase our faith" (Luke xvii. 5). They had seen miracles enough, and yet could not believe to their own liking: they wanted not objects of faith, nor yet evidence, but thought they wanted the principle; which they were wise enough to seek, not from their equals, but from a higher authority, looking unto Jesus "the author and finisher of their faith" (Heb. xii. 2); and were not disheartened, "being confident of this very thing, that he who had begun a good work in them would perform it unto the day of Jesus Christ" (Phil. i. 6).

It is a mighty privilege, if men did but know it, to derive our faith or the principle, as we certainly do, from God immediately by his Holy Spirit or influence; but without the Word too our faith so derived will be merely spiritual, or faith without knowledge, a sort of chaos, without form and void. The only true, solid and substantial, or as we should say *concrete* faith is that which we derive, like every other good and perfect gift, from the Father of lights; "with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning" (Jam. i. 17), by the light and influence of his Word and Spirit, so that there are properly these Three united in the production of a true and lively faith; 1, the Father Almighty from whom it comes to us by 2, the mediation of the Son, and 3, the operation of the Holy Ghost: which three being clearly identified as One, are all mentioned together in one passage of our Saviour's discourse to his disciples, 3, "The Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom 1, the Father will send 2, in my name, He shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance whatsoever I have said unto you" (John xiv. 26). Where we may perceive both the beginning of our faith and its degrees or progress: as for example, 1, its beginning with God in Three Persons; 2, for one degree our acceptance of this beginning with suitable attention, other means following thereupon in continual succession; as 3, a renewal of the

subject, whose perception of the most important objects having been closed or paralysed by guilt, or as the apostle expresses it, "dead in trespasses and sins" (Eph. ii. 1), is thus restored or released, being the same in effect as the Divine Presence or Image returned, as light rekindled, man revived. It is like our life-blood flowing again through the heart after animation had been long suspended. "Turn us again, O Lord, God of hosts (says the Psalmist); shew the light of thy countenance; and we shall be whole" (Ps. lxxx. 7).

It does not seem worth while to trace the progress of faith any farther: but to indicate the standing and affinity of this first principle among the tribe of heavenly virtues which are consecrated to God and promoted from virtue to godliness by its means.

1. Faith has a near resemblance to *Fidelity*: but faith and fidelity will not be quite the same thing if rightly understood, however essential they may be to each other's perfection, and however they may agree in their antithesis; the former of the two being rather more contemplative and intellectual, the latter more active and spiritual. Besides, fidelity carries a good will to its object, which even a loving faith would seem rather to expect.

2. *Mercy*, another of the tribe, is older than faith; and faith than *charity*, being the twin-sister of innocence, which lived before the fall. "For faith is the life of the just; and the just shall live by his faith" (Hab. ii. 4): as Adam did, till losing his faith, he fell into temptation, and became an object of charity; and well it happened for him, that mercy on the contrary was in being before its object.

3. Thus it would seem as if faith and *Good works* were twins originally, or rather like two halves of one subject, however remote from each other they may be found at present. For good works, we may presume, were originally instinctive; there was no reasoning upon them before the tasting of the forbidden fruit, when mankind began to

distinguish between good and evil. Before the cause and beginning of that distinction, believing was as natural as breathing, and doing as believing: but then came on a woeful alteration, and hapless man began to have his doubts; while stubborn faith continued in the neighbourhood an unwelcome and neglected monitor. And hence

4. Another association for faith, or opposition rather, with *Doubt*: which has continued till now, and will continue in all probability as long as the present world shall last: doubt, sometimes being rather convenient, in this imperfect state, not only as it may lead by chance to conviction, but also as it may serve to exercise our humility before God and our deference for the authority of his Word. Nevertheless, if doubt may be convenient sometimes perchance, the presence of faith will be always indispensable. "Whatsoever is not of faith is sin" (Rom. xiv. 23), says the apostle: and it will not be enough either to do or leave undone ever, according to our belief of their propriety, those things on which there cannot exist a doubt; but we are also to leave undone some things on the propriety of which there can be no faith, because they are too bad perhaps to be mentioned; as the apostle says. "And have no fellowship with the unfruitful works of darkness; (says he) but rather reprove them. For it is a shame even to speak of those things which are done of them in secret" (Eph. v. 11, 12).

"Do we then make void the law through faith? God forbid: yea, we establish the law" (Rom. iii. 31). And it may be decidedly proved that faith in God must tend to establish his moral precepts, only by the authority of St. Paul; though he has been understood to mean differently by some: while, on the other hand St. James, who may be thought by the Antinomians to lean rather more than enough to morality, will even appear to value the same partly on account of its subservience to faith or religion; as when arguing from the example of Abraham's faith and obedience in the intended offering of Isaac, he says

to his supposed antagonist, "SEEST THOU HOW FAITH BROUGHT WITH HIS WORKS, AND BY WORKS WAS FAITH MADE PERFECT" (Jam. ii. 22). Which then is the object of perfection ; faith or works ?

5. If doubting be sometimes mistaken for reasoning, and that rather wilfully perhaps by some who have more doubts than reasons to justify them, it is however to be hoped, for the credit of *Reason*, that it may be more allied to faith, existing as a beautiful superstructure on this immutable foundation. Of the precedence or comparative worth of these two excellent companions, it is not necessary to speak in noticing merely their connexion ; but to observe, that as faith is older than reason, so it is more prospective, which seems also rather a property of age. Reason is more prospective indeed at present than instinct, which is said to have been as primitive as faith : but it is no longer the same. Therefore, as reason now is more prospective than instinct, so is faith more than reason. For by faith we are lifted above the concerns of the DAY, which belong to reason ; as by reason, above the concerns of the MOMENT, which belong to instinct. And, as the distinct views of reason may limit the pressure of those in immediate contemplation, so faith looking to futurity will reduce the weight of all our views and concerns in this preparatory state to less again.

6. After proposing reason and faith in the relation of a superstructure and its foundation, *All knowledge* may be mentioned as their common material ; and all three, v. g. faith, reason, and knowledge, as naturally inseparable ; though there have been those, who could imagine the possibility of reason without knowledge as well as of both without faith : but in truth without this there can be neither. For THERE IS NOT A SINGLE AFFAIR IN LIFE SO TRITE AND INTELLIGIBLE, BUT HAS ITS FOUNDATION IN FAITH : and the higher the matter, the more necessary will this principle be to begin with ; in fact, it is already allowed as a necessary beginning to all knowledge, except the very

highest species, and the very one that requires it most, being the species of divinity.

7. Without considering how they are related, besides reason and knowledge with the other correlatives before mentioned, we may still find room for another and another. For though one had all reason and knowledge, and all faith, so that one could remove mountains and had not *charity*, it would be nothing (Cor. I. xiii. 2) and the same likewise, if one had not *holiness* with *sobriety* (Tim. I. ii. 15).

8. Lastly, putting faith against *All the world*, and supposing faith and the world to have begun together, it may be queried, which shall continue longest? Our Saviour tells his disciples, that "he that endureth to the end shall be saved" (Matt. x. 22). While on another occasion he queries rather abruptly, but the query is very important, whether the Son of man when he cometh shall find faith upon the earth (Luke xviii. 8). For whether this query refer to the great day of judgment, or to our individual summoning to appear before the tribunal of divine justice as we depart this life, the occurrence only in the latter case will certainly be a great trial for our faith, and such as we may deprecate long before it arrives, praying the worthy Judge eternal that He would not suffer us at our last hour for any pains of death to fall from Him.* The property next

* Between different parties in the church, and especially between two that are apt to brand each other with epithets not worth repeating, such a broil has been got up between faith and works as must needs be very injurious to one of them, or it may be to both, if either of the said parties should ever be suffered to predominate materially: which God forbid. For one of them by never preaching works in detail, nor reading of them either in the Holy Scriptures if they can help it, but abstracting and refining them to a mere shadow if they cannot help mentioning them, do what they can to drive these out of remembrance: while the other party, by preaching works, perhaps, sometimes, (when they do preach,) but still on general principles, which they have learned somewhere but not in the gospel, do what they can to abolish the Christian faith, and good works likewise; as no work can be good in a Christian country if it be not Christian; any more than the country itself can be Christian without the Christian faith and

to be mentioned will exemplify a good part of our dependence with his kind interposition being,

§ 2. The good objective characteristic, *Grace* or *New Life*, than which there are few subjects in divinity perhaps that have been so much talked of and so little considered; which makes it almost like a new theme, and consequently more difficult than others that may have been partly matured by popular discussion with more heed: yet one might venture a few remarks on 1, the nature and derivation of the subject; 2, its efficacy and necessity; 3, foundation and affinities; 4, access, reception and other accidents.

1. Considering an expression of St. Paul's, "By grace are ye saved through faith," with only common attention, one might be apt to doubt, respecting the *Nature* of the property, whether as a principle, faith should be repeated first in the way of godliness, or not rather grace, which would seem to be the cause or principle of faith. But more than common attention will enable us to discover in this case the same reciprocity of cause and effect which our Saviour ascribes to good properties in general, "Who-soever hath, to him shall be given, and he shall have more abundance" (Matt. xiii. 12); and how faith may be a medium of grace or of the heavenly principle, the Holy Ghost, from which it proceeds, when that Principle being at first incidental only, and as it were, a stranger to its new subject, is domesticated, and from an incidental become a constituent. Then it will be as St. John says, "grace for grace" (John i. 16): and as St. Paul might have said, only by reversing the order of his forecited expression, "Through faith are ye saved by grace": this is a consequence of your faith: this is what you get by believing, or receive by the medium of faith; v. g. the grace or new life which leads directly to salvation.

But understanding by Grace, as used in this and many such good works as must inevitably proceed from that faith wherever it exists.

other passages of the apostolic epistles, no more than some would be glad to have it, which is an insipid purpose, we should not need to be in much concern about its order and station among godly characteristics ; and then too they would not be obliged to acknowledge an opposite production in man's fall or DISGRACE, which is very inconvenient for their antichristian opinions. Therefore, it may be proper to observe, that grace, without ever being two things, will, in the first place, like every other property, have two forms, types, or appearances ; virtual and eventual, or essential, and characteristic. As virtual and essential, grace will denote both the substance and particulars of a Christian life : which was the cause of the twofold designation here given it, namely of Grace and New Life. Virtually and essentially grace is the general attribute of divine light and life which was in the beginning ; as St. John says, " The same was in the beginning with God.—In him was life, and the life was the light of men " (John i. 2, 4). Eventually, and characteristically, grace will be favour, beauty, elegance in a supreme degree, so far as to have been even tribed and deified by some who had a livelier sense than ordinary of its moral perfection : and upon the whole it may be considered as positive an existence, as wisdom or truth, or any other excellent characteristic that we derive from the same quarter ; being first *New Life* to those who are favoured with it, but always in itself and eventually to them the life eternal. " And this is life eternal, (said its blessed Mediator to the Parent of life,) that they might know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent " (John xvii. 3).

If any man will be at the pains to consider, he shall find that many positive acts, whether in doing, or giving, or any other mode, with the properties they compose, and many properties so composed together pass very often under the head of some general characteristic ; as all the operations of the Most High, for example, under the head of Mercy according to the Psalmist, where he says, " All

the paths of the Lord are mercy and truth unto such as keep his covenant and his testimonies" (Ps. xxv. 9). As loving makes love, and giving bounty, and doing good beneficence, so all the doings of the Lord, and others' doings by Him, his primitive and imparted life, are mercy and truth, and all his giving in the same manner is purely GRACE. We need not therefore feel any more hesitation concerning the nature of grace in its receiver than in its Giver or itself: for the characteristic may be traced among a thousand properties, if so many should ever happen to be got together; "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things" (Phil. iv. 8), remember their origin as well as their quality, and you will not be far from the notion of grace.

Grace, generally considered, may denote any kind of benefit gratuitously bestowed in relation either to the bestower or the receiver: but more particularly considered in relation to "the Giver of all goodness", the term will have a double aspect and consequent import, as relating not only to the bounty of the Giver, but also to the demerit of the receiver, whereby the weight or quantum of grace is doubled. Before man was created, of course he could deserve neither good nor evil; therefore, all the good, whether physical or moral, that he received in creation, an ample treasure, was simply a gift by grace. And if the Almighty in becoming a Creator and consequently bound both implicitly and explicitly to the object of his creation, as man in becoming a parent becomes bound to the fruit of his body, made grace to be justice; yet in the sequel, after man had forfeited the whole treasure of his existence by a capital delinquency, and so deserved annihilation or every inferior evil, for no evil can be so great as that, then to be made an object of divine bounty again in spite of his demerit, seemed like grace upon grace, or

grace doubled ; SUCH IS THE GRACE OF GOD considered as a general principle of salvation, which St. Paul intimates, when he says, " The grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared to all men " (Tit. ii. 11). And considering the same more definitely as we have it in Christ, being then not only a gift, as it is said, " According to the gift of the grace of God " (Eph. iii. 7), but a prodigious sacrifice and immense purchase, it must appear like grace upon grace, tripled and quadrupled ; and SUCH IS THE GRACE OF GOD BY CHRIST, or as it is oftener styled, the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ ; it being again the same principle in a more particular application, when " WE BELIEVE, THAT THROUGH THE GRACE OF OUR LORD JESUS CHRIST, WE SHALL BE SAVED " (Acts xv. 11).

Thus the whole process of salvation is in effect generally the grace of God, and his gift of eternal life ; but especially " the gift of grace which is by one man, Jesus Christ, abounding unto many " (Rom. v. 15), " the gift of God in eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord " (Ib. vi. 23). And this gift so emphatically denoted by the name of Grace coming only by Jesus Christ, " full of grace and truth " (John i. 14), and high above all other marks of God's favour, whether in person, mind, or fortune, will signify likewise the gift of the Holy Ghost, by which we are regenerate, and have a new life ; coming still to the same point of life, grace, or unmerited favour, and MORE THAN UNMERITED, being the very reverse of our desert ; as when a vanquished foe receives his life from the victor, and not only life but PROTECTION. All the favour and protection that we receive from God must needs be unmerited, as aforesaid, consequently all pure grace ; and that will be all that believers receive : his chastisements as well as his blessings ; our birth, life, and death, and removal to a better state, are all favour and grace. How partial a conception of the property must it be, to understand thereby, as many do, either an inefficient purpose only, as aforesaid, or at most, but a casual, a preservation from sin, or

power to do good, when it instructs, preserves, governs, and in fact even animates us continually, after having brought us into a new existence; and is not a characteristic in the way of righteousness only, but in every way, subjective as well as objective, and incidental as well as constituent; in the latter especially, even to the commonest and most natural; as in the ability to walk, talk, or swallow; when every mouthful that we eat is by grace, and every breath of air that we inhale, as much as the greatest grace, or the sum of all, a new life by Jesus Christ!

"Therefore, if any man be in Christ, he is a new creature: old things are passed away; behold all things are become new: and all things are of God who hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ" (Cor. II. v. 17, 18), says St. Paul: and again, "If there had been a law given which would have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law, but the Scripture hath concluded all under sin, that the promise by faith of Jesus Christ might be given to them that believe" (Gal. iii. 21, 22); comparing the law as a principle of action with the property and effect of grace. It may be inferred from this passage at first sight, that the gift by grace was limited, namely to "them who believe:" which were a desperate case indeed, as none can believe without it. But the limitation to "them that believe" is meant demonstratively, and not conditionally; as much as to say, It is to be seen by their faith, who are the subjects of grace, as it is to be seen by their works who are the subjects of faith (Jam. ii. 18). If the promise had been conditional, it could not have been universal, as in the forementioned and other passages it appears: and therefore, if the gift by Christ be one while represented as universal, and another while as peculiar, namely to "them that believe," we are to understand one of its offer, and the other of its acceptance; of which the first will depend on calling, and the last on election, the evidence of which is belief. "The grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared to all men:" but it is

not felt by all, any more than the light of the sun, which shines to all alike, is perceived by those on the shaded as by those on the enlightened side of the earth, or by those in its bowels as by those on its surface. "For many be called, but few chosen" (Matt. xx. 16), says our Saviour. They who do not believe are in the shade at present, even as he that hateth his brother is in darkness, and walketh in darkness, "and knoweth not whither he goeth, because that darkness hath blinded his eyes" (John I. ii. 11). Blinded, indeed, are they all: who knows if any of them may live to see another sun?—Still, looking therefore

2. To the *Efficacy and Necessity* of this principle on these accounts, as a corrective for the first fatal and subsequently continual cessation of METED PROPERTIES, how truly might one say with the apostle who has been so often quoted on the subject because he says so much concerning it, "BY THE GRACE OF GOD I AM THAT I AM" (Cor. I. xv. 10), not simply, "I am" (Exod. iii. 14) as God says, but "by the grace of God", "and the life which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God who loved me and gave himself for me" (Gal. ii. 20.) Or one might say with the prophet in his beautiful address to the Deity, "Lord, thou wilt ordain peace for us: for THOU HAST WROUGHT ALL OUR WORKS IN US" (Isai. xxvi. 12); that is, natural as well as moral; in short, all our new life or works. Which new life or works, if we cannot owe to the law, as before observed, much less can we to the principle of reason as it now stands. For as it is said, "If righteousness come by the law, then Christ is dead in vain" (Gal. ii. 21); so it may be said too, If with both these subordinate authorities, i. e. both law and reason, reason cannot rectify itself, how can it raise the dead? It is, therefore, as the prophet says, "Precept upon precept, precept upon precept; line upon line, line upon line; that they may go and fall backward, and be broken, and snared and taken" (Isai. xxviii. 13.) For precepts are not principles, any more

than lines are carpenters. And even supposing our minds to be refitted by grace, and our souls elevated to an higher pitch than in their primitive state of rectitude, still it may be considered, What is to become of our bodies; and what were peace to the soul without peace to the person; or what would a happy mind and soul be hereafter, if they could be, with a wretched, perishable body: then the grace or new life of the body of our Lord Jesus Christ, which is demonstrably its substance, will seem as necessary to our eternal happiness and increase, as that of his mind and spirit. Hence the necessity of eating the one (John vi. 53), as well as of imbibing the other (Rom. viii. 9.)

Neither does this divine principle appear necessary to our future and eternal happiness only: but the fact of the general corruption of mankind through the fault of Adam being admitted, the necessity of grace must be admitted also; not only to account for our future salvation, but also for the preservation of our species to this moment. If the grace of God did not go forth somehow into hedges and thickets where no servant or preacher of righteousness could make his way, some parts of the world which still maintain a decent population had been depopulated long ago; men springing up as long as they could, like the dragon's teeth, (a very proper emblem,) only to cut each other's throats. And in respect of both parts—of both the present and future life, this principle of grace is so thoroughly as well as generally necessary, that one shall not find a point in any particular from which it can be spared. For what has not God's favour must be all refuse, and cannot possibly stand in his sight: but this favour is only displayed or shed forth originally in Christ; the favour enjoyed by others being all for favour to him, and nothing to be done that will stand or be accepted without it. On this consideration men "may have power and strength to have victory, and to triumph against the devil, the world,

and the flesh": that is on the same consideration for which such power is given unto men, the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ.

And to shew farther our dependence on this principle; it does not appear, as lately intimated, how grace itself can even be desired without grace: so that when we pray for God's grace to strengthen and direct us, it cannot be supposing, that what we do already is not of his grace in endowing us at first with those excellent gifts of which we have still some imperfect remains; but that the share remaining to us is not sufficient for any good purpose: nay, that our NATIVE GRACE, as it may be called, is so infected with evil as to be more harm than good to us in the way of eternal life and salvation. It is like mouldy bread, which rather wastes than nourishes the body. We therefore daily pray, as for daily bread, so more especially for that sound, wholesome, and incorruptible bread of life which the mercy of God has provided us in his only begotten Son, our Lord Jesus Christ. For it may be seen as clearly almost as can be wished, how the sum of all grace, or the principle of "every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights" (Jam. i. 17) by the way of our Saviour Christ, as he says, "I am the way, and the truth, and the life" (John xiv. 6), bringing pardon and peace for the past, and light and life for the future.

3. The *Foundation* of this blessing in Christ is as natural as that of a parent's regard for his own offspring, and the means conformable thereto. The most natural foundation of grace in any subject, and medium or vehicle of the same to another, is an affinity of the two whether natural or moral: whatever, therefore, is of God or like Him will be the first and most particular object of his favour and grace, being the beloved Son and those with him (John xvii. 10); as He says, "All my delight is upon the saints that are in the earth, and upon such as excel in virtue" (Ps. xvi. 3): "For the righteous Lord loveth

righteousness, his countenance will behold the thing that is just" (Ib. xi. 8). THERE IS A SORDID JEALOUSY AMONG MEN, THAT COURTS PECULIARITY AND DISTINCTION: BUT IT IS THE GLORY OF GOD, TO HAVE OTHERS LIKE HIMSELF, AND GROWING TOWARDS AN EQUALITY THAT CAN NEVER BE ATTAINED. "Glorify thy Son, (says our Lord,) that thy Son also may glorify thee" (John xvii. 1): and again to his disciples, "But I say unto you, love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and persecute you; that ye may be the children of your Father which is in Heaven: for He maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust. . . . Be ye therefore perfect, as your Father which is in heaven is perfect" (Matt. v. 44, 45, 48).

Considering the infallibility of the divine judgment even in matters purely appertaining to God, we may be assured 1, that the more honour He derives from, or by means of any person or thing that He has formed, the more He will love such person or thing both virtually and respectively; or the more He has distinguished the same already in its formation, whether by nature or grace, the more He will distinguish it continually according to our Saviour's fore-cited declaration (Luke xvi. 26): consequently, 2, how much it is for our honour and interest to glorify Him with all the ability that He gives us. And as the same divine authority, after declaring that he is the way, as aforesaid, continues, "No man cometh unto the Father but by me," (John xiv. 6,) it will appear, that our only means of grace and acceptance with the Father is found in a common life or operation with the Son, even as he is one with Him. "The Son can do nothing of himself (said he) but what he seeth the Father do: for what things soever He doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise" (John v. 19): While on the other hand, speaking of his disciples in a petition to the Father, he says, "The glory which thou gavest me

I have given them, that they may be one, even as we are one" (Ib. xvii. 22). "Ye have not chosen me, (would he say to them,) but I have chosen you, and ordained you, that ye should go and bring forth fruit, and that your fruit should remain; that whatsoever ye shall ask of the Father in my name, He may give it you" (Ib. xv. 16).

By a sedulous and sincere cooperation in their benevolent undertakings we may hope to win as much grace of the Lord Christ, whom we serve (Col. iii. 24), and of the Father for his sake, as by prayer to God with this express purpose. So the good men of old thought however, and so may we think. "IN THE WAY OF THY JUDGMENTS, O LORD, HAVE WE WAITED FOR THEE; (said they) the desire of our soul is to thy name and to the remembrance of thee" (Isai. xxvi. 8): and so the beloved Son likewise alleges of himself, "My meat is to do the will of Him that sent me, and to finish his work" (John iv. 34); proposing the Father as his example, and himself as ours in this respect; v. g. 1, "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work" (Ib. v. 17); 2, "If ye keep my commandments, ye shall abide in my love; even as I have kept my Father's commandments, and abide in his love" (Ib. xv. 10). Which sedulity and efficiency on the part of our great Exemplar was aided and set off likewise to great advantage by his singular humility; "Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God; but made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant" (Phil. ii. 6). So, taking after him again in this respect, we must, as St. Peter signifies, be all of us "subject one to another: for God resisteth the proud and giveth grace to the humble" (Pet. I. v. 5). "Ride on because of the word of truth, of meekness, and righteousness" (Ps. xlv. 5): "For though the Lord be high (says he) yet hath he respect unto the lowly: as for the proud, he beareth them afar off" (Ib. cxxxviii. 6). Which is very well imitated in that excellent precept by St. Peter just repeated. But for both example and precept in this way

of grace we need not go farther than what is signified by our Saviour, "Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart; and ye shall find rest unto your souls" (Matt. xi. 29). An easy way, as he says, to the fountain of grace: "For my yoke is easy, and my burden is light" (Ib. 30).

On different occasions that we read of, different prophets have been asked for a sign; as the prophet Isaiah, by king Hezekiah, when he answered, "Behold a virgin shall conceive and bear a son, and shall call his name Immanuel" (Isai. vii. 14): likewise, that Immanuel, by the scribes and Pharisees; when he gave them one, and the only one, but as infallible as that of his birth; being the sign of the prophet Jonas in relation to his death. "An evil and adulterous generation seeketh after a sign (said he); and there shall no sign be given to it, but the sign of the prophet Jonas" (Matt. xii. 39). And so another, if he were asked, Whatever he might expect to be the particular sign of grace to himself, among all its accompaniments, if he should ever be happy enough to receive it, might answer, HUMILITY—such a clothing of Christian meekness as becomes a disciple of Christ. That is to be my sign of grace: whereby, if it please God to send it, I may know myself to be his in Christ, and will humbly beseech him to keep me his as long as I live.

4. It would be too metaphysical a question rather for this place, to ask on the *Access*, &c. of grace,—How, where, or when an infusion may be caught or imbibed, either from its Fountain or Flood, either from the Father or the Son; but, admitting the fact, it may be surmised, that all the grace that we have received from the fulness of the latter, is by the way of communion; as we receive other properties from the fulness of their subjects, or those who abound in them; as wisdom from the fulness of the wise, and folly from the fulness of the foolish, according to the wise man's observation, "He that walketh with wise men shall be wise, but a companion of fools shall be destroyed" (Prov. xiii.

20): and that as we catch either the wisdom of the wise, or the foolishness of the foolish by walking with them; so may we catch an abundance of divine grace, and be filled with all the fulness of God, by walking with its immediate object, the First fruit of his love. So that grace or new life may be imbibed continually, like the air we breathe, and by which in another sense we also live: which makes it hard to say, when or where this may happen, farther perhaps than, if we ask for grace, that it befalls us either before, or at the time of asking, and not after. So David says, "The Lord is nigh unto all them that call upon Him; yea all such as call upon him faithfully" (Ps. cxlv. 18). He does not say, The Lord is coming, or will be nigh, but is: and our Saviour speaks in the same tense, when he says, what may be regarded as a primary maxim on the same head, "EVERY ONE THAT ASKETH RECEIVETH" (Matt. vii. 8), and not shall receive. For we do not, as before intimated, choose or ask so wisely, without divine grace: and therefore must have grace before, if we do not receive it at the time of asking. That sentence of Solomon's in which he describes this heavenly gift, is also highly characteristic of the access and operation of grace, "WHEN WISDOM ENTERETH INTO THINE HEART, AND KNOWLEDGE IS PLEASANT UNTO THY SOUL; DISCRETION SHALL PRESERVE THEE, UNDERSTANDING SHALL KEEP THEE, to deliver thee from the way of the evil," &c. (Prov. ii. 10, &c.) At that point therefore, namely the entrance of wisdom into the heart, or at some such point may be apprehended the first infusion of divine grace.

And what has thus been explained may serve to demonstrate the error of the Pelagians, and others after them, in putting as they do the end for the means with regard to good works, and merit, and grace. Good works in man are like the regular movement of a time-piece after it has been cleaned and repaired: instead, therefore, of good works procuring our reparation and salvation, our reparation and salvation must be effected by the grace of

God granted to the merit and atonement of his only begotten Son, before the adopted race can be in a condition to perform good works, or in the language of mechanics, to go well, to go as they ought; in the language of Scripture, "to walk worthy of their vocation" (Eph. iv. 1). Virtue or holiness, as well observed by an English Divine *, is the health of the soul; it is THE STATE OF HAPPINESS, not the means of procuring that state. For herein a soul is capable of enjoying the divine presence, of feeding on God, of digesting "the body and blood of Christ, which are verily, and indeed taken and received by the faithful in the Lord's Supper." "By grace (therefore) we are saved through faith: and that not of ourselves, it is the gift of God" (Ib. ii. 8). "Who is rich in mercy for his great love wherewith he loved us, even when we were dead in sins" (Ib. 4, 5). And though we are properly considering the principle of grace, and namely as naturalized or become constituent in the subject; having mentioned the topic, it may not be amiss still to observe another particular or two concerning good works with which it has so near a relation.

The way to consider good works, then, should certainly be, as a natural consequence or reward of grace, and not as the cause or antecedent. For the performance of good works may be termed almost the practice of pleasure, since these two operations are nearly inseparable; and is certainly a very great privilege. Then setting all idea of merit out of the question, let it be our constant wish and endeavour, to find the grace of God in the way of his commandments, that we may be able to perform those works which we know are agreeable to Him, because attended with lasting and not with fallacious honour and pleasure to ourselves. And whether we have any merit in doing good or not, still let us endeavour at it for our own sakes at least, and for the lasting, heartfelt pleasure it affords.

* Whichcot.

It is also to be considered, that if we receive this blessing of wisdom and grace from above, so as to be able to do and believe any thing proper by means of it, which we could not otherwise, there will needs be a debt of gratitude consequently incurred; and the least that we can do, will be to acknowledge it. So far the proud Pharisee in the parable (Luke xviii. 11) may be worth imitating; and if he could have thanked God for preserving him from some faults by his grace, without forgetting others, or drawing a fond comparison between himself and such men as the poor publican, he might have gone down to his house rather justified perhaps than not. For while we deplore those unlucky instances in which we have not been kept by divine Providence from the general corruption that is in the earth, we ought, at the same time, if we can do it without fondly overrating our good fortune, to be thankful at least for those happy instances in which we have been so kept. But gratitude is even a rarer gift somehow than repentance; and some who can repent, though their repentance may never be so acute as what others seem to feel, and perhaps themselves would have it, may still forget, or till very late, however, to acknowledge the divine goodness which has kept them from accumulating a greater load of guilt.

And allowing this want of gratitude for grace received to be a fault, as we needs must, how much greater a fault, unless we would rather call it Folly, must be either the rejecting of so valuable an endowment after it has been received, or the resisting of its beneficial influence in the kingdom or system! For that such things may happen, is but too well known and proved by experience, as well as by the authority of Scripture, in sayings like these.

1. "We then, as workers together (with Christ) beseech you also, that ye receive not the grace of God in vain" (Cor. II. vi. 1): from which may be reasonably inferred, that the Corinthians were in some danger of losing it.
2. "Ye are fallen from grace" (Gal. v. 4): which shews

that others to whom the apostle was writing had actually incurred this loss. 3. "For there are certain men crept in unawares, who were before of old ordained to this condemnation; ungodly men turning the grace of God into lasciviousness" (Jude 4): from which it would seem as if some could go farther than rejecting, resisting and simply frustrating the grace of God; even to the turning of it into lasciviousness, taking advantage of the secrecy sometimes required in the reign of terror and persecution to make their religion a cloak for their lust.

And if we wanted examples of *Grace resisted*, and alas! but too effectually, besides those to which the apostle alludes, and others which modern history would also afford, we might find enough in the history of the Old and New Testament. We might there find such examples too, not only among temporal characters, and some of them in the highest station; as Saul, and Jeroboam, and others of the kings of Israel; but also among the spiritual, and of equal dignity in their line; as the example of Balaam, the son of Beor, and of that other disobedient prophet (Num. xxii, xxiii — Kings I. xiii); who had each of them the grace to be trusted on a divine commission, and were also able enough to betray their trust. Nay we have a more remarkable instance among the twelve apostles, of one, only in that small number, falling from grace altogether, and thence named the son of perdition (John xvii. 12); also of another man, who might have been an apostle perhaps if he had not resisted the gracious call, "because he had great possessions" (Matt. xix. 22). And what man was ever put upon doing or receiving any good, and ever so well gifted or qualified for the same either by nature, fortune, or grace, who could not have resisted the gracious motion, if he would, as soon as he had time to reflect on it? For the grace to repent and do good is not so natural in this present state, as the delight to do evil. "But not as the offence, so also the free gift" (Rom. v. 15), says St. Paul. If sinning be natural, and naturally unavoidable, only to be free to do good, and

blessed with the ability, may be enough for creatures born in sin, without their being obliged to do it. Indeed there is little reason to doubt, that grace may be resisted ; but much if it will be offered again thereafter.

In one respect new life, which has here been represented as the substance of grace, would appear rather as the fruit of the same, like faith just mentioned and other godly objectives on constituents now to be mentioned ; in that it seems to proceed from grace : but it is, as here before represented, the substance of the principle with which it has been identified ; namely of grace ; as life itself is the substance of the principle of life, and light of the principle of light. Grace is the principle of a new life, and a new life is the substance of grace ; comprising not only faith, but that as foremost, and with it the several other godly characteristics above alluded to ; as,

§ 3. *Conscience* or the fear of God : which resting on faith as its foundation, and springing from that as its root, will also find the same diversity with that in different subjects : so that there may be a good or evil conscience, as well as a good or evil faith : one a peaceful and edifying conscience, the other a tormenting or else deceiving ; as there may be an edifying or deceiving, and a peaceful or tormenting faith—according to the subject or combination in which it happens to exist. But as both these properties, to wit, faith and conscience are naturally good—for they are naturally two sublime constituents as any in the Kingdom, and as they are also generally considered in their most favourable light only, when mentioned without any qualification, and it may be perhaps on account of their natural worth—they are therefore here reputed accordingly as good objective characteristics of the godly class on constituents.

The word conscience may be thought to signify the same with consciousness : but on consideration these will appear to be two things, and to differ as genus and species : conscience being that sort of consciousness which may be

called RELATIVE, as it respects another object besides the subject or sentient; and that second object may be either God or man, a judge in either case, giving to such respect somewhat of the quality of fear. With God for its object particularly, the same can never be accounted a bad or only indifferent principle in itself, however troublesome it may be in company; when it happens to meet with unpleasant recollections, gloomy forebodings, painful apprehensions and the like. For conscience will have respect also to consequences and deserts, as well as to second objects; while common consciousness respects or has to do with merely what is, and that not often good for much.

Considering its principal object or regard, conscience may be used alone to denote by way of eminence the same as St. Peter expresses by a periphrasis, namely, CONSCIENCE TOWARDS GOD; as where he says, "This is thankworthy, if a man for conscience toward God endure grief, suffering wrongfully" (Pet. I. ii. 19). It is a compound feeling; a sense of our momentary relation to God at every period and on every act of our lives attended with a corresponding approbation or disapprobation of ourselves, as the first object, according to the agreement of such period or act with our relation to God, the second object; be the relation fair and friendly, or hostile and troubled. And this may account for the synonyme or partner in signification here assigned to conscience in the *Fear of God*.

For if these two, conscience and the fear of God, be not one property, they are certainly so far united, that they cannot subsist apart: that person, for example, can have no conscience who has no fear of God; and, vice versa, no fear of God who has no conscience. Neither can a person have one of these conditions very well without the other, and likewise of a complexion answering to it: as for example, not a blind ignorant fear, without a guilty and troubled conscience; nor an enlightened fear, without a peaceful and consolatory. It would seem indeed as if persons were occasionally deficient in both these conditions.

or godly characteristics, having neither conscience towards God, nor any fear or care concerning him; and living as it were without God in the world. But even in this case the constituent is not lost: it is *striving*, though latent; sure to break forth some time or other, like the returning consciousness of our own existence and circumstances after a profound sleep, or after a more stupefying debauch. "Drunken, but not with wine" (Isaiah xxix. 9); with ambition and avarice, with pride and conceit, with cruelty and revenge, with lust, envy, hatred, and other stupefying sins, how can a man possibly entertain any fear of God, or have any conscience toward him either in suffering or enjoyment, so as to walk with him at any rate, much more in the way that he requires? being with an humble consciousness of his presence; as the prophet says, "He hath showed thee, O man, what is good: and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?" (Mic. vi. 8); or else, as it is said by another prophet, "they shall clothe themselves with trembling" (Ezek. xxvi. 10). But no man, if he were not possessed, could ever walk on God's earth, and as it were in His presence, without that humble apprehension; much less could any one ever rest or be contented for one moment in the presence of so great a judge, while his conscience told him that he had reason to apprehend his displeasure.

This conscience, fear, or apprehension, though it may slumber and sleep, so as to warrant in any place almost the conclusion that Abraham drew from the manners of Gerar, "Surely the fear of God is not in this place," (Gen. xx. 11,) can never still be extinct any where: no, not in death; nor yet in hell; nor wholly either, it is to hoped, in heaven. The fear of God is a calculating principle towards consequences of incalculable moment; it is a retrospective principle also, looking back on obligations that can hardly be imagined in advance; it is a prospective principle, building future hopes on favours received;

robbed too of its goads and asperities by grace, it is altogether a pleasant principle, an agreeable apprehension, deriving confidence from love: and then one might be said, to have a safe and quiet conscience.

The claims of conscience ought therefore to be respected by all who have any respect for themselves: it is the voice of God every where and to every purpose, be it in anger or in peace; speaking terrible things in that case, or the most delightful in this. It is a terrible case, when God speaks to us in anger, alarming and exciting our keenest apprehensions; and more terrible again, when he will not speak to us any how; when our apprehension of his anger and pleasure likewise is lost, as it may be sooner than regained. But it is a delightful proclamation of peace to the soul; when, indulging its godly motions, we steer directly towards its author, and meet his approbation in the testimony of our own hearts, or when we find him appeased by the same token after a temporary suspension of the good understanding with him, which is so much to be desired on our part, and by Him so kindly encouraged in these and many similar expressions, "Come now, and let us reason together: though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be white as snow; though they be red like crimson, they shall be as wool" (Isaiah i. 18). "Cast away from you all your transgressions, whereby ye have transgressed; and make you a new heart and a new spirit; for why will ye die, O house of Israel? For I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth: wherefore turn yourselves, and live" (Ezek. xviii. 31, 32). For God's being pleased or appeased by our improvement must be the same as our conscience approving and witnessing for us: So St. John tells his disciples, after observing what a bad case it must be, if our heart condemn us, as God is greater than our heart, and knoweth all things. "Beloved, (says he) if our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence toward God" (John I. iii. 21); that is, when our heart or conscience is attuned to the word of God, and truly responds to his

precepts; like David's, we may presume, when he sang, "My heart is fixed." "My heart is fixed, O God, my heart is fixed; I will sing, and give praise" (Ps. lvii. 8)! And again, "I will magnify thee, O God, my King; and I will praise thy name for ever and ever. Every day will I give thanks unto thee; and praise thy name for ever and ever" (Ibid. cxlv. 1, 2). Therefore, valuing conscience as one of our highest intellectual endowments, we pray for its continuance as we would pray for the continuance of our intellects, and not only for its continuance, but improvement. For the sake of thy beloved Son and co-existing Word, give us, O God, a conscience; and give us a good one! Perpetuate the fear in us: perpetuate in us the fear that leads to peace and salvation: not too mighty for its frail associates, nor yet too feeble for the opposition!

§ 4. So prepared we may be in a capacity to perceive the more general and with respect to its object more intimate sort of godliness here termed *Devotion*, or the *Love of God*: being a characteristic of that extent, as to stand sometimes, like faith, for the whole genus; and so essential, as to have received the testimony of the law, with a gospel confirmation, of its being the first and great commandment; (Matt. xxii. 38,) that is, the first of those two grand divisions on which hang all the law and the prophets (Ib. 40).

No inconsiderable degree of labour has been also bestowed on the subject of these two great commandments or divisions of righteousness by other authorities as well as by the Law and the prophets; by the sages of antiquity and of all nations, as well as by the legislators and philosophers of these days, and by the later divines of Christendom: but it may not have occurred to many even of the last mentioned class, to remark the agreement or rather unity which the two said commandments or divisions, bear with each other, and only an accidental difference between them proceeding from the relation of their ultimate object. For all the principal objects of our love or regard are only

three in number ; being first ourselves, and next our neighbour, and ultimately God, the crown of each : whereupon the characteristic may differ, so as to form species by the number and choice of its objects from among these three : for example, with the first only it would be selfish love ; with the second, weakness ; with the third, ultra human, or seraphic : with the first and second object it is just, lawful, or moral ; being of that sort which St. Paul recommends when he says, "Owe no man any thing but to love one another : for he that loveth another hath fulfilled the law" (Rom. xiii. 8) : with the first and third only, if such a combination were possible, it would not be accepted. "For (as St. John says) he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen? And this commandment have we from Him, THAT HE WHO LOVETH GOD LOVE HIS BROTHER ALSO" (John I. iv. 20, 21). The love of God, therefore, to be perfect, must now respect all three of these objects, namely God, our neighbour, and ourselves.

Such is the love of God which Christian modes uphold and recommend ; always referring the love of God to the benefit of his creatures, and especially of two parties, the author and receiver of such benefit, "that both he that soweth and he that reapeth may rejoice together" (John iv. 36) ; and making it then very lawful and becoming to love ourselves, if it be not even praiseworthy with such a preference, because we shall deserve it. And, as love without a special object will be both halt and blind however high its pretensions, that we may be prepared for the love of God in this respect, He has also given us a living pattern of Himself, "Christ, who is the image of God" (Cor. II. iv. 4), as an instance of goodness to excite, and an object of sensation to define or embody our love ; but for which it must be in this case as airy and insubstantial as any sentiment can ever be without an object. Thus it was said of that living image and his archetype, "no man hath seen God at any time : the only begotten Son, which is in the

bosom of the Father, he hath declared Him" (John i. 18) —literally "brought Him out," which made him also tell Philip. "He that hath seen Me, hath seen the Father" (Ib. xiv. 9). It is not that the property of Love cannot exist without an object, but that it must otherwise be latent and inefficient, that a clear and sensible object is required even for the love of God.

Supposing moreover love efficient, there will still be degrees of intenseness or efficiency belonging to it; which begin with liking and ascend to devotion. Devotion being the highest degree of love, is that which we assign as properly the love of God, the same being also perfect in its kind as well as highest in degree: which it is, not only as including all the objects before mentioned, but also for its universality; being the only sort of love that can apply to its ultimate object, whatever that may be, most intimately and entirely without any alloy or modification, which is its greatest peculiarity. For all true love is of that sort which attaches most intimately and entirely to the beloved object; as more to a man's person, than to his fortune or circumstances, and more to his mind than his person. If therefore a man were all mind, as they say, we could love him more intimately than a man of the earth, as well as with more consent in thinking and doing, which is said to be the firmest friendship or love: and if the man should live so long too, we might love him in this degree all the days of our life. But God being all mind or most intellectual, as well as all life or eternal, we may love him longer than our present life without any ifs, or exceptions, and as long as we live, if we should live for ever. And if self be admitted with our neighbour into the love of God, it is almost imperceptibly, and the more so the better. It were romantic in this age of the world, to think of exchanging or laying aside our self-love entirely for any other sort; but there may have been a time perhaps when it was more moderate than at present, and self not the less amiable. Our first parents were most probably what the apostle would

have men still to be, and what they might be too as well as they, were they equally innocent—"FOLLOWERS OF GOD, AS DEAR CHILDREN" (Eph. v. 1): who passed their time most delightfully, "walking in love" (Ib. 2), before they had learned to distinguish between good and evil. But the beginning of knowledge was the downfall of love; and by the time that our first parents were come to know what was good for themselves they had well nigh lost the best thing belonging to them, that frank dependence and unsuspecting love which they formerly reposed in God, their parent and protector.

Thus it appears evidently, how the human heart was corrupted by knowledge. And we need not a stronger evidence, to send the conviction of his innate depravity home to any one, than the difficulty that he must now feel in himself of loving and esteeming the adorable image of God—not to say, so much as he ought but so much as he loves his own vile self: and this, notwithstanding the unquestionable proofs of divine wisdom and goodness presenting themselves continually on all sides! Indeed it is not only self, but nearly all the world that seems to step in between God and us: that is to say, not its various inhabitants altogether, whom God loves more than they love him, or each other,—“For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life” (John iii. 16): but it is the depraved way of the world, suiting better than he a depraved appetite, that steps in between God and us. And hence it happens, that the best of us can pretend to no more than a divided affection, a loving of God by halves, as we also believe; being half his and half the world's, like the amphibious creatures, snakes, toads, newts and others, which addict themselves equally to land and water, and which nature therefore seems to have clothed with horror and disgust, as if on purpose to shew by comparison **THE DEFORMITY OF A DOUBLE MIND.**

On the other hand, there is a natural idea of beauty or loveliness in the singleness and simplicity of every sort of subject, but more especially in that of an heart so devoted to God, his word, and commandments. For God, as lately observed, being all mind, of which these commandments are a part, we cannot love Him entirely without loving them; nor love these either, without experience; nor enjoy such experience without owning and adoring the authority by which they were framed. It is idle, to pretend to know him without such experience; as our Saviour told the Jews, "Ye say, that he is your God: yet ye have not known Him; but I know Him: and if I should say, I know Him not, I shall be a liar like unto you: but I know Him, and keep his saying" (John viii. 55); and again, "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God" (Ib. vii. 17). It had also been similarly said, by the Psalmist, "As for me, I will behold thy presence in righteousness" (Ps. xvii. 16): and so it will be said by every enlightened Christian and true lover of God, when he feels any godly motions in himself, instead of congratulating, or priding himself upon them. For he knows what it is that he enjoys. The perception of God's presence is delightful to him: the feeling of his Holy Spirit, most comfortable: and well may he be anxious about retaining such an inestimable treasure, such an "unspeakable gift" (Cor. II. ix. 15).

To mistake the "fulness of joy" for their own sweetness, as some will at the first sip, is both simple and unjust. The experienced lover will delight in God only, and in his commandments. If he perceive in his own conduct a ready obedience to these, it will not be his obedience that satisfies him; but its principle, love kindling love, God's love kindling his love of God. Such is the evidence of our love towards God and Christ, both given and required by Him. "Hereafter I will not talk much with you (said he to his disciples): but THAT THE WORLD MAY KNOW THAT I LOVE THE FATHER, AS THE FATHER

GAVE ME COMMANDMENT EVEN SO I DO" (John xiv. 30, 31). And as he thought doing the best evidence of his love for the Father; so likewise of his disciples' love to himself, "HE THAT HATH MY COMMANDMENTS AND KEEPETH THEM, HE IT IS THAT LOVETH ME" (Ib. xiv. 21). For if the love of God be now more rational than at first, and founded rather on esteem than on instinct, it still must proceed in the way of innocence: we must be renewed in other respects at the same time that the love of God is renewed in us, if we ever experience this renewal; and to love Him, even inadequately as at the best, must begin with keeping his commandments, that we may learn to love and esteem them by experience, and Him by them.

So far may the love of God be reconciled with the love of self, and so far only as we are reconciled to Him. For naturally, as intimated by St. Paul, (Rom. vii. 18,) we find nothing in ourselves to love, no pattern of loveliness, no amiable object: but when we have the happiness to be acquainted with other principles, "if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise," flowing in upon our hearts from the fulness of God; such as faith, love, and the happy fruits of each, "through sanctification of the Spirit, unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ" (Pet. I. i. 2), then indeed can we find something to love within us; which however is not ourselves, but those good principles, and still more the heavenly Fountain itself which supplies them. Good principles in man are the jewels of the Almighty, man the casket only that should contain them. Then where is the beauty? where is the worship? Man at the best is but a temple for the same, that heavenly Fountain is its proper object, while the infused principles aforesaid may supply a reasonable service.

"We love him because he first loved us." It is God's own love that makes him lovely: and the loveliness of every object that is lovely in the highest form and degree must also proceed from Him. The perfection so gra-

ciously imparted to him by God, is the foundation of loveliness in man: and his love shed abroad in other parts of creation is likewise that which makes them all so lovely. NOT ONLY MAN, BUT ALL NATURE, IS MADE LOVELY BY THE LOVE OF ITS AUTHOR, as it was originally made perfect by his perfection: so that it is impossible to help loving Him when he is known; because he loved us enough to shew Himself to us, and all around us enough to clothe it with attractions that are truly irresistible. But above all do we love him for his inestimable love in the redemption of the world, by our Lord Jesus Christ.

And "this is the love of God (or a natural consequence of his love) that we keep his commandments," (John I. v. 3), whereby we may "know, that we know Him" (Ib. ii. 3). Therefore when St. John declares that "God is love" (Ib. iv. 16) it must be meant two ways, *virtually* in relation to God, and *consequently* in relation to those whom He deigns to bless with his presence; as He is elsewhere called "THE LORD OUR RIGHTEOUSNESS" (Jer. xxiii. 6). For it were taking a poor idea of God, to consider Him "our Righteousness" in any other sense, than virtually and consequently as aforesaid: which excludes from the account all our native righteousnesses, as "filthy rags" (Isaiah lxiv. 6). He is love and righteousness to us in the same manner as Solomon proposes his fear to be health, in that saying, "Fear the Lord and depart from evil. It shall be health to thy navel, and marrow to thy bones" (Prov. iii. 7, 8); or as St. Paul, speaking of Christ says, "Who of God is made unto us wisdom and righteousness, and sanctification and redemption" (Cor. I. i. 30). So God is love to us; pure, spiritual and intellectual love, such as the love of God.

§ 5. From the beneficent quality of the divine government, which has just been alleged as a principle or foundation of the love of God, it would seem as if there could be no objective goodness beyond the moral characteristic, prudence, or no godly respect in resigning ourselves, or

submitting implicitly to its direction. For if any order or dispensation be good for its object, or the person to whom it is directed, where can be any room for *Resignation*, which supposes a contrary effect or tendency? It may be in the person's ignorance of the same: and that may be almost always, as few of the objects of divine government can be aware of the particular effect or tendency of many of its dispensations. We can know only what is, and what has been, or but a small part indeed of each, and nothing of what is to come: yet conjecturing, or rather believing from what we know and what we read what is to be, we may in the most unpromising circumstances against hope believe in hope; expecting still the same goodness in God by which we have always known, and for which we shall always revere him,—like Abraham in his fiery trial, on account of Isaac, who “staggered not at the promise of God through unbelief; but was strong in faith, giving glory to God, and being fully persuaded that what He had promised He was able to perform” (Rom. iv. 20, 21).

This may be mentioned therefore, by the way, as an instance of the fertility of faith, before noticed, in producing godly characteristics of different species, or different species of godliness; as resignation is a work of faith. But besides the forementioned objection to the godliness of resignation founded on the general goodness of the occasions in which it is supposed to exist, some may be disposed to question its claims also, on the score of duty; being the same consideration which our Saviour alleges to lower the pretensions of obedience, and the merit of submitting to the commands of the Deity. “Doth he thank that servant (said he) for the things that were commanded him? I trow not” (Luke xvii. 9); as also for the necessity a man is under of doing thus, and his inability to do otherwise. But yet there will be a wide difference between the sullen and the cheerful resignation of a subject to the will of his superior, and be-

tween a voluntary and a reluctant submission to his authority.

The basis of resignation has been mentioned already in the moral characteristic called Patience, a good characteristic; especially when it takes this direction and becomes a part of godliness, which it does, by taking what it suffers as the will of God, and meeting rather than avoiding any, even of his most painful dispensations. To suffer, therefore, with patience only in this case, is not enough; we must learn to suffer also with gratitude, to kiss the hand that strikes us, and welcome the sufferings by which we are corrected and reclaimed; as the Psalmist determined with himself, "I will thank the Lord for giving me warning: my reins also chasten me in the night season. I have set God always before me: for he is on my right hand; therefore I shall not fall" (Ps. xvi. 8, 9). Or if our suffering be taken only as a merited chastisement, both its weight will be lessened, and its benefit promoted by this means. "I will bear the indignation of the Lord (says one of his prophets) because I have sinned against Him" (Micah vii. 9).

Being content to suffer too in such a case, that is knowing how we deserve it, would also seem to detract a good deal from the merit of resignation: for if a master is not expected to thank a servant for only doing what he ought, is it to be expected that he should praise him for only suffering what he deserves? "For (as St. Peter justly demands) what glory is it, if when ye be buffeted for your faults, ye take it patiently? But if when ye do well and suffer for it ye take it patiently, this is acceptable with God. For even hereunto were ye called: because Christ also suffered for us; leaving us an example, that ye should follow his steps" (Pet. I. ii. 20, 21). And when with an eye to his example we suffer at once both patiently and innocently as he did, our resignation will be a part not only of godliness but of Christianity; which, as before intimated, is specific godliness, or godliness em-

bodyed in a specific form. THIS IS PROPERLY TO TAKE UP OUR CROSS AND SUFFER WITH CHRIST; WHEN, WITH HIS EXAMPLE BEFORE OUR EYES, AND HIS SPIRIT IN OUR HEARTS, WE MEKKLY, PATIENTLY AND CHARITABLY SUBMIT FOR HIS SAKE, AS HE SUBMITTED FOR OURS, TO ANY INJURIES, SUFFERINGS OR PRIVATIONS THAT OUR HEAVENLY FATHER IN HIS WISDOM MAY BE PLEASED TO ALLOW OR INFLICT. Then it would seem almost as if resignation went beyond submission, even to conversion: and certainly if our own will be contrary to the will of God, we must give up, postpone, sacrifice, or, as we say, resign that, before we can pretend to take up this. So our Saviour tells his disciples, "He that loveth father or mother more than me is not worthy of me; and he that loveth son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me; and he that taketh not his cross and followeth after me is not worthy of me. He that findeth his life shall lose it; and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it" (Matt. x. 37, 38, 39). "These things I have spoken unto you (says he), that in me ye might have peace. In the world ye shall have tribulation: but be of good cheer; I have overcome the world" (John xvi. 33).

§ 6. What a happy transition is here then from the love of the world, and the care that it brings, to the love of God, with *Peace* and *Reconciliation*, through Jesus Christ! Or if the world hate us; which were no wonder, as we are not of the world, and as our Master himself was hated for the same reason before us (John i. 8—13; John xv. 18, 19): if we can find no comfort in ourselves either; knowing that in ourselves literally (that is in our flesh) "dwelleth no good thing" (Rom. vii. 18)—still what a compensation and comfort for all do we find in him "who hath called us out of darkness into his marvellous light" (Pet. I. ii. 9.) "For (as St. Paul observes) it pleased the Father, that in him should all fulness dwell; and having made peace through the blood of his cross, by him to reconcile all things unto himself" (Col. i. 19, 20). Which

is nearly a repetition of his remark to the Corinthians, with a special application to the ministry. "And all things are of God; who hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation; to wit, that God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them, and hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation" (Cor. II. v. 18, 19).

We may not have a very constant sense perhaps of the thing that is meant by Peace in Christ, nor a very correct of that which Scripture means by Tribulation in the world, though no man of Christian principles can live long in the world without some experience of it: but there are times of waking, lucid intervals, for the maddened subject; when a few moments' smart reflection on long past occurrences, or it may be on some recent transaction, — some disagreeable rupture, some heedless animosity, or some tedious litigation, as it may happen, shall remind us of one of those things perhaps, if it do not for the first time even set us right with regard to both: v. g. with regard to peace in Christ, and tribulation in the world. For on a review of the whole affair, we may happen to perceive, that our trouble therein has been aggravated and prolonged repeatedly by ourselves, in acting more like men of the world perhaps, than like members of Christ. And the farther we look back on our past life, the more instances we may perceive of tribulation or trouble brought in after this manner from the world, or from the sort of conduct which it pursues and inculcates; while on the contrary, whatever compensation or comfort we may have experienced under tribulation shall have been found, though not so often perhaps as we could have wished, in the exercise of Christian principles, and in the contemplation of Christian verities.

Such is the peace to which our Saviour invites his followers; when sinking under the cares and conflicts with which they are oppressed, in that divine exhortation,

“Come unto me all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me; for I am meek and lowly in heart: and ye shall find rest unto your souls. For MY YOKE IS EASY AND MY BURDEN IS LIGHT” (Matt. xi. 28, 29, 30.) But although it be a gift, v. g. of God by Christ, and all things are of God, as aforesaid, this peace of God is, nevertheless, a duty that we owe both to God and ourselves: and if we had not a certain power and ability for promoting the same lent or given to us from above, it could not be proposed as a part of godliness, or as a good objective characteristic of that species in the way of righteousness; our endeavours also on the subject must be unavailing in that case. If we had no share in our own pacification or composure even in a religious view, there would be no sense in our “endeavouring to keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace” (Eph. iv. 3), as St. Paul exhorts; nor yet in St. Paul’s advising likewise, or rather beseeching, some to be reconciled. “As though God did beseech you by us, (says he) we pray you in Christ’s stead, (who ‘hath given unto us the ministry of reconciliation’), be ye reconciled to God” (Cor. II. v. 20).

This peace and reconciliation to God is a part of the victory that overcometh the world, and to which our Saviour alludes in the passage afore cited, giving us a mind that cannot be ruffled by its storms, nor subdued by its rudest assaults: this is a part of that “peace of God which passeth all understanding” (Phil. iv. 7), and ever must in the understanding’s present contracted state: it is none of that FALLACIOUS sort of peace which is entertained by many, and by many more than would be imagined; who deceive their own souls, saying, “Peace, peace; when there is no peace” (Jer. vi. 14), but a true peace, to which we are led by the Spirit of God through the medium of faith in God’s Word. Therefore, considering our very poor provision by nature for the inward struggle and outward triumph by which it is preceded, this desirable pa-

cification and agreement may be considered both a special work of God as well as TOWARD God: and the prophet also intimates as much when he says, "Lord, thou wilt ordain peace for us: for thou also hast wrought all our works in us" (Isai. xxvi. 12). "And this (says an apostle) is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith. Who is he that overcometh the world, but he that believeth, that Jesus is the Son of God?" (John I. v. 4, 5): another instance of the fertility of faith; or, as St. Peter has it, how the regenerate "are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation" (Pet. I. i. 5).

§ 7. It may be questioned whether, following the usual order of coincidence, two other kindred properties or conditions of the heavenly kingdom should not have been proposed before the two or rather one, if not rather two in one, the peace and reconciliation just mentioned. For these now to be mentioned certainly are two, though no one thing was ever more inseparable in itself than these two things are together, v. g. than *Repentance* and *Reformation towards God*; which may be considered as the two supplemental parts of a godly life making one only in this respect; as in general with respect to life, of which the two supplemental parts, unthinking and undoing, are also in effect but one. And whether the said two parts may be thought to precede or to follow the forementioned, they may still be viewed together, and as it were at one glance too either way. For it is not much, to suppose a reciprocity between peace and repentance toward God: and that if peace must be made for us in the manner just alluded to before we can have the grace to repent, we must also repent, and that most sincerely, toward God before we can enjoy the fruits of such a pacification, and not continue in sin, that grace may abound. For (as the apostle asks) "how shall we who are dead to sin continue any longer therein? Know ye not, that so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ were baptized into his death? Therefore we are buried with him by baptism into death:

that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life" (Rom. vi. 1, &c.).

It does not often happen to the same person, to have the gifts of knowledge and practice, of learning and obedience, at the same time, nor in an equal degree; but as we journey through life, however backward our knowledge may appear, we shall still find our practice halting far behind it; and not only halting behind, but often deviating from the track of knowledge. So that we are obliged to tread back our steps continually, and begin anew "the race that is set before us" even after it was fairly commenced, leaving the errors antecedent to knowledge out of the question. Hence there is also another part to be performed in either sphere besides thinking and doing, or rather two parts in each of these; namely, a negative as well as a positive, a corrective as well as progressive. With the Creator every performance is only progressive; all is simple and straightforward with Him: He has no occasion to return and begin again. For "He is not a man, that He should repent" (Sam. I. xv. 29); but "the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever" (Heb. xiii. 8): while his creature, man, is hardly the same thing two days together. It therefore necessarily results from this imperfection, that to perform a consistent part, and be the same person on a general view, a man should pass his existence in a continual reformation; thinking and unthinking, doing and undoing all his days, that he may appear to have thought and done something to some purpose at last.

"The Lord knoweth the thoughts of man, that they are but vain" (Ps. xciv. 11), says the Psalmist: and, fairly considering, only what a man knows of such thoughts by experience may satisfy him, not only that He who can spy into the depth of our thoughts, being Himself also the standard of perfection, must know them to be vain, but that the best thing that a man can do in relation to these

thoughts, is generally to discharge them from his service as fast as possible by the second and more important part of thinking, which is unthinking or repentance, for the sake of other thoughts, if they are to be met with, that will better answer his purpose. When a man is thus duly awakened to a sense of his inward corruption, he will be apt to exclaim with the Psalmist again, "Make me a clean heart, O God; and renew a right spirit within me!" (Psal. li. 10.) For it were an afflicting case indeed, if any one should be absolutely tied up through the voyage of his life to the same froward way of thinking that he may have adopted in the days of ignorance; still more, to be tied to its consequences in doing and suffering, without being ever allowed, not to say, enabled, to retract what he may have thought amiss, to throw his cargo of rotten conceptions overboard, and proceed afresh, with no other inconvenience than that of labour lost, and the turbulent subsidings of an inward tempest—as some may think; though there may be some, who will rather stubbornly persist in the wrong that they may seem in the right, THEIR FRAILTY BEING GREATER THAN THEIR INGENUITY. And let these so persist, if they will, till wrong is right, if they can make it so: for those will rather exert themselves to get out of their dilemma by a prudent retreat, cost what it will; the goodness of God leading them to repentance (Rom. ii. 4).

Repentance, therefore, is another name for unthinking, what has been thought amiss, or for retracing the paths of error; in which we have all the same parts or stages to go through as in advancing, the order of the process only being reversed. For it is not to be supposed, but that if we began again at the same point, our success likewise would be nearly the same again. As, therefore, in the first instance we began with the part of apprehension, proceeding therefrom to conclusion, and ending in choice or determination; so contrariwise in the present instance we are to begin with choice or determination, and thence go back through the intermediate stages to a more exact

apprehension than that with which we began in the first place. The first point therefore to be attempted in the process of repentance or unthinking is, to expel the evil choice or determination from its empire in the heart, and renew our allegiance to its proper Sovereign.

This is what Scripture signifies by conversion; which is literally a turning about, or turning again; as by the Psalmist in that beautiful soliloquy, "TURN AGAIN THEN UNTO THY REST, O MY SOUL, &c." (Ps. cxvi. 7); turn again to thy Redeemer: take his yoke upon thee, and learn of Him, for He is meek and lowly in heart, and thou shalt find rest. Then having our choice, which may be regarded as the key-note of the soul, corrected by the tone we receive from Him, our judgment concerning good and evil will undergo a simultaneous reformation, changing of itself, or by the change of that fundamental property whereon so much of its general character depends. We shall now believe indeed what before was only professed; transferring many a wise and benevolent purpose to the heart, which before was only held on the tip of the tongue, or diffused like an artificial colouring over the lines of a deceitful countenance. We shall now desire to BE what before we only desired TO APPEAR; and to possess, instead of only taking credit for, what the world could never deny to be a real treasure, though the world has never appeared to believe it, real improvement—"PERFECTING HOLINESS IN THE FEAR OF GOD" (Cor. II. vii. 1).

Then at the same time that we are enabled to judge of the fitness of things in a relative view or to perceive their natural tendency, knowing good to be good, and evil to be evil, we shall also enjoy a clearer apprehension of the things themselves; being no longer so very liable to take one thing for another, as in the days of ignorance: bitter will now be bitter, and sweet will be sweet; every thing just what it is. And when we reflect on the great variety of objects that are submitted to our apprehension in the first place, and thence referred to our judgment and choice, we cannot

but admire, that the change of a single image in the heart should be capable of working so total a revolution in the character of its constituents. But it is said, "The same stone which the builders refused is become the head-stone in the corner—(the foundation of our most important sentiments). This is the Lord's doing, and it is marvellous in our eyes" (Ps. cxviii. 22, 23). Man having once undone himself, God's workmanship is now undone by God again from what he was become: "for (now) WE ARE HIS WORKMANSHIP, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them" (Eph. ii. 10), AND ALL HENCEFORTH IS HIS DOING: We can see how he does in the natural department: if a tree, it may be some beautiful sapling, has been gnawed by "evil beasts," it has been laid bare, is dried up and all dead to the very pith on one side—he will restore it: his vivifying influences shall creep into the wood, absorb its death and restore its life: the bark also shall be renewed; and the tree shall thereafter be all of a piece, good enough for the king's garden, to be "planted by the water-side." All this we can see in nature; the effect is demonstrable: and may we not imagine, or rather do we not feel, a similar conversion and recovery of our own dead parts within us by the power of God? And may we not confidently believe, that our flesh also shall be similarly restored by the same, and creep upon our returning bones: as the lacerated bark is seen to free itself from tatters, and granulate upon the reviving wood? So David said, "My flesh also shall rest in hope" (Ps. xvi. 10).

The first part of this process consisting in an inward change or undoing by God, is the effect of his grace, and the sum of repentance: it is the process of unthinking towards or in respect of Him, which naturally goes before *undoing* by man, as thinking in general goes before doing. And herein consists the distinction between repentance and reformation, which is now assigned as its correlative, that while each appears to be what Scripture calls "putting

away the evil of our doings" (Isaiah i. 16), the first shall be inward, and the second outward undoing. For if after all the admonitions of divine grace, and all the friendly checks that are laid by divine Providence in the way of the revolting sinner, and God's spirit striving with the forward determination of his heart (Gen. vi. 3); which may be noted as a prodigious condescension for God towards such a creature, **SEEING HE IS BUT FLESH**—if after all this the sinner should still persist in doing the wrong that he has conceived and determined, such is the mercy and forbearance of God towards him, and such his fatherly care of the innocent, that to spin out the process of sinning and leave sufficient opportunity for repentance, He has ordained several stages in doing as well as in thinking; some of which must necessarily be passed, if not all, previous to consummation. And these (not to insist on particulars farther than is needful) may generally be comprised in two acts, the preliminary and the substantial; 1, in attempt or aggression; 2, in perpetration or transgression.

1. In the first of these two parts *attempt or aggression*, a man may do all his deed of evil so far as to complete his guilt, without precluding himself from a retreat, or his intended victim from an escape: of which we have examples enough only in the persecution of royal David by his insatuated predecessor, through the evil spirit which troubled him from the Lord (Sam. I. xvi. 14)—the misguided Saul with his sombre malice being invariably on these occasions a murderer of the man after God's own heart in point of aggression, though the evil intended and attempted too was never accomplished or perpetrated. "For if," as St. John says, "whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer" (John I. iii. 15), he who has carried his murderous intent, and that repeatedly, to the point of execution can be considered no less.

2. In the second part, act, stage or degree of evil doing, which constitutes what is above named *perpetration or transgression*, there is no room for the assailant to retract,

or for his object to escape : the deed is done, and cannot be prevented ; according to the example which St. John refers to in the passage above cited, and which is also one of the most memorable in the records of crime—the example of Cain, “ who was of that wicked one, and slew his brother ” (John I. iii. 12). Here the wrong apprehension, the base conclusion, the wicked determination, and the foul aggression are seen to terminate in the full perpetration of as horrible a deed as, excepting parricide, the wicked one is capable of suggesting, or his party of undertaking. Here there is no room indeed either for retreat or escape. Alas, unnatural assassin, what hast thou done ! The voice of a brother’s blood crieth from the ground against thee unto God, the avenger of the innocent. “ And now art thou cursed from the earth, which hath opened her mouth to receive thy brother’s blood from thy hand. When thou tillest the ground it shall not henceforth yield unto thee her strength : a fugitive and a vagabond shalt thou be in the earth ” (Gen. iv. 9, &c.). Fear and remorse, the attendants of an evil genius, shall continue to haunt thy solitary walks, and wring from thee the sad exclamation, “ My punishment is greater than I can bear ” (Ibid.).

There are those stern moralists who will not admit the possibility of a sinner’s putting the evil action away from him after it is perpetrated, or of separating from his offence by any means whatever the punishment that is denounced against it : and they may think, they serve the cause of morality by this rigid doctrine ; which, if as rigidly followed, must be productive of universal despair—“ for there is no man that sinneth not ” (Kings I. viii. 46). But, without staying to consider their opinion, as it seems to proceed more from humour than from judgment, every one must admit, that if there be a possibility of undoing what is done amiss, its particulars may deserve our most anxious inquiry : and dear indeed must be the discovery of any mode by which a deed like Cain’s may be undone, it being in effect most complete in character—most atrocious. For this

purpose it will be necessary to notice another combination in the process of thinking and doing besides those formerly mentioned : which other consists of two particulars ; 1, the matter or substance ; 2, the effect or continuance of any thought or deed, and evil especially, when gone through with or perpetrated. And,

1, Of the first of these, the *matter or substance*, it may truly be said, that the same cannot be reversed, whether it be like Cain's, or less flagrant. . . . For whatever any thought or deed may be in substance ; that is what it so far must be and remain ; in that respect it cannot be other than it is. A fratricide for example must be a fratricide for ever, as to the matter or substance of the deed : it never can be any thing else under any circumstances, whether it be asserted or regretted, whether it be pardoned or punished : so that in this sense, or respect, there is no possibility of undoing.

2, It is therefore on the second particular, v. g. *effect or continuance*, of any evil deed that the argument will lie between the assertors and deniers of its reversibility. This will involve a consideration of the parties or objects to which the effect may relate : and not to insist on the relation of such effect to its principal object, the author and proprietor of the whole world, who cannot be uninterested in the occasion, there are properly two on whom it will fasten or bear particularly, the doer and the sufferer ; whereby the question may be divided, to ascertain how far an evil deed is reversible in respect of these two parties, and in respect of the doer first.

—1, Where, to give the effect its due, besides the award of punishment for such a deed, we ought also to consider its moral effect on the subject or *Doer* ; remembering here what has been stated before respecting the reciprocal bearing or influence of an action on such doer himself, or on his principles in this lower sphere ; whereby he is also liable to be either deteriorated or improved, according to the nature of his action. Whereupon, admitting the im-

mutability of any action with regard to the first particular, namely its matter or substance ; yet with regard to the second, its effect or continuance, there will be room for a contrary supposition of its reversibility, and first with regard to the subject doer, or perpetrator himself, as aforesaid.

For sin, considered as a property now pervading the whole earth, and continued in the generations of its inhabitants, will consist, like other properties, in the repetition of one act which was the first transgression, and of one thought which was the first defection, and of one word which was the first renunciation in reference to the divine authority ; all which, like other acts and properties, must be perpetual in the constitution of the subject, agent or owner, until they either run on to perdition, or be regularly killed or ejected, " that the body of sin might be destroyed " (Rom. vi. 6). In this case, the order of cause and effect having been instituted by a superior authority, and founded in the nature of things, there may indeed be some reason in maintaining, that neither the progress of guilt is to be restrained by any human interposition, nor the alliance between sin and suffering to be dissolved by any human tribunal, whether lay or ecclesiastical. " There be some that put their trust in their goods, and boast themselves in the multitude of their riches (thinking to buy a pardon with them, or it may be, a plenary indulgence). But no man may deliver his brother, nor make agreement unto God for him " (Ps. xlix. 6, 7). All the world could not purchase a pardon in the case, or a divorce between sin and suffering. " For it cost more to redeem their souls: so that he must let that alone for ever " (Ib. 8): man can have nothing to do with it. At the same time it were foolish to suppose, that this order may not be interrupted, and this alliance dissolved by the same authority by which they were instituted and cemented.

If through the prevalence of evil habits on the one hand,

and of an evil principle or beginning to which they are due on the other, the elements of the soul have been thrown into disorder; if its dissolution or disorganization has been even completed, there can be no reason against the restoration of this, which will not equally militate against the restoration of the natural body after its dissolution by death: and if you suppose the body to have been once created, you cannot deny the possibility of its restoration or second creation by the Author of the first: and the same of the other; if you suppose the soul to have been once created, you cannot deny the *possibility* of its restoration or second creation after it was "dead in trespasses and sins." There is no way to avoid such a conclusion, but by ascribing the origin of both bodies, v. g. of the spiritual and the natural, to that indescribable chimera, known by the name of Chance. And even admitting the omnipotency of chance, who can say that chance too may not restore what chance has created? or, that chance, having given one existence to the human soul and body, may not give them a second after the first has yielded to another sort of chance. For if the reality of a Creator be denied, that of a destroyer will be denied of course: when the work of destruction as well as of creation must be all a matter of chance, and chance must be every thing; which in fact is nothing but the chimera of fools.

Or if the question should turn, not on the possibility but on the *probability* of a ruined soul being restored by its heavenly Author; whoever shall take upon himself to declare against a probability of this sort can only allege for his justification an extraordinary insight into the mind of his Creator: and then he becomes obnoxious to the reproof of Eliphaz, "Art thou the first man that was born? or wast thou made before the hills? Hast thou heard the secret of God? and dost thou restrain wisdom to thyself? What knowest thou that we know not? What understandest thou which is not in us?" (Job, xv. 7, &c.)

Without pretending to a share in the particular secrets of the Almighty, one might confidently refer to his intimations and promises respecting it, as authority on this head; and not only for the probability, but for the absolute *certainty* of his both absolving the guilty, and likewise abolishing the effect of sin, so as to restore in those for whom it is predetermined the ruined elements of the soul; as that intimation by David, "Behold I was shapen in wickedness, and in sin hath my mother conceived me. But lo, thou requirest truth in the inward parts, and shalt make me to understand wisdom secretly. Thou shalt purge me with hyssop, and I shall be clean; thou shalt wash me, and I shall be whiter than snow" (Ps. li. 5, &c.); and that by Isaiah, "Come now, and let us reason together, saith the Lord; though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be as white as snow; though they be red like crimson, they shall be as wool" (Isaiah i. 18); and by St. Paul, "though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day" (Cor. II. iv. 16.) "Therefore, if any man be in Christ he is a new creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things are become new" (Ib. v. 17). And

—2, With regard to the effect or continuance of an evil action on its direct and immediate object, the *sufferer* who in the nature of causes is liable to be most permanently affected thereby; if it were not possible to undo what is done maliciously against the innocent, and defeat the ends of successful villainy even when it triumphs in the present ruin of its object; such an impossibility would appear to the best of our judgment a defect in the machinery of the kingdom; as it did to David, when he saw the ungodly in such prosperity (Ps. lxxiii. 3): though no man of a modest and sober mind, whatever appearance things might have, would presume to decide on the inscrutable measures of divine Providence, or to arraign the conduct of that Holy One, "Which doeth great things past finding out; yea, and wonders without number" (Job ix. 10).

It is not necessary, to the credit of Omnipotence, that all its proceedings should be level to a common apprehension; however sincere; much less, that they should be so to the faithless and ill disposed. "WISDOM IS JUSTIFIED OF HER CHILDREN" (Matt. xi. 19): and that may be enough; no matter for others—Her children have the privilege to consider the present life only as an incipient state, of which the fulness or maturity is to be found in another: consequently, that no evils incurred in this life can be conclusive for the next with regard either to continuance, diminution, or increase. "The end is not yet" (Ib. xxiv. 6). It may be SAID generally at the closing of the present scene upon such men, "The righteous is delivered out of trouble; and the wicked cometh in his stead" (Prov. xi. 8): it is to be BELIEVED with regard to the future, that the wicked in delivering his rival out of this troublesome life has done the very contrary of what he intended, by hastening him on to a better.

Thus it appears, how an evil action may be also undone with regard to its effect on the party most immediately aggrieved by it: and in every respect the part of undoing may be admitted so far as it concerns *the effect* of a deed, which is the most weighty particular; though with regard to its matter or substance, that part, as we have seen, cannot be admitted. And, considering the prevalence of evil all over the world, it is hoped that this prospect of undoing what has been done amiss in the weightiest respect, however faint such prospect may appear, will prove acceptable to those who can feel an interest in the truth. In cases of middling atrocity the offender may also be admitted to share as an instrument in the honour of undoing his own misdeed by means to be mentioned: though in extreme cases like that of Cain, which has just been considered, he can have no share in undoing by any means whatever; as far as it regards himself the case is without remedy; he has done what he cannot undo, and ABBRIDGED HIS OWN PREROGATIVE in the

highest respect—that of showing mercy. God himself is the only undoer to be looked to in such a case ; as He is also the only undoer to be absolutely dreaded : “ And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul ; (says our Saviour) but rather fear Him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell ” (Matt. x. 28).

Naturally all our doing is of the nature of death, God's only, of life : the good of undoing, therefore, will relate to man's doing, the evil to God's ; and the evil of doing, to man's undoing, the worst of all to God's. Good reason have we to pray, that he would not lead us into temptation, but deliver us from evil. Give us new life, O heavenly Father, and let thy will be our doing, or our doing thine !—Of those who aspire to a place in his kingdom of Christ an otherguise life will be required, to what is generally led by some who seem to think themselves already at the top of it, because they happen to have a few unmeaning titles, or a little unmerited reverence in the kingdoms of the earth. “ For I say unto you, (said he in his sermon to the disciples and others,) That except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven ” (Matt. v. 20) ; and again, “ That which is highly esteemed among men is abomination in the sight of God ” (Luke xvi. 15). We must have not only fewer exceptions in our conduct, but also purer motives—a very great revolution will be required among the objects of our regard, and the degrees in which they are preferred—“ many that are first shall be last ; and the last shall be first ” (Matt. xix. 30) ; and in general a new will altogether with new sentiments and other appendages—or shortly, a new heart, as it is called in Scripture—before we can have any chance of the kingdom of God in Christ ; meaning such a kingdom as that which he has taught us to contemplate in futurity.

This is a very great help to the kingdom, and as much a gift of God by the Holy Ghost, as faith, light, love,

or any other grace; being such an heart as every man must have who can address his heavenly Father in the language that our Saviour prescribes, and say with him sincerely, "Thy kingdom come; thy will be done!"—such an heart as that which was predicted by the prophets Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel; and others (Isai. lix. 21; Jer. xxiv. 7; Ezek. xi. 19; xxxvi. 26, &c.): when the will of the subject shall be one with the word of the Sovereign, and its issue an enlightened obedience, a willing cooperation in the measures of divine Providence, walking and abiding in the light; as St. John infers from the tenour of our profession. "This then (says he) is the message which we have heard of Him and declare unto you, that God is light, and in Him is no darkness at all. If we say, that we have fellowship with Him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth: but if we walk in the light as He is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin" (John I. i. 5, &c.).

§ 8. So walking in the light, and previously, as it may be inferred, released also by our Saviour's atonement from the shame and captivity of sin—for there cannot be a surer evidence of such release, we may now be in a capacity to exercise the highest part that rational creatures can expect, a part in the service of the bountiful Creator. And here may we vie with each other in proofs of *Fidelity* and *Obedience* towards God, without any diminution or disparagement of the service that we owe to man. For if some men have an idea, as they seem to have by their jealousy of the attention paid to God's honour and worship, that their servants or dependents are swerving from their duty to them by such attention, their idea is neither just nor religious. It is said, indeed, that "no man can serve two masters" (Matt. vi. 24): but hereby is evidently meant two masters who are two indeed, being in direct opposition to each other, as God and Mammon: not God and those who also serve him, and serve Him well perhaps by ridding others, FEEDING them at the same time, like David,

"with a faithful and true heart" (Ps. lxxviii. 73). For by serving one master faithfully we may serve two in such a case, and ourselves likewise, which is making three; of the last of whom the wise man observes. "Whoso keepeth the fig-tree shall eat of the fruit thereof: so he that waiteth on his master shall be honoured" (Prov. xxvii. 18).

Now there are different species in the general relation of service, and among others two founded on occasion, v. g. as the service may happen to be performed either on recollection, or on requisition. Service on recollection is of the species or sort called Fidelity: which, whether its aptitude proceed from practice or intelligence, is also a spirit that does not require much telling and bidding: but where instruction and admonition are necessary, we must have recourse to Obedience; which is also a servant on occasion and never inferior to it, whatever the occasion may be; for if a word be obeyed, no more can be expected or desired for that occasion. Such are these two characteristics in general; and if we were to note their relative distinction—the distinction between fidelity and obedience towards God particularly, as we have noted other excellent kindred productions and constituents of his incarnate kingdom, we should be apt to admire the former as more hearty, and the latter as more obsequious; that as marked by love and devotion, this by endeavour and assiduity; both being aided by one motive, as they are also addressed to one object. So our Saviour tells his disciples, "If ye love me, keep my commandments" (John xiv. 15): thus identifying in a manner these two, fidelity and obedience, with each other, or the love of their object with the effort to please him, in doing not only what he bids, which is obedience; but also with a willingness, that is only to be expected from a principle of fidelity.

For fidelity, winged by love and not waiting to be bidden, may show itself more forward than obedience in the Christian race; but will never run away from its partner, though halting, and out of heart. Fidelity will incline us

in every case, to ask what may be our master's will, and to do it if possible. But this is the part of obedience as well as of fidelity; while a successful co-operation between the two must depend, like the development of other latent properties, on many contingencies besides opportunity: and this can seldom be wanting in God's service; as the prophet observes, "For since the beginning of the world men have not heard, nor perceived by the ear, neither hath the eye seen, O God, beside thee, what he hath prepared for him that waiteth for Him. Thou meetest him that rejoiceth and worketh righteousness, those that remember thee in thy ways" (Isaiah lxiv. 4, 5). The first inquiry with every faithful servant will be like that of the people which followed our Saviour to Capernaum, "What shall we do, that we might work the works of God?" (John vi. 26): and his answer will be the same, "This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath sent" (Ib. 29). This is the first act of obedience, namely, to believe on Christ: next, to act on that belief. It may also be said, that the first act is the more difficult and precarious, the second a more certain consequence. And as the BELIEF in Christ would necessarily produce a corresponding life, this may also be justly called the work of God, as well for its perfection, as for its authority and beginning. Thus obedience is the fruit, end, or issue of fidelity by the medium of faith: or it may be said, that faith is first expressed in fidelity, and next in obedience: ANOTHER INSTANCE OF THE FERTILITY OF FAITH.

There are those who imagine, they should be ready enough at this "work of God," if He would only condescend to show them his will, and speak to them so as THERE SHOULD BE NO MISTAKE: they do not want fidelity or inclination, (though arrant apostates,) they only want a clearer understanding of their duty; (the hypocrites!) and a clearer understanding they might have, if they would, with very little room for doubt. There are three ways especially in which the divine pleasure may be signified to mankind; 1, by

nature or instinct; 2, by reason or inference; 3, by revelation and faith. Since reason and instinct are authorities from God, as well as Revelation; in conforming to their dictates we have generally the merit of obeying Him, as much as in obeying HIS REVEALED WILL: but wherever there appears to be a disagreement, as we often find, between these three witnesses or mandates; the rule in this, as in all ordinary cases of obedience, will be, to take the last mandate or witness in preference to others; so that instinct coming first into the world, and then reason, and then faith—reason at this rate is to be heard before instinct, and faith before reason.

Moreover, IN OBEYING A DIVINE REVELATION, THE MATTER OR WORK IS NOT SO MUCH TO BE WEIGHED, AS THE AUTHORITY BY WHICH IT IS ENJOINED: a very inconsiderable or even repugnant undertaking may serve to exercise or call forth the property of obedience; as it appears, 1, by the positive institutions of the Levitical law, 2, by special mandates from Heaven, as there have been, of which some have not appeared so trifling or indifferent in themselves, but rather opposed to reason and even revolting to human nature; such as the offering of Isaac by his father, whose exemplary obedience on that occasion is still exceeded by the self-devotion of the immediate Son of God in obedience to his Father's will which that prefigured.

However God may speak to us, whether by revelation, by reason, or by instinct, his commands should always be gratefully acknowledged and implicitly obeyed in the order aforesaid: and no undertaking of moment ought ever to be entered upon without the approbation (as we may say) either of fidelity or of obedience to the word of command so delivered. For, if they can avoid mistaking, fidelity will be sure to find a ready way, and obedience to make a good work of almost any thing. But we are too apt to consider duty as optional, as a matter of selection or invention: which is a gross and dangerous mistake; as there would be nothing were it so, to hinder us from prescribing trifles, or

even crimes, as duties to ourselves and those under our care ; which, if God can make important and good by his almighty providence, men cannot. There is no choosing—it is self love and not the love of God to choose, even for good, as we may think, against his revealed decree. “ Behold, to obey is better than sacrifice ” (Sam. I. xv. 22); and “ This is the love of God, that we keep his commandments.” And when the apostle says, “ commandments,” he means ALL of course ; whether past, present, or to come. For a man may have kept all the commandments from his youth up, like the young man mentioned in the Gospel, (Matt. xix. 16, &c.,) till there comes one more trying than the rest : and then it is to be seen, whether he has been loving God entirely this while, or whether he had not at the same time a latent affection for one of another character. And what sort of love were that—love, supposing it possible, without fidelity or obedience ? But it is not possible to separate them in this case ; “ ye cannot serve God and Mammon ” (Ib. vi. 24). So a man possessed with these vain imaginations may think to serve the invisible God in a cloister or in a cave, or SECLUDED IN A COMFORTABLE HOME as well as in either, without caring or concerning himself about any of his visible relations : but what would St. John say to this one again, “ He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen ? And this commandment have we from Him, that he who loveth God love his brother also ” (John I. iv. 20, 21).

§ 9. The enumeration of those heavenly inmates, or some of them, which enliven and adorn the earth occasionally by their presence is now necessarily drawing to a close. For in so vast a range as the whole kingdom of God incarnate, and among such an infinity of particulars as it exhibits, even a celestial visitant might find great room for selection, with little for pausing and investigation ; since if he stopped at any, the most likely would be some of the most fertile and interesting, and while he was buried in the mazes and depths of these, he would, celestial as he was,

be in some danger of losing that regular and connected view of the whole subject which he might desire, and ought to have, before he attached himself to any one of them especially, however interesting. One finds the same difficulty in describing the subject as in comprehending it: if one should dwell immoderately or only too disproportionately on any particular, it must prejudice or interfere with a comprehensive description of the lot: therefore when one particular of the sort before alluded to, that is to say, one more fruitful and interesting than common, occurs, it is still better to proceed with that also in a general way, if its description be no fuller than a preface. We have met with two or three particulars of this sort already in our progress, and are now at another, the last remaining part of godliness to be mentioned: which is *Worship*, or as we should say, *Divine Worship*; every substantial mark of attention to our Maker being comprehended under the same title, as nearly identified with it; and that in a degree exceeding the comprehension of some who seem to think, that going to church is going to God, as well as of others who seemingly take divine worship to signify all godliness because it has all its appearance and a great deal of its effect. They seem to understand by Divine worship "all things that pertain unto life and godliness." But that can only be according to their notion of it: godliness altogether meaning very little according to their notion apparently. For a distinction ought to be made between the vulgar notion of Divine worship, and that which is most important to true believers, as well as to the divine Object of both sorts; 1, one being named and regarded as outward, and 2, the other as inward—worship. For

1. Then the first mentioned *outward worship* or the *form* of worship, would be considered in a limited sense only; which is more than the vulgar intend, their notions being very imperfect. For by Outward worship should only be meant a shadow of good things to come (of "all the heart, and all the soul, and all the strength, and all the

mind") and "not the very image of the things;" v. g. the heart, the soul, the strength, and the mind—much less the substance. Outward worship is a symbolical language used by the godly, by those who care for God, to express their obligations to his goodness, and to denote what they owe him, being his incidental property and their all, both incidental and constituent, which is implied though not expressed in the title of worship. Thus David, being one of that godly sort, exclaims with rapture, "Bring unto the Lord, O ye mighty, bring young rams unto the Lord; ascribe unto the Lord worship and strength; give the Lord the honour due unto his name; worship the Lord with holy worship" (Pa. xxix. 1, 2), naming only one of the general parts above designated as incidental to the kingdom, to wit, nominal property, with its characteristic, outward honour and respect, though for the sake of continuity it be here admitted among good characteristics on constituents, and that too on some of the highest order. For what St. Paul said of Jewish worship may be likewise applied to the Christian; since neither of them is more than a shadow or notion of truth, and not its real image, which is Christ, and can no more be separated from his person, than the outside of any thing can from its substance. "The law having a shadow of good things to come, and not the very image of the things, can never with those sacrifices which they offered year by year continually make the comers thereunto perfect. Wherefore, when he cometh into the world he saith, sacrifice and offering thou wouldest not, but a body hast thou prepared me. In burnt offerings and sacrifices for sin thou hast no pleasure. Then said I, Lo, I come (in the volume of the book it is written of me) to do thy will, O, God. . . . By the which will, (adds St. Paul) we are sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all" (Heb. x. 1, &c.). And here to wit, in the body of Christ, whether general or particular, integral or constituent, is found the substance or second part implied in the first. Therefore while we practise ourselves,

and induce others likewise to practise all the particulars of outward worship; kneeling and invocation, prayer and confession, praise of God and self reprobation, with the holy sacraments, we should be careful, neither to entertain ourselves, nor to encourage in others that gross though common mistake of such outward observances including the whole debt due from any creature to his Creator and constant Benefactor. The merit of such observances will consist in their tendency to effects of greater importance, and not otherwise in them. For the acknowledgment of a debt is one step toward payment, and an outward habit of respect is often conducive to the inward feeling.

2. This *inward feeling of worship, the substance* of worship, or worship with inward feeling, is what we have now to remember in a general, and as it were, in a rather prefatory way among, or rather at the conclusion of, godly characteristics, especially of the class on constituents, where we have as it were in one, a whole company or legion of good properties, being such as, 1, the desire and remembrance of God, 2, the silent prayer lifted to Him, the admiration and gratitude, swelling towards Him, which are the praise and thanksgiving of the heart—his knowledge and enjoyment also, with other particulars; which, like these, may be included in the notion of inward and real worship contrasted with the outward and too often insignificant. To consider these several heads distinctly:—

1, With regard to the *desire and remembrance* of God; as every creature in existence is endowed with its proper affinities or appetites, without which it could not exist; it may in respect thereof be said to search or inquire after something continually; and if not after God, yet after his gifts, as we find in the human relations, since every creature seeks its own good. But men being apt to look farther into principles than the other natives of the earth, and to pursue them with peculiar attention, may therefore be styled by way of eminence, THE RACE OF INQUIRERS. They are apparently the only race that ever inquires by

choice and for the sake of information; the others inquiring no farther than instinct obliges, or their wants impel them, that we can perceive; and by no means concerning the author of their existence. It is the peculiar glory of mankind, which He has made of one blood, and stationed in their several habitations for to dwell on the face of the whole earth to be endowed with this principle generally, if not universally; "that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after Him and find Him, though He be not far from every one of us" (Acts xvii. 27).

But to inquire rationally and respectfully after God, as a part of the worship due to Him, and no less indeed of the regard due to our own interest, we should inquire with some other view, than merely for the sake of information; that is with a view rather to enjoyment, as we seek our daily food; but rather still with a view to both; that is with a view both to information and enjoyment. For we may consider the Lord himself as our portion for both of these; that is for both enjoyment and information, or spirit and intellect; as "the Lord's portion is his people" (Deut. xxxii. 9). It may be said by every true worshipper as by the prophet, "O Lord . . . the desire of our soul is to thy name and to the remembrance of Thee" (Isai. xxvi. 8), and while we desire we cannot forget. No more should we at other times: for it is a necessary part of his worship to *remember God* always, as David professed, "I have set God always before me: for he is on my right hand, therefore I shall not fall" (Ps. xvi. 9). We should remember our divine object in time, and at all times, as He will have cause to be remembered: we should remember Him in the time of old age and sickness; of trouble, want and oppression; of temptation, sin and contrition: in the time of general scorn, neglect and desertion. And before all this be come upon us, in the time of youth and prosperity, we should remember him most eminently: while, as the wise man observes, "the evil days come not, nor the years draw nigh when thou shalt say, I have no pleasure in them"

(Eccles. xii. 1). We should remember Him on dry land, and in the deep: even sinking a man shall remember, and seek unto him, crying save me as long as he has breath, "Save me, O God: for the waters are come in even unto my soul. I stick fast in the deep mire where no ground is. I am come into deep waters, so that the floods run over me. Let not the water flood drown me, neither let the deep swallow me up: and let not the pit shut her mouth upon me" (Ps. lxi. 1, 2, 16).

For remembering God, as here intended, and as David and Solomon and other prophets and wise men intended, is not a mere act or issue of the imagination; but a passion of the soul and a propensity, inclination or appetite of every other constituent towards him, a constant reflection in which his divine image is supposed to be always uppermost—not however with "any manner of similitude" (Deut. iv. 15), but with such feelings in the spectator as may best denote the excellence of his object with feelings of the purest delight, and of an assurance beyond any upon earth. For so may we even now enjoy the inconceivable majesty of God in enjoying those kinds of properties, or the accidents composing them, which we ascribe to it—his wisdom, justice, mercy, power, truth: and that not only severally and individually, as divine properties or accidents; but collectively, as the sum of those properties or accidents which we conceive to be in God, though in truth He consists not of properties or accidents; and also, as the fountain of that hallowed stream by which the lives of good men are replenished with their best contents; as David says, "For with Thee is the well of life: and in thy light shall we see light" (Ps. xxxvi. 9).

And if this enjoyment in the present stage of our existence be necessarily partial, fleeting and interrupted, yet it may serve to give us an idea of what the same would be in perfection and perpetuity. If the enjoyment seems to be lost sometimes, and its recovery even doubtful; so that one begins to think with one's self like David, "Will the

Lord absent himself for ever, and will he be no more intreated? Is his mercy clean gone for ever; and is his promise come utterly to an end for evermore? Hath God forgotten to be gracious; and will He shut up his loving kindness in displeasure?" (Ps. lxxvii. 7—9). Still a tried servant like David will not absolutely despair; but consider these reflections as proceeding in a great measure from his own infirmity; and "remember, (as he says) the years of the right hand of the Most High" (Ib. 10). Thus memory steps in continually with a servant of the Lord, as a substitute for assurance and enjoyment. For it is a necessary condition in remembering, to suppose the absence of what may be remembered; though memory itself shall be mistaken, perchance, when it considers divine goodness as a thing gone by.

The remembering now mentioned as a godly objective and a part of inward or essential worship is that sort of remembering which a good shepherd finds in his flock. They remember their guide: they anxiously expect his presence in the morning, whether to lead them to shady pastures or to the free-fed mountain: "And when he putteth forth his own sheep, he goeth before them, and the sheep follow him; for they know his voice" (John x. 4). It is that sort of remembering which a mother finds in her infant, to whom she is all the world; particularly when he happens to be kept from her, as in that beautiful comparison of the Psalmist's, "I refrain my soul, and keep it low like as a child that is weaned from his mother; yea, my soul is even as a weaned child" (Ps. cxxxi. 3). It is that sort of remembering which a master finds in his servants, or a mistress in her maid. "Behold, even as the eyes of servants look unto the hand of their masters, and as the eyes of a maiden unto the hand of her mistress; even so our eyes wait upon the Lord, our God, until he have mercy upon us" (Ib. cxxiii. 2). It is that sort of remembering which an husband finds in his spouse: "By night on my bed I sought him whom my soul loveth: I sought him; but

I found him not . . . I SLEEP: BUT MY HEART WAKETH” (Cantic. iii. 1, and v. 2).

2, And if this be not mental worship, or if we would come nearer to its idea, we must take for it a property without a name: for it is remarkable that while most of our other godward acts, or accidents direct, on both sides; i. e. both positive and negative or good and evil, have corresponding properties which are their sums or aggregates, expressed in proper terms—usually by a simple flection; for the habit or constituent of *Praying to God*, which is as positive as believing in Him, we have no simple term, as we have Faith for this; but must use a periphrasis, as Habitual, or the Habit of—Prayer, to correspond with Faith, which means habitual, or the habit of—believing. Yet prayer is a part that may go on, and in good set terms too, as some have experienced, while the subject sleeps; as well as faith or memory or any other, however indelible, impression.

3, The same may happen likewise by another very essential part of inward worship; which is, not only gratitude, but the *Habit of Praise*: so that one shall think upon God, and call to remembrance one’s song in the night perhaps, not only while “thou holdest mine eyes waking” (Ps. lxxvii. 4); but while their sight is latent and unconcerned. As soon as our eyes shall be released from their night’s imprisonment we may find other and more effectual ways to thank and praise Him. For as we cannot be grateful enough to our Almighty Father, “Which hath made us meet to be partakers of the inheritance of the saints in light” (Col. i. 12), especially for having restored an image of Himself in His Son, Jesus Christ, to be an object of universal praise and adoration, so neither can we better study to express our humble gratitude, than in a faithful imitation of this adorable object; glorifying God for all his mercies by all the means that He has conceded to us. Let our labours praise Him as well as our lips; for

actions are generally the best expressions of gratitude, and particularly where, as in this case, the credit of our actions is ascribed to the object of our imitation.

Many a man there is, who will pride himself only on the performance of an horse, which owes nothing of its fleetness to him: how much more then will God be glorified in the splendid exhibition of those virtues and graces which he actually confers! And how happens it, that so many can pride themselves on the performance of a brute, as if the performance were their own; without thinking perhaps of Him who has actually endowed the same with his strength and speed? Cannot they imagine, that God too must take a delight in the performance of his creatures, and particularly of a rational, self-taught and, under Him, self-directed sort? "He hath no pleasure in the strength of an horse, neither delighteth He in any man's legs: but the Lord's delight is in them that fear Him, and put their trust in His mercy" (Ps. cxlvii. 10, 11). We should therefore endeavour rather TO PLEASE AND GLORIFY GOD BY RATIONAL EFFORTS rationally directed, than by the performance of either our legs or our lips.

Yet should not the tribute of our members, and of the lips especially, be withheld in a case wherein so much more than all that we can pay is due. The gift of language must be accounted one of the greatest and most peculiar blessings with which the Creator is pleased to distinguish our kind, the very foundation of reason itself, and of all the temporal advantages (to mention no others) of us rational creatures: therefore, as God is pleased to distinguish mankind with this important gift, it cannot distinguish itself or be distinguished in a more appropriate service. As far as circumstances will permit, not only the best prose at our command, but the best poetry too should be thus employed; that, "by prayer and supplication to let our requests be made known unto God" (Phil. iv. 6); this, to praise Him worthily, as well as to recreate ourselves most agreeably, "speaking to

ourselves in psalms and hymns and spiritual songs; singing and making melody in our heart unto the Lord" (Eph. v. 19).

In a word; though the efficient part of godliness—judgment, mercy, and all that is generally meant by obedience, must be owned more important than hymns, or prayers either, of any quality or on any subject, yet these are important enough, leaving their agreeableness out of the question, to claim a considerable share of our attention; as Jesus told the sanctimonious scribes and Pharisees, "These ought ye to have done and not to leave the others undone" (Matt. xxiii. 23). All that passes under the denomination of worship, whether inward or outward, is little enough for relief in the drama of life, to fill up the intervals of an active obedience; and to be indeed, what our own natural reason would dictate and our heart approve, some little attentions paid to a great Benefactor, besides the best services that we can perform, and the greatest degree of pleasure that we are able to take in them; as it is said by the psalmist, "My soul shall be satisfied even as it were with marrow and fatness, when my mouth praiseth thee with joyful lips" (Ps. lxiii. 6). But where services are so inadequate to duty and obligation, as in this case, prayers must go for purchase money, and thanks for ready payment.

§ 10. Thus proceeding, as it were, step by step, from one species or particular of worship to another, and especially among those of the inward or heartfelt kind frequently known by the name of Devotion, we shall with good practice arrive at the extent of what is called *Communion* or companying with God; which means the enjoyment of his presence and perception, and all that is generally meant by Going to God; by Waiting for Him, Walking with, after or before Him, Living before Him, Communing, or having communion or fellowship with Him, and other terms of the kind; all being as foreign as possible to the nature of the subject, and though serving to express the affection of those who apply them, not calculated to express one tittle of the matter to which they are applied; for example,

1. There is *going*, in the first place, without locomotion. A man may go to God on a sick bed, before he dies, and does, oftener than in the prime and vigour of life; in prison, for his name's sake, surer than by any personal liberty without the fear of God; and in adverse circumstances generally, sooner than in more favourable; the simplicity of childhood will help a man on this journey as far as worldly wisdom, nay, far beyond all the veteran craft in the world; he may go without any other guide than the word that is closeted in his own breast; and by staying in his closet, if he cannot help it, as directly as by going to church—there being in all these cases not one word about moving. But, what would seem most strange to one who had not considered it, a man may go to God by God's coming, or, as we say, descending to him; (though there be no descending nor ascending with omnipresence,) and he could not go to God without it.

For it may here be pertinent to observe, how all men go to God by his miraculous incarnation in Christ as well as by the continual operation of the Holy Ghost being a divine assumption of our nature in that case, and our assumption of the divine in this; though this may not be the place for considering such relations. Let it suffice, therefore, to observe at present, how we naturally go to God by the effect of his covenant descending into our hearts, and restoring in us that primitive or even nearer resemblance whereby we are partly enabled to see Him as he is. "For we know, that when he shall appear, we shall be like Him, for we shall see Him as he is" (John I. iii. 2); being holy as he is holy (Lev. xx. 7); perfect as he is perfect (Matt. v. 48); loving as he is loving (Ps. cxlv. 9); happy as he is happy (1b. xvi. 12). And to know this may be enough for any one without his particularly considering however it may happen, like Nicodemus in the Gospel.

There are those who, judging by their practice, have no idea beyond one point of resemblance between God and themselves, thinking it sufficiently divine to be terrible as

he is terrible ; for, (as Moses said,) the Lord our God is indeed “ a mighty God and TERRIBLE ” (Deut. vii. 21) : who would fain resemble the Lord of Hosts in command rather than any thing, and excel Him too if they could. But can it be questioned, whether this alone would liken men to God ? If power were God’s only attribute, or if it were not always attended in Him with wisdom, justice, mercy, truth, and the other perfections above-mentioned, men might indeed be as like Him as if He and they were one, by being only powerful and warlike. But to be one with God in this respect—they must be in this respect as He is, just, as well as powerful ; hopeful, as well as terrible ; not more strong, than wise ; being terrible to the wicked, and hopeful to the innocent—and endowed with penetration to distinguish, as well as with temper and capacity to act on such distinction. With power so modified and combined men may fight their way up to God ; being in every known way, and in every possible respect as He is, or “ partakers of the divine nature ” (Pet. II. i. 4), as St. Peter expresses it. This, the divine covenant with the other means before-mentioned will tend to make us ; and when we are this, we shall be come to God, we shall be where He is, or in his place—not in his stead, but in his place ; as they say, were I in your place ; meaning in the same circumstances or position. And this one might venture to say without any fear of contradiction, that whatever change of sphere, place, or residence, may befall a man in the next, or in any future stage of his existence, it is most essentially by a change of manners and principles, from opposition to likeness, and from evil to good, that he must change places—when he ascends from earth to heaven, and from an earthly communion to a communion with the “ God of the spirits of all flesh ” (Num. xvi. 22) ; “ Who only hath immortality, dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto ” (Tim. I. vi. 16).

2. Only the privilege of *walking* before God in his beautiful world amidst so many charms and wonders, and the

mere enjoyment of breath, or, as it is said by David, "that I may walk before God in the light of the living" (Ps. lvi. 13), are valuable blessings that He has prepared for those who wait for Him. He says, "The earth is the Lord's, and all that therein is: the compass of the world, and they that dwell therein. For He hath founded it upon the seas, and prepared it upon the floods" (Ps. xxiv. 1, 2). The earth is one of the Creator's courts; its rational inhabitants are a little levee; and, if they were duly conscious of the Creator's presence, they would hardly dare to walk abroad with their hats on. But to walk with God upon earth by a communion of spirit, as the apostles propose!—Why, if we could only walk with such an heathen as Confucius in this manner, we might think much of it; of only walking with an enlightened heathen! Much more ought we to think of walking with a more enlightened apostle, like St. John, for example: but most, of not only walking with St. John, but also with God through his accurate transcript; having our fellowship with him, as he says: "And truly (says he) our fellowship is with the Father, and with his Son Jesus Christ" (John I. i. 3).

3. We must not persuade ourselves, however, that we are walking or communing with God or with his Son Jesus Christ while the spirit of Christ is away from us, or our heart away from him. "He that saith he abideth in Him ought himself also so to walk, even as he walked" (John I. ii. 6). We cannot walk with God while our heart inclines more fondly to other objects: for this were properly to walk one way and look another, which is very unsafe. "If we say, that we have fellowship with Him, and walk in darkness, we lie, and do not the truth, but if we walk in the light as He is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ his Son, cleanseth us from all sin" (Ibid. I. i. 6, 7). For by all those expressions; as going to God, walking with, or generally companying or communing with Him, and others of the kind before-mentioned, is metaphorically denoted the

current of our affections running toward Him, a preference for God before any idol or common usurper of the throne of the kingdom within, before all usurping deities, and gods that would be if we would suffer them. This preference of ours for Him is a natural consequence of his for us: it is a consequence of our calling, and a very considerable part of our spiritual communion. As we love Him too, we also wish to be loved; as we admire Him, we court his consideration; as we honour Him, we are principally ambitious of "the honour that cometh from God only" (John v. 44); the same as it is said to be; "For them that honour me I will honour," saith the Lord (Sam. I. ii. 30). So they who trust and delight in the Lord will be reciprocally objects of trust and delight to Him; as we often read, and particularly in the Psalms with expressions like these, "Delight thou in the Lord, and He shall give thee thy heart's desire. Commit thy way unto the Lord, and put thy trust in Him, and He shall bring it to pass" (Ps. xxxvii. 4, 5). For "the Lord's delight is in them that fear Him, and put their trust in his mercy" (Ib. cxlvii. 11).

In these and such like instances is exemplified that spiritual intercourse between God and his creatures which we properly understand by Communion with God, and which is the perfection of a godly life; as they say, The end is the perfection of every work. For a godly life is our tilling and sowing, "and such trust have we through Christ to godward" (Cor. II. iii. 4); but here is our harvest, as the apostle says, "Whatsoever a man soweth that shall he also reap. . . Let us not be weary in well doing, for in due season we shall reap if we faint not" (Gal. vi. 7, 9); we shall reap a constant flow of mild enjoyment here, and enjoyments such as we can at present have no idea of hereafter. "How excellent is thy mercy, O God! and the children of men shall put their trust under the shadow of thy wings. They shall be satisfied with the plenteousness of thy house; and thou shalt give them drink of thy pleasures, as out of the river" (Ps. xxxvi. 7, 8). "Rejoice in the Lord, O ye

righteous, for it becometh well the just to be thankful" (Ibid. xxxiii. 1). His bountiful providence has made a duty of every real enjoyment, and his wisdom has ordained, positively ordained, as we often read in his holy word, and might oftener if we would, an habit of rejoicing with righteousness, and that the righteous should rejoice in God.

Godliness is a pleasurable appetite, and one not likely to be soon sated, but more likely to grow for ever with the enjoyment of its object. Call it Godliness, or Piety, or Devotion, or, as more commonly, Religion, or by any other name you prefer, denoting the same cast of righteousness, there are no terms for beauty and loveliness too perfect to suit it, nor any comparison sufficient. The beauty of godliness deserves to be differently named from that of any other property or thing, for it is different. The beauty of the topaz is not so bright, that of the lily not so chaste, the beauty of no human production is so polished, nor of the human form itself so exquisite. The beauty of godliness has no parallel in all the beauties of nature and art. And for dignity it needs only to be observed, that godliness is the crown of righteousness, the best of what is good, the very summit of perfection. While for utility and importance it so far surpasses every other good thing, that while some are profitable in one respect and some in another, "Godliness (as St. Paul observes) is profitable unto all things; having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come" (Tim. I. iv. 8). Godliness is never out of season; it ought to rule in all our thoughts, words, and works: **THERE IS NO BUSINESS TOO HIGH FOR ITS CONTROL, NOR TOO FAMILIAR FOR ITS ATTENTION.**

Many seem to think that habitual godliness is incompatible with the ordinary calls of nature, but they are widely mistaken: for it may have as much to do with these as with the exercise of our highest intellectual properties, and may coalesce with them as well as an habitual devotion to it with any other object, say wealth, or power, or knowledge for example, is ever found to do. The miser, the politician,

the scholar, eat, drink, beget children, and endeavour to provide for them like other men, (indeed every man almost is devoted to some other object beyond the calls of nature and commonest concerns of life,) and if these can discharge their routine employments without any let to their ruling passion, why may not the godly man, or the man who is truly devoted to God, without any let to his? In truth, there is not one of those employments, nor of others too familiar to be mentioned that might not be done in the fear of God, and dignified by the same. Every action that we undertake, whatever may be its nature, object, or magnitude, should be a part of our daily exercise in godliness, so that godliness can never be out of season, if it be real, if it be true and unaffected.

*** No more can any other good objective characteristic, or sort of them, besides the samples that have here been mentioned and reviewed, whether belonging to morality, as justice, honour, truth; or to godliness, as faith, devotion, worship; or to the comprehensive head of righteousness, including the two forementioned morality and godliness; to righteousness the staff and ornament of society at large, as well as of every smaller, down to the domestic relation; to righteousness, which not only makes a good family, but even "exalteth a nation" (Prov. xiv. 34), as it is said. And the way it does so is, by selection: for never yet was there any thing like a righteous nation. It is by righteousness, the noblest condition of our noblest part, the immortal soul, that some are exalted, and others by them. Thus righteousness is the high road to preferment here, as well as to "a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory" (Cor. II. iv. 17) hereafter; a road predetermined or us by God in eternity, and trodden before us in time by his eternal only begotten Son.

CHRISTIAN MODES.

PART I.

THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN CHRIST.

CHAPTER V.

EVIL SUBJECTIVE CHARACTERISTICS.

1, Of Incidentals.—2, Of Constituents.

"A fire is kindled in mine anger, and shall burn unto the lowest hell, and shall consume the earth with her increase, and set on fire the foundations of the mountains."—DEUT. xxxii. 22.

WHAT may be generally understood by *Evil*, or the class of characteristics that now claims our consideration having been explained already in a comparison with its antithesis, now duly considered as far as circumstances would permit, there will be no occasion for pausing here at its name and notion; but we may proceed with some other particulars concerning, or belonging to, a subject of the kind. Among these, the UBI, or place, though frequently but a relation, is generally noticed for one: and the vulgar prejudice in favour of localities being such, that even happiness and righteousness, which may be thought infinite, must have their sphere and boundary as aforesaid—it will be hard to deny the same incidental to sin and misery, which one would fain persuade one's self, are rather limited. Indeed, one should be glad to learn, that so small a prison, hell, or ADES, as the centre of our planet, was large enough to hold all the evil spirits by which it is troubled and tormented; that they might regularly depart with their bodies when

they go hence, whether to the land of darkness, or to the fire that cannot be quenched, and be no more seen nor heard of.

But it would seem from different allusions to the subject in Scripture, as if the place for evil subjects was at present only in preparation, and the central fire was to be regarded rather as a light shining in a dark place, and not a place like heaven, in which there are many mansions—until it burst forth in a general blaze, from the centre of the earth to its surface. Or, as some have indulged a fancy of comparing the earth to a beast in its health or ordinary functions, they may go on to conceive, that by the fire in preparation, or, as it is said, “the everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels,” (Matt. xxv. 41,) was meant the process of dissolution, or the progress of an inward fever which was sure to consume the patient with violent eruptions at its proper crisis. But without denying aught that cannot be disproved, one might spare one’s-self the trouble of casting about for hypotheses on the local habitation or principal quarters of sin and misery, either here or hereafter; as some who have travelled must know, that hell is not stationary, any more than the evil spirits, its supposed inhabitants; but that their hell and their evil spirits go along with them every where at present; and hereafter, whether they should be secluded with their evil spirits in the centre of the earth, or be falling and rolling with them on its ignited surface, whether this or that be their dole, will make little odds to the wretched sufferers. For burning is torment any where, in a fiery lake or a bottomless pit; in a falling star, or in the train of a comet; or millions of miles from either, in infinite space. Therefore, with the perfect conviction that every one must have of present guilt, instead of endeavouring to determine the place or sphere of future torments, their thoughts would be better engaged in endeavouring to avoid them.

Any one by straining a poetic imagination, if he happen to have it, may give as horrible a representation of the place

of torment as ever any poor maniac doating on misery almost could conceive; but men of reflexion, who have noticed in themselves some of the spiritual and intellectual properties above-mentioned, and felt their intensity at times must be sensible, that even liquid sulphur were no great aggravation to the worm that dieth not, or what it might be, and will easily recognize in the bitter and endless gnawing of such worm "the fire that never shall be quenched" (Mark ix. 48, 44).

It were a hard task for any one to analyse even the feelings that he actually experiences, and refer their ingredients to their several sources or affinities, but much harder to specify "those things which are coming on the earth: for the powers of heaven shall be shaken" (Luke xxi. 26); and so it is to conjecture how the storm may fall; whether on the soul, receiving the things done in the body (Cor. II. v. 10), or on the body, being destroyed "that the spirit may be saved" (Cor. I. v. 5); or on both soul and body, suffering in one common fate or destruction (Matt. x. 28). But all who have any feeling and observation must know, that they have felt something like the part here mentioned, an hysteric affection rising somewhere; by which not only the powers of the soul, or higher department are shaken, but even the ordinary functions of the body are liable to be disturbed sometimes, and the body itself perhaps wasted to a shadow, or consumed as by a slow fire. And, to strengthen their common, private, and internal evidence, in this case, in which no evidence can be too complete; some may also recollect the anguish of maniacs just alluded to, which, though illusive, and, like our present capacity, both for suffering and enjoyment, limited of course, may still be very terrible to a considerate witness, and naturally lead him to conceive, what that anguish might become with a real foundation and redoubled sensibility, or acuteness of sensation.

The same bitter spectacle might also be enough to do away with an overweening notion that some men have, of

future punishments not consisting with the known goodness of the Creator. For no one who looks feelingly on this poor creature can doubt the reality of his sufferings; no one who sees and hears him can be ignorant as to the pangs which God Almighty may and will perhaps inflict on others if deserved; as, for example, on others who may be the chief cause of such a wretch's sufferings, and what may be preparing for them, which yet they fondly hope to escape. Or, perhaps being both to blame, as "evil men and seducers shall wax worse and worse, deceiving and being deceived," (Tim. II. iii. 13,) they may prove hereafter, as they do now sometimes, each other's torment being, as it were, a very hell to each other: for such are many upon earth, without any public or political atrocities; as invasion, with wasting and massacre; and without the natural calamities, ELEMENTAL INVASIONS, as we may call them, of flood and tempest; in short without the woe of Ariel, "a multitude of strangers like small dust...with thunder and with earthquake and great noise, with storm and tempest, and the flame of devouring fire" (Isai. xxix. 5, 6). They are devils, only by the evil incidentals which they pour (it may be singly) on each other from their evil constituents; these evil constituents (to speak geographically) being, as it were, the city or kingdom of hell, and the evil incidentals its outskirts. For every considerable city or kingdom will have its outskirts, which are so mingled with the adjoining country, that one can hardly be distinguished from the other; but it may be possible, in this instance, to succeed so far as to distinguish the evil subjective characteristics of incidentals from those of constituents, in the same manner as the good subjective characteristics were distinguished.

§ 1. The opposite subjective characteristics, or contrasting properties, of the good incidentals before considered, being evil subjective characteristics of, or simply *Evils of incidentals*, are many to bear, or only to read of, so that a moderate sample of them only may be enough to men-

tion, as 1, Low life and Insignificance; 2, Slavery, Servitude, &c.; 3. Debts, Taxes, Conscriptions; 4, Poverty and Want; 5, Obscurity and Neglect; 6, Infamy and Ridicule; 7, Trials and Temptations. Which, however, are not extreme afflictions, nor necessarily any, but may be even benefits, and that oftener than the supposed advantages against which they are poised. Because these incidentals do not necessarily imply any demerit in their object or receiver, the person on whom they alight, and for whom they are decreed; nor always any inconvenience either, as every one must know who has experienced them, and is capable of appreciating their fruits or effects accordingly. They are proper matters to exercise a man's wisdom and virtue certainly, as it is said, "In the day of adversity consider" (Eccles. vii. 14): not, however, because adverse circumstances are more critical and alarming than prosperous circumstances, for on that score perhaps both kinds would be about equal, but for other reasons: as, 1, to reconcile our feelings to what they naturally, but not properly, abhor, by a better view of the case; and, 2, to found upon such view some improvements that cannot so well be derived from prosperity.

In the first place, it must needs appear no easy part to reconcile a man's feelings to what he is in the habit of considering adverse to himself; and therefore notes by this very expression; for the meaning of adversity is *something against us*: and how will you reconcile us to that which is against us? Either our outward condition, or a part of it, is against us or not; if the former, we cannot be reconciled to it; if the latter, it cannot be adversity; to adversity, therefore, in either case, we cannot be reconciled.

So it may seem; but there are, in fact, two sorts of adversity, as there are of prosperity; one comparative and mediate, the other positive and final; just as there are two sorts of success at play well known to adepts in the art of gambling. But the men of this world, looking no farther than to this world, are mostly apt to think, like young gamblers, only of their first chance, and to laugh at damnation.

The young gamester, when he stakes a whole half of his substance on one throw of the dice, considers only for that throw; and, in the same manner, heedless gamblers at good and evil will throw desperately on their present chance; never regarding the future, nor considering within themselves "What is a man profited if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul? or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" (Matt. xvi. 26). Or else they would say, if the first chance is against us, the last may be for us; when they would be apt to change their tone, and instead either of prosperity or adversity, begin to talk of futurity as a matter worth considering. For none but the damned are excluded from another chance, and have no hope to futurity. Futurity is the grand issue upon which the merits of every case and of every acquisition in life must be tried, and it cannot be doubted, that upon this issue many dispensations which would otherwise seem very hard, may be discovered to be highly advantageous to the sufferer. Hardship, like hardness, its corporeal synonyme, has no determinate signification, but will depend on the subject to which it may be applied, the same condition being frequently a hardship to one, and luxury to another. The proper way, therefore, to remove all hardships is by becoming superior to them, hardening ourselves against hardships, or fortifying our hearts against the common evils of life. For if men do not care to make themselves what they should be, Providence will do it for them; and while some men are instrumental to their own improvement, incomparably the greater number shall be whipped into better habits, or kept within bounds at least, by the iron hand of adversity.

We are not now considering adversity, or evil incidentals, as an affliction coming from the hand of God; but simply of the state itself, without alluding to this or to any other relation; yet, in justice to Him, and to shew that "He does not afflict willingly," (Lam. iii. 33,) or WANTONLY, as it should rather be said, it may be proper to observe

at once, that neither men nor any other sort of creatures, not being quite lost, are such perfect wretches and blanks as to be always suffering, that is, miscarrying at every point in which their nature or condition may be improved ; but every one, suffer as he may in some respects, will needs have his share of pleasure or improvement in others. And if either spiritual or intellectual improvement can establish the advantage of any condition, it will, beyond all doubt, that of adversity over the opposite condition of prosperity. For take a man who has been accustomed to privations and hardships of any description, and try him against another who has never been exercised in the school of adversity, or try the same man against himself when its wholesome effects begin to wear off ; and the result of the experiment will be as clear as any in demonstrative philosophy, to shew the different rate of moral force, or of the rank and standard of the inner man, in either of these two opposite conditions. Or let the experiment be tried in any other respect ; that is, not in a moral respect only, but in a physical likewise, which may seem most unpromising, and its effect will prove the same.

Thus in the first mentioned moral respect ; with regard to the passive virtues of meekness, resignation, humility : where, for example, shall we find the greatest display of these excellent virtues ; among the children of adversity, or the children of prosperity ? Among the former most assuredly ; that is, not among the poor merely, but among all persons, whether rich or poor, being in what is called adverse or unfortunate circumstances. The child of adversity seems to look upon suffering as his portion : " I have said to corruption, Thou art my father ; to the worm, Thou art my mother and my sister " (Job xvii. 14) is the profession of one of them. But look at the sons of prosperity ; and behold what a contrast. " Their heart is as fat as brawn " (Ps. cxix. 70) : " They are inclosed in their own fat, and their mouth speaketh proud things " (Ib. xvii. 10). And how they will resent every little cross occurrence or sinister

incidental that is laid on them ! It seems as if they expected, that themselves of all mankind should be peculiarly exempted from opposition and adversity. They are choleric, overbearing, haughty, and vindictive, any thing in short, but meek, humble, and resigned.

And if the child of adversity excels in passive virtues, how much more in those of an active description, as in fortitude, enterprise, and resource, with others that might be mentioned ; in so much that we can hardly help admiring, how REPUTED EVILS should ever happen to make so favourable a distinction among beings of the same species, i. e. endowed with the same form and materials. For pride, insolence, rapine and other vices that appear in men of one condition will be equally inherent in those of another ; as nature gives the vice, if the world gives its fashion. And the world may vary the form of vice, as it does of indifferent fashions ; but cannot touch its principle or beginning. What moderates the impetus of such principle or beginning therefore occasionally is, next to God's grace, a few bad incidentals, or, to speak more familiarly, an inferior station in the world ; which will have the effect of keeping a young SCAPE-GRACE in pretty good order sometimes during the hours of labour, if he still be one that will begin beating his own father and mother as soon as he gets home.

It may be that such a mere temporary restraint were no great improvement to its object : but, more than that, we see continually in more sensible instances how good properties are formed by the effect of adversity, or opposition, in every line ; as, for example, a thirst for improvement by a want of education ; the love of peace by a turbulent life, and even in some by a turbulent disposition ; power to support life by habitual sickness, and fidelity by habitual temptation ; so that many virtues which are naturally passive and precarious may become by such means more active and real. It is evident how we are generally qualified for an active life by a satiety of leisure, and that owing

perhaps to sickness, or some other adversity, as we recover strength and opportunity for action.

Nay, among inferior animals, and even among vegetable productions, the forming hand of adversity is sufficiently conspicuous. That most useful and at the same time most injured of brute beings, the hack-horse, or roadster, is as superior to the sleek church-going palfrey in energy, fortitude, and endurance as a smuggler is to a capuchin. And even in your own garden or grove you may remark the superior vigour and fruitfulness of a plantation that has stood the brunt of winter to what you shall see in one that was made under the new born sun. In the same manner it has happened to more than one in the human form or species to "grow up before the Lord as a tender plant, and as a root out of a dry ground" (Isai. liii. 2) in the beginning, which was to flourish eventually "like a palm tree and be spread abroad like a cedar in Libanus" (Ps. xcii. 11), the rather for his hard beginning through the power and providence of God. For it is all as He wills at last: there is nothing necessarily either good or evil in externals or incidentals without his particular fiat.

1. A more particular view of the subject of adversity, or a distinct survey of its particulars, may give a more distinct conception of this providential effect: wherein we ought first to consider the final advantage of *low life and Insignificance*, two very unpromising incidentals at first sight, and but a poor match apparently for some others. It may be said apparently: for all is not always what it appears. When the fountain of a man's life issues pleasantly in the beginning between good expectation and interest, what should hinder the same from running on pleasantly as it begins? But say, that instead of such pleasant borders and a free scope as aforesaid, the fountain should be nearly choked at its birth by the obstacles before mentioned, how then can it make any progress? Why very clearly: not by a smooth course to be sure, but by a strong outset. Swelling by little and little until it

has acquired sufficient force, the obstructed fountain will surmount at last its natural barrier, rush against the borders of expectation and interest, and fairly run over the gentle current that glided so smoothly between them. But it may be a serious case, if the exulting stream do not either contain, or meet with some countervailing principle to restrain, its wild impetuosity within bounds. Where then is the mild influence of charity—where the governing sense of religion—to sustain the character and consolidate the advantages of triumphant obscurity?

2. But harder circumstances still than this may be rendered both easy and beneficial. Of all the adverse conditions in life there is none perhaps harder and more unpromising in appearance than the condition of *Slavery*, or an abject dependence of one man on the will and caprice of another, as it may be, not only for his comforts and enjoyments, but for the very necessities of life, and even for the tenure of life itself. What hardship can be more formidable in itself than this; which we call Slavery? None certainly for a kind; though one kind or degree of slavery may be more formidable than another; as there are several kinds and degrees of this crying hardship answering to the several kinds and degrees of the blessing of freedom before enumerated. Thus the kind of slavery properly known and considered by this name, being a mere slavery on incidentals, or incidental slavery will be very indifferent compared with slavery on constituents, being generally more terrible, and in some cases very terrible indeed, though not so much dreaded by the world sometimes as that first mentioned incidental sort. For without stooping to panegyry so base, so hateful a condition as incidental slavery, whether private or public, within doors or without; one might still be allowed to observe, that it is not impossible, nor inconsistent with reason, nor without good experience, for outward or incidental slavery to be made subservient through the blessing of divine Providence to inward or constituent freedom; as

3. *Debts, Taxes, and Conscriptions*; which look very like slavery and bondage, may be made subservient to good ends by the same overruling cause, and even to both private and public freedom, though properties in themselves that no man would covet for their own sake; as, indeed, he need not, since it requires more effort to avoid them.

4. As a further example of the indifference of some evils, if the phrase may be allowed, and their inclination to essentiality; let the kindred incidentals of *Poverty* and *Want* be considered; which to many would appear even worse than death, if not worse too than its consequence, that which comes after death, v. g. judgment. We may reckon these two properties or conditions under one head, although they be not precisely the same, nor yet more alike than the two conditions of wealth and competency above mentioned; but the latter, v. g. want is as much below poverty in fact, as poverty is below wealth in the vulgar estimation. Therefore, while poverty is not only sufferable, but in many respects even desirable according to Christian modes of thinking on this head, real want is barely sufferable in any case. We may agree sometimes to suffer want, rather than worse consequences, or for the sake of countervailing advantages; but it is only the extravagant and over-righteous sort of Christians that can desire want, merely for its own sake, or for the sake of being poor and for no other purpose. Understanding, however, that these naturally unfavourable conditions may still have their advantages as aforesaid, a few of the same would here seem worth considering, v. g. a few of the peculiar advantages of poverty and want. One shall never find it necessary, except by a very great chance, to magnify the advantages of wealth, the creed of the world, which is more operative than that of the Gospel, being most decidedly in its favour: but if one can reconcile the poor to their lot, and others to this alternative when necessary, it will not be amiss.

They who rightly understand, sincerely believe, and

seriously consider what they find in God's word will derive the truest and most agreeable solace for common privations from that authority. For there they are not only encouraged with the promise of a blessing in the case; but also with its special assignment, in the fact of the Gospel being particularly dedicated to them, the greatest treasure upon earth as a mean to the enjoyment of heaven; the same who promised the blessing, himself supplying the means; as for example, "Blessed be ye poor: for yours is the kingdom of God," (Luke vi. 20,) to his own disciples; and to two of John's, "Go, and shew John again those things which ye do hear and see: the blind receive their sight, and the lame walk; the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear; the dead are raised up, and **THE POOR HAVE THE GOSPEL PREACHED TO THEM**" (Matt. xi. 4, 5). So justly read he when by the guidance of the Holy Spirit he opened at this text, "The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me to preach the Gospel to the poor" (Luke iv. 18): and so justly likewise did he comment thereupon, when he added, "This day is the Scripture fulfilled in your ears" (Ib. 21). But since all are not believers, and believers not always proof against the temptation of riches, and the influence of the world, or common opinion, the more familiar though less considerable authority of reason should be added to that of the Gospel on this head; as for example in the following respects.

1, *Poverty is the surest teacher of practical wisdom*; the just and natural effect of scarcity in any article being to induce a more careful application of the same to any purpose for which it is suited; as of the few precious moments of our life in the first place, and of the advantages assigned us for enhancing and improving these few moments for the great ends of eternity in the next. And whatever sort of good incidentals may be advantageous to that end, they who do not abound in them will be likely to make the best use of what they have.

2, Hence we scarcely find one *active virtue* but will come within the reach of poverty, and in which it may not shine more eminently after the rate than riches, by managing its resources with caution and prudence. Even in the general virtue of beneficence, whereto riches seem so much better adapted, poverty may emulate, and, according to an unquestionable authority, by chance excel them. For we read how "Jesus sat over against the treasury; (that is, for the poor) and beheld, how people cast money into the treasury; and many that were rich cast in much. And there came a certain poor widow; and she threw in two mites, which make a farthing. And he called his disciples, and saith unto them, Verily, I say unto you, That this poor widow hath cast more in, than all they which have cast into the treasury. For all they did cast in of their abundance; but she of her want did cast in all that she had, even all her living" (Mark xii. 41, &c.). Jesus would not have commended that poor woman for starving herself to feed others; but it was the faith, determination, and courage that could stake its last farthing for this noble purpose, that he so justly commended, next to the kind sympathy that prompted her beneficence. She knew what it was to be poor, she knew what it was to be a widow; and yielding, perhaps, like others of her sex, to the suggestions of charity before prudence, she cast in her all for the fatherless and the widow: and, we may add, was no loser. For in a Christian view, every act and condition is to be estimated by its subservience to our moral improvement, or to the extension of those heavenly principles which belong to the peculiar kingdom of God: and not only beneficence, which includes every sort of active virtue is promoted by poverty, but

8, Many, and perhaps, all the *passive virtues* likewise; and that especially when poverty is borne as it should be v. g. with hope and resignation towards God, towards men with justice, dignity, and civility—not flattering, fawning, nor cringing—nor yet envying, slandering, or

undervaluing on account of the difference of its object's circumstances; not despising the rich, merely on account of their overwhelming opulence, as if they were all hunchbacks; but always displaying in its conduct that kind, equitable, and truly Christian spirit, which is able to adorn any circumstances or condition.

4, Or if our poverty is not borne in so high a style of Christian perfection, it still may be a means of improving men in *other respects*; by obliging those who have the good hap to be endowed with this advantage, to shew themselves humble, meek, and obliging towards others for their own sakes; also, to be inwardly temperate, discreet, and vigilant; outwardly abstemious, chaste, and honest. So that, only in a common way, poverty may be as hopeful a condition at least as wealth; while it has the advantage *in that blessing without which no condition can be prosperous or desirable.*

5, From the stress that is generally laid on the acquirement of riches and similar allurements one would really suppose, that they were every thing to be desired, and that the want of them was every thing to be dreaded: one would suppose for example, to go from their general pursuit or request at least, that in riches were comprehended health of body and peace of mind, with every subordinate advantage conducing to either; and on the contrary, that in poverty neither of these advantages, nor any thing like them, was to be expected. And there is also a worse mistake than this, the awkward condition of poverty being disliked in the world as much by those who do not suffer it, as by those who do, and often resented by them in a manner as guilt: but not as the guilt of mismanagement only to which it is often due, nor yet of any other particular failing so much as of absolute vileness and a sort of ban that nothing can remove or mitigate. As for intrinsic worth, it is out of the question: if a man has had the misfortune to be born of obscure parents and to a scanty inheritance, no matter what he may be himself; he shall be

cursed for his birth by a misdeeming world, as if he had made it his choice. And such is the judgment of the world against poverty with its innocent cause, while all our reason and experience, as well as the best authority in the world, the authority of the Gospel, is clearly on the other side, as just observed. The matter is then, which to hearken to; the judgment of the world or the dictates of reason, and the word of God?—It is the Son of the Blessed himself that has pronounced a blessing on the poor: and if theirs be not the happiest state, which admits of a dispute, it must certainly be *the most honourable state* on all accounts: and particularly, 1, because it is the most innocent; 2, because the most useful; 3, because the most independent; 4, and most eminently, BECAUSE IT WAS THE STATE OF THE BLESSED SON HIMSELF UPON EARTH: for if it had not been the most honourable before, it must have been so since his assumption of the same.

Even competency is more honourable than wealth; as having only a few comforts and no superfluities. But poverty is so much more honourable than competency, as it retains only the barest necessities of life; all that was over being either given away, employed, or never received; and consequently not to be accounted for.

Therefore, while others study to be rich, let Christians study to enjoy an honest poverty, after the great example which they profess to imitate. “For (says St. Paul to the Corinthians) ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ; that though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, that ye through his poverty might be rich” (Cor. II. viii. 9). Which shews too that our voluntary pauperism is not to be without an end, but for the end of making others rich. The advantages that Providence has confided to us, whatever may be their kind or description, are not to be thrown away foolishly, but carefully employed for the public good; and wealth in particular, being the commonest, to the last farthing, if worth while or necessary.

In this way two mites only of a rich man's income may be as acceptable as the widow's, being his last. And while he has thus the honour to be poor in a temporal respect, he will also have the greater honour to be rich in a spiritual, his deep poverty abounding to the riches of his liberality (Ib. 2).

5. Having many other arguments of the greatest importance before us, it does not seem worth while, to pursue any farther the contrast between a Christian and a worldly judgment; or one might easily prove an error against the world in respect likewise of other incidentals which it considers unfavourable, and includes accordingly in the general term of Adversity with those before mentioned, being such as *Obscurity* and *Neglect*; disesteem, infamy and ridicule, with others of the kind: of all which the real and ultimate evil must, as before observed, depend upon another judgment than that of the world, or of any one in it. The world is not the less resolute however in its disesteem of the said incidentals, without excepting that which may be considered the least obnoxious. For only of obscurity the world has such an abhorrence, that it appears to consider even a bad name better than none: and in one case no name is bad enough to be sure, if it be more shame to others than blame to the hapless illegitimate. So on the other hand (to own an exception) obscurity is also often courted by men of the world, much as they dislike it, when they have made for themselves a bad name or troublesome reputation; proving, that in one case no name may be better than a bad one. So likewise, no name or obscurity may be convenient in cases where there is no particular dread of exposure or infamy, as, for example, while some part that may do credit to the performer is in a course of preparation; and likewise sometimes in performing as well as preparing a good part—enough to shew how the evil of obscurity may be supportable, at least, if it please God.

6. But, to speak more particularly of a bad name; if it

be undeserved, whether soberly spoken, which is slander to the subject and *Infamy* to the object of the same—or wantonly, which is folly to that and *Ridicule* to this—in either form it can confer no lasting injury on its object, the party to whom it is originally incidental. So far from that, a bad name, if enviously and maliciously conferred for good deserving, may rather benefit the object, thank God! as active worth is generally enhanced by unmerited suffering. And as no might nor greatness in mortality can escape censure, of course meekness and innocence must not expect it.

7. Among the *Trials* of life this last mentioned incidental is not one of the least, and has often proved too hard for the endurance of an honourable mind, as well as the cause of animosity and bloodshed, not between rivals and enemies only, but also between friends and brethren. Other incidentals might also be enumerated as trials, and some more severe approaching the quality of constituents; as bodily accidents, sickness, care, disappointment, and the like, which happening, as usual, from without, have still a seat in the subject. Indeed, there seems no scarcity of trials and *Temptations* for us in any quarter: we should not have far to look for EITHER sort, if its presence were desired.

It may be said, Either; because these two, namely, trials and temptations, however nearly allied, may be considered as sorts, not being without a palpable distinction; which is that of bearing on different principles respectively—trials, on fortitude, like hardships and sufferings of every kind; temptations, on clemency, moderation, chastity, temperance, and other good aversive characteristics, like the thirst of revenge, the charms of power, the blandishments of the fair, the influence of bad example and seductive company, the relish of pleasant dainties and drinks. It would seem as if the last named sort, or temptations, were thought more pressing than trials by our heavenly Preceptor from his teaching us to pray particularly against them: but Christian prudence and humility will teach us, not to court nor yet to wait for either, if it can well be avoided.

Such may be considered as the best rule or measure for our conduct in relation to trials and temptations of every kind happening incidentally or from without : which have now been mentioned as evil, because they generally are so mentioned ; while their indifference in point of fact, like that of other incidentals, has not been forgotten ; nor how in point of fact every thing without us must be naturally indifferent, since nothing ever hurts until it is taken to heart. "THE END IS NOT YET:" And then it will no longer be something, but our sense of something without—a painful image that hurts us. The pain of this image too, is not always necessarily severe ; being to be moderated, if not wholly subdued, by a sense of religion. Many of the evil subjective characteristics, even of constituents, are nearly indifferent : of course, those of incidentals may be comparatively so, almost without exception. They may be evil, however, or they may be good according to circumstances. The world does not generally seem to include such a conversion among the number of possibilities : but some considering both the testimonies of reason and Revelation here adduced, to which a great many more might easily have been added, will incline to admit the fact contended for ; to wit, that such particular evils as those before enumerated, and others of the kind, cannot be final. And it is by possessing our souls in patience (Luke xxi. 19) ; as the Lord told his disciples, or by our patient endurance of such evils for His sake, endeavouring at the same time to deserve better things with him, that we approve ourselves the servants of God—"by honour and dishonour, by evil report and good report—as dying, and behold we live ; as chastened, and not killed" (Cor. II. vi. 8, 9). For as there are two parts in life generally, so in every single life particularly, if not in every period of the same—the suffering and the efficient : to suffer evil therefore and do good without repining, or as St. Peter expresses it, "If when ye do well and suffer ye

take it patiently, this is acceptable with God" (Pet. I. ii. 20); this is the way to be one with Christ; and being one with Christ, the way to be one with God. "SUCH HONOUR HAVE ALL HIS SAINTS!" (Ps. cxlix. 9.)

§ 2. Between the good and evil characteristics by which it is bounded on either hand our life glides hastily along, as a stream hurrying to the abyss of waters between a paradise and a desert; the one side bearing riches on its surface, the other sometimes deep within its bosom. And hence, while any one can tell, which looks fairest, any one must have more than common penetration to tell for a good way, which is worth most—until the characters on either hand becoming gradually more decided, leave no room at last to doubt between good and evil. Add to this, there are also certain criterions or land-marks, as already intimated; which, occurring at intervals, serve to denote the growing intensity of either characteristic. There is none very formidable to be passed as yet on the sinister side; none but what an angelic observer viewing effects in their causes both far and wide might regard with indifference, if not with satisfaction: yet the mark at which we are now arrived would imply a more serious class of evil subjectives than that which we have just contemplated, as these attach to constituents, but the others only to incidentals; being therefore easier to be shaken off than these, which are bred in the bone, or if it be only in the skin. For among this newly mentioned class of evil subjectives, v. g. evil of constituents, we also find a regular gradation ascending from the lowest element in which the evils are least to the highest in which they are most intense.

1. First, for example, there are found in our material constituents various evil subjectives; some characterizing the form of the person, whether more light and superficial, as *Ugliness* or *Uncomeliness*—or deeper and more inconvenient, as *Mutilation* and *Deformity*; some characterizing the stature; as *Dwarfishness* and *Overgrowth*, or *Immensity*;

—and some, the substance; as *Leanness* and *Obesity*. But among all these evils there is not one that offers a topic for censure or reproach, however it may be considered; except where people have either drawn the evil as a stigma on themselves by vice and vanity, or entailed it by the same means on their hapless posterity; which is as doubtful as the case of the blind; whom some of our Lord's disciples, as fond of detecting judgments as some good wives may be of finding likenesses, would needs have, to be suffering that infirmity either for his own sins or for those of his parents; whereas in truth it was for neither, but for a very superior reason, as our Lord observed: "Neither hath this man sinned, nor his parents; (said he) but that the works of God should be made manifest in him" (John ix. 3).

If however the responsibility for *material defects* brought into this beautiful system of human nature since man's first transgression be doubtful in any case, their reality is certain, and cannot be observed without commiseration and regret by those who wish to see every production of nature existing in its primitive perfection, as when the Creator "saw every thing that He had made; and behold, it was very good" (Gen. i. 31). But when we observe the horror, and often insolence, with which the vulgar, unreflecting sort are wont to regard these outward ills, or even the deficiency of a fair exterior, we bless God that his partiality is not such as they take it to be; and cannot help reflecting on the wisdom and goodness of his dispensations in choosing occasionally a plain person before others; as well to set off the latent worth with which it is combined, as to lessen the inconvenience of deformity, and teach mankind a more charitable judgment of their equals, by showing, that He has not the same taste with some of them, nor the same horror of his own innocent works. "For the Lord seeth not as man seeth: for man looketh on the outward appearance; but the Lord looketh on the heart" (Sam. I. xvi. 7). It is not in form, nor in manner, nor in speech either, but in thought and in deed, that we are to

look for the moral expression which constitutes loveliness that will last, and the only real beauty. The only begotten Son of God, the very "brightness of His glory" (Heb. i. 3) had in appearance, or at least to a common observer, "no form nor comeliness" (Isai. liii. 2): and the apostle Paul, who has been so great an instrument in His hands for cleansing and beautifying by far the most effective portion of the moral world, was reproached with his deficiencies in these respects by some of his own scholars, as he observes, "For his letters, say they, are weighty and powerful; but his bodily presence is weak, and his speech contemptible" (Cor. II. x. 10).

It may seem like anticipating a higher and infinitely worse exhibition of evil, to notice the insolence and injustice of the ungodly in prosperity towards their less fortunate brethren in outward respects; but one cannot think of such characters without feeling a degree of horror as well as they, and a lively indignation too sometimes; particularly at instances, as there have been, of the prosperous wretches, and wretches enough too if they were not prosperous, mutilating and disfiguring the image of God, not only from a stern principle of revenge, to make mourners; but it may be in wantonness, to make objects of sport for themselves; while some shall do as much in the way of mendicity, to make objects of compassion for others.

We are all liable to be partakers of other men's ill appearance so far as we have any connexion with them; and of the fault of it likewise, as well as of their other faults sometimes; by avarice, by over driving, by reproof, by satire and severity: as of their leanness especially; which is so often due to hard usage, and which others who have been similarly oppressed may bewail as well as Isaiah: "But I said, my leanness, my leanness: woe unto me! (said he) the treacherous dealers have dealt treacherously; yea, the treacherous dealers have dealt very treacherously" (Isai. xxiv. 16). Holy martyr: as if the study of a prophet, which Solomon himself considered a weariness

of the flesh, was not enough to reduce thee; but thou must be a prey to "treacherous dealers, and spoiled of the little that a prophet lacks," to pamper an idolatrous priesthood! That was Manasseh's doing: it was not like David's. According to him, whether the men of religion studied hard or not, if they were sincere in their vocation, they should deserve a better fate. "SUCH AS ARE PLANTED IN THE HOUSE OF THE LORD SHALL FLOURISH IN THE COURTS OF THE HOUSE OF OUR GOD: (said he) they also shall bring forth more fruit in their age; and shall be fat and well liking, that they may show how true the Lord, my strength is, and that there is no unrighteousness in Him" (Ps. xcii. 12, &c.). So sang David, the man after God's own heart: who loved when it might so happen, no doubt, to meet the blameless priest in a comfortable case.

But occasion reminds us now of the deformity and disease of fatness, properly called Obesity, rather than of that comfortable appearance; being such only in relation to mankind, and to a few other animals, horses especially, that are made, like man, more for active service than to be eaten or looked at. And even when this deformity, or blemish rather and that only relative, attaches to the human person, it will not always be censurable either. For if some men make themselves monsters by pampering, with late lying and other indulgences, there are some likewise, who from some peculiarity that they have in their digestion can hardly starve themselves into leanness without starving entirely.

2. The several kinds of *spiritual disadvantages* to which we are subject may also be regarded as so many deductions from the weal of the corporate body in a general view; though God knows, as he often intends, them to be blessings to those whom he favours: and blessings too must they then needs be. "For thou, Lord, wilt give thy blessing to the righteous; and with thy favourable kindness wilt thou defend him, as with a shield" (Ps. v. 13). These disadvantages therefore, being so many species or

portions of the forementioned state of adversity, may, as we are going to see, justly be considered in the same light with it as to the grounds and variation of their quality; which will be sometimes evil, and sometimes good in the same particular, according to circumstances.

1, And if evils in a higher sphere—as in the spiritual for example, are naturally more adverse than in a lower, as in the material, just mentioned, by God's grace the same may become on the contrary as much more propitious: of which we have examples even in the lowest or *motive* kind; as weakness and inactivity; languor, wasting and impotency. These evils, however frightful to look on, are all improveable, all good for something.

2, Still better for our use may the more serious evils of *sensitive* constituents become by the same means: such evils, to wit, as 1, weariness; 2: 3, sorrow, and remorse; although, as we read, "No chastening for the present seemeth to be joyous, but grievous" (Heb. xii. 11). For that indeed cannot be disputed: neither can it be disputed; that every species of suffering and uneasiness that is felt deeply, or as we say, at heart, every sensible evil in short, must be evil at least as long as it is felt, and more evil at the same time the more it is mixed up with intellect; however it may occasionally prove a mean to good, as aforesaid, and as may be seen in the example of suffering for righteousness' sake already noticed, with others of less importance.

—1, *Weariness* for one which many court in various ways, by sporting, by exercise, by physicking, by contention, would seem to be an evil notwithstanding its popularity. Yet weariness being so easily superseded by rest, will not seem very grievous; and being often found a remedy for greater evils by inducing sweet sleep, it may so far be considered in the light of an advantage.

To a slight observation there would appear to be no necessary mixture of intellectual spirit in this property; yet the mind has certainly something to do with it, namely,

with the weariness of the body ; as appears by the body's wearying sooner where the mind is not interested, than where it feels an interest. But the share of intellect in this species of suffering is, perhaps, less than in any other, though gross enough to make it an example in point, namely, of the convertibility and at the same time reality and distinction of these evil subjective characteristics, which become more apparent continually as we ascend with them from the spiritual element towards that of intellect.

—2: 3, And so we find too in the examples of *Sorrow* and *Remorse* ; where the mind seems to have more to do with the matter, than it has in the crying out of an overstrained muscle, organ, or faculty of any kind whatever. Sorrow would be thought as fixed and inconvertible an evil at first sight, as it is real and decided : but much of the evil of this too must depend on circumstances. Indeed, it must depend entirely on its relations and circumstances, whether any sorrow be good or evil. It will be necessary, therefore, to have an eye to these, and to two relations especially, the author and object, in order to distinguish accurately the evil sorrow from the good ; a third relation, the end, being their proof or criterion.

—1, First then, what makes the sorrow of any subject to be evil to him will be its *evil production* ; whether 1, directly, by the subject's 1 misconstruing and mistrusting the dispensations of Providence ; 2 suspecting the honour and friendship of others to whom he is nearly related ; 3 remissness, neglect, and inattention in his particular concerns, with other vices arising from an indolent disposition ; 4 indiscretion and the like ; but 5 most directly, eminently, and universally by that never failing source of sin and consequent suffering, infidelity, which is of a piece with the first mentioned—or 2, whether such production be mediately by the intervention of the angels that trouble us, not being always absolutely evil in them-

selves, as may be observed hereafter, but relatively so only sometimes in respect of the sufferer who brings that trouble on himself of which they are the instruments. For if the said sufferer be evil, his very joy will be evil too; and of course his sorrow cannot be good, or not good to him however. Especially when sorrow lights upon an individual, and perhaps sorrow upon sorrow, without making him either wiser or better, but rather hardening him, as it did Pharaoh, in the wrong course he had taken, and riveting his affections still closer perhaps to some idolatrous object; who is stricken again and again, but has not rightly grieved—especially then, may we know such sorrow to be evil, and whither to refer its beginning: so that the beginning may be judged from the end, and the end from the beginning, and all most inauspiciously for the ill omened sufferer or subject.

=2, But what may blunt the edge of sorrow, and make it good in the end is chiefly *its good beginning* or God's goodness and his kind direction; whereby the very evil that is in us will often be turned to good for us, and to a thanksgiving for Him. Therefore, this happy end of sorrow may also be deemed a certain proof of its divine beginning: as, for example, sometimes by punishment in a lower sphere or element, to correct the evil in a higher; whether it be in the material, to correct one in the spiritual; or in the spiritual, to correct one in the intellectual. So the apostle Paul with regard to a very perilous as well as infamous case of fornication determines, as he says, "with the power of our Lord Jesus Christ, to deliver such a one unto Satan for the destruction of the flesh, (which is done oftener than people imagine,) that the spirit may be saved in the day of the Lord Jesus" (Cor. I. v. 4, 5). So the apostle himself, it seems, was chastised, and for the same salutary purpose, v. g. as he owns, to avert or correct the impious habit of pride and self-adoration. "And lest I should be exalted above measure through the abund-

ance of the revelations, (says he,) there was given to me a thorn in the flesh; the messenger of Satan, to buffet me, lest I should be exalted above measure" (Ib. II. xii. 7).

= 3; But sorrow may be either good or evil according to its *object* likewise, as well as according to its subject and beginning; to be known by its good or evil tendency, as well as the good or evil occasion. For example

* 1, The trials of those who sorrow towards God are not casual, "neither doth trouble spring out of the ground" (as Job says) on such occasions. And why? "God is the Judge: He putteth down one, and setteth up another" (Ps. lxxv. 8). "When He giveth quietness, who can make trouble? and when he hideth his face, who then can behold Him; whether it be done against a nation, or against a man only?" (Job xxxiv. 29.) And as it is said likewise, that "He doth not afflict willingly" (Iam. iii. 33), if we ever enjoy any marks of his favour in rejoicing, we ought not to distrust it in tribulation. For "shall we (says the virtuous forecited patriarch) shall we (he might have said, can we) receive good of the hand of God, and not receive evil?" (Job ii. 10.)—No! for the pain of the righteous is no pain in effect, but the precursive shadow of peace and pleasure. "Great are the troubles of the righteous: but the Lord delivereth him out of all" (Ps. xxiiv. 19).

No two things can be more distinct than good and evil sorrow, care, trouble, or uneasiness; than the trouble of the righteous and of the wicked, or sorrow towards God and mere worldly sorrow: they are as opposite, and their feeling or perception too is as opposite, as are their respective sufferers or subjects, and strictly answerable thereto, v.g. good to good, and evil to evil—as they say, "Ashes to ashes, and dust to dust." For the care of the righteous and their concern at the evil are soon turned into joy, and a perception of good; one beyond the power of man to shake (John xvi. 22), and the other too sublime for

him to attain without the aid of divine inspiration ; while on the contrary, the joy of the wicked is soon turned into sorrow, and their evil apprehension into utter darkness. So David found, as he says—"Then thought I to understand this : (says he) but it was too hard for me, until I went into the sanctuary of God. Then understood I the end of these men : namely, how thou dost set them in slippery places, and castest them down, and destroyest them. Oh, how suddenly do they consume, perish, and come to a fearful end ! Yea, even like as a dream when one awaketh, so shalt thou make their image to vanish out of the city" (Ps. lxxiii. 15, &c.). The goodness and infallibility of divine Providence must be evident soon or late to all who trust in It : their heaviness, like David's, "may endure for a night ; but joy cometh in the morning" (Ib. xxx. 5); as the divine light enlivens their hearts to the wonderful works of God.

Such men as David may also be troubled sometimes through other men's faults as well as their own, and angry enough too on the same account ; as he says, "Do not I hate them, O Lord, that hate thee ; and am not I grieved with them that rise up against thee ?" (Ps. cxxxix. 21.) Sometimes too such men may well be grieved on account of their own faults to others ; as the same David on account of his signal fault in relation to a brave and loyal soldier, Uriah the Hittite (Sam. II. xi.), and St. Peter in relation to his adorable Lord, with many others ; who shewed by their hearty remorse on such occasions and its virtuous direction, that they were all true in heart, though faulty sometimes, to their sorrow, in practice ; and eventually the happier for their temporary dejection.

God is never disappointed in those who love Him, and each other with him ; neither will they be disappointed in Him. They may be sad for having displeased their heavenly Father either directly or indirectly, and for having lost the comfort of his presence, when they can take no more delight in other objects, than a woman who

has lost her only child: when he hideth his face from them, they may well be troubled (Ps. civ. 29); but they will soon have the more cause to thank him, because they loved much (Luke vii. 47). Such is the quality of that relative or reflected sorrow which has properly God for its object. It is a sorrow that our kindest friend may be pleased to witness, and rejoice at; as St. Paul wrote to some who had justly smarted under his reproof. "Now I rejoice (says he) not that ye were made sorry, but THAT YE SORROWED TO REPENTANCE. For ye were made sorry after a godly manner, that ye might receive damage by us in nothing. For godly sorrow worketh repentance to salvation not to be repented of" (Cor. II. vii. 9, 10).

* 2; The foregoing makes a very disadvantageous contrast for another cast of sorrow of the same relative kind to which St. Paul alludes in the same passage; and which is indeed the proper scope of our present consideration. He terms it *Worldly Sorrow*, or the sorrow of the world; as from its source or beginning it may also be termed *Sordid and Selfish*, with the character of working death: when having said, "For godly sorrow worketh repentance to salvation, not to be repented of," he adds, "But the sorrow of the world worketh death." There is not so much danger of this work from a becoming sorrow towards either God or man. For that furious fiend, the World, knocks harder in the worldly sensorium, his death dealing fangs strike deeper into the worldly breast; and there is not any specific balm for his cruel wounds in that quarter, as there is for the inflictions of godly sorrow. Another reason also for the fatality of that worldly sort may be gathered from the saying of another apostle. "For all that is in the world (says he), the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father, but is of the world. And the world passeth away, and the lust thereof" (John I. ii. 16, 17)—as much as to say, that the vain world, and every vain, and every carnal, and every covetous, and every high feeling that goes to its

moral composition is answerable to its origin, as a thing of no steadfast existence, that is passing every day, and will be gone in no time compared with the term that comes after.

Therefore, a sufferer whose sorrow happens to be of this complexion, that is *worldly*; who bewails his weakness and wrinkles, his poverty or comparative dejection, inability to drink or domineer as formerly, and other unworldly, or as they say, unfashionable conditions—who bewails these formidable afflictions for a man of the world in respect to the world generally, and to himself as a part of it more especially, because the world no longer esteems him, nor he himself as before, that sufferer is by such sorrow contracted more closely to the crumbling mass of materials that is sure to fall ere long and bury him in its ruins. He is filled with vain apprehensions of harm in every shape, but in that in which it really happens, and the vain expectations of good more tantalizing than any apprehensions, but most unfortunately with vain conceptions of its nature and acquisition; when atheism is thought profound wisdom; to be at open enmity with God, good policy—and every other friend, that would be, is repulsed by ill usage, or cast off in suspicion; when the light of the soul is extinguished by pride, and the body itself consumed by the very care that he bestows upon it, his innocent food being taxed for the same, or his dress, or habitation, or exercise, or somewhat else, which has no more to do with the visionary's complaints, than he has himself the power to remove them. His vanity is rewarded with endless disappointment, disappointed lust, disappointed avarice, disappointed ambition, be it only that of mingling strong drink; enough, all together, to bow down and break the stoutest spirit, bringing the same to a moral or spiritual death—eternal like itself, and as painful as mental suffering, with which that of the body bears no comparison, can possibly be, or will admit of. Then well may a man say, “Woe is me now! for the Lord hath added grief to my

sorrow; I fainted in my sighing, and I find no rest" (Jer. xlv. 3).

And all this while sorrow on precisely the same accounts as those before-mentioned, namely, weakness and wrinkles, poverty and dejection, loss of health and appetite, loss of authority, and crosses of every description, even in the most important quarter, in the way of righteousness—having God for its object, with the idea of being less able to serve Him, or less worthy of his service, or less approved and supported by Him, will contract the sufferer, in like manner, more closely to God and his eternal happiness, as he goes through this vale of misery. But when we go a step farther, and the journey of life is considered in its last stage, and the worldly sufferer's mind at that awful period is compared with the godly sufferer's, one sorrowing towards a sinful world that he is about to quit, and the other towards a merciful Judge that he is about to meet; one because he has sinned out his allowance and can sin no longer, the other because he has sinned, and "come short of the glory of God," (Rom. iii. 23) on making this comparison, we shall find the difference of sorrow in these two opposite relations most palpable. And then we may almost think we see the wretched horror-stricken worldling driven, from light, life, and comfort, as it were by his own reproaches; while, to the godly man, his own reflexions, however bitter and insupportable for the time, will not seem destructive; they burn, but do not consume; he is baptized with the Holy Ghost and with fire (Matt. iii. 11), and comes safely out of the flames, one walking with him, in the form of God (Dan. iii. 25). While he lived he might say with the Psalmist, "It is good for me that I have been in trouble" (Ps. cxix. 71), and afterward it may be said of him with propriety, "Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord" (Rev. xiv. 13). "Thus the righteous that is dead shall condemn the ungodly which are living" (Wis. iv. 16).

In the same manner also they who have bewailed their injuries to others merely in respect to the world or themselves; as when a whole family is ruined at once by the dissipation of its head, an amiable wife is hurried to her grave by unkind suspicion, or children are brought to ruin by an excess either of severity or indulgence, by a bad example, by carelessness, or otherwise through the influence of an evil genius, and all the world cries, Shame upon it; when they feel how they have cut up their own enjoyments by the root, they may well sorrow indeed, but it will be very differently from those who bewail their own losses chiefly on account of those whom they may suppose themselves to have injured and lost. And so one goes to join his kindred spirits in everlasting shame and remorse, while the other, purged by godly sorrow and a sincere repentance through Christ, goes to rejoin those whom he has cordially bewailed before the throne of their common Redeemer, chaunting with them and with numberless other both higher and lower instruments of his goodness, the chorus of "blessings, and honour, and glory, and power unto Him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb for ever and ever" (Rev. v. 13). His captivity has been turned like the rivers in the south; he has sown in tears a bitter remembrance of the past, and the decline of life has been with him a continual effort to rectify the errors of its rise and meridian; for which, by God's merciful allowance through Christ, he shall doubtless come again with joy and bring his relations with him (Ps. cxxvi. 7), while others who have despised that mercy, and will have no Redeemer, hardening themselves also even now "*in this their day*" against the memory of their ruined relatives, shall remain in endless captivity, and fetters of woe galling more and more for ever, and fretting by continuance.

For the remorse of an unrepenting sinner, or repentance without a proper object, is real pain in the heart, or, more literally, to a man's inmost constituents, all the while that

he continues in this state ; and that must be for ever, if his hour of grace is past. Then the sinner's misery can only admit of one aggravation, which is found in the knowledge of its perpetuity. Then remorse shall be aided by despair ; which burns and harrows up the whole mass of spiritual and intellectual properties, making indeed a very hell of that which was created a perfect paradise.

3. As much more important as the intellectual department of the kingdom is than the spiritual and material, so much more serious will be any lasting deficiency or derangement in that quarter, like what may be called *intellectual woes*, or the woes of intellect. Therefore, while other troubles are more immediately of the sufferer's own production, it would seem as if this last stroke of adversity was mercifully kept out of a man's power, and reserved by his Almighty Judge, to see if there were any passable constituents, if it were but as ten in a city ; if there might be any spiritual improvement, any little disposition, if it was but ever so little, to return and take hold of his salvation, after the chastisements that men have received for that purpose. He will not trust this awful infliction to other hands, any more than his thunder ; but should it so happen, after due time given for repentance, as we read in the prophets, that " the people turneth not unto Him that smiteth them, neither do they seek the Lord of hosts " (Isai. ix. 13) ; " Thou hast stricken them, but they have not grieved ; thou hast consumed them, but they have refused to receive correction ; they have made their faces harder than a rock ; they have refused to return " (Jer. v. 3) : then will the Judge assert his own dignity and the dignity of his offended laws, without any respect of the culprit's high character and capacity, and will bring them both to a shadow, as He says, " Forasmuch as this people draw near me with their mouth, and with their lips do honour me, but have removed their heart far from me, and their fear toward me is taught by the precept of men ; therefore behold, I will proceed to do a marvellous work among this people, even a

marvellous work and a wonder: for the wisdom of their wise men shall perish, and the understanding of their prudent men shall be hid" (Isai. xxix. 13, 14).

The evil subjectives of this class may generally be ranked among the severest calamities of our mortal condition, and more especially when they are not inbred, but provoked and brought on, or, as it may be said, assimilated to the sufferer by his own default or evil objectives. It is this unlucky co-operation indeed, that gives the keen edge to most of our sufferings, as they mostly proceed in this way. For the mind consisting naturally of various motions or properties without any character or direction except what they derive either from their imperfect associates in the body, or from the action of the mind upon itself—in other words, the mind being naturally a mere *rasa tabula*, or vacuum rather, and consequently without the knowledge of God, while, from the natural corruption of the body, it is also incapable of knowing Him truly; if, being brought by divine providence within the light of the truth, it should still choose darkness rather than light, it will be thought fair by every reasonable man, that such a choice on the part of the mind, or inner man, should make a wide difference between the quality of its consequent sufferings and such mental afflictions as were only natural, and yet bad enough: to say nothing of the common aggravation that most sorts of troubles and afflictions must derive from the sufferer's recollection of his own share in their production, when he has leisure to recollect it, as he must soon or late, whether he have leisure for such recollection or not.

Independent of cause and production, however, there are evils, and those very deplorable, in every department of intellect; whether it be 1, in that of apprehension, as Blindness, Deafness, Obtuseness; or 2, of memory, as Oblivion or Forgetfulness; or 3, of judgment, as Idiotism and Imbecility; or 4, of the will, as Irresolution, Indecision; or 5, and last, of the imagination in several respects. Thus,

1, In the evil subjectives of the apprehension, usually

called Infirmities—as Blindness, Deafness, Obtuseness, from the outward sense, though lying chiefly in the inward perception, the sufferer may find somewhat to deplore; especially, if he have contrived by any means to be instrumental to his own hurt, as afore said. But it is possible that an imperfect apprehension, whether we call it Blindness or Deafness, may be temporary, as proceeding only from a temporary fault: when, trying the same by the usual criterion of continuance, we should pronounce it comparatively light, though it might not be altogether faultless or unprovoked. Such was the case with David once upon the occasion just now alluded to, when, knowing the goodness of God to his people, he could still so far forget it for a time, as to grieve at the prosperity of the wicked; and, though he does not directly own so much, almost to doubt his equity; “Thus my heart was grieved; and it went even through my reins. So foolish was I and ignorant, even as it were a beast before thee!” (Ps. lxxiii. 20, 21.) But, as it always happens for one impression to continue only in proportion to another on which it is founded, David’s distrust being but momentary, his wrong apprehension founded on such distrust was no more, dispersing of itself like the morning dew as he went into the sanctuary and in its holy atmosphere imbibed other feelings—feelings more worthy of the subject, its object, and himself. “Then understood I” (Ib. 16), says he. An habitual sceptic would not have been so easily set to rights.

2: 3, The *Memory* and the *Judgment*, which, as before observed, are only two species of apprehension, may be similarly defective in the relation above-mentioned, and are perhaps like that more frequently in the highest than in any inferior respect. Yet Forgetfulness, Simplicity, and other defects of these as well as

3: 4, *Of the Will*, like Irresolution and Indecision before-mentioned, may exist without any farther guilt than that by which they were originally caused or prepared. While it is certain that all these evils will still depend, in a great

measure, on the fault of every individual sufferer for their production as well as aggravation, like the general evil of sorrow before-mentioned.

5, But more room for fault, and for consequent suffering, will occur in every evil cast *of the Imagination*; that being of all properties the highest, therefore the most responsible and first to be arraigned, as the lying, the perturbed, the doating, the somnolent, all equally belonging to the class of evil subjectives; as they who feel them most must know best, at the same time that some may be more immoral than some, or more inclining to the objective import, and among these, the first especially, that is

—1, *A lying imagination*; which may include every species of doating, whether criminal or innocent, as every kind of self-adulation, whether military, civil, or religious; whether consisting in visionary conquests, or golden dreams, or beautiful hypotheses. For in every walk or department a lying imagination will be the same bauble, or something worse, however it may be coloured: it is one that you indulge in false representations, to flatter your particular bent or inclination, painting to the life events that are never likely to happen in a more substantial shape, and which, if they really happened, would be sometimes neither so creditable nor so gratifying in fact, as the dreamer decrees. For he can decree characteristics as well as essentials in that airy region where he is so absolute, and picture laurels, titles, saintships, as fast as the glorious achievements to which they are annexed; doing very easily too, in his dreams, what no man can do waking; which is, to ensure a great reputation, as well as deserve it.

As for anticipating the consequences of our attempts with a view to practice, it is quite another thing: and although every hypothesis or conjecture on futurity, may, every positive intention respecting it, may be called a vanity in strictness, and is not far from lying, or fondling, at least, yet there will seem a wide difference between this manner of supposing contingencies for the sake of a reso-

lution, and that wilful dreaming, for the purpose of self-deception, between an hypothesis for use—ay, or an invention, either for public amusement, and a solitary, sober, self-deceiving lie of the imagination. For by an hypothesis, the work of the imagination may be forwarded, and by an ingenious fiction, it may be occasionally refreshed; but by a fond lie it is hindered and debased, and the whole subject liable to be greatly hurt. By flattering ourselves with visions of glory, comfort, sanctity, we waste our precious time, and render ourselves unequal to the attainment of either: to say nothing of the effect it has in exciting our vanity, an effect that we are not sensible of sometimes before it is well nigh become an incurable habit.

—2, By a *perturbed imagination* we may understand two sorts of terror, as the same shall be either falsely or justly perturbed.

=1, The *falsely perturbed* imagination is one that exaggerates on the dark side, shewing things indifferent, or even good, to be evil: and evil things many times worse than they are. And whether this illusion proceed from the body or the mind, from disordered nerves or a sickly conscience, or both, its bitterness will be the same while it lasts: but there is this comfort in such case, v. g. that of a false or excessive perturbation—that the bitterness will soon be over; which cannot always be said of perturbation in the other case.

=2, The *justly perturbed* imagination is a case of terror that will hardly admit of exaggeration, when it comes to be so well founded. For it may not be amiss to mention here, that there is a sort of terror very different from that beautiful characteristic, the fear of God* before described; as different as burning is from warmth and comfort. The comfortable warmth of the fire may be increased to a painful and fatal degree: and the salutary fear of God may be increased to mental agony, growing from fear to terror,

* More particularly in Kingdom-Sermons.

and from a blessing with the righteous to a curse with the wicked, like that which their masters experience.

This dreadful passion is noticed very frequently in Scripture by different figures and appellations; as "the terror of the Lord" (Cor. II. v. 11), "the cup of trembling" (Isai. li. 17), "a consuming fire" (Deut. iv. 24); the same not being a constituent of the kingdom, but rather an accident on a constituent, as overflowing is an accident on water, a constituent of the earth. The true fear of God is a most precious gift, as before observed, but this is not a gift; it is a punishment and a curse that is denounced against many offences differing as to form or mode, but agreeing in principle or origin—no fear of God. So Moses denounces it against the Israelites in the desert, if they should ever abandon the divine institutions which he had been employed by God to set up for them. "The Lord shall give thee then a trembling heart, and failing of eyes, and sorrow of mind; (said he) and thy life shall hang in doubt before thee; and thou shalt fear day and night, and shalt have none assurance of thy life. In the morning thou shalt say, Would God, it were even! and at even thou shalt say, Would God, it were morning! for the fear of thine heart, and for the sight of thine eyes which thou shalt see" (Deut. xxviii. 65, &c.). So David denounces this same punishment against conceited infidels generally. "Put them in fear, O Lord, that the heathen may know themselves to be but men" (Ps. ix. 20), says he: and a very proper way it must be owned, to correct presumption, and shew strong men their weakness; as it was shewn to the army of the Syrians (Kings II. vii. 6), and has been shewn to many other armies and individuals, both lately and long ago; when they had not the sanction of a good cause, to uphold their resolution.

No terror, therefore, can be exaggerated in cases like these; seeing the perturbation of thought attendant on a guilty conscience, even when false, in fact, will be true in effect; and though begun here, may not end here per-

haps, but follow its wretched proprietor through the silent tomb to a more frightful confinement, without silence, more woeful than the echoing cell of a frantic maniac, to the blackness of darkness, and region of sorrow; where he will find more trembling devils by the side of him, to assist his perturbation. "For the devils also believe and tremble" (Jam. ii. 19). And if these wretched spirits, and he with them, should suffer nothing else, their own horrible dread might be enough to overwhelm them.

—3, It seems a late faith is the punishment of those wretched spirits, being (however it may originate with them) with mankind too often the fruit of what may be called a *fond imagination*, and is simply expressed by *Doating*. This differs from lying as much as idiotcy differs from indiscretion: it is a lost case indeed; and there is no remedy for it, but the grace of God and special interposition of his all gracious providence. For the object of such an imagination may be either superior or inferior; a superior who cares nothing for us, as a proud patron, for example, or an inferior that we care for too much—as a child, a toy, a garden, or a lap-dog: the dotage being hardly curable by human means in either case; any more than the last to be mentioned and similarly accountable species, being

—4, *A somnolent imagination*: whereby is meant, not our "songs in the night" (Job xxxv. 10), which may be innocent according to Him who gives them, but the sad affliction of dreaming with open eyes; which, however indifferent in itself, may be guilty enough in its causes when brought on by idleness, pride, gluttony, lust, intemperance and the like, and rewarded accordingly in the manner and measure before intimated.

* There may be some use in observing what evil subjects are most attributable to our own conduct, as many are more or less; since it enables us to judge among them, and act accordingly. For, accordingly as evils are more

or less severe they ought to be more or less strenuously resisted or avoided : and it is a pleasing discovery made long ago, that the severest evils on earth are generally those of our own choosing, being therefore the easiest to combat with such assistance as we may have, in consideration of a certain ransom or head-rent, only for asking. They are the severest, by reason of their consequences, and the easiest to combat by reason of their dependence to a considerable extent on our own will and inclination : which is an advantage that they have sometimes over the incidental sort of evil subjectives before mentioned.

CHRISTIAN MODES.

PART I.

THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN CHRIST.

CHAPTER VI.

EVIL OBJECTIVE CHARACTERISTICS.

SEC. 1.

IMMORAL—ON INCIDENTALS.

1. Covetousness or Cupidity.—2. Ambition.—3. Avarice—4. Dishonesty, &c.—5. Penury, Parsimony, Inhospitallity.—6. Prodigality, Waste.—7. Discontent.—8. Foppery and Filthiness.

“A cage of every unclean and hateful bird.”—REV. xviii. 2.

HAPPY would it be for mankind, if the description of a Christian life and spirit were the whole of that which we are now considering, or if the characteristic constituents of mankind did not go beyond that description: but only just now, while a Christian life was described under the head of good objective characteristics, an allusion was unavoidable to objectives of a contrary description; which it now becomes a painful duty to unfold. Wherefore, in attempting this part, it will only be needful to exhibit the other half of a contrast, the better half of which has just been exhibited, affording, at the same time, a pattern and foundation for this. We have considered the subject of righteousness as a good characteristic or improvement on wisdom; the word taken in a neutral sense being, as before observed, an alteration of right wisenesse; which is right wisdom, or wisdom put to a right use: we are now

to consider the antithesis of righteousness, as an abuse of wisdom, or of the natural wit that God has given us ; when it must be, not right wisenesse, but wrong, or unright ; unright wisenesse, or unrighteousness, as it is commonly spelled. This is not the wisdom from above, which we are all taught of God (John vi. 45) ; but the wisdom from beneath, which we learn in the world ; worldly wisdom, which is foolishness with God (Cor. I. iii. 19) : and after a few observations on the general subject of unright wisenesse or unrighteousness, we shall also presently have to consider some of its more remarkable shades and particulars as we did by its antagonist property of righteousness.

For the general subject we have other terms besides unrighteousness above mentioned ; as Wickedness and Depravity, Sin and Corruption, Criminality and Guilt, Villainy, Flagitiousness, Atrocity, and others that might be mentioned. Perhaps Guiltiness, for the property or habit of unrighteousness would be more expressive than Guilt, as well as more certain, considering the incidental quality of the latter : and perhaps too, one use of the different terms here enumerated may be, to intimate and denote so many different degrees of criminality, depending on the subject or sphere in which these characters are exhibited and to which they are confined, as well as on the object to which in different cases they chiefly relate ; as villainy for example, which is the work of a villain and very deep-seated. For guilt may be almost involuntary by chance, or so slightly tinged with evil purpose, (for it can never be all white) as to seem far enough from what we should call Deliberate Villainy. We call it villainy, when a wretch can coolly meditate an action of that sort ; when he can meditate, perhaps, what will then deserve to be called Villainy, waking upon his bed after the sedative effect of a good night's rest, and he ought to be of a better mind ; or when (as the Psalmist expresses it) he " imagineth mischief upon his bed " (Ps. xxxvi. 4).

Therefore, guilt, or guiltiness, being less perfect in thought than in word, and less again in word than in deed, is esteemed accordingly lighter, but not justly ; as the ratio ought to be reversed. And still the combination of those evil characters will seem likewise more decidedly evil, than their distinct or particular exhibition. It is the wilful violation or neglect of a known duty, evil thinking and doing, or the union of evil thought with evil action or speech, or its intellectual cast, in short, that must make either an action or speech to be thoroughly evil ; and when evil thoughts, actions, and speeches unite in one subject, they are like confluent ulcers covering the body in some loathsome disease. Arrived at this point, sin is (as St. Paul accounts it) " become exceeding sinful, working death by that which is good " (Rom. vii. 13).

Sin is not a negative property, though it be any thing except righteousness ; but positive and real as righteousness in this department, or as gravitation, solidity, and extension in the material. Like righteousness too it is also known to centre and originate in one being. As all the righteousness that we know or can imagine is of God by Jesus Christ, so is all the sin or unrighteousness in the world of the wicked one by the corruption that is in it ; and as all the righteous are of God, and one with Christ in Him, so all the unrighteous are of that wicked one, and one with him in corruption and its consequences.

If, therefore, we would ascend to the very source and centre of this generally reprobated, though at the same time highly cultivated subject, unrighteousness, we should consider the same in embryo, as revelation teaches and reason apprehends it : because unrighteousness, being a general term for evil properties, will not differ in the main from any one of them, and particularly with regard to its nature and origin. St. John says, " All unrighteousness is sin " (John I. v. 17) : intimating its common origin, and how all unrighteousness is naturally, or by origin, original sin ; from the period of its first introduction, a latent, na-

tural, and in our department, universal property of the kingdom: which property, like manhood itself, or tigerhood, or the mischievously obsequious humour called puppy-hood, or any other specific character, though insite or inbred, does not immediately discover itself in the subject; pushing only by degrees, and breaking so slowly at first, that, like the tares in the parable, it can hardly be discerned, but so surely too at the same time, that if it be not soon attacked by the weeder, it will, like they, defy his efforts, and leave no remedy but binding and burning (Matt. xiii. 24, &c.). But as this, like other general properties, is made up of particulars, or rather abstracted from them, the most effectual course to demonstrate its reality, or any other property belonging to it, will be, to review these particulars successively in the order just referred to—proceeding accordingly with the moral class first, and the sort that is founded on incidentals; such as 1, Cupidity, or general covetousness; 2, Ambition, or Covetousness of power; 3, Avarice, or Covetousness of wealth; 4, Dishonesty, or a false appropriation of what was falsely coveted; 5, Penury, which is either too sparing an application, or else a parsimonious and inhospitable withholding of the same on the one hand, with 6, the opposite extreme of a prodigal and wasteful employment of it on the other.

§ 1. As the wider comprehension and superior policy of mankind, compared with other kinds, enables them both to fancy more enjoyments and also to accumulate more ample means in order thereto, and as new desires still spring out of opportunity; the views, means, and opportunities of many will first give rise to an excessive appetite for enjoyment, and sooner or later to a rage for accumulating means without an end, and most frequently too after the season for enjoyment is past. But, whatever may be their seasonableness and consequent importance, the same means will be of two sorts or degrees, primary and secondary, with different calls for *Covetousness* adapted

thereto ; as, for example, 1, the primary or immediate means of enjoyment, whether consisting in objects of taste, sense, or comfort, will furnish food for cupidity ; 2, the secondary means, or means to the former, whether consisting in power and influence, or in influential opulence, will furnish food for ambition and avarice. The whole family or genus comes under the denomination of characteristic by excess ; and it may be added, by an excess of the most troublesome kind to its subject or owner, as well as of an inconvenient and often dangerous quality too for other people. It is even no uncommon quality among brutes, and more worthy of them than of rational beings ; which alone were enough to entitle it to the place it here holds at the foot of the list of evil objectives.

But it will be necessary to understand a covetousness of the primary or immediate objects of enjoyment rather than of any means to the same, and of wealth especially, when this evil characteristic is imputed to brutes. For brutes would seem to be above such means : it is only human beings that are greedy of earth. And well it may be for brutes in this respect sometimes, that they have not our extensive views of enjoyment, to call forth avarice by degrees in them too, and exasperate their humble appetites to the same pitch with ours : humble appetites truly in them, and more humble in us, however, or to whatever objects directed, although they rank as spiritual and intellectual properties. They are raging, ravening humours, as degrading to intellectual spirits, as they are troublesome and inconvenient ; and that not only in present endurance, but likewise in respect of consequences. Indeed, the consequences of these unworthy appetites are more to be dreaded than even their gnawing influence, both by the covetous man and his posterity. “ Woe to him (says God by the prophet) that coveteth an evil covetousness to his house, that he may set his nest on high, that he may be delivered from the power of evil ” (Hab. ii. 9). By means of the blessed apostles he also teaches us to

beware of covetousness, "which (says St. Paul) is idolatry" (Col. iii. 5): But he most decidedly warns us against the same by his only begotten Son: whose life and doctrine were opposed so entirely to this evil habit, and particularly on the grounds before cited, v. g. that "a man's life consisteth not in the abundance of the things that he possesseth" (Luke xii. 15); the objects of covetousness are no constituents.

St. Paul is not the only saint who ever regarded covetousness as idolatry, for holy Job had the same view too of this property, and dreaded it accordingly, as he says. "If I have made gold my hope, or have said to the fine gold Thou art my confidence; if I rejoiced, because my wealth was great, and because mine hand had gotten much . . . this also were an iniquity to be punished by the Judge; for I should have denied THE GOD THAT IS ABOVE" (Job, xxxi. 24, &c.). Denying God in this manner, is vulgarly called, Worshipping gold, and no uncommon expression; no more is the practice either unfortunately: yet its priests, understanding thereby coiners, publicans, and usurers, with other sorts of money-makers, are not reverend: and as for their object or idol; if the worshippers could recollect sometimes, what hands the shining metal is apt to pass through, as before observed, they would not be so apt to fall down to it when present, still less to devote themselves to other objects of covetousness for the sake of that, and to power especially, which is one great object of ambition. For if avarice and covetousness are often considered as one, it can only be by inclusion—ambition being as much covetousness as avarice in fact, two species included under one denomination, shade or degree; as may appear from their distinct consideration, v.g. the consideration of ambition and avarice as two particular sorts of covetousness.

§ 2. Respecting the first of these, however, it may be right to premise, that the appetite for power or greatness is not alone the proper object of *Ambition*, as many appear to think; but likewise, and much rather, the appetite

for goodness or excellence in some respect, to which eminent power may and ought to contribute, when something might be said in excuse for a man's ambition. But the ambition that should desire greatness without goodness, or power without excellence—if it deserved the name at all, would be, however, ambition of a very poor quality. This, so far from being the infirmity of great souls, as generally imagined, is a vice of very little souls, of souls that cannot take in a larger scope of action than one sphere at a time, and that, the sphere immediately above them. Hence, the little tyrant of his family and work-people will aspire to domineer in the village; the village-tyrant to domineer in a county perhaps, and the county-tyrant in a kingdom. But what a paltry ambition is the very highest of these casts to the ambition of a truly great soul, which feels its relation to God and angels, and aspires to rise in universal importance! which feels the dignity of a righteous and useful existence in the eyes of very different witnesses, and is not the less honoured for being overlooked by men! What a criminal ambition too is it, when a man begins to idolize his own greatness, instead of adoring and contending for the greatness of his Author! Would you but “let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works and glorify your Father which is in heaven” (Matt. v. 16), you need not shine the less; while there is also this advantage in such an ambition; v. g. that it is not likely to become excessive, as not many men are very sanguine in this respect, if it may be said by such as David and Jesus the son of David (but he was more than man) “The zeal of thine house hath even eaten me” (Ps. lxi. 9). In this sense, ambition is good: but this is not the usual sense of ambition. Ambition in the usual sense is a love of power; and that for its own sake merely, or else for the sake of mischief; which is what makes it to be an evil objective characteristic.

§ 3. If *Avarice* be not more mischievous than ambition,

it may be equally covetous or flagrant, and by that means also an equally mischievous propensity—a miserably low, as well as mischievous, and a sneaking as well as unnatural propensity; a propensity that seldom takes a man, till nature has done with him; an unvaried calamity; a propensity that is always bad. For as avarice does not desire a bare competency, nor is supposed to covet wealth with any benevolent purpose, but only for the love of wealth, there can be no good kind of avarice, it is always an evil symptom: never good nor indifferent; no not even in a fond sense, like ambition.

The ordinary fruits of avarice are the same with those of ambition, the first mentioned species of covetousness; v. g. dishonesty, fraud, theft, murder and rapine. The character of the two is also much the same; except that avarice, being the older is, as one should expect, rather the more cautious. A sample of their common fruits or productions from the list above given may farther indicate their agreement. One of them

§ 4. *Dishonesty*, was the first cognizable offence that man ever committed; an act in commission, but habit in effect, becoming its own punishment by perpetuity. And hence, though man was soon made sensible of its folly by the loss of a peaceful and approving conscience within, to say nothing of inferior losses without; yet was he not reformed by experience, nor emancipated from the corrupt influence to which he first yielded against his better conviction. Now, therefore, though every man knows, or might know if he would, how “the earth is the Lord’s and all that therein is, the compass of the world, and they that dwell therein” (Ps. xxiv. 1), and that He having allotted to the sons of men their several portions upon earth, one cannot rob nor defraud another, which is one way of taking the forbidden fruit, nor even misuse his own means whatever they may happen to be, without defrauding, robbing, and insulting the Lord himself, the Author and Giver of all good things; and though likewise every man knows,

or might know if he would, how "his eyes are upon the ways of man, and he seeth all his goings—with no darkness nor shadow of death where the workers of iniquity may hide themselves" (Job xxxiv. 21, 22), that his authority is universal, and his wrath inevitable; yet there are still men in every sphere who can be dishonest. Nay, considering this property in the broad and accurate light in which the Gospel displays it, we shall hardly find a man on the face of the earth who is STRICTLY HONEST. For all manner of righteousness being implied in the simple characteristic called Honesty, the smallest deduction will be enough to make it the thing of which we are considering. "For (as it is said in the authority just mentioned) "whosoever shall keep the whole law, and yet offend in one point, he is guilty of all" (Jam. ii. 10); though he may not be exactly what we should call a Thief.

But the notion of dishonesty is here applied only to the abuse of incidentals: and considering these inversely, it must be obvious, that our own incidentals, as well as other people's, may become a snare to us, and a foundation for this evil objective; though one might think, "Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own?" (Matt. xx. 15). For there are many cases in which such a law could not be allowable; as for example, when it should be your will, to bribe, corrupt, and seduce other people with your incidentals—to put a fee into the hand of a false witness, or a sword into the hand of an assassin. So far it is not lawful for you to do what you will with your own. It is hardly lawful for you to bestow a penny of what you call your own in vain, much less to any bad purpose. NOTHING SHEWS THE QUALITY OF A MAN IN ACCOUNT BETTER, THAN THE QUALITY OF HIS EXPENDITURE. Let the account of a man's incidental expenses be duly stated, and any one can tell what sort of a steward he has been for constituents; seeing, as our Saviour says, "He that is faithful in that which is least is faithful also in much; and he

that is unjust in the least is unjust also in much : if therefore ye have not been faithful in the unrighteous mammon, who will commit to you the true riches ; and if ye have not been faithful in that which is another man's, who shall give you that which is your own ? " (Luke xvi. 10—12.) Which may teach a man what to think of a misemployment of the incidental as well as of the more valuable constituent properties confided to him. For the reward of vanity, the price of enmity, the wages of prostitution are not more disgraceful to the receiver, than they are in the giver, dishonest and unjust, to say no worse of them. They are all dishonest forms or practices, and a part of the primitive corruption : as are likewise many other abuses of wealth, power, and influence ; which deserve to be included with them in the general term of Dishonesty, and also rewarded as such. Indeed they are all sure to be rewarded sooner or later. " Foolish men are plagued for their offence, and because of their wickedness : " " in the same net which they hid privily is their foot taken " (Ps. cvii. 17, and ix. 15) : and so they get fixed, as it were, at last in irretrievable folly. " FOR THEY HAVE SOWN THE WIND, AND SHALL REAP THE WHIRLWIND " (Hos. viii. 7). They have plodded hard through life, and exhausted all their wit, to outwit themselves : and have not often at last either the wit to perceive or the candour to own it.

§ 5. There may not seem so much wit in some other properties of this class as in fraud and dishonesty, but what wit there is will generally be found to bear the same character ; as in *Penury* and *Parsimony* for example ; with grudging, inhospitality, and the like on one hand, and on the other, prodigality, waste, and general extravagance ; the folly of either of which is evident enough : though by a strange infatuation men act with regard to all as if there were no folly nor evil in them ; or at least, as if the evil that is in them were over-balanced with good.

Thus the penurious wretch, who uses himself worse than a dog ; denying himself even common necessities will have

his reason no doubt for so doing: and if he starves himself, it is to avoid extravagance, lest he should come to want. So the parsimonious and inhospitable will be as they are at all hazards, chiefly indeed for want of natural affection, but at the same time, not without a sufficient reason too, as they may think: and if penury cannot furnish this, they will go to suspicion, misanthropy, spleen, or some other vice of the kind, and there find it. To say at once of this characteristic as much as it may deserve; penury is not so greedy of gain as avarice, and consequently is more remote from ambition. It is a sort of little snivelling aversive; and in short the lowest degree of covetousness or concupiscence. Likewise,

§ 6. *Prodigality, waste, &c.*, which one would hardly suspect of reason or deliberation, are furnished nevertheless with as full a council of evil objectives, and with as ample a train of sophisms as any of their congeners or comrades: and to this false array must be attributed the frequent instances of men who are not deficient but rather abound in worldly wisdom, failing in life so shamefully as to make one think with St. Paul, "Where is the wise? where is the scribe? where is the disputer of this world? hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?" (Cor. I. i. 20). But what matters it, how others may think of them? they will think for themselves; and this is how they think.

§ 7. The forementioned evil cast of spiritual and intellectual properties is almost always the cause of another, *Discontent* by name; which has been too often ascribed to unfortunate circumstances or bad incidentals. And this would imply nearly all the antitheses of content above-mentioned; such as covetousness, ambition, avarice, emulation, envy and others; scorn and contempt, moroseness, ill humour, and many painful properties besides; as well as dissatisfaction, repining, disgust and others more particularly denoted by this ill sounding name; Discontent. All which properties, or different shades of one, are of such a

character as leaves no room to doubt where they belong, and whence they are descended, being of the painful aversive class by the author of strife, and however well founded at any time as troublesome always to their subjects or owners, as to their objects or those against whom they are directed : which may be enough to make them evil objectives. Even in the slightest degree their evil quality may be perceived, consisting in a fondness for change and continual looking after something new ; and known as the Love of novelty. And no characteristic can show more decidedly the sinfulness and misery of our present existence : for if our existence was not thoroughly sinful, it would not be always miserable ; and if it was not always miserable, we should not be always looking for a change.

It seldom occurs to the discontented perhaps to remark, how this and other evil dispositions, the truest object of discontent, are generally a punishment for evil practices. But so they are in effect ; and most remarkably so in this respect. For when a bad man has gotten himself by any means into a situation that is too good for him, he soon begins to be tormented with the pangs of discontent as a substitute for guilty conscience, of which he is not perhaps quite so susceptible as he should be. And the better the situation that he has gained the more will he be dissatisfied with the same, as if it were the greater imposition upon his demerit : neither will he rest sometimes, till by some foolish change or some dangerous machination he has worked himself at length into a case that is not too good for him, but about such a case as the unhappy man deserves.

Properties of this cast therefore are more tormenting than useful ; insomuch that it seems a duty to one's self almost, to try to be satisfied, or at least, not to be discontented : except when some good end is to be gained by it ; as fretting one's self into attention and diligence, for example, when one has been rather idle, and indeed caring generally, when care can signify. For " by taking thought "

a man may add to the stature of his mind considerably, though he cannot add one cubit to his bodily stature by this process (Matt. vi. 27).

§ 8. But taking thought, or discontent, on the stature and other descriptive circumstances of the body is certainly conducive to an evil characteristic on one incidental at least, that is to *Foppery* and *Extravagance* in the article of dress. Some think they are not tall enough as nature makes them; these must be preposterously underlaid with ox-hide, till they stand upon their toes: some on the contrary are not wide enough; these must have canvass wings or pinions added to their superstructure to give them a sufficient breadth: some are not deep enough; these must be padded on the breast, till they look like the other ~~sax~~, or like turkeys stuffed and trussed for the spit—and all to gratify the natural discontent that happens to fall on their innocent persons or features. But such image worshippers might know, if they had only the wit to understand, that their truest ground of discontent is the absence of that intellectual expression which shows itself sometimes in the person and countenance; and is indeed the most pleasing characteristic of a human presence. For the very cause of their discontent betrays a want of understanding: and being as they are, how can they look otherwise? It has been well observed, that “a man’s wisdom maketh his face to shine” (Eccles. viii. 1) or seem interesting: therefore people should try to be wiser, if they would wish to look better; considering their moral improvement first, which the material is sure to follow in some respects.

Yet if people cannot look so interesting as they would, they need not therefore take pains to deform themselves, and look more disgusting than they can help, whether by a preposterous habit; or, what is worse, by a filthy negligence in this particular, which seems contemptuous and has generally a more repulsive effect than tinsel and foppery. For any one would rather see an overfine coat in company than one intentionally mean; or too fashiona-

ble a costume, than one too rustic or obsolete; or frizzled hair, rather than hair uncombed; or a patched face rather than a dirty one. Indeed the monotony of a vulgar, unmeaning countenance, such as one should be apt to impute to the smiter of St. Paul (Acts xxiii. 2), for example, might be somewhat relieved by a judicious patch, as that of a "whited wall" may be relieved by a blind window. Yet it is the well lighted, the intelligent face, that makes the delight of good company; and the honest face, that has ever been, however unconsciously, sought as its greatest ornament since the time when higher intellectuals used to mingle in the assemblies of men, and neither was so great a rarity as they have been since. It may be farther remembered, as an improvement on patching, what St. Peter, who was a good judge of MORAL DECORATION, says on this head (Pet. I. iv. 8); and if some who have the means could be induced to bestow less in foppery and more in sincere acts of beneficence, they would not look, any more than they would feel, the worse for it. With a little only of what the world covets, and of that little a proportionate part gladly bestowed for the love of God and of its object, a man may both be richer and look better than with any abundance either miserably hoarded or foolishly squandered in the way before mentioned. Richer or wealthier in a true sense he would be at least: for truly WEALTH DOES NOT DEPEND ON WHAT A MAN HAS, BUT ON WHAT HE ENJOYS. "In the house of the righteous is much treasure: but in the revenues of the wicked is trouble" (Prov. xv. 6).

CHRISTIAN MODES.

PART I.

THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN CHRIST.

CHAPTER VI.

EVIL *OBJECTIVE* CHARACTERISTICS.

SEC. 2.

IMMORAL—ON CONSTITUENTS.

1. Material—2. Spiritual—3. Intellectual.

“The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked : who can know it ?”—JER. xvii. 9.

IF the abuse or misapplication of incidentals, which is their application to evil purposes, give occasion to so many and serious evil objective characteristics as aforesaid, what may not be expected from the misapplication of constituents, and especially as they spread inward from the material form to the spirit by which the same is animated first, and thence to the central combination or superior properties metaphorically denominated, The Heart ! The general survey now intended of the characteristics that are formed by a misapplication of these weighty essentials may serve to shew somewhat of their mischievous importance : but it should be taken methodically, and in the same order as the opposite view was taken, commencing with the first mentioned material form, or the properties so described.

§ 1. Faults, or unrighteousness in the choice and ar-

rangement of their dress is not the only outward species to which light minds are addicted: but the levity of their minds will discover itself likewise sometimes in a levity of action that looks almost like insanity, and sometimes in a solemnity that has almost the appearance of idiotism; both being the more ridiculous, as counterfeits generally assume the appearance most opposite to their real character; the dull for example an appearance of brightness; and the more superficial, of more than common depth and acumen.

1. The term *Levity* is one that has been rather hardly used by the world, and especially to palliate a favourite vice; which it would be fairer to call by the name of sober folly. For incontinence is truly a sober, and not a thoughtless vice. It is sober in its determination, and still more in its consequences; such as destroying our own memorial, and labouring for other men's—in the elegant language of Solomon, “lest thou give thine honour unto others, and thy years unto the cruel: lest strangers be filled with thy wealth, and thy labours be in the house of a stranger” (Prov. v. 9, 10). Folly were a juster name for this or any other practice so injurious to its subject or practiser. But folly has a peculiar meaning, and levity likewise, besides the flagrant construction of incontinence aforesaid, which would hardly come within the scope of material faults, being deeper seated in the sphere just mentioned, in the sphere of sober folly; of base, wicked folly. Levity in its proper sense is not so bad, though imbued with a strong tendency thereto by the way of wantonness.

2. *Solemnity*, which stands opposed to levity, as slovenliness may be to foppery, does not appear to have so dangerous a tendency as that; but one however to make its owner ridiculous, and one rather calculated to prevent, than to promote the wisdom it would look itself into, by fixing its thought on externals. Indeed a similar affectation would have a similar effect in the prohibition of every estimable property, as well as of wisdom which is one for

all; as looking holy, to prohibit holiness; looking brave, to prohibit courage; looking friendly, which they call leering, to prohibit friendship; looking honest, to prohibit honesty, and promote knavery: as the others to promote cozening, cowardice, and hypocrisy. For the most part therefore it were best for a man to leave the talent he might have for modelling his looks and gestures any how to the direction of facts and feelings, or to the occasion by which such feelings would naturally be called forth and the expression after them if necessary. But this must depend on circumstances: ~~as~~ sometimes the same occasion may rather demand a concealment of the feelings to which itself would naturally give rise, be they feelings of grief, of terror, of indignation, or of any other impression—in order to prevent infection, to avoid detection, or for any other purpose: and on the contrary, occasion may often demand an unrestrained expression of feeling for purposes equally becoming; as for the purpose of diffusing honourable, just and important feelings—in the common intercourse of society, in the administration of justice, in the solemn offices of religion. Solemnity may become a solemn office, if it be not overstrained or excessive: when it will cease to be solemnity and become buffoonery in the eyes of the more discerning: how much more in a general way, to impose a wilful stillness on one's visage; as one should say, "I am Sir Oracle;" and perhaps none of the wisest.

3: 4. It may be thought, that such a misapplication of countenance, or abuse of this material endowment, if any one would rather, as the last mentioned—cannot be very serious, as before signified; neither is it pretended, that the misapplication of any material property can be so serious as that of some by which they are followed. It would not be said of *Puppyism* and *Apishness*, for example, that they were very serious objectives: which differ from the two last mentioned, levity and solemnity, as applying rather to the motions of the body than to its still life, and from the before mentioned objective, foppery, as turning—one

merely on the ornaments of a foolish person, the other on its contortions and agitation or exercise, which being generally borrowed, as well as unworthy of a human being, are characterised accordingly after two of the most imitative, as well as wanton and mischievous of brutes, the dog and the ape.

From the undoubted superiority of man a general comparison of his kind with any other must be thought degrading; more especially with kinds of a very inferior make, like these; and hence comparisons with such kinds are only made, to indicate the characteristics of those who seem to have laid aside the proper dignity of men in order to become imitators and mimics like the poor animals aforesaid. But to imitate the imitator in his peculiarities as well as in this practice, or to personate the ape himself, may be considered a further lowering of human dignity, and yet is not without an example. For one characteristic difference between the human exterior and that of anthropomorphite beasts being the general baldness of the one, and hairiness of the other, and nature as if to keep up this distinction, having suggested to savage nations a practice of plucking out the hair wherever they find it almost, except on the head, where it is their peculiar glory (Cor. I. xi. 15); so that among them, that is among savages, the person or exterior may be made as different from the exterior of apes as their simple means will permit—the light characters here alluded to will nevertheless by retaining some hair on their throats and temples while their faces and hands are bare and their bodies hid with clothes, make it almost doubtful at first sight, whether they may not be some of the very sort which they affect to imitate, so nice is their imitation in this and other respects.

Neither are these, apes and puppies, the only inferior animals with which degenerate men are wont to be compared; for as it is said in Job, "Vain man would be wise, though man be born like a wild ass's colt" (Job, xi. 12).

5. Even the tame ass may be wayward enough, one should think, for a comparison ; while on the other hand, some objects seem to be employed to this end which are vastly too good for it ; and in justice to injured innocence one glaring impropriety of the kind deserves to be here remarked ; which consists in the metaphorical term *Sheepishness*, but should rather be written shamefacedness perhaps—that is, being ashamed to look up and show one's face, a vice peculiar to fallen man, though by a corruption of language it has come to bear the name of a respectable brute. Indeed so far is that or any other class of brutes from meriting this reproach at our hands, that they are in general more remarkable than ourselves for the contrary expression : which however it may vary from the harmless confidence of the sheep and the blunt honesty of the ox, being their natural expression, to the look of anxiety, care and displeasure to which they are subject as well as we, will be the reverse in every case of the expression so improperly called sheepishness, as well as of any other that would disgrace a human countenance. And when David says, “So foolish was I, and ignorant, even as it were a beast before thee !” (Ps. lxxiii. 21,) he cannot mean that he had felt any thing like sheepishness, or more properly shamefacedness, but something like the sensation of bewildered innocence without a leader and companions. Oh, for either a congregation or an household like a flock of sheep ! (Ib. cvii. 41). “Help us, O God of our salvation for the glory of thy name: O deliver us, and be merciful unto our sins for thy name's sake. So we that are thy people and sheep of thy pasture shall give thee thanks for ever, and will always be showing forth thy praise from generation to generation” (Ib. lxxix. 9. 14).

Moreover, let man be honest ; and instead of boasting his erect position and celestial gaze, let him own, that there is not naturally a more down looking animal in the creation ; nor one that can have more reason to be so, until he have washed his face again in the pure fountain of inno-

cence, from which its superior charms were originally derived. Reflections like these may be mortifying to human vanity, and not the less mortifying for being just. It can be no advantage nor gratification to any one who studies the advancement of his species, to load it with invectives; no more can it for the species, or for the more considerate sort who study their own advancement in the general scale of existence, to flatter themselves in any practice or habit that seems likely to obstruct it. The just and rational part on either side is, to view things fairly, and own them accordingly for what they are: then it will be no wonder for material evils like those above enumerated to rank as faults or evil objective characteristics, without excepting even the last mentioned property of sheepishness. For if it be thought, that one man's sheepishness is no offence to another, the same may be thought as well of other evil expressions; and among them perhaps of some that never come to light.

6. So the very opposite characteristic to sheepishness, which is an *impudent look*, may be thought innocent, because it does not amount to an assault: but considering it only as a material objective expression, reflecting on the surface what is passing underneath, one might feel hurt at it: and whether one feel hurt or not, as far as this characteristic goes, which is only to the material class or degree, the same must needs be owned an evil objective. We have a list of evil objectives in this class, the material, given by king Solomon, that may serve to exemplify the mode in which material characteristics come to be evil and objective, as before signified: and in this list the proud or impudent look is found to stand foremost. "These six things doth the Lord hate: (says he) yea, seven are an abomination unto him: A PROUD LOOK, A LYING TONGUE, AND HANDS THAT SHED INNOCENT BLOOD; AN HEART* THAT DEVISETH WICKED IMAGINATIONS; FEET THAT BE SWIFT IN

* Not strictly material.

RUNNING TO MISCHIEF" &c. (Prov. vi. 16, &c.). It may be possible to estimate every evil objective, and good likewise, after the material or visible medium by which it is expressed: but the more practical and solid enumeration seems to be that which comes nearest to their rise or beginning in the heart. 'For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts" (Mat. xv. 19); as our Saviour observes. And therefore David when he congratulates himself on having no proud looks, does not forget the more central and significant property of which their absence is a tacit expression. "Lord, I am not high-minded, (says he), I do not exercise myself in great matters which are too high for me; but I refrain my soul, and keep it low, like as a child that is weaned from his mother; yea, my soul is even as a weaned child" (Ps. cxxxix. 1—3).

§ 2. The further we proceed in the enumeration of characteristics the more striking and manifest shall we find the distinction between those of the subjective and those of the objective class, as well as the more weighty importance of the latter to their subjects or owners, when these two classes are compared. And if the subjective evils of incidentals appear light in comparison with objective on the same in cases just mentioned, as poverty in comparison with avarice, debt with dishonesty, and obscurity with ostentatious prodigality—equally light at least will the evil subjectives of constituents appear to every sound apprehension in comparison with evil objectives on the same essentials or foundation; as ugliness and deformity in comparison with puppyism and apishness, slowness and weakness with sloth and idleness aforesaid; and other evil subjective characteristics with other evil objectives of and upon the more serious because more central or influential classes that remain to be mentioned, the *spiritual* being foremost for consideration; and of these, 1 the motive; 2 sensitive; 3 appetitive; 4 aversive; each comprising its several particulars; and some, their subdivisions as follows:

1. The *motive*; of which the principal particulars are

two besides their correlatives ; being 1 Idleness, Sloth and Indifference, 2 Turbulence, Restlessness, and the like. Of these we are first to consider

1, *Idleness* or *Sloth* : which our proverb says is only good in excess, meaning, for the reformation to be expected from satiety. And it may well be doubted, whether many who now make so little use of the motive property with which they are endowed, or use it to so little purpose, if they were condemned either to absolute inaction, or to confine themselves to the activity of their choice for a sufficient trial, without which some evils can hardly be appreciated, would not feel as weary of either before the expiration of their term as travellers can be of quarantine, or prisoners of solitary confinement. This, therefore, were no bad plan perhaps for rousing idleness from its reveries, and dissipating, if possible, the visions of sloth which are constitutional with some ; and although a misfortune in that case rather than a culpable habit, like unsought vacation an affliction before alluded to, sufficiently deplorable. But the sort of sloth here properly considered is more deplorable than any that one cannot avoid : which is wilful sloth—that which a man really chooses either from idleness or conceit ; from idleness picturing to itself insurmountable difficulties, or from conceit imagining some hurt or degradation in an active employment. Thus “ the slothful man saith, There is a lion in the way ; a lion is in the streets. As the door turneth upon its hinges, so doth the slothful upon his bed. The slothful hideth his hand in his bosom ; it grieveth him, to bring it again to his mouth ” (Prov. xxvi. 13, &c.). This is Solomon’s picture of idleness or sloth, which he finishes by coupling the same with conceit as aforesaid, and as we generally find it. “ The sluggard is wiser in his own conceit, (says he) than seven men who can render a reason ” (Ib. 16).

2, We may consider idleness and sloth as one characteristic ; the difference between them being rather in form than in effect, as in effect it signifies little whether a man sit still or move to no purpose : but there is another that

has very much the air of idleness, and yet in some respects seems very unlike it; that is the characteristic, *Indifference*.

For, to see an indifferent man at work, one would think he was either going to pieces or falling asleep; so much has his labour the manner of idleness. But idleness is not indifferent to labour, 'tis what it detests; while indifference has no more antipathy to that than to ease or rest, or any thing else; being too idle for antipathies; nor caring either WHAT IT DOES, OR HOW. So indifference will go on working in its own way till midnight, and is as nearly allied to the virtue of patience as to idleness: indeed, it may be good in some respects, though in a general way and as a matter of habit it is little better than idleness: for it still does but little, and seldom any thing well.

But this is to be understood, however, of the general property of indifference, and not of indifference in any one point; for that were no peculiarity, as most men are indifferent on some point, or to some purpose or other—the wise man to vanity, and the vain man to wisdom: the humble man to ambition, the ambitious man to humility; the man of business to pleasure, the man of pleasure to business. In neither of these cases is there any peculiarity: the peculiar case is listless indifference, a mood without list or liking, and also without aversion; a general indifference, indifference to one thing as well as another, to every thing in short, whether it be good, bad, or indifferent; as observed in savages, and in others who cannot be civilized.

3, At the same time it must needs be owned, that with all their idleness and sloth, not only the indifferent man, but the idler and the sluggard too, however pitiful in these respects, may yet be princely in themselves, as well as much easier to others, than the restless, turbulent, and agitated mortal, with his *Turbulence* and *Restlessness*; who can have no peace in himself, nor will suffer it in others, if he can help it: who never goes from home, but he returns in a worse mood, if possible, than that he went out in, like the evil spirit mentioned by our Saviour, “who walketh

through dry places seeking rest" (Mat. xii. 48), when he ought to be up to his neck. Perhaps, instead of finding rest, the man has lost money in some of those "dry places;" and hence his ill humour; such, according to David, being the usual order of God's providence. "He is the God that maketh men to be of one mind in an house, and bringeth the prisoners out of captivity, but letteth the runagates continue in scarceness" (Ps. lxxviii. 6). Providentially too, He has ordered, in respect of this, as of other noxious animals, that (in our class at least) the more noxious are of the least frequent occurrence; and, that where we meet with one very turbulent man, we shall find many who belong to the other extreme.

2. It may seem unjust to impute to any one, as a fault, or evil objective, the present misery that he draws upon himself, simply by the indulgence of humours like those above described: but it is the natural order of cause and effect, from the lightest to the weightiest of the evils here detailed, that while they all seem to issue out of each other, the fault of the last is as due to the sufferer himself as the fault of the first, consequently quite as objective; their evil subjective quality, being also at the same time, unquestionable; as sin and suffering, or misconduct and misery, proceed very nearly together. A man's own reflexions may also teach him, that he is accountable to himself, if not for his own fortune and constituents, yet for his improvement thereon; and that should he fail in this respect, he would also be guilty before God, of persecuting, betraying, and, it may be, utterly destroying, one, at least, of God's creatures, in his own particular person or instance. Which destruction a man may effect for himself in several ways, but most directly by self-abuse in poisoning, exhausting, or corrupting the fountain of his own happiness, the *sensitive* property from the righteousness or right use of which alone, as before observed, a steady course of enjoyment can be derived.

Rightly and soberly conducted every act or passage of our

life is full of enjoyment, every moment is good: but man, (according to the royal preacher) is for other modes and measures, unfortunately. "Lo, this only have I found, (says he) that God hath made man upright, but they have sought out many inventions" (Eccles. vii. 29): and hence, that is from men's own invention, come bitter moments, instead of good, to reward their false measures. Such are the constituents of the sensitive class of evil spiritual objective characteristics now to be considered. We have seen already, in considering the subjectives of this class, how even our sorrows towards God are happy and good: the present enumeration will shew, on the contrary, how, as also before asserted, our most natural delights, become evil and wretched, when they have an exclusive regard for other objects besides Him, as for example,

1, With respect to *Sensuality*, or sensual indulgence; which in other animals is more simple and direct than in man, dwelling contentedly on the natural enjoyment, without exceeding much, or SEEKING OUT MANY INVENTIONS. It is the refinement, or rather distinction, of intellect on sensual enjoyments, with their excessive indulgence, and a criminal preference of the same to more intellectual pleasures, that have called forth the evil characteristic and consequences of sensuality and intemperance—which indulged in eating, is gluttony—in drinking, drunkenness. But the evil of the first of these being generally more confined to its subject, the glutton, as he is called, than the evil of the second, (though a man cannot be innocent towards others who swallows a ration for five*) it is of the more dangerous failing of drunkenness that we ought chiefly to consider.

And this is a vice, happily for them, almost unknown among brutes. If any of them are prone to intoxication, it is only the swine; and a sight of one of them in such a state may be almost enough to cure a human drunkard of this DANGEROUS, as well as swinish habit: which not only

* "Like Benjamin's mess." Proverbial.

lays a man open himself to the invasion of more serious evils than satiety, heaviness or head-ache, but others by his means. For it is certain that there are malicious spirits always on the wing; watching with nice attention every opportunity that our turbulent passions afford, to enter into the unguarded soul or intellectual republic, and poison all its sources of delight. And let a man's passions be never so calm in their quiescent state; yet, when by intoxication either they are excited, or their antagonists, reason and discretion oppressed, such passions will generally become unmanageable, and take their full sway of him both within and without. It is a rambling course that we lead in this life at the best; and if a man cannot walk straight on his way sober and seeing, it is not to be expected, when every evil passion, pride, lust, wantonness—and many more, are whetted by *Intemperance*; whence come daily the ruin and disgrace of numbers that we hear and read of.

2, But who can calculate the numbers that are daily disgraced, ruined and destroyed by a kinsman of sensuality called *Lust*! by lust; which consists in the worst type of a natural, and therefore necessary and becoming appetite! by an appetite, which degrades its owner most, while it meditates the degradation of others! For no man ever lusts with esteem and good will towards his object; but with contempt, hatred, and a wish to degrade by unlawful enjoyment. This HOSTILE APPETITE is what our Saviour meant to reprove when he declared to the assembled multitude from his mountain pulpit, "that whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart" (Matt. v. 28). He did not mean to reprove in either sex their natural and necessary desire of each other, but an heedless and improper indulgence of the same; that is "lightly and wantonly, to satisfy men's carnal lusts and appetites, like or even in a manner too bad for, brute beasts that have no understanding;" without duly regarding the proper end of connubial intercourse, and the divine blessing essential to its prosperity. To

desire a woman with this fair regard, were no more criminal than to desire our daily food. Looking on a woman, and looking on her as a woman, is not the crime ; it is necessary to look thus : but THE CRIME WILL CONSIST IN LOOKING ON THE WOMAN AS A STRUMPET, and as an object meet only for base and unlawful enjoyment, directing one's life to wanton, promiscuous, beastly, insolent, and merely libidinous views and connexions.

The effect of sexual intercourse rightly enjoyed is to season and cement the enjoyment of some of our fairest properties—charity, esteem, friendship, piety and the like : but this proud AND CONSEQUENTLY VILE appetite, lust, would destroy every enjoyment of that kind, and ensure likewise the degradation of the parties so implicated, instead of their exaltation in the universe ; rendering them at the same time obnoxious to the censure and reproach of society, to their own private and mutual disesteem ; and above all, to the heavy judgment and displeasure of that purest Being whose covenant they either despise, or trifle with his sacred name.

By chaste affections and enjoyment mingled with esteem two persons may truly be said to live together as man and wife, and to have a proper consideration for each other, "as being heirs together of the grace of life" (Pet. I. iii. 7). But while living under the dominion of lust, a man and his wife may be said to live (if it be living) apart from each other in every case ; much more, when that ceremony has been contemptuously discarded. And still if there be ever so great reproach in such miscalled unions, it may be honour compared with some heathen abominations which St. Paul has alluded to ; but which are better kept out of mind, as their perpetrators ought if possible to be kept out of sight.

Such an arrangement indeed is hardly to be expected : and yet among all the inventions and contrivances for averting contagion there might have been some thought of for one so infamous. How comes it to pass, that no cor-

done have yet been drawn against nameless faults? How is it, that no receptacles have yet been established for men suspected of depraved affections; and, that while hospitals are allotted for the diseased in body, lunatic asylums for the diseased in mind, and prisons for evil doers generally, or those who are diseased in heart—no peculiar prison, nor asylum has yet been thought of for the greatest pests of all—no prison, no hospital, no pest house to take before trial the worst of doers, those infectious sinners whose very nature is changed, as the apostle intimates (Rom. i. 24, &c.), to abuse, out of the sight of the public, and out of the way of contaminating the weak ones that are left! If men of unnatural affections and habits were debarred the sight even of indifferent characters, much more of honest men, of those who adorn the highways with their presence; and could only see themselves reflected continually in all they meet now, as they will hereafter if they do not repent in time, it may be presumed, that so much of that which is so much in their own way would be enough to disgust them with themselves, and make them repent.

As the quality of a man's lower affections is necessarily determined by the quality of the affection, whether good or ill, that he bears towards God in the highest, these deepening shades of sensual delusion; which St. Jude has called a "going after strange flesh" (Jude 7), i. e. roving from one lust to another, seeking some singular and singularly abominable gratification continually; will be a natural consequence of the subject's defection or falling from God; as St. Paul remarks on some particular examples. "FOR THIS CAUSE (not liking to retain God in their knowledge) GOD GAVE THEM UP UNTO VILE AFFECTIONS, &c." (Rom. i. 28, &c.); "TO A REPROBATE MIND, TO DO THOSE THINGS WHICH ARE NOT CONVENIENT" (Ib.); and which the apostle also characterizes both as offences against the body of the perpetrator, and also as a robbing of God, whose property we are by purchase as well as creation; "bought

with a price, to be **TEMPLES OF THE HOLY GHOST**" (Cor. I. vi. 18, &c.).

It cannot be necessary nor would be very becoming, to insist any farther on those abominable modes in which a man sins against his own body: but there are other lustful indulgences that ought not to be passed over; of which the very least, being one before alluded to, may deserve some notice, because an offence of some weight in this line, and yet not so liable to be viewed in this light as one should expect; that is, the wretched offence of *Bastardy*; whereby a man submits what may be called his own body to certain infamy, and often to want and misery, and that in two respects; 1 in respect of his fair accomplice made one with him by this foul confederacy, bone of his bones, and flesh of his flesh (Gen. ii. 23); 2 in respect of their joint issue, which is a continuation of the degrading matter as well as of the degraded woman, the fruit of his loins, his future representative, himself for futurity. And only observe what a spirit this degrading practice proceeds from. The spirit or principle of fornication is a foolish as well as villainous sort of selfishness, an abominable propensity to please one's self at one's own dear expense, to gratify one half of one's self, and that not the best, at a ruinous expense of the other.

"Let the things that should have been for their wealth be unto them an occasion of falling" (Ps. lxxix. 23), says the Psalmist: and if ever this imprecation is verified in any case, it must be in that of fornicators and adulterers turning the credit of issue into a reproach for themselves. If moreover the fruit of fornication be not a burden to the fornicator as well as a disgrace and consequently an offence against himself, it will be the greater disgrace to him in becoming a burden and a disgrace to the community: for which perhaps the miscreant shall beget first one burden and then another, till he eventually becomes a burden to the same himself: and then he ought to be genteelly maintained, to be sure, should not he? or a woman either, to be sure, after

heaping charges and reproaches on the parish, it may be, long after she had sunk herself below the reach of either ?

But it is to the adulteress of rank that the greater reproach belongs, for exposing the issue of her wanton amours to the mercy of venal nurses : as nurses generally are venal. Which seems like throwing their fruit to the dogs, or like what was said of the degenerate Israelites in the wilderness, doing things which turned to their own decay ; “Yea they offered their sons and their daughters unto devils” (Ps. cvi. 36). In some cases honest men may create objects for Providence : as the frail bark for example ; which being once launched on the deep, is from that moment beyond the controul of the honest builder : but it is much if any honest man had ever a share in the production of this—a poor bantling, thrown upon the wide world like an orphan from the womb, more helpless than ships that reel to and fro, and stagger on the ocean (Ps. cvii. 27) ; these being filled with strength and intellect, whereas that little lonely adventurer has no more benefit perhaps of either than what his helplessness extorts from the bosom of charity, of charity, the last friend of the unfortunate, the friend that never faileth (Cor. I. xiii. 8). Our Saviour observes to his disciples, incidentally indeed but very appositely, that a woman when she is in travail hath sorrow because her hour is come ; meaning only in an honourable case : but how must this sorrow be augmented in her hour, when travail is accompanied with shame as well as with anguish ; and when on being delivered of the child, she cannot rejoice, that a man is born into the world (John xvi. 21), because no one will care to own him ! The effect of fornication at the best, is to create unfortunate outcasts, objects of scorn, children of sorrow. The child of the poorest peasant with, and almost without, the common necessities of life, if born in lawful wedlock, is happier than the outcast of a duchess, and not so likely to become an idiot, a bandy-leg, or a chimney-sweep.

But now, judging the case fairly all around ; there can be

no excuse in reason and equity, whatever there may be sometimes in custom and even in legislation, for one of the aforesaid parties more than for the other, for the father of an illegitimate offspring more than for the mother. And one cannot help admiring at the tyrannical licence of male men; which has always prevailed more or less from the days of Judah, who allowed himself the liberty of frequenting harlots while his widowed daughter was to be burnt for one offence, down to our day; when judges professing Christianity have been seen to forget the Christian ordinance of judging righteous judgment (John vii. 24), as well as a Christian improvement on the Levitical, to throw the first stone with clean hands (Ib. viii. 7), alluding most likely to the prosecutor. Speaking impartially of both sexes, it is hard to say, which deserves worst or suffers most by the effect of lust: but this may safely be said for both, that the paradise which heaven had prepared for their mutual enjoyment in the exercise of innocent and blissful affections, is hereby turned into a very desert, or a gloomy Gehenna, like "the valley of the shadow of death." Every irregular propensity; as avarice, theft, idleness, intemperance before mentioned, and others however based, is an evidence of innate corruption, captivity and decline in the human subject; but no where will their evidences be more perceptible than in unseemly lust, or the preference of furtive and unnatural amours to those which are lawful and right; as it clearly proceeds from a secret repugnance to plain honesty, and a mere aversion to the law of God, THE REWARD OF THOSE WHO FORSAKE HIM. "Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin; and sin, when it is finished, bringeth forth death" (Jam. i. 15).

3. It is observable only from the construction of the last mentioned characteristic, how an evil objective may be founded on an *appetitive* basis; notwithstanding the prejudice of those who stand up for the inviolability of appetite and liberty for every one to do that which seemeth good in his own eyes. And examples enough of such a

foundation are to be met with : as in the broad characteristic called Selfishness first ; then 2, in Fawning and Sycophantism, 3, in Time-serving and Party-spirit, 4, in Spunging and Dependence, 5, in Cringing and Cowardice, and lastly, 6, in Credulity ; examples that may be worth considering separately. And,

1, *Selfishness* : which is an evil objective characteristic founded, not merely on the essential property, nor yet on a good subjective characteristic, but on a good objective of the appetitive class ; namely, on the good appetitive objective self love, now spoiled or perverted two ways into this shocking characteristic ; as it may be,

—1, By *excess*, like any other good subjective or objective either : which, if it have not the usual effect of exhausting the appetite, and so making way for the properties of listlessness and ENNUY, or self-loathing, may succeed far enough however to render the subject very unamiable, and by chance very troublesome, without depending on,

—2, The more effectual way of converting a good principle into an evil one *by seducing and corrupting all the good properties by which it is wont to be surrounded*. So honour, prudence and industry, with patience, meekness and humility—to say nothing of intellectual graces arrayed in the train of self-love, will fly before selfishness, and yield to its ordinary host of bad principles and bad thoughts, and retreating take true self-love clean off with them. For it is barely possible that a man should be able to look upon himself cordially again after being so stripped of all that was rich and lovely in his composition. He is now become like a country laid waste, and the more he looks upon his own self, the less he likes it. He can now no longer endure what he once loved so excessively and so injuriously. Whenever he sees another person like himself especially, he cannot but be shocked in some degree at the deformity of his own image, although he was not very apt to be shocked at himself. Indeed a man neither likes nor dislikes himself directly, as he does by reflection. In others

we can only admire the beauties of the inner man; righteousness, faith, love, patience, meekness; but any manner, or condition of spirit, in ourselves. In others too we also admire the person in whom such qualities as the foregoing are found for their sake; but in ourselves, any qualities that we can find for the sake of the person.

2, If one man should ever admire another man's qualities for the sake of the person or only pretend to admire them—"having men's persons in admiration because of advantage" (Jude 16), as it is said, the same would be like what is called *Fawning* and *Sycophantism*: faults that are seldom owned but not seldom possessed—possessed, but not owned; or owned and not owned, like other evil properties, by their owners. And such a thing as one of them is to be sure!—Plying to every little object, whenever a little object is to be gained; and then "starting aside like a broken bow" (Ps. lxxviii. 58), or piercing like a staff of bruised reed the hand that was open to relieve him (Kings II. xviii. 21), the sycophant drags on a paltry and precarious existence, trusting in others continually for that for which no other can reasonably trust in him, **BENEFICENCE.**

But it seems like anticipating relations, to wander from a subject to its subject or from properties to their depositaries: returning to the subject therefore—

3, To fawning and sycophantism; Time-serving is near akin, and Party-spirit again of kin to that by a regular ramification, which is as observable in "the tree of the knowledge of good and evil" as in any other tree. And hence it happens, that while good and evil run through the world in two parallel lines and can never meet or unite by inoculation, they will however by apposition in every essential subject, like the diffusion of light and shade: and seldom shall any variety of one occur without a corresponding variety of the other. As self-love is accompanied by selfishness, so are all the particulars branching from either accompanied by their respective shades or antitheses;

many examples of which may have been observed already; and here is another.

—1, For if we consider first the evil characteristic of *Time-serving*, we shall find it only a broader cast of sycophantism and dependence adapted to the age instead of individuals. And what improvement can be expected for the age, if it is to be humoured in every whim and flattered in all its prejudices? If this be serving the times, it is serving them ill, and not like a friend; as on the other hand, by observing the signs of the times and adapting our manners thereto in some respects, we may be able to do. Our Saviour blamed the Pharisees and Sadducees for observing the signs of the weather, as they did, more than the signs of the times which are so much more important. "Ye hypocrites; (said he) ye can discern the face of the sky; but can ye not discern the sign of the times?" (Matt. xvi. 3.) And he was so much concerned at the inadvertency of the people of Jerusalem in this respect, that he fairly wept, as it is said, when he thought of its consequence. "And when he was come near, he beheld the city, and wept over it, saying, if thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace! but now they are hid from thine eyes" (Luke xix. 41, 42).

Much of the quality of every practice or habit will depend on its measures and effect, and to evil time-serving as well as to evil self-love there may be generally a good under all circumstances. It is good time-serving, for example, in any man, when the happiness and salvation of others can be promoted by some innocent and seasonable compliance: as St. Paul thought most likely; when he followed two concurring professions, the Christian and Levitical in their differences, the same happening to be inessential, as well as in their agreement: "being made all things to all men (as he says) that I might by all means save some" (Cor. I. ix. 22). And so likewise,

—2, With regard to *Party-spirit*; which is in general

more hurtful to society, and consequently more to be deprecated than time-serving; even that we must be cautious of condemning in toto, lest we condemn a leading principle of our conduct as Christians; being all strong partisans of one cause, regularly baptized and enlisted in its defence against all opposition, and bound to strive for it by all means, being instant in season, out of season—reproving, rebuking, exhorting with all long suffering and doctrine (Tim. II. iv. 2), also with a good observance of times, and plenty of time-serving conditioned as aforesaid.

So far then these two considerable characteristics on the evil side may indeed be one, as they are both generally evil with a fair allowance for good; also as remarkable for meanness, more than flagitiousness; also as founded on the same essential properties, on which other evil characteristics are also founded which still remain to be mentioned; some of them being as ugly, deformed and dangerous, if not as mean and pitiful as any that have been mentioned yet.

4, Such for one is the habit of *Spunging* and *Dependence*: the latter being included on account only of its occasional identity with the former. For spunging is an evil designation that admits of no varieties; but a simple dependence on some party, person, or condition cannot be necessarily evil objectively, because it is not always avoidable. Evil enough it is, no doubt subjectively, to depend on such persons as a bad master, husband, or ruler; making such dependent conditions as bondage, oppression, tyranny and the like: but dependence can only be evil in this objective sense, when it is uncalled for, or, it may be, even courted for the sake of some ulterior object, perhaps as bad as itself: when evil is to be attained by evil means; and for its sake the subject or aspirant is content; perhaps rather pleased; to depend on a suitable patron. Such a subject would deserve in its very extent the deprecation of the Psalmist to the God of his praise, "Set thou an ungodly man to be ruler over him; and let Satan stand at his

right hand" (Ps. cix. 5): a jurisdiction, which though he might court, he would not long like.

Also in the choice of innocent patronage wisdom will find a difference, choosing to depend on many rather than upon any one man; though some would think it more honourable to be a king's pensioner than a paid servant of the people, forgetting that the king himself is neither more nor less. But to depend on Him on whom both king and people depend, considering these only as his instruments for any purpose, is the prime dependence, and the most perfect instance of an exception in the generally evil character of the property objectively considered.

5, No one could ever yield to so base a condition who was not made for *Cringing* and *Cowardice*—to succumb to his own species, or fly before them like one of another; instead of consulting either the means and advantages which God has given him for resistance, or seeking either such means from Him, or else the fortitude TO ENDURE ANY SUFFERING, BEFORE AN EVIL DEPENDENCE.

6, As a very common inducement, not only to dependence, but to fawning, cringing, and other evil habits connected therewith, *Credulity* ought also to be mentioned. Credulity is the excess of faith, which we should certainly do well to avoid, not only on account of its evil influence aforesaid, but also, if not rather, because more damage has been sustained by the true faith through this excess than through any other medium. It has heaped more nonsense and lies on Christian modes of thinking than they are well able to bear; is a thorn in the side of Christianity, and like the plague of leprosy among its adherents. Scepticism would seem a more innocent failing, if it might be kept from the bounds of Atheism: for scepticism or incredulity will lead sometimes to inquiry, if not to conviction; but credulity shuts the door at once against every change of improvement. And as credulity is a more dangerous fault than scepticism, so is it likewise more common, and always has been, unfortunately, in every system of thinking, if

the credulous can be said to think. For if they only think they believe, which is as much as ever they do sometimes, it will be perhaps without thinking WHAT, or caring either very often, which is a deep device. All the superstitious worshippers of antiquity, and all the modern idolaters in the world, as well as many doating Christians, are, and have been formed continually, by this piece of diabolical ingenuity. Good reason, therefore, have professors to dread it; and, as St. John advises, to "believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God" (John I. iv. 1). "That we henceforth be no more children tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men, and cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to deceive; but, speaking the truth in love, may grow up (or inosculate) INTO him in all things which is the head, even Christ" (Eph. iv. 14, 15). In some respects it might be well for us to be more children than we are; as in malice or malignity, for example, but not in understanding or doctrine. So St. Paul says, "Brethren, be not children in understanding: howbeit, in malice, be ye children, but in understanding be men" (Cor. I. xiv. 20).

4. There is a good sample of this property of malice in the fourth, or *aversive* class, of evil objective characteristics, on the more spiritual foundation; more, it may be said, than in any other class: this of evil aversive objectives, dividing into three branches by their direction, whether it be from a superior, equal, or inferior—and named accordingly, like the division of the good appetitive objective before described. And of these three branches, here, as in the first instance,

1, The first to be mentioned is the objective *superior*, which may be designated by the general term of *Obduracy* or *Insensibility*, including many particulars, of which,

—1, *Cruelty* and *Severity* may be regarded as leaders or chiefs, being distinguished from each other by degree, and consequently serving in the same relation to other ob-

jectives that follow, whereby their effect, or intensity, is partly signified; to wit, by severity in the least, and by cruelty in the highest degree; as a severe threatening, a cruel persecution, for example. Yet there is an absolute as well as relative, a positive as well as comparative, distinction, in one respect, between severity and cruelty, as one may be only an excess of duty, for which there may, by chance, be some extenuation; but cruelty is an excess of depravity, and admits of no extenuation. And as for many species of cruelty, or any of the many which man has invented, with diabolical ingenuity, for his fellow creatures, and for some of other species too as well as his own, it does not seem worth while, or not on the present occasion, however, to multiply examples beyond what is here presented in the list of evil objectives. For if these cannot actually be regarded as so many species of torture, they may be cruel enough sometimes without its common implements; as the next-mentioned for example,

—2; Austerity and Moroseness, Peevishness or Petulance, Spite, Spleen, and Vindictiveness; with other aversives of the same kind, which are generally comprehended under the name of *Ill-humour*, a great blasphemer, suicide, glass breaker, &c. If we were to look into Scripture for a NAME for this characteristic, we should find it in an evil spirit: if we were to look into Scripture for an EXAMPLE of the same, we might find one very remarkable in the person of Saul, and if we consulted Scripture for the SOURCE of this ill-humour or evil spirit, we should find it springing most frequently, as in his case, from the misconduct of the very persons themselves who bear and are tormented by it; being sons of Belial, as they are called in Scripture. Indeed we need not recur to Scripture for information on this head; since any captious mortal, if he could and would take time to consider what manner of spirit he may be of, when what they call out of humour, might find, that he had been doing somewhat that he ought not to have done, either then, or about that time. Or if any one who was not

habitually captious and splenetic, could stop and examine himself in a moment of high displeasure, he might find sometimes by chance, that it was not one of the most virtuous and enlightened periods of his earthly career; perchance, that he had mistaken his object, like David, in his hasty sentence on the distrainer of the poor man's lamb (Sam. II. xii.). It were well not to be too hasty in condemning others: "for in many things we offend all" (Jam. iii. 2), says St. James; and "Judge not that ye be not judged" (Mat. vii. 1,) is the precept of our blessed Saviour, for the reason that we may not condemn ourselves.

Peevishness or *Petulance* is never so intellectual as harsh judgment, being naturally more spiritual than intellectual, and consequently more foolish than wicked. It may also proceed sometimes from bodily indisposition, more than from ill affection, but in any case there must be some fault, or at least a want of charity, or what will be, if the humour be not both restrained and lamented, particularly when our petulance happens to be directed against the unfortunate, against those who have cause enough for vexation perhaps, without our ill-humour. Whenever we are disposed to launch out against one in such circumstances, it may be to chide a poor, a simple, or a sickly offender, we should look in his face the while, consider his circumstances, mark his withered, vacant, or dejected countenance, and if something do not bid us stop, there must be something wanting; if our feelings are correct, they will soon tell us, Hold: it is enough.

As for *Spite* and *Spleen* or *Vindictiveness*, there needs not be any doubt on their nature and origin; or if there should be any, let the doubter go to Scripture again, and there he shall learn from the words of our Saviour himself, as well as from the saying of the evangelist who has recorded our Saviour's, our Saviour telling the spiteful and malignant Jews, "Ye do the deeds of your father" (John viii. 41), that is, the devil, as he explains below, and the evangelist observing, as from himself, "In this the chil-

dren of God are manifest, and the children of the devil : whosoever doeth not righteousness is not of God, neither he that loveth not his brother " (John I. iii. 10).

—3, The original cause of austerity, moroseness, peevishness, petulance, spite, spleen, or vindictiveness, and every other form, variety or degree of ill humour, is the same with that of all other ills in thinking and doing, a wrong bent or bias proceeding from original sin : but their life and support, their natural continuator, being in this as in many other instances a sort of supplement to sin, is found in two other properties, which, however, it does not seem worth while to divide, *Obstinacy* and *Conceit* ; whereby sin, or the wrong bent or bias is cherished and perpetuated. For without some share of these unlucky ingredients, a man might be apt by chance to alter, or retract what he had begun amiss : but that he cannot, until either he or another for him have gotten the better of his unsound principle or beginning : when by God's grace through him the same two properties, having taken a right bent instead of a wrong, will be altogether as effectual and beneficial in serving the man under other names, *Firmness* and *Judgment* ; which have been here already mentioned, and imperfectly commended.

It may be proper to observe, that *Obstinacy* and *Conceit*, though now put in apposition have their distinctions however ; and especially in that of obstinacy being rather the more spiritual of the two, and consequently the more common among brutes ; while these have an advantage of man on the other hand, in not being so conceited. *Obstinacy* and docility in animals will correspond with hardness and ductility in metal, each having its proper fault and use. Men may speak with contempt of the obstinacy remarked in some brutes : but if they do not like this character, it should teach them to guard against the same in themselves ; and to " be not like to horse and mule, which have no understanding ; whose mouths must be held with bit and bridle " (Ps. xxxii. 10).

And with respect to the milder degrees of obstinacy and docility, such as we find in brutes and varying in them, as in different casts of mankind; they do not seem to require consideration here particularly. Since the Creator has been pleased to make us dependent on the services of brutes in some measure, we should be grateful for the docility with which He is pleased to invest them or some of them, and endeavour to imitate the same in every part or station that He may be pleased to appoint us. As on the other hand, the ridiculous obstinacy that we observe in some brutes, and in some men no less, may teach us to watch and correct that fault in ourselves. For one should not like to rank with the two animals just mentioned, and the latter especially, although the invincible obstinacy of some people, however preposterous we may find it, is nevertheless a principle of great utility in the mysterious designs of Providence. And considering this effect, we need not be surprised to find men persisting, as they frequently do, against nature and common sense in the prosecution of undertakings dictated to them, or even forced upon their choice by an Almighty Power through their evil genius for the good of others; as Pharaoh, for example, in the persecution of Israel, which was equally impolitic and unjust, yet not to be compared with the unaccountable aversion of Israel to their own Christ or King.

—4, It is no unusual conjunction, to see *Pride* in a line with obstinacy and conceit: only it generally stands before the others in this manner, namely, *Pride*, *Obstinacy*, and *Conceit*; as being a senior or parent perhaps to these; and not after, as in the ascending scale which is here pursued. It evidently appears to be an evil aversive of the superior cast or complexion from the circumstance, that pride seldom points at a superior, nor often at an equal indeed, but generally at an inferior; though an inferior in society may have as much pride at heart as any of his superiors, as pride often begets poverty. But who, or what should be the parent of pride, is not a question to be easily

resolved. It might be stated as the fruit of rebellion, if rebellion itself did not so often spring from pride: but, perhaps, they may change seniority sometimes; being each of them mother and daughter to the other in turn, so near are they akin—while the devil breeds by both, begetting either upon other by turns; as pride on rebellion and rebellion on pride—continually. For what is pride, but rebellion in the first instance? And what sort of rebellion is it, if not foolish and impious? IT IS IMPIOUS REBELLION, TO THINK OTHERWISE OF OUR IMPORTANCE, THAN AS A REFLECTION OR CONSEQUENCE OF THE DIVINE; to set up our own image in opposition to the divine, as pride does.

In a theological view therefore, pride, though it stands here, might be carried on to the account of ungodliness, as impious rebellion, or at least as one trait or instance of such rebellion. We can see it breaking out almost as it were before our eyes in the Psalmist's description of an ungodly man, "THE UNGODLY IS SO PROUD, that he careth not for God: neither is God in all his thoughts. His ways are always grievous: thy judgments are far above out of his sight: and therefore defieth he all his enemies" (Ps. x. 4, 5). Indeed, to say another word of pride in this view, while it is uppermost; it seems a great piece of injustice as well as of arrogance before God in any man, however gifted, to think highly of himself, since all the merit of his gifts must needs rest with the Giver. "For we are his workmanship" (Eph. ii. 10): "It is He that hath made us" (Ps. c. 2); and if *us*, then, of course, all our works in us, or all that make for righteousness and peace, as the prophet tells Him, "Lord thou wilt ordain peace for us: for thou also hast wrought all our works in us" (Isai. xxvi. 12).

But little tendency has pride to peace. Pride is an aiming above our natural sphere, and as such by no means the way to peace of any kind, but rather to emulation and envy, and strife, and other species of villainy: whence it

also comes to pass, that the vilest persons have generally the most pride; as, from their vileness, they have indeed the most room for it, though least occasion—the same being to them like wind in an empty stomach. And when thus inflated, if they cannot be proud of themselves, they will be proud of their fortune, or parentage, or some other circumstance, the credit of which must belong to the Giver by right; like the credit of their constituents, as before observed. If a proud man could only value himself as he values his horse, there would be more sense in it: for he values his horse according to what it will sell for; but himself according to what he can purchase. Or if the proud man should happen to have no great means himself, which is likely enough, perhaps his cousin shall be rich: or if not his cousin, yet his employer shall be some great man, perhaps; and in either case there will be something to be proud of, he thinks, though he may not expect to be ever the better for it. Hence some varieties of the distemper; as e. g.

=1, *The Pride of Birth*.—Many who have never done any thing themselves to be proud of can boast notwithstanding, a lofty birth; and will be as proud of their parents, as if they had begotten them; prouder of their parents perhaps, than their parents of them, or prouder than they would be, if they were alive. And after all how little would the children be inclined to boast their parentage, if they went to the root of it! if they could know and consider the quality of their great primogenitor or general parent, children of the devil as they all are, by damnable rebellion—be who will their father; Abraham (John viii. 39), or Eli (Sam. I. ii. 12), or any other honest man. And how indignant would these men of family be too, if they were told, that many a poor beggar whom they might spurn from their gate is better born than they!

For, properly speaking, there are now but two distinct families on the face of the earth; which are the seed of the woman and the seed of the serpent: though in the seed

of the woman we also find a distinction; as originally there was that which was BORN of God, and that which was CREATED by God, and the same distinction still continues—what was first born of God, being born of God still, and what was first created by God being created by Him still; that a son, and this a creature of God in chief, whoever may happen to be the intermediate godfathers of the one or natural parents of the other. “For that which is born of the flesh is flesh: (the creature will always be a creature) and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit” (John iii. 6); they who are so born being in every descent “partakers of the divine nature” (Pet. II. i. 4), with Abraham, if they partake of his principle (Gal. iii. 7); though their natural fathers should not happen to be such as either Abraham or Eli was. So is every one that is born of the Spirit (John iii. 8). Even the mortal birth or descent of a creature, through the operation of natural causes, is often important in determining the quality of the subject, some being born more after one property or element, some after another; how much more that which is so commonly prayed for, and so highly deserving our ambition, yet so little thought of, that we may be born of the Spirit!

So here are three stocks or beginnings for the sons of men, and one only a beginning for choice, which happens to be the least thought of. For the family pride of most men reaches only to a few generations, rarely to an immortal parentage; which makes their importance, in this respect, to be like a figure without a head. And there have been some indeed who were so far sensible of this particular, that they could not be satisfied with such a defective birth; but must affiliate themselves, forsooth, on some pre-existing personage, if it were only a demon or demigod: of which, not only the heroes of the old world, with the founders of the Roman and Macedonian empires, and others of that sort in their rear, but some heathen leaders of the new world likewise, might be men-

tioned as examples. It may, therefore, be evident why each of the early patriarchs, and many likewise of their nearest descendants were proud as it would seem of THEIR immediate parentage, because it tended in a plain retrogradation to the Fountain of honour and importance. So that originally there was nothing absurd in the feeling of family-pride; but a good, sober foundation, which it will always preserve as long as the same relation shall be kept in view. And upon the same criterion, family grandeur must flow continually in another guise direction than that which is generally accounted highest. For every birth that is purely after the flesh must needs be corrupt: IT IS ONLY BY BEING BORN AGAIN OF WATER AND THE SPIRIT, THAT ONE CAN BE WELL BORN. This is a fact attested every day by the contrary success of nature and grace; the best natured degenerating continually without grace, and the worst improving continually with it: which made our Saviour tell the Jews, that "many shall come from the east and west, and shall sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob in the kingdom of Heaven; but the children of the kingdom shall be cast out" (Matt. viii. 11, 12).

The most righteous lines will often be tarnished with examples of descendants that belie their origin. Therefore, if a man should think to be proud of his children rather than of his parents, they will be very likely to be such too as he shall have vastly more reason to be ashamed of: or if he be proud of his house, or his wife, servant, maid, ox, ass, or any thing that is his, it will be all the same for him as family pride, a priding in himself and consequently, a fraud upon his Maker.

=2, Such likewise, is the *Pride of Office*, as common a species of pride as any; that is to say, a fraud on the Maker and Governor of the universe, or at least a withholding of the respect due to him; being, therefore, just as imperfect as the vulgar pride of birth, and proceeding in the same manner too from an imperfect apprehension of

the subject. For official importance, or the importance derived from office, has truly no other foundation than that which has just been ascribed to birth, whether men perceive it or not. So that, without "speaking evil of dignities," or intending the slightest disparagement to any station on earth, one might boldly aver, that its importance must be headless, if it have not a Head above the earth, to which it may be referred. And some have had the wisdom to perceive this too : but it may be, as in respect of birth, "through a glass darkly," while a little reflexion would make the whole matter at once as clear as the light. For if through the effect of descent and official connexions we derive an importance from the next above us, and they, in like manner from those above them, their importance still tending to the accounts of ours, and swelling the same with what it receives, how can we think our importance perfect without ascending to some determined point, where the receiving ends? We cannot account of our importance as we ought, leaving pride out of the question ; we must entirely undervalue our own importance, if we do not carry or impute it to the highest point from which it may be derived : because what gives it to the first receiver, gives it to the next through him ; and so on to the last. For example : if Enos derives the importance of his birth and station from Seth, and Seth from Adam, from whom does Adam derive it, but from God, the Creator and Governor of the universe? and without this finish or perfection, what importance could any trust or descent derived from Adam confer, more than a derivation of the same from Enos?

=3, And such, finally, but still one degree farther removed from its axis or foundation, is *the Pride of Acquaintance* : when, if you do not happen to be related to some great person, nor yet to be employed by such a one yourself, you shall know some one who is ; you may not know the great man himself perhaps, but you know his groom. And though this sort of pride may seem almost too ridi-

culous to be included in the doctrine of the kingdom, it is nevertheless, sufficiently common in practice. This foible is carried sometimes indeed to such an extreme, that only to have sat next to some great man for once in their lives, without exchanging a word, shall be something for some to remember with exultation ; as if an identity must be the effect of this accidental contiguity. While a more rational view to the acquisition of the great man's image, physiognomy, or personal appearance could neither warrant a boast, considering how such acquisition when made does not infer a resemblance to its object, nor consequently to his fate ; as our Saviour once intimated to his vain beholders and unedified hearers. Then shall ye begin to say, " We have eaten and drunk in thy presence ; and thou hast taught in our streets. But he shall say, I tell you, I know you not, whence ye are ; depart from me all ye workers of iniquity" (Luke xiii. 26, 27).

From these few distinctions and remarks, it would seem as if there was no room for absolute pride in any case : yet we often hear of such a thing as HONEST PRIDE. And what is honest pride ? Is it the arrogating to ourselves of honour that belongs to God only ? You may as well talk of honest theft. To be independent of other men's bounty and support, if your independence be perfect, and not partial, or restricted to trifling favours,—is as honest as desirable : but only still in a dependence on God ; namely, that with his blessing we shall be equal to the supplying of our own real necessities, a very different feeling from that which many call Honest Pride. There is nothing honest in that, nor in any other common sort of the characteristic : but on the contrary, a natural tendency to degrade its subject ; which may be observed in various ways, as in the way of friendship or society for example—where the humble man, preferring the acquaintance of wiser than himself, by means of them is improved in wisdom ; while the proud man, preferring the acquaintance of others more foolish than himself when he can find them, that he may

be "king of the company," becomes by their means more silly and insignificant than he was; which would seem needless.

There is, indeed, one sort of both honest and edifying pride; and that has only one object: our Father in heaven is the only father, friend, or employer for a man to be proud of; as He is the Only One that we can confide in. Let this be our OBJECT, and then we may boast; as David says, "we make our boast of God all day long, and will praise thy name for ever" (Ps. xlv. 9). If a man could be proud of him—proud to be the work of such an Author, and proud of all his "marvellous works," there would be something in his pride like perfect honesty; one might even be excused for glorying secretly in the perception of such a Being, or, as it may be shortly expressed, in one's faith. Indeed, we have a positive license to indulge in this secret exultation; as for example, "Thus saith the Lord, Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom, neither let the mighty man glory in his might, let not the rich man glory in his riches; (it might have been added, Let not the courtier glory in his recollection of princes;) But let him that glorieth glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth me; that I am the Lord, which exercise loving kindness, judgment and righteousness in the earth, &c." (Jer. ix. 23, 24.)

For not even this precious understanding and knowledge, or more properly FAITH in the present application, may be thought to bear or authorize a public boast. "Hast thou faith—have it to thyself before God" (Rom. xiv. 22), says the apostle. Let it be thy hidden treasure; bear it in mind, wherever thou goest; retire, and consider it more leisurably as often as thou hast opportunity; keep it as the apple of thine eye; amass more of it daily by prayer and divine contemplation; let thy heart be delighted with its beauty and increase, and warmed by its energy to acts of beneficence: and if thou must glory in something, as a man would be wretched if he could not; do not glory in

thy own ability, nor yet in thine own infirmity; but glory in this. THIS IS HOW EVERY MAN OUGHT TO BE PROUD, though few men are. This is also the way to live peaceably, if you wish it: for if "only by pride cometh contention" (Prov. xiii. 10), meaning the common sort of pride, we have only to get rid of that sort, or to exchange it for the sort last mentioned, and we are at peace both with God and man.

—5, But not by *Boasting* one's self, nor yet by any other sort of *Arrogance*, can one hope to enjoy the blessing of peace. For there can hardly be a readier way to disgust and bring up a quarrel; as if men were eager to avenge the injustice of such boasting towards God their Maker and Redeemer, on the principle above-mentioned, namely, that however superior any man's actions or abilities may be felt or appear in comparison with others, if the odour of his life should be perfect sanctity, and every action spotless innocence, not he, but another, must have the credit of his life. "For who maketh thee to differ? (says St. Paul) and what hast thou that thou didst not receive? Now, if thou didst receive it, why dost thou glory as if thou hadst not received it?" (Cor. I. iv. 7.) As well might the rose be proud of its fragrance, or the lily of its snowy whiteness. The lily may say, I am beautiful; and so thou art, fair flower: but who gave thee thy beauty?

This were common boasting, but not rational. The rational mode is, to boast of One of whom we have reason to boast; as David, for example, appears to have done habitually, not only from a passage before cited, but from several acts besides of his eventful life; when the spirit of the man was evinced in the style of his expressions. Of this we have a pleasing instance in the affair with Goliath, for whom he was thought by Saul to be no match, neither indeed did he profess to be any alone, "Thy servant kept his father's sheep, (said he to Saul) and there came a lion and a bear, and took a lamb out of the flock, and I went out after him, and smote him, and delivered it out of his mouth; and when he arose against me, I caught him by his

beard, and smote him, and slew him : thy servant slew both the lion and the bear, and this uncircumcised Philistine shall be as one of them ; seeing he hath defied the armies of the living God. David said moreover, **THE LORD THAT DELIVERED ME OUT OF THE PAW OF THE LION AND OUT OF THE PAW OF THE BEAR, HE WILL DELIVER ME OUT OF THE HAND OF THIS PHILISTINE**" (Sam. I. xvii. 34, &c.). " And to the Philistine he said, Thou comest to me with a sword, and with a spear, and with a shield, but I come to thee **IN THE NAME** of the Lord of hosts, the God of the armies of Israel, whom thou hast defied. This day the Lord will deliver thee into mine hand," &c. (Ib. 45, 46). Speaking of his multiplied enemies at the same rate, in a beautiful psalm, he says, " All nations compassed me round about, but **IN THE NAME OF THE LORD** will I destroy them. They kept me in on every side ; they kept me in, I say, on every side, but **IN THE NAME OF THE LORD** will I destroy them " (Ps. cxviii. 10, 11). " I will not trust in my bow, (says he,) it is not my sword that shall help me, but it is **THOU** that savest us from our enemies, and puttest them to confusion that hate us. **WE MAKE OUR BOAST OF GOD** all day long : and will praise **THY NAME** for ever and ever " (Ib. xliv. 7—9). There is a pleasing example of one who had wisdom and riches and might, and **ALL OF HIS OWN ACQUIRING** too, under divine Providence, yet gloried in neither so much as in his relation to the divine Author of his acquirements ; and, that he had the gift to understand and know Him for a Being to whom it was an honour to be related in the capacity of a son, a servant, or only of a creature, " The Lord which exerciseth loving-kindness, judgment, and righteousness in the earth " (Jer. ix. 23, 24).

We have many fine samples of oratory both in the camp and in the field of battle upon record ; but a sample of each, being two in one day, like those above cited, is not to be paralleled in all history, perhaps, whether sacred or profane, only for its modest manly sense ; but its exalted piety is what gives the finish to its excellence. It is by such a style as David's that we recognize the servants of

the Lord, those who do not venture any how on their own account, nor trusting in their own strength; and, considering their sort of trust, we need not be much surprised at their extraordinary performance. This too may be regarded as boasting indeed, but it is as rational as pious, considering its object, otherwise nothing could be more absurd than to boast of future contingencies in any case, to say nothing of the event of a duel like that between such a stripling as David then was, and the champion of the Philistines. "Go to now, (says St. James,) ye that say, to-day or to-morrow we will go into such a city, and continue there a year, and buy, and sell, and get gain; whereas ye know not what shall be on the morrow. For what is your life? it is even as a vapour that appeareth for a time, and then vanisheth away. For that ye ought to say, If the Lord will, we shall live and do this or that" (Jam. iv. 13, &c.). A good lesson for the tongue!

The tongue in a man's mouth is also very prettily compared, in the same passage, to the helm in a ship, by which it is turned any how, in spite of winds and waves, "whithersoever the governor listeth. Even so (says this honest apostle) the tongue is a little member and boasteth great things" (Jam. iii. 4, 5).

—6, Every member in the body has its qualification somehow, either for good or evil; and this one often for both, as St. James observes (Ib. 9, 10). That is to say, the tongue can threaten as well as boast, especially with the help of glaring eyes and a clenched fist. But with these and other suitable accompaniments, the action may be considered as rather more than *Threatening*; being then what we mean by *Intimidation*. And further than this, likewise,

—7, The ready services of the tongue are often retained in other ways as well as threatening, by other unseemly characteristics, such as *Craft*, *Wit*, *Wantonness*, and the like; respecting

—1, The *Beauty* or *Seemliness* of which, generally, there may be some doubt with others, if their owners seem to have no doubt on the point. Also with regard to

=2, The allotment or *classification* of these varieties, as whether they belong chiefly to the animal or intellectual sphere. It certainly does not appear how any of these can be more intellectual than any of the services last mentioned; but as the tongue itself may be either more spiritually or more intellectually applied, according to the prevalence, either of passion or of intellect, so may the offices in which it takes so conspicuous a part, namely, in craft, wit, wantonness, before-mentioned, and others of the kind.

=3, A great deal must also depend on the *Meaning* occasionally applied to these characteristic expressions, as Wit, for example; by which we understand, in one sense, nearly the same as Wisdom, i. e. sober wit—social, appetitive, and benevolent wit, wit according to the sense in which it has been considered by old-fashioned people. But such is not the sort here intended; the sort of wit here intended is foolish and insolent, wanton, unsocial, sarcastic, and altogether aversive. It does not savour so much of wisdom as of folly and impertinence, nor of friendship and benevolence as of pride and conceit; of malice and of an evil spirit, more than some other casts of folly, with not a grain less of foolishness. And it is not always lighter, though called light wit, but heavier, too, sometimes than mere folly, in its consequence, as by means of this unlucky habit many a peaceful state has been embroiled, and many a man of worth has brought his own sincerity in question, if, which is still worse, he have not even impaired this excellent property. However, giving loose to a man's wit, as it is said, but with more correctness, to his folly, is not the way for him to improve his dignity and self-command, any more than his respectable look and air of sincerity. Indeed, so nearly allied to wantonness is this same wit, and upon the whole so dangerous a property is it to the owner himself, as well as to others, that he had better, for the most part, restrain, or have nothing to do with it, LEST HE SHOULD HAVE MORE TO ANSWER FOR THAN ENOUGH.

=4, But considering, likewise, their *Distinction*; however nearly these two may be allied, it is possible for wit

of the gayer kind to be without wantonness, and by no means uncommon for wantonness to be without wit; though its subjects, owners, or employers, are seldom aware of this possibility until they begin to feel the scourge as an effect of its employment. Wantonness is a source of the scourge, the scourge of famine and pestilence, of war and tumult; and the scourge is a temporary cure for wantonness, for nothing can root it out of the world entirely, nor keep it in subjection either, for any length of time. But this is the way of the world: first, "foolish men are plagued for their offence, (as the Psalmist says,) and because of their wickedness" (Ps. cvii. 17). "Then they cry unto the Lord in their trouble, but no sooner has he delivered them out of their distress, than they begin to wander out of the way again in the wilderness of woes from which they were reclaimed by God's grace. This is the way of them, oscillating continually between wantonness and reform. This is their foolishness, and their posterity praise their saying" (Ps. xlix. 13), instead of profiting by the lesson they afford at last.

—8, Close upon the company of wit, including wantonness, with other kindred qualities before mentioned, and so near like them as hardly to be distinguished from some of the company, *Scorn* and *Contempt* present themselves, forming, like their predecessors, a branch of malice, and a refinement though not so ingenious on their common foundation, which pride is, being at the same time, as usual with refinements on bad properties, even grosser than their foundation. It may be more nice than agreeable, to determine a precedence among refuse, but really scorn and its associates are uglier properties than some of the ugliest of this superior class, without excepting envy which compares with them in the inferior. For there may seem a tinge of modesty, or, at least of shame, in this property; since the envious person must needs feel a sense of inferiority, if he be too proud to own it; but the scorner and the contemptuous person, despicable as he is, can feel an infe-

riority to no one; he is a subject that will not submit, if he can help it, either to God or man; because he scorns the authority of both, contemning and despising all that is orderly, good and excellent in every line, whether spiritual or civil. Therefore it may be said, that scorn looks worse than envy, while its effect may be as deleterious as its aspect is disgusting. And it was observed by Solomon, as other politicians may also have probably remarked, that "scornful men bring a city into a snare" (or set it on fire) (Prov. xxix. 8); namely, by their ungodly counsels, being very firebrands, as we may say. Therefore, "blessed is the man that hath not walked in the counsel of the ungodly, nor stood in the way of sinners, and hath not sat in the seat of the scornful" (Ps. i. 1).

And when the scornful do not also happen to be ungodly, or at least not after the common acceptation, not being exactly like the scornful judge in some city, "which feared not God, neither regarded man" (Luke xviii. 2), but to have rather some fear of God, they may still be very unacceptable to Him, and very unprofitable to mankind, from their contempt of others, or from their want of charity in not making a proper allowance for other men's faults or deficiencies. By another parable in the same chapter, our Saviour has censured the godly scorner as well as the atheistic (Ib. 14); and to follow up his censure, it may be questioned, whether some who are neither Pharisees nor Atheists, may not have a tinge of the same spirit, though not a perfect dye or baptism, perhaps; when they conclude the children of this world to be more reprobates than themselves, because they know not, neither seem likely to know—the Gospel; as the Pharisees thought of the people in another respect, when they said, "This people, who know not the law are cursed" (John vii. 49). And is not this prejudice a clear invention of Satan's, to prevent those who desire the improvement of others, from attempting it so zealously as they otherwise might? Indeed, this may seem not unlikely. It is, therefore, a very dangerous and insi-

nuating vice, is this evil united characteristic objective, scorn and contempt, and of which we ought to beware.

—9, But how are men to beware of two other kindred properties, *Bigotry* and *Intolerance*: the same being equally troublesome with scorn and contempt, and pulling for ever all they can lay hold of into their train—too odious to be followed, too strong sometimes for people to avoid! Which, with views and actions most disgusting, will do what they can to force their example and their views upon others; not choosing, if they can help it, that we should walk in any other counsel, or stand in any other way but theirs. Their subjects are seldom aware of the pride that shews itself in their character to all but themselves, nor of the malignant spirit, which they mistake for a love of truth, of virtue, excellence and the like; the same being neither more nor less than self-love, self-esteem, admiration and other selfish properties so disguised; No more are such subjects aware of the fond principle altogether that mingles with their malignity, whereby it becomes a high misdemeanour against the fond mother, to mislike her child; against another, to mislike her cat; against a man, to mislike his horse, dog, writing, religion, or any other hobby. And whether you mislike these or not, the bigot is sure to mislike you, if you be good for any thing; the aversive rancour that slumbers in his breast, only waiting for opportunity, and never wanting will to break out.

The outward form, or FRUITS as generally considered, of bigotry and intolerance are seen first in disqualifications, restrictions, tests—articles upon articles, and creeds upon creeds, with other irritating overtures: to these succeed disfranchisements and exclusions, pains and proscriptions: and when at length some, or all of them, have so far answered the bigot's purpose as to drive men into open rebellion, then the civil sword shall be unsheathed, and bigotry pander to fratricide, as in that first memorable murder, when a man slew his brother, because the brother's offering or worship was more acceptable unto the

Lord than his (Gen. iv. 3, &c.) ; or, as St. John more deeply observes, because Cain was of that Wicked One, and his brother's works were different from his, as ONE OF ANOTHER FAMILY (John I. iii. 12).

—10, Hence it may appear how short is the transition from bigotry and intolerance to a one-sided warfare, known by the name of *Persecution* ; and which may be distinguished into two kinds by the relation of object, namely ; one persecution for practice, the other for opinion.

=1, The first of these two kinds, namely, *Persecution for Practice*, may not have been so commonly avowed or professed as the second : but there can be no doubt of its having been more commonly practised ; nor any scarcity of examples either, to prove it from the time “ when men began to multiply on the face of the earth ” besides those eminent and often quoted examples of Abel, and Isaac, and Jacob, who were all members of the holy family, and persecuted by their own brothers after the flesh on that account. For the honour of humanity it is to be hoped, that so flagrant an example as the first mentioned, wherein one brother is seen persecuting another to death, and which has just been proposed to exemplify the fruits of bigotry and intolerance, do not occur often ; but still they do occur, and precisely in the relation above mentioned. For the righteous do not persecute the wicked, but the wicked persecute the righteous. And if we were really to examine we should discover, that a great part of the professed persecution for opinion belongs in fact to this kind of which we are considering, that is, to persecution for practice, or because the works of the persecutor are evil, as St. John says, in comparison with those of the persecuted ; so that he really pleads one motive while he regards another, and in that respect is not only a persecutor, but a liar and an hypocrite. And what also makes the supposition of such cases very probable is, that you may preach the severest truths even to men like Elymas, “ full of all subtlety, children of the devil, enemies of all righteousness ” (Acts

xiii. 10), IF YOU WILL ONLY CONDESCEND TO BELIE YOUR PREACHING BY YOUR PRACTICE.

=2, But if it be really *Opinion*, as they pretend, that the persecutors resent and persecute, so let it. And what right has any one man to persecute another for matters that are not in his province? "To his own Master he standeth or falleth" (Rom. xiv. 4). To punish wrong opinions is God's province; who alone can know to what extent they are maintained, and will punish them accordingly with wrong actions, as elsewhere observed*. But some not knowing, or not considering his judgments, will be happy to step forward as the champions of orthodoxy and avengers of wrong notions in every department of science. So philosophy, for one, has been subject to the desolating arm of persecution: but its Kadesh, its Bœotia, its NETHERLANDS, are found in religion. Here is the field of merciless contention, the favourite province of ambition and bloodshed; where much of the early persecution that we read of was provoked apparently by the insolence of its objects, in making their religion a cloak for sedition; and then what has been called persecution was more properly an act of justice. For some cases of persecution too there might have been a shadow of doubt; as e. g. where there was an appearance of expediency, or of some public advantage to be derived from it: nevertheless its chief provocative, THE CHIEF PROVOCATIVE TO PERSECUTION HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE HEAVENLY BIRTH AND MODEST unpretending worth of genuine Christians; which to persecute, is easier than to imitate. Therefore, in such cases, we are to look beyond a mere principle of envy and groundless dislike; understanding as the root of all or complement of malice, an evil sympathy, or a fellow feeling with the enemy of virtue and innocence, the prince of this world as our Saviour calls him; who, as he says, "hath nothing in me" (John xiv. 30). "If ye were of

* In Kingdom Sermons, No. 4.

the world, (said he to his disciples,) the world would love his own: but because ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you" (John xv. 19). As they who are chosen by Christ cannot possibly esteem the way of the world, the world will naturally take offence at them on the principle just mentioned.

And so it happens from one cause and another, that although the world cannot help esteeming a righteous man and true Christian, and feels every day the benefit of his presence; yet it is always on the watch to do him some harm, and will hinder his ever reposing in this life, if possible. His relative virtues are such as the world has no reason to be sorry for: he pays all the world his due, and is disposed to help every one; yet the miser and the oppressor are not so much hated. "The kings of the earth stand up, and the rulers take counsel together against the Lord and against his anointed" (Ps. ii. 2), says David in one place, and "Yea, the very abjects came together against me" (Ib. xxxv. 15) in another. It is not any one class, not two, but men of every class from the highest to the most abject, that are so rancorously bent against the Lord, and consequently against those whom he has chosen, for his sake; as he also foretold his followers, "Ye shall be hated of all men for my name's sake" (Matt. x. 22)—for the sake of a name most opposite to hatred and persecution! of a name identified with the practice of beneficence!

But what may strike any one as most disgusting in this unhallowed warfare, is the fact of persecutions on account of religion, being often fomented, if not actually headed by her own ministers, and of religious persecutions HEADED BY CHRISTIAN MINISTERS too, above all things! a one-sided warfare headed by ministers who were sent ostensibly to preach the glad tidings of peace! Of this horrid inconsistency, this downright blasphemous absurdity, such examples might be quoted as would fill many volumes, and present such a picture to the eye as

would make the heart recoil, and be enough to raise a doubt as to the truth of the Christian institution, if its Founder had not anticipated this consequence by declaring beforehand, that he "came not to send peace but a sword" (Matt. x. 34); as we find it.

For very soon after the visible church began to emerge from the horrors of Jewish and heathen persecution it seemed to emulate the spirit, as well as the trappings and circumstances of its quondam persecutors: and immediately as they could be heard, the flaming orthodoxy of Christian pontiffs and priests made them seize the trump of war, and long and loud was their blast: from Asia to Africa it was heard, and throughout Europe; more room was wanted, and a new world presented a new sphere for Christian persecution, or for persecution by Christian priests and potentates, just about the time that orthodoxy was at its height. O what shocking scenes of barbarity were then enacted under pretence of religion on happy and comparatively innocent nations by these unchristian reformers! Here was Satan casting out Satan (Matt. xii. 26) with a witness! It matters little to allege, that the slaughtered multitude on that occasion were heathens; or on any other occasion, only half believers, like the Jews, Moors, Saracens, and others: for had they been cannibals, the murderous priests with their bands of military executioners would all have deserved hanging for such barbarity aggravated by hypocrisy.

And if it be a further aggravation of the offence, Christian blood too has been spilt as freely in this cause as the blood of infidels and half believers, if not more freely, by persons calling themselves Christian Warriors, at the instigation of persons calling themselves Christian Ministers, with their crusades, inquisitions, councils, commissions, and SECRET TRIBUNALS*. Why should one mention the

* This engine of spiritual tyranny and oppression, though here designated by a plural noun, is in fact but one power, consisting in a variety of springs and resources. The secret too, as well as the use of this vile ma-

collective names of the sufferers, as Wickliffites and Hussites, Albigenses and Waldenses, Protestants and Huguenots, or the individual names of many who have suffered like the first Christians, EXCEPT IN SUFFERING BY CHRISTIAN PERSECUTORS? "For such are false apostles, deceitful workers, transforming themselves into the apostles of Christ. And no marvel, for Satan himself is transformed into an angel of light: therefore it is no great thing, if his ministers also be transformed as the ministers of righteousness" (Cor. II. xi. 13, &c.).

We are apt to think more ourselves of persecutions directed against our brethren, than of those against others: but "the Lord is loving unto every man, and his mercy is over all his works" (Ps. cxlv. 9). He could not but view the persecution of his Indian tribes with abhorrence, as well as the shameful oppression that has been occasionally exercised on his own peculiar people by those who could scarcely be said to harbour them, at the best, if they were ever so well paid for it. And however light a matter any Christian may think it, to stigmatize, disqualify, or proscribe; in short—to persecute others of the same profession for not being as orthodox as himself, or for not equalling him in heedless professions; the same may not be viewed in the same fond light by One whose judgment ought to weigh with a man more than his own caprice, which in fact is neither more nor less than the dictation of the common enemy.

chinery, has been nearly confined to its ruler so far; which makes the same worth exposing, independent of other considerations. But the most that one can do at present is to caution the reader against lending himself to the views of such a ruler in any degree. Perhaps his services shall be required in some remote degree—he may be himself perhaps in the next degree of innocence to the destined victim: if so, he will not be unlikely, to see the propriety of *trying the spirits*, as St. John advises (John I. iv. 1); or in other words, of *marking the character of the instigators*, before he lends himself to their purpose—to a purpose that runs much farther than he, perhaps, may have any idea of.

Whoever yet heard of any one persecuted by the Lamb of God in any shape? Though he came to take away the sin of the world (John i. 29), and FOR JUDGMENT (Ib. ix. 39) as well as atonement (Ib. vi. 51), we do not read of his cutting off its inhabitants by wholesale executions therefore: but we do read of HIS GIVING HIS OWN LIFE A RANSOM FOR MANY (Matt. xx. 28). And here is the test of a genuine Christian, or true follower of Christ: if others dissent from him on this important head, considering it their misfortune; he will be sorry for them, and the more sorry the more they dissent: should a fair opportunity offer, he will endeavour to convert or reclaim them; but should they resist or even resent his friendly endeavours, he still will not think of persecuting, stigmatizing, or injuring them any how: he will rather preserve his disposition to benefit and befriend them AS FAR AS HE HONESTLY CAN; not making any distinction in this respect, but that of not shielding them at the expense of the community, nor choosing to be benefited by them, nor to hold any preferment under them, or any trust, gift, or bequest, from or after them. "For the rod of the ungodly cometh not into the lot of the righteous, lest the righteous put their hand unto wickedness" (Ps. cxxv. 3).

But how opposite to this is the fighting professor! "Put up thy sword" (John xviii. 11), said our Lord to St. Peter: and here are whole crusades of thousands upon thousands enlisted for slaughter by his infallible successors in the very name of the divine Prohibitor! What an idea does this single consideration afford of crusades—yes, or of any civil distinctions on account of abstract opinions! For shame, ye crusaders of every sort and degree!—Christian persecutors by wholesale and retail, persecutors for the sake of a particularly peaceful religion, and not for that of Odin or Mahomet, do not pretend to murder for your master Christ; murder for your master, the devil, who "was a murderer from the beginning" (John viii. 44). And for the sake of consistency, if you are ever to do good, or have any thing to

give, do good or give to any but a Christian: "Put up thy sword again," deluded hierarch, as impolitic as thou art unchristian and inconsistent—"put up thy sword again into his place: for all they that take the sword shall perish with the sword" (Matt. xxvi. 52). And see, if it be not so now in Campagna, and in all the extra Catholic countries of Christendom.

—11, The forementioned may seem bad enough; but the most serious form of persecution is one that people in general are least aware of, and most likely to overlook, because its operation is not only hid, like that of its shield or *chaperon*, THE SECRET TRIBUNAL, but unconsciously promoted by the objects themselves through "the deceitful lusts;" and that is the trade of *Corruption*, a trade infinitely more formidable than the trade of war. For there one might have some chance of escape at least by flying on the appearance of a superior enemy; but here he attacks without showing himself, secretly in spirit: and being an host himself, is still attended with many an evil spirit besides; all lurking in secret, wathing witchout intermission, and ready to lay hold of every opportunity of stealing forward and breaking in upon the outworks of virtue. First our arch enemy leads the way with these by small beginnings: and there are beginnings so small (Improprieties; they call them) that they seem almost to be none; but these are presently followed by others so glaring that they cannot be mistaken; then come on downright faults, offences, crimes. Then as soon as a mine can be sprung, a breach made, and the evil host admitted, our spiritual enemy will begin to draw out all his forces together in open array; having a band of human traitors—ten thousand Judases at a time, if necessary, always within call and fully equipped, and as forward as himself on the work of destruction—wicked zealous; who will "compass sea and land to make one proselyte; and when they have made him, will make him two-fold more the child of hell than themselves" (Matt. xxiii. 15). And if he be "like a roaring lion that walketh about,

seeking whom he may devour" (Pet. I. v. 8), they are like ravenous wolves prowling about for lambs. Innocence is their game, corruption their sport: they have no pleasure comparatively in offending with each other; but where they can perceive any remains of pristine worth by the modesty and ingenuousness of the subject, there they mark their prey; and if they can but succeed in hunting it down, all their native venom shall be presently transfused into the veins of the unlucky PROSELYTE, and therewith the same propensity to prowl and poison for the grand deceiver. So that in fact the trade of corruption, or "the mystery of iniquity" (Thess. II. ii. 7), as it is properly called, can never be regarded in any other light, than that of a spiritual persecution, and a part of the one-sided warfare to which some men of the sort before mentioned are particularly exposed, or would be, if their heavenly Spirit should ever forsake them.

Perhaps the theory of that part, or of the general system of that one-sided warfare might be interesting. And if no more benefit can be expected for society from the theory of the same warfare generally, and from the theory of the corrupting part especially, than from that of mutual warfare, or war for mutual carnage—it still seems much, and much to be deplored, that after a military education of so many years' continuance or profession, the Christian community should have made so little progress in the art of self defence against its spiritual enemies. And the present* is not a seasonable opportunity for enlarging on that subject, as another train of evil aversive characteristics of this class and subservient to the last mentioned, if the last mentioned be not rather subservient to these, will now claim our attention.

—12, Like "evil men and seducers, deceiving and being deceived" (Tim. II. iii. 13) are the kindred trains of evil characteristics: so that one hardly knows sometimes,

* A little further notion of this traffic has been attempted in Sermon 20, entitled THE WILES OF SATAN.

which to consider first or highest in the order of cause and effect. The train to be now considered, and nearly the last of its kind, does not consist in a direct opposition to the divine authority; if it did, the particulars would belong rather to our next argument; but it consists, like the foregoing, in *Hostilities* directed first or most immediately against those who are confederated and acting under that authority: “also the sons of the stranger that join themselves to the Lord, to serve Him, and to love the name of the Lord, to be his servants; every one that keepeth the sabbath from polluting it, and taketh hold of my covenant” (Isai. lvi. 6). And the plan of the betrayer is, 1, *Heresy*, 2, *Schism* and *Separation* or *Seclusion*—to divide the confederates aforesaid by all means, if possible; but chiefly in two respects or departments; 1 in the spirit, 2 in the flesh; or in respect 1 of doctrine and discipline, 2 of cooperation and communion—from the life and body of the church. For if each of these, that is the life and the body, be naturally inseparable, the first as being “hid with Christ in God” (Col. iii. 3), and the second as an eternal rock, which the gates of hell shall not prevail against (Matt. xvi. 18), yet the individuals confederated or “knit together” (Col. ii. 19) as it is said, in these respects may show a falling off from the institution, as of leaves from a tree, or of splinters from a rock: and that is what he aims to promote.

== 1, The first of these two divisions; being the *division in spirit*, or otherwise in doctrine and discipline as aforesaid, is properly called *Heresy*: a great part of which has been fabricated perhaps in the visible church for the sake of distinction only, that the heresiarchs might be famous in history; and so far some of them have succeeded—thanks generally to the patience of those who had to write an account of their heretical proceedings;—sometimes owing to the connexion of such proceedings with others of greater moment, and sometimes perhaps with a view to the reputation of the historian himself, that he too might be famous in history. But

simply considered, the said heresies are matters of little moment in an universal relation ; and such as do not become a general view of the Kingdom of God in Christ.

=2, It may be said, however, that heresy has often led to *Schism*, &c., a spiritual division to a temporal or *corporeal* ; which is sometimes of greater importance, by begetting one excess upon another ; as articles upon articles, and creeds upon creeds. And sometimes perhaps without such a provocation, only from a base Simoniacal policy, the same multiplication of articles and creeds may have been adopted with a view to narrow the terms of church-communion ; and by consequence, of eligibility to church-preferment, which is one step towards a monopoly of that highly valued article. And then, by limiting the right of appointment again to a few patrons within this narrow sphere, another step is gained, not only towards the foresaid monopoly, but also towards the ulterior object of its author in dividing the church. Whereupon there would seem to be but one step more, when to pieces goes the church, and the gates of hell have prevailed against it ; which is, to draw all the power and glory of all the kingdoms of the world into the hands of a single ecclesiastic.

So indeed it would seem ; but we have reason to hope better things on the faith not only of our Saviour's fore-mentioned assertion, but also of a certain and infallible observation confirming our hope and that word at the same time, which is this, namely, that SPURIOUS PREFERENCE DOES NOT ATTRACT HEARERS, IF IT DOES PREACHERS. The people will always cling to the man of their choice : they may be first driven from him, or from the Catholic communion together with him, by an hydra-headed monster called Orthodoxy, and then persecuted for seceding : but all in vain. They will soon re-unite : it is but buffeting the air to do any thing to divide them. From Catholics they may become Protestants, and from Protestants Dissenters ; but let them change their denomi-

nation as they will, they may be equally united in charity, in holiness, in godly sincerity; and then CATHOLIC still at last; THE HOLY CATHOLIC CHURCH; the church that owns no head, either visible or invisible, but Christ. "O Lord, our God, other lords beside thee have had dominion over us: but by thee only will we make mention of thy name. They are dead; they shall not live: they are deceased; they shall not rise: therefore hast Thou visited and destroyed them, and made all their memory to perish" (Isai. lxvi. 13, 14).

Let men cease to differ wantonly and capriciously; let them not fail in a brotherly feeling toward each other individually, and in a family feeling collectively; and we might then all of us be Catholics, if not nominally and formally, yet virtually and essentially, which is the main point. "Let us therefore (as the apostle advises) as many as are perfect be thus minded: and if in any thing ye be otherwise minded, God shall reveal even this unto you" (Phil. iii. 15). Do not presume to talk of tolerating that which you cannot prevent: but if your neighbours seem to be in want of spiritual medicine or food, rather encourage them to choose their own pastor and physician: if they are really supposed to have souls of their own, allow them to cater for themselves in this as in other respects. Allow them the same liberty that Jacob allowed his ten sons, when he said, "Behold, I have heard, that there is corn in Egypt: get you down thither, and buy for us from thence: that ye may live and not die" (Gen. xlii. 2). Yes; and let "little Benjamin their ruler" go with them. "And take double money in your hand; and the money that was brought again in the mouth of your sacks; carry it again in your hand; peradventure it was an oversight. Take also your brother, and arise, go again unto the man, (the man of your choice) AND GOD ALMIGHTY GIVE YOU MERCY BEFORE THE MAN" (Ib. xliii. 12—14).

But those who are properly called schismatics will often pretend a difference of opinion as their inducement to di-

vide: which is like invoking the spirit of heresy to cover that of schism: for in the main all this difference of opinion will be found a mere pretext. RELIGIOUS DIVISIONS AND DISPUTES ARE SELDOM PROSECUTED ON RELIGIOUS ACCOUNTS, as before intimated, whatever the disputants may pretend. They may cry out on one side for faith, and on the other for works; but what does it signify which they are for, when they do not appear to have either? That excellent apostle, St. James, could afford a better account of these differences between all parties, if he was consulted as to the cause, "Whence come wars and fightings among you? (among the professors of peace!) Come they not hence, even of your lusts that war in your members?" (James iv. 1.) Too often they do. And truly it seems a wonder, that you should not think more of dividing and subdividing as you do continually: Pilate's soldiers thought much apparently of rending your master's coat (John xix. 24): but you think no more of rending his body in pieces than would "some evil beast" have thought of rending Joseph's (Gen. xxxvii. 33), or one like the enemy aforesaid of rending yours. Has not he said, "Whoso shall offend one of these little ones which believe in me, it were better for him, that a mill-stone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea?" (Matt. xviii. 6.) But to secede, however humble and modest it may appear sometimes, and almost like flying or submission—is in truth very often, if not generally, more like persecution: and many a poor curate, and many a "blameless priest" has been made to feel the weight of such persecution in—to him at least, A PAINFUL DIMINUTION OF HIS FLOCK.

In private families, brother and sister, father and mother, uncle and aunt may not always think alike; but still they live together, and do as well as can be expected: their difference of opinion does not immediately affect their digestion, nor prevent their going on with their several occu-

pations quietly enough sometimes, by chance ; that is when there are no busy or malicious agents going between to prevent it : but should we imitate some violent religionists, we must all leave our families, or our families leave us, and have such another breaking up as there has not been since the dispersion at Babel. If such religionists, being a very proud and arrogant set, would take fright at each other and disperse, it were well for the tolerant ; and all much as it should be. For SINFUL LUSTS WHICH SEPARATE MEN FROM GOD, OUGHT ALSO TO SEPARATE MEN FROM EACH OTHER, for the sake of preventing contagion : but their effect is not to be hindered by any such instinct. “ And because iniquity shall abound, the love of many shall wax cold ” (Matt. xxiv. 12)—of many who may seem to agree in faith when it suits their convenience, but are more likely to be agreed at heart in unbelief and in ripeness for mischief.

If however there be any Christian professors, as it is to be hoped there are some of all sorts, who really value the peace of the church at large, and so far deserve the name of Catholic, they should labour strenuously in these times to promote it by all the means they may happen to possess. There are two influential parties especially, the ministers or leaders of congregations and their patrons or electors, who ought all of them to be more Catholic now than they were in the days of ignorance.

First, the *Leaders* of different flocks or communities should remember the injury that may be done to the general cause of Christ's church by their slandering and reviling, or only being severe upon, each other. They should remember the example of Abraham, that great flock-founder : when there was a striving between his servants and Lot's, “ and Abraham said unto Lot, let there be no strife, I pray thee, between me and thee, and between my herdmen and thy herdmen ; for we be brethren ” (Gen. xiii. 8). They should remember, that they, though having different families under their charge, are all children them-

selves of one God-father and one God-mother, which is Christ and his church; "endeavouring to keep the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace" (Eph. iv. 3).

And next, the present influence of *Patrons* and electors might also be rendered more useful, or at least, more Catholic and innocent, by due precaution, to promote unity and concord in the church, if not to prevent greater troubles than it has ever yet experienced. Some, especially, who profess to be its great friends and supporters, and really persuade themselves, perhaps, that they are such, should rather strive to mend their appointments, than to traduce, vilify and persecute those who quit their fold, because they will not put up with any sort of pastors that such lordly patrons may think proper to impose on them.

At the same time it must also be owned that these MIS-APPOINTMENTS do not seem a sufficient ground for separation: and the dissatisfied would do better to correct, if possible, abuses in the patronage of the church, than to be wandering up and down like sheep without a fold, because things are not exactly to their mind, and they perhaps not exactly of a mind to make them what they should be. The conduct of our Lord in relation to the temple is worthy to be remembered and imitated by any who may be offended at what they observe in the church. He was more zealous for the purity of the Old or Mosaic institution than such men can possibly be for the new; insomuch that it was said of him prospectively, "The zeal of thine house hath even eaten me" (Ps. lxix. 9)—yet did not he forsake the temple on account of the money-changers, and "all them that bought and sold in the temple, but fairly cast them out" (Matt. xxi. 12). And let the governors or frequenters either of any church be as bad as they will, people are not obliged to obey the former nor to cooperate with the latter in aught that is morally, much less RELIGIOUSLY wrong. It may also happen, that they whom we suspect, are not so bad in that particular respect, as we have imagined; it may even happen, that they are not

much worse than ourselves. And in pretty many cases when we are disposed to be severe upon others, to be out of humour with them, to scorn, to persecute and cast them out, or else to secede from them, perhaps the action might properly continue the object being changed; to wit, from others to ourselves, that we may cast out the beam, or if it be only a mote out of our own eye first (Matt. vii. 5). Meanwhile the farther we withdraw from others, the more savage and morose we get, the more strange and disgusting will others appear: we disgust them first by our pride or moroseness, and then leave them because they are disgusted: we first reject those whom we dislike or despise, and then dislike them the more for being rejected. Even our own spittle has not the same consideration with us after it is out of our mouth as it had before: and all the world is but as spittle to the proud seceder or seclusionist. Not that every seceder, or every one who secludes and shuts himself up, or separates, or withdraws himself any how from others on a moral or religious account is therefore necessarily proud or otherwise faulty on such account. Lot was a moral seceder; when he kept aloof from the men of Sodom (Gen. xix. 9): the patriarchs, the prophets, apostles, martyrs, confessors, and all the faithful people of God have been religious seceders in holding back from the heathen idolaters by whom they were surrounded, and a remnant of every sort perhaps from the majority, BY MEANING WHAT THEY PROFESSED; yet none the prouder for seceding, nor the more faulty for it in any respect. Sometimes it may have happened to a well meaning man to secede ignorantly, and perhaps rather conceitedly; like the Psalmist perhaps in a fit of despondence, when he said, "The zeal of thine house hath even eaten me" (Ps. lxi. 9): and like the prophet Elijah; when he was tired of his life and reduced likewise to a very shadow by being so jealous, as he evidently was, for the Lord God of hosts; because the children of Israel had forsaken his covenant, thrown down his altars, and slain his prophets with the sword; and he was the only

one left, (as he thought) and his life was eagerly sought after: there being at the same moment seven thousand in Israel of his own stamp—"seven thousand in Israel; all the knees which have not bowed unto Baal, and every mouth which hath not kissed him" (Kings I. xix. 18). And let men be as staunch as they will, the best of them may always find some matter of dislike even in their own selves.

2. It would be a very great improvement, therefore, to transfer a part of the aversive properties before mentioned to ourselves; but to do this, apparently, we must begin another cut or division of that class presenting, or presented by other objects. For whereas the objects of the properties hitherto mentioned in this class may be supposed inferior, constituting the sort or division of evil, aversive, superior objective characteristics just considered; the objects will be equal when our aversive properties fall on ourselves as aforesaid, and on others our equals, if only for a time or in a temporary relation; by means of which a sort or division of evil *equal* objectives is constituted in the same class.

—1. The first of these is one nearly related to the last mentioned of the former division, Schism, &c., being an inverse direction of tedium or satiety, by some called *Ennui*; properly speaking, an essential weariness, a weariness of one's self; as restlessness may be an incidental weariness, though a constituent property, i. e. a weariness of incidentals, as of place, posture, or circumstances; that being only so much more serious, as self is harder to get rid of than circumstances. Indeed the importance of the property is experienced several ways; as for example, by its efficacy in promoting friendships, if friendships they may be called, as well as many other relations and predicaments, whether friendly or hostile—civil, political, or domestic, almost beyond any other property, whether appetitive or aversive, that we are acquainted with. For it is chiefly through self-weariness or ennui, and in order to get rid of the burden of themselves, that people turn

their thoughts towards each other—some in the way of friendship, as it is called, some in other ways besides those above mentioned, v. g. besides ill-humour, persecution, and others, as well as others that may be mentioned, and still more that will not most probably—all crying out at once, “Who will shew us any good?” (Ps. iv. 6,) and cheating themselves with the fallacious hope of relief, and of finding elsewhere, perhaps, that contentment which they either do not try, or cannot ever hope to find in themselves.

Hence the love of novelty and change will generally be a bad sign for its subject as before observed; namely, a sign that he has brought himself into a bad or tiresome predicament: and until he have the grace or good fortune to get out of that predicament, the more ennui he feels the more he will have a right to expect. The condition of any society or kingdom may be made altogether wretched only by the effect of such a property as this; no uncommon effect of the same being that which follows; namely,

—2, *War*, the ingredients of which are nearly the same indeed with those of persecution; as rape and rapine, murder, wasting, burning, and other cruel consequences of both. Yet there seems an essential difference between the two, namely, between war and persecution, however they may agree in their consequences; war being defensive as well as offensive; persecution offensive only, as before stated; war of a malignant type, a bad species of a bad subject, or genus. Therefore, having already considered this particular species, it may still be well to bestow a moment's attention on the said evil genus to which it belongs, and as the objective evil, or criminality of war is questioned by many—to view it also in a questionable shape; considering the arguments on either side distinctly, with a view to determine, how far this destructive trade may be lawful, or unlawful for Christians.

=1, The *Lawfulness* of war is asserted by those who

believe its necessity ; supposing that a thing must needs be good somehow or other if it be necessary ; and they will have it, that war is good as a necessary evil, like pains and penalties, and if good, then lawful of course. They say, especially, if government be necessary, then war must be necessary for the sake of government, whether such war be civil or foreign, consequently just and good. For if subjects in any country should revolt, or if some other country should pretend to dictate in its private concerns, there can be no alternative between war and anarchy, or bondage. This is certainly begging the question very much : but still such a sort of argumentation may be held on this side : while,

=2, On the contrary side, or *Unlawfulness* of war, it shall be said, that settling disputes in this manner between nations externally, or between their different orders internally, by the way of arms, is not more rational than settling disputes in this way between individuals ; that the trial by single combat is now generally exploded in Christendom as the remains of feudal and heathen barbarism, being an appeal to brute force, instead of imperial reason ; and a trial by the combating of thousands and tens of thousands cannot be thought of otherwise in principle, at the same time that in effect it is more mischievous.

Thus may the disputants reason variously on this side and that ; and on both sides wrong, by consulting either mere reason instead of authority, or authority less than reason, to know what is lawful. For when the same law is acknowledged by both parties in a dispute, be they nations or individuals, their proper appeal will be to its authority, and not to reason, still less to arms ; as it is said, " To the law and to the testimony " (Isai. viii. 20). In a dispute between Christian nations, as well as between Christian individuals, the law of Christ is to be consulted first on the subject of dispute, and then on the subject of war, if either party should turn recreant or apostatize from the authority which it professes to acknowledge, and both have guaran-

ted by baptism ; in order to ascertain ; first, whether there be any wrong in the case, and if so, whether it may not be righted by reason and truth ; or else, secondly, whether force may be employed in any case, and how far in that case particularly ; unless the general question of war have been already settled one way or the other, when that trouble may be spared. Resuming the question, therefore, on this ground,

=3, Concerning the question of war or no war *for Christians* particularly, what does Christ say ? Does he permit the use of weapons to his servants, and in what cases ? There is one very remarkable case on record, from which it might be inferred, that the use of warlike weapons is decidedly prohibited by Christ : being the case of his own capture by, and consequent submission to the temporal authorities, with an express prohibition to the disciples who were with him, against drawing the sword in his behalf (Matt. xxvi. 52), which has been lately cited. And another very remarkable and decided authority, to the same effect, was his declaration to Pilate, " My kingdom is not of this world : if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight, that I should not be delivered to the Jews ; but now is my kingdom not from hence " (John xviii. 36).

To these immediate authorities uttered by Christ himself should be added others that he has given by the medium of his apostles, which may serve for their comment, as that by St. Paul, " Though we walk in the flesh, we do not war after the flesh. For the weapons of our warfare are not carnal " (Cor. II. x. 3, 4) : also by others in other passages of the apostolic writings. Now the spiritual warfare which St. Paul mentions, is no more than we all are, both born to as men, and bound to as Christians, and what cannot be avoided, and, of course, being so far necessary, would be lawful, even if we were not so bound to it : the question regarding that sort of warfare may, therefore, be clearly affirmed. And considering farther ; with a little at-

tention to the forecited authorities, and others of the kind, we may observe, that our Saviour's prohibition of carnal warfare applies only to the same as it may concern himself and the great cause for which he was anointed; that his followers should not take the carnal sword against Antichrist, as evil principles are to be met with the sword of the spirit, and not with a blade of steel. Especially, where evil principles, or Antichrist, should happen to be in possession, ought Christian people, "as strangers and pilgrims" there to submit, or else quit the country, if they find it too inhospitable and adverse. "Of whom do the kings of the earth take custom or tribute? (said Jesus to Simon Peter) of their own children or of strangers? Peter saith unto him, Of strangers" (Matt. xvii. 25, 26). So, as they were both strangers, he ordered St. Peter to take a piece which he supplied miraculously, and pay for both: "That take (said he) and give unto them for me and thee" (Ib. 27). And so generally, as "the Lord our righteousness" was*, like righteousness itself, a stranger upon earth, he pretended to no more earthly consequence or authority any where, than one of another country; as a foreigner in the very kingdom in which he was born, he became subject to its rulers, just as the king of one nation upon earth would be subject to the king of another, or even of his meanest deputy, as long as he remained in the other king's dominions. "And being found in fashion as a man (says St. Paul), he humbled himself and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross" (Phil. ii. 8).

It was for St. Paul's successors to exemplify the glaring inconsistency of spiritual persons, who should all be as "strangers and pilgrims on the earth" (Heb. xi. 13), taking carnal weapons and rising up against "the kings of the nations" on their own ground. But the rule delivered by Christ to his apostles, and transmitted by them to posterity respecting their conduct in persecution was this,

* Gen. iii. 24.

“When they persecute you in this city flee ye into another” (Matt. x. 23) : by which he provided for the safety of his followers without encouraging opposition to government, or any confusion in the state of society. “For he is not the author of confusion, but of peace” (Cor. I. xiv. 33); there is no inconsistency in all his enactments: but if others have found in them things inimical to peace, it must be by a vicious understanding of the same, it cannot be by any fair construction or inference. With regard to the general question of war, as applying to strangers, or the children of this generation, he enacts nothing; he only legislates for his own subjects, and to these he inculcates mutual love and lenity, as a leading principle, with an obligation to bring others into his covenant by example and persuasion, that the same principle, and the benefit of the same may be extended to them; at the same time cutting and slashing heartily with their spiritual and mighty weapons, through God, against the strong-holds of Satan.

If there be any authority in the world that teaches wilful war and a turn for slaughter, it must be he, or one, however, most opposite to the authority of Christ. But why should it be doubted, when we know that there is such an authority as that alluded to, only by another name, particularly expressive of its wicked craft? Well may it be called *THE OLD SERPENT*. And that is no sly invention of his—*THE WAR OF PREVENTION*, is it? of which there has been such a sample in our days*. And can ever this be necessary? Say, that by a very rare, as well as deplorable chance, this dreadful scourge should threaten; arming and training may then be lawful, (though they have also their temptation) and may operate as a preventive of that to which they are adapted; but how war can prevent war it is not an easy matter to conceive. A Christian-state should always be ready and resolute to repel force by force on its own ground, if necessary; but first, that necessity is to be fairly proved. *AN IMPRUDENT CONCESSION IS ONLY THE*

* Before many of our present contemporaries were born, however.

WAY TO PROVOKE AGGRESSION, BUT ANY INNOCENT SACRIFICE MAY BE MADE FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE, even where victory should *seem* certain; for certain it cannot be: as "the race is not always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong" (Eccles. ix. 11).

—3, As the force of habit is great upon earth, the same being a mighty arbitrator between duty and inclination, and consequently useful as an ally, if not as useful as the world almost, to our infernal enemy, when he can get it on the wrong side, it is possible that many who engage in the trade of war may be so far reconciled to the same by habit only, as to view its horrors with indifference. But in general, it will require other reconcilers besides habit, to get the better of some little remains of goodness still found in human nature so far as to make these horrors endurable; and the most direct are two characteristics of the same class with war, namely, of the evil, aversive, equal; which two characteristics are correlatives and consentients, seeming one together, though distinguishable enough apart; Emulation and Strife by name.

The property of *Emulation*, simply considered, is almost too indifferent for a characteristic, as it may be either good or evil: good, for example, when its subjects "consider one another, to provoke unto love and to good works" (Heb. x. 24): or evil, when on the contrary, they are rather "desirous of vain-glory; provoking one another, envying one another" (Gal. v. 26,) with no such good object. And *Strife*, as emulation partly indulged or let loose, will be similarly distinguished. We may strive either for good or for evil, according to the ends of our emulation; and with either good or evil persons, as its objects: and as the one may be, so will the other be likewise—good emulation or strife, with good ends, and sometimes with good objects or competitors; but evil, with evil ends and good objects. We cannot emulate or strive with the good in any evil work, nor with the wicked in any good; for they will not strive with us either of them, but in his own

way: and that we have nothing to do with, the emulation and strife here properly considered being of the evil kind only. But although these evil shades of either property are most common too, unfortunately, they dare not always vent themselves in open strife—no, not even in *Wrangling* and *Invective*, which is “THE STRIFE OF TONGUES.” And whenever this happens to be the case, which is as often as the envy and malice of the timid are equal to their timidity, then will emulation and strife go abroad disguised in two other characteristics of the same cast or quality,

—4, *Slander* and *Tale-bearing*; than either of which, to give them their due, there is hardly a more “hateful bird” in the cage; that is literally, a more mischievous, or mischief-making property in the whole evil collection. The Wise man observes, “Where no wood is, there the fire goeth out: so where there is no tale-bearer the strife ceaseth” (Prov. xxvi. 20). The tale-bearer therefore is a character that ought to be shunned, and branded too sometimes, that one might know how to avoid him, or if not to avoid his presence, at least his observation. It were well, if the trade of these people could be written generally in their countenances, as it is sometimes; or rather if any thing could be done (though it is not an easy matter) to put them out of countenance; namely, all such as “learn to be idle, wandering about from house to house; and not only idle, but tattlers also and busy bodies, speaking things which they ought not” (Tim. I. v. 13): that they might be publicly stigmatized with as great reproach as they strive to confer in private.

For the tale-bearer is not one that will often repeat what he thinks may do good, and therefore as the world goes may not be likely to procure him much attention. Yet, if he should think to get great thanks in the world by aught else, more than by what might do good, he may find himself mistaken; as slander, tale-bearing, and the like food for conversation, is some of the most unwholesome

that either man or woman can produce to their acquaintance; and instead of begetting confidence and hilarity, will be more likely to make every one in the room, who has any regard for his friends or himself, and every one not used to this venomous stuffing, rather sad and suspicious. Therefore, however these may feel, the slanderer or tale-bearer himself will generally be the greatest sufferer by his trade: so will the personal jester, and so will likewise the evil thinker as well as the evil speaker. The detractor will always lose another way more than the injured party by what he takes from his reputation or credit: he will lose the same properties himself which he would detract from others; namely, honour, credit and esteem: he will lose constituents too instead of incidentals, and constituents of the highest quality; as peace and charity, candour and magnanimity, with other manly graces: and what should weigh most, he will also lose the favour of One above, whose gifts of reason and speech he has so foolishly abused.

For, as St. James observes, "Every good and every perfect gift is from above,"—"but (says he) the tongue can no man tame: it is an unruly evil, full of deadly poison. Therewith bless we God, even the Father; and therewith curse we men, which are made after the similitude of God. Out of the same mouth proceedeth blessing and cursing. My brethren, THESE THINGS OUGHT NOT SO TO BE" (James iii. 8, 9, 10). And while the detractor loses so much in respect of the valuable commodities above mentioned by his villainous traffic, what does he gain thereby, but ill-will and opposition; jaundice, misfortune and contempt? An evil report, if true, is hardly worth bringing to market: but if false, it evidently comes under the denomination and offence of bearing false witness against a neighbour (Exod. xx. 16): and though the same may not exactly be uttered in court, it is uttered however IN A PRESENCE WORTH REMEMBERING.

—5, But admitting that the slanderer and the tale-bearer ought to go or be sent together, where there is no rational

and benevolent society for them to assail or disgust with their unwelcome discourse, they still need not go alone; there still may be found some of a congenial turn, to go with them: and it were a pity that any of this foul order of evil aversive objective characteristics should be kept back, at least in their general enumeration: so let those of *Lying, Prevarication, Quibbling, Evasion*, and every one of the sort remaining be added to slander and tale-bearing, with their predecessors: let also their subjects, the liars and quibblers as they are called, go with the subjects of slandering and tale-bearing, the slanderers and tale-bearers. In short, let these evil spiritual, equal aversive subjects, and their constituents all go together, far from the resort of honest men: for it is not in the power of man to separate such evil subjects from their evil constituents; or in other words, to reform the said subjects, whatever he may do who formed them originally.

But there is no subject except a fool, or not many species of fools rather, that it is harder to reform than a quibbler, or THE SUBJECT OF QUIBBLES, the man who is made up of quibbles, as the earth might be partly made of pebbles. He is the man beyond all others either to evade an acknowledgment or make it, as best suits his convenience: who can see with either eye, or both, or neither, as it may suit: who can readily comprehend one part of an argument, which is the part most favourable to his own views or wishes, but not that to which he is opposed—by any art or method whatever: for every thing unanswerable is to him unintelligible. Such is the genius of the quibbler or dissembler, one not too good apparently; to rank in the train of the liar, the slanderer, the tale-bearer, and any other subjects of paltry constituents.

This sort of evil objective characteristics is reckoned among the equal aversive, because it does not immediately regard either a superior or an inferior particularly, and because from the greater intercourse which there is between equals they most frequently occur in this class: but if the

sort were reckoned among inferior or uplooking aversive characteristics, it would be no injustice towards some of them, as they evidently imply a degree of submission: such are the last mentioned, lying, prevarication, and the like, which evidently seem to stoop for the occasion, whether it be to a superior or to an inferior, though it may be only for the purpose of making its object stoop; like the haughty miscreant whom we read of in the Psalms; who "falleth down and humbleth himself, that the congregation of the poor may fall into the hands of his captains" (Ps. x. 11). One in such authority as to have captains under him humbling himself to the poor as a body or congregation, with such a false purpose, is an instance of the inferiority of this evil characteristic in some cases, even against superior circumstances, and a very proper one to demonstrate the CASUALNESS OF ANY DIGNITY AND IMPORTANCE THAT IS NOT FOUNDED ON INTRINSIC WORTH: as the liar and the prevaricator must needs truckle to the honest man in their lying and prevarication, however they may look down upon him in their pride and arrogance; or he upon them for the honour of the species, when he sees how needlessly they degrade themselves.

3, It will be no more than one should expect, if their neighbours *the inferior or uplooking* evil aversive characteristics of the same class, namely, the spiritual objective, should also have generally a mean appearance, as well as a shocking effect on account of their falseness, "starting aside like a broken bow" (Ps. lxxviii. 58). Such are, 1 Incredulity, 2 Backsliding and Disobedience, 3 Envy, 4 Ingratitude, being all matters of evil consequence; though some of them, like the rest of our fallen creation, may have had a good beginning. For, as before observed, every virtue will have its fault or vice, which is usually its antagonist; and many have also a fault in solitude or excess besides; as for example, in not being duly poised with other qualities, or kept within the bounds of reason by them. But one good property, and

one of the most important, will have two faults; being one in either class or sphere; namely, the appetitive and the aversive: which virtue or good property is faith; its fault in the appetitive class being credulity, and in the aversive incredulity. Of these two, the first mentioned being one that was noticed with its class, and the last that which now stands foremost on the list for consideration.

—1, *Incredulity* is ranked among the inferior or up-looking class of evil aversive and objective characteristics; because the informant that should be if he were not disallowed, would necessarily be supposed to have the advantage of the unbeliever; or the object of the subject of incredulity, in respect of the information offered and rejected. A stubborn vice it is too as any in the list; and an almost irremediable affliction upon its owner. For one hardly knows how to meet such a stubborn property: it is not to be met by arguments, nor moved by the sight of miracles. As for arguments indeed; they cannot be expected to enter into a mind that receives nothing in the shape of reason. And why talk of arguments; when signs and wonders, however palpable, may be exhibited to the incredulous, and even these they will find a way to obviate or explain? If a man only by his word or by a word from him, ("God also bearing him witness," Heb. ii. 4), should cause the lame to walk, the blind to see, the dead to rise and live again and all before their eyes, they would either suspect some imposition, or doubt the evidence of their own senses, or conclude that such extraordinary effects were produced upon earth by some infernal agency. The same, if only on a person's word, and the divine Power attending it, grander and more unexpected phenomena should also occur in the heavens; if the pure empyrean should instantly be overcast, and clouds of thunder rolling like mountains towards each other, and kindling as they roll create a fearful din—all this the incredulous would own to be strange, yea, passing strange, but that the man's word had nothing to do with it in the way of operation;

this appalling scene was only foretold by the person ; he only foretold it, and might possibly have been mistaken. So the incredulous will impute to science what belongs to power ; as in the case of prophecy, another species of evidence, he will impute to power what belongs to pre-science : and there is no doing any thing that may not be so misconstrued through wilful incredulity. Which shews what a task it must be to produce what would seem but a rational assent to any doctrine in the incredulous ; and how no outward miracles can move him, unless an inward miracle of faith be wrought at the same time, to make the outward take : for without this a person would also have no more chance of convincing the incredulous of his incredulity, than he would a fool of his folly, or a madman of his insanity.—This is only mentioned as an example of the general feeling or characteristic of incredulity, and not of incredulity towards God and his Holy Word or Spirit either. For the incredulous man is one who will not believe any thing on the authority of good evidence, whether it be divine or human ; though he will believe any thing without, or even in opposition to it ; such being his superlative credulity.

—2, The same irregularity which that characteristic evinces inwardly by feeling *Backsliding* and *Disobedience* will also evince outwardly ; whether by doing, not doing, or undoing ; the difference of their objects, namely, the objects of backsliding and disobedience, or that to which they are averse, being a general, tacit, or implied authority, in the first instance, an express authority whether written or spoken in the other, and both amounting to the same point of disobedience. For wherever there are duties and engagements, there will be a lawful authority commanding though silent, and an equal obligation to the same in either case.

At the same time, such duties being also mutual, there must, in every case, be a mutual subjection, which one party cannot infringe without affording the other an ex-

ample and precedent injurious to itself. The Creator and Governor of the universe has poised it so nicely in every part, that none is properly without its regular chain of subordination ; and which among beings capable of understanding the same, it is criminal either to endanger or disturb. There can never be a lawful disobedience to lawful authority ; but in every disobedience of the same there must be guilt somewhere. If that which is commanded be wrong in its own nature, we dare not obey the authority however lawful by which it is commanded ; yet guilt will follow such disobedience still, notwithstanding its necessity ; only in this case it will rest with the authority that commands, and not with the subject that disobeys : which shews a responsibility in governors beyond that which some may imagine. It is imposing a hard necessity upon a wife, a son, a servant, or any other subject, to say, I will not ; when ordered to do something : therefore, if we order so wrongfully, we may expect to suffer something more for it than the mere mortification of being disobeyed. And the same rule that applies to this case in a domestic relation will apply also in a political. It is as much for the interest of the many to submit to the direction of a few, as it is for the honour and interest of the few to be obeyed by the many : but if disobedience should be provoked by government, it will not be the fault of the subject—a fault it will be, and an horrible crime, no doubt : “ for rebellion is as the sin of witchcraft, and stubbornness is as iniquity and idolatry ” (Sam. I. xv. 23) ; but all its guilt, and all the horrors of rebellion are properly chargeable on the party with which it originates ; whether the same be high or low ; the governing or the governed : so any one may know, where the guilt would lie in a case like that pre-signified.

If we were to look for the origin of all outward anarchy, rebellion, misgovernment and strife, whether political or domestic, we should find it to lie near home in a quarter where it is generally least suspected ; all the bad feeling

without us being a natural consequence of that which is within. And who can be surprised to see the whole world from highest to lowest running counter to authority, when our own inferior properties are allowed the same licence within us?—more particularly, when that upstart pride before mentioned is allowed to usurp, as he does, the ascendant over reason and charity; over respect, gratitude, and in short over every other characteristic that deserves to be most honoured and highly upheld in society.

—3, As a very suitable companion to backsliding and disobedience therefore *Envy* may be mentioned; namely, because few envious men perhaps have considered impartially, what their distinguishing characteristic may be, and in what it consists. Envy is a motion of the fallen spirit directly stirring men up against all good, and against the Author of all; as their neighbour's good fortune, good reputation, prospects, but chiefly against his good principles. And why instead of envying others do they not try to amend their own lives? Must others be hated, and a kind Providence likewise, because the haters themselves deserve it? So our Saviour asks, "Is thine eye evil, because I am good?" (Matt. xx. 15).

But—to think of the hypocrites! They will go to church, there kneel down, and pray aloud to the Creator and Preserver of all mankind; first for all sorts and conditions of men, that He would be pleased to enlighten and enliven them generally with a true prospect of salvation; next, more especially for those who are entered on the career of such salvation in company or communion with the petitioners, that all might be guided and assisted on their way by his good Spirit in unity of purpose, in the relation of peace, and in righteousness of life; and finally for those who are any ways afflicted or distressed in mind, body, or estate; that it might please him to comfort and relieve them according to their several necessities; yet are they the said hypocritical petitioners always afraid, that some or other if not all of the forementioned SORTS AND CONDITIONS will

fare better than themselves, and jealous as it were of the very favour for which they intercede! One can hardly imagine a more palpable and odious inconsistency: our Saviour bids us love our enemies and pray for them which despitefully use us and persecute us (Matt. v. 44); but this is hating our friends, and mingling enmity with our prayers—with our very petition for men of all sorts and in every relation.

Odious indeed is this property in itself: but the person envied has not so much reason to feel disturbed on his own account as on account of his enviers. "If God be for us, who can be against us?" (Rom. viii. 31.) Surely none effectually. Then why disturb yourself for nothing, but other men's discomposure? Are you not ashamed, to repine on account of the envy that is drawn upon you by God's grace or providence, and never to thank his goodness for procuring you this distinction? What is all the evil that envious men can do to you compared with the good that a bountiful God has bestowed upon you, and will bestow in despite of them? "Fret not thyself because of the ungodly; neither be thou envious against the evil doers" (Ps. xxxvii. 1, &c.). Or if thou wilt be so childish as to fret at what thou canst not avoid; fret like a child, and not like a man: humbly fret like a child as thou shouldest be, and not haughtily like a man as thou art: for when children are crossed, they humbly express their chagrin by wailing and tears; but thou, a man, chafest indignantly against the order of divine Providence, and darest to arraign or question the justice of its infallible dispensations.

One should think that others had more right to complain of envy than its objects, as long as it continues *MERE ENVY*, or envy without aggression. The same may be said likewise of *Suspicion* and other similar characteristics that are found in this abundant class; v. g. the morally evil aversive. That the consequences of such aversives are worth watching, we cannot doubt; if they be only injuries in

thought at first: for begin where they will, there is no knowing where they may end. But absolutely considered, no other one of the said aversives, nor several of them together, can be near so vexations as the next mentioned.

—4, *Ingratitude*, an “unclean” property of the same class; than which none more deserves to be hated also, as indeed it generally is when its object is visible, being one of the observer’s own species. But much more does that cast of ingratitude merit the disgust and reprobation of every intelligent being which is pointed towards our great and universal Benefactor—ever blessed be his name! the INVISIBLE GOD. Such an unnatural failing in this highest respect is entitled to everlasting shame and infamy; and cannot fail to draw on itself the curses denounced against it, if not seasonably and sincerely repented, as Moses tells his congregation, “And they (the curses before enumerated) shall be upon thee for a sign and a wonder, and upon thy seed for ever. Because thou servedst not the Lord thy God with joyfulness and with gladness of heart for the abundance of all things, therefore &c.” (Deut. xxviii. 46, &c.)

—In speaking of the monstrous vice of ingratitude, it was hard to help noticing its most common as well as most criminal aspect; but the present is not a fit occasion for insisting on that important topic: neither does it seem necessary to propose any farther examples of immoral characteristics in the same spiritual class at present; as the forementioned may suffice to give an idea of the rest. And if in the course of their description an evil characteristic has been occasionally held up to abhorrence, it was no more than it deserved. One should be sorry to clothe any properties of the kingdom with undue disgust, especially where the characters are so equivocal that others may be taken for them; as good for evil objectives in the appetitive class previously considered, and sometimes also in the last mentioned aversive; though there does not generally appear so much room for mistaking in this class as

in that. Thus e. g. in the aversive class of malignity the characters are more striking than in the appetitive class of evil concupiscence: which makes the reprobation of the said aversive class much safer. Yet the evil appetitive does not want its criterion either, and especially that of rejoicing in iniquity, as the Psalmist intimates where he says of a subject, "His delight was in cursing, and it shall happen unto him: he loved not blessing, therefore shall it be far from him. He clothed himself with cursing like as with a raiment; and it shall come into his bowels like water, and like oil into his bones" (Ps. cix. 16, 17). And only by this one criterion may the said abominable class be distinguished from its lovely antithesis, from that charity which "REJOICETH NOT IN INIQUITY, BUT REJOICETH IN THE TRUTH" (Cor. I. xiii. 6). For, not to rejoice in the truth, may be bad enough without rejoicing in iniquity.

But who can withhold a stigma from such evil properties, or classes rather, as that of evil concupiscence, for example, which would as soon condemn the righteous and cut him off in judgment, as it would load him with curses and invectives. And without going the extent of that—if it be an evil action to condemn the righteous, it cannot be much better to covet, as many seem to do by their eager justice, proper objects for condemnation. Indeed it is clear, that some judges can be disappointed and chagrined when they find no guilt to lay hold of; as the wicked priests at our Saviour's trial for instance. There seems a sort of confused feeling (and no wonder when feelings are so unnatural) in the case; since to rejoice at any sort of evil, merely as such, that one might either occasion or only come in time to witness is like hating good: it is however an evil aversive property towards the person of the sufferer, though towards the matter of his suffering, more appetitive. And hence also another anomaly: as rejoicing and satisfaction are not wont to be ranked among evil characteristics. But what is the rejoicing only at an expensive jest, if it be not malignity in general, and a

more special sign of aversion to the sufferer? Would either charity or private friendship rejoice on such an occasion: or would only a general love of rectitude, such as may be imputed to beings which have no affinity with flesh and blood—or would even the unnatural perfection of a stoic be delighted with such a jest? One might feel assured of no rejoicing in the two former cases, however it might be in the last mentioned. In short a man had only need consult his plain sense of right and wrong to be satisfied, that delighting in the presence of evil is as bad a property as lamenting its absence; and the joy of a successful villain, whether little or great, in jest or in earnest, as the chagrin of a disappointed. By indulging a malicious satisfaction at mishap and enjoying the perception of another's woe we undermine the foundation of our own happiness, which eminently consists in divine benevolence: though the natural man would hardly be persuaded of this, being the sort of man to whom that proverb particularly applies, "There is a way which seemeth right unto a man, but the end thereof are the ways of death" (Prov. xiv. 12).

So the successful villain may have as little reason to exult in the accomplishment of his wicked purpose, as its unfortunate object; but more, to rue its consequences. And others, too, would rather the malignant himself could be spared "if God, peradventure, will give him repentance to the acknowledging of the truth" (Tim. II. ii. 25), or else the earth will have more right to rejoice at the removal of such a plague than ever he had at his most successful enterprise. Then the successful villain will have made himself of consequence for something, when every one must view his departure with satisfaction. "He who smote the people in wrath with a continual stroke, he that ruled the nations in anger is persecuted, and none hindereth. The whole earth is at rest, and is quiet; they break forth into singing. Yea, the fir-trees rejoice at thee, and the cedars of Lebanon, saying, Since thou art laid down no feller is come up against us. Hell, from beneath, is moved for thee, to meet

thee at thy coming : it stirreth up the dead for thee, even all the chief ones of the earth ; it hath raised up from their thrones all the kings of the nations. All they shall speak and say unto thee, Art thou also become weak as we ? Art thou become like unto us ? ” (Isai. xiv. 6, &c.)

Considering, therefore, what manner of spirit it is we should be very cautious of submitting to that of malignity in any form or degree, whether it be of pride and ill-humour only, or of war and persecution, and never do evil to any one, for the sake of evil only, however we may be provoked. For why should we suffer our hearts to be rent with passion, and become the instruments of our own torture, as well as our neighbour's, when we have done nothing amiss ? Malice or malignity is both a prolific source of evil, and also its natural punishment, as St. James observes, “ Whence come wars and fightings among you ? Come they not hence, even of your lusts ? ” A furious animosity is too often encouraged in wars and executions, as necessary to the cause of public justice, of public honour, and even of a political existence, and considerable pains are therefore taken sometimes, to disparage and misrepresent rival persons, parties, and nations, to each other, with a view to render them the more forward in each other's destruction ; but the several sorts of evil spirits, the evil motive, the evil sensitive, the evil appetitive, the evil aversive, above described are the actual movers most frequently ; and all that mutual rancour must be as needless as it is unchristianlike in the forecited respects, seeing the love of our own may afford as good a stimulus to exertion and courage in the field, court, or cabinet, as the hatred of others, though it may not afford so much satisfaction to the enemy of all parties. His unnatural associates against their own kind may pretend what cause they will—private honour and safety, as well as public, if they will ; they may pretend self-preservation, justice, or even the sacred cause of religion, but it is all false ; they who strive for the evil spirit can be no friends in their

hearts to a good practice ; they encourage hatred, and no executions, however signal, would answer their purpose if founded in love. They are all murderers rather than executioners, however just their executions may be by chance at any time. They do the deeds of their father in all they do, and prove their descent by their deeds, if they do not wear his very lineaments in their faces.

Indeed, if one might be allowed to guess a father's lineaments by his children, one should think the most odious being in the universe must resemble, in his physiognomy, as well as in his character, the turbulent, the lustful, the selfish, the scornful, the proud, ill-humoured, vindictive, and, generally speaking, malignant sort, as above described ; at least, it is certain, that no expression can be more worthy of him than theirs. And such an expression must be very inconvenient sometimes to its subjects or owners, since there are times with every one when conciliation may be worth the while ; and then what a work it will be for either of these to look pleasant, or so as to inspire confidence—to the proud and ill-humoured, more especially, unless, which would be no wonder, they should also happen to be practised in hypocrisy as well as in pride and thwarting. There is no knowing how it may be then : but without being quite ill-humoured, the man of stern countenance will have much to do, a violent effort to make, a perfect revolution of the brow almost, before he can arrive at the accosting point, much less at the conciliating ; whereas a mild, benevolent countenance is always in order for conversation, and attuned, as it were, to the sounds of kindness and cordiality. **HAPPY THE MAN WHO CAN ALWAYS CARRY SUCH A COUNTENANCE, AND BE NO HYPOCRITE !**

§ 3. In considering the antitheses of positive properties, one often encounters a dilemma that may seem to be bordering on absurdity, and yet cannot well be avoided ; as here, for example, in naming certain characteristics *Intellectual*, which seem to consist rather in a deficiency, aberration or

alienation of intellect. But rightly considered, Folly and Falsehood will appear to have the same essential foundations as wisdom and truth ; v. g. the apprehension, judgment, will, imagination ; deriving therefrom, or building thereon, a foolish characteristic of either sort ; as wisdom, on the contrary, a wise. A false or treacherous memory is also acknowledged in common discourse, but cannot be well included with the rest as an evil objective, when one endeavours “to lay hold on folly” (Eccles. ii. 3) ; the same being in general rather more of an affliction, or more like an evil subjective. For, happily, all is not foolish that may be false in thinking and doing, if all must be false that is foolish. A man may also be guilty by chance of his own delusion or false thinking. But of this, more hereafter, as we proceed to collect by a separate consideration of the two, v. g. of 1, Folly ; 2, Falsehood ; both what is their common quality, and also what are the particulars in which they differ ; as well as of 3, Another condition arising out of the two, that may also be worth a caution in its turn.

1. Of the first mentioned sort of falsehood, called *Folly*, there appear to be several species and degrees ; as the unwise and the foolish, for example, will differ decidedly in degree ; the former being accordingly looked on as rather inconsiderate, the latter, more than inconsiderate, or, as rather more confirmed. Thus, in the part of apprehension ; while one shall overlook what he ought to observe, the other will really seem as if he had no eyes for it. Whereupon the Psalmist asserts, “An unwise man doth not well consider this, and the fool doth not understand it” (Ps. xcii. 6). If, however, the inconsiderate are only in the first degree of folly, they may on a time be in the last degree of guilt perchance ; and then, by consequence, of folly likewise : though it seems necessary to understand some positive degrees in folly, or to deny its existence : for men will err unavoidably with the best consideration sometimes ; and, as qualities are formed or perceived by comparison, if all

who prove that general liability by their occasional errors were to be reputed fools immediately, there would be no wise, and the character of folly be lost for want of a contrast.

No man, therefore, should be accounted a fool for not being wise at all hours. Neither again is it folly for a man to be deficient in matters out of his sphere and concernment; but it may rather be folly for a man to meddle with such matters. And as there are two species of wisdom, so are there two species of folly in this respect likewise; which may be called general and particular; the first being a deficiency in common sense, the second in professional skill and ability: for example,

1, Such characteristics as lying, dishonesty, ingratitude, and pretty many more are demonstrably of the first sort—*general and first rate folly*, as being deficiencies in common sense after a man has arrived at years of discretion, but till then, rather a criminal neglect in those who have the care of his education: while,

2, Some cases of mismanagement; as in steering a ship, in raising a scaffold, or in conducting any professional business, would be *particular folly* in those to whom the part belonged, but none to others, except they had chosen to meddle with such part unnecessarily; when they may be reputed fools for so meddling with a part that did not belong to them, as before observed. In other respects, too, there are different sorts of fools and folly: v. g.

3, There is a decided difference between solemn fools and jocose, or between sober and jocose, habitual and occasional fooling. For pure *childish sport*, admitted among friends, and not admitted too often, may be a wholesome, as well as agreeable relaxation to the scholar, and the man of business, though every scholar does not seem to require it. And whether one of either sort, or of a more philosophic cast, may require much relaxation or not on his own account, there will be others who will require it from him. We should have a stern race indeed, if fathers and elders

were never to address their children and young friends, except in the language of philosophy! A little innocent badinage is like the song of birds; it will make our philosophy go down with the young people better sometimes than a set discourse: when clever, it savours more of inspiration than any philosophy, and at all times the folly of it will be more passable than that of a droning recitation. For while men, or children either, retain their wits they cannot entirely lose sight of THE GREAT EVENT that is coming upon all; and in the mean time, nothing can be more tiresome and unprofitable than *sober nonsense*, than grown up folly and perennial childhood; as it was with the old Athenian philosophers, and has been with many a modern mock worshipper of wisdom, of whom it might be said, as it was of those Athenians, "professing themselves to be wise, they became fools" (Rom. i. 22). That is what comes of having a wisdom of our own, or, as Scripture has it, being wise in our own conceits (Ib. xii. 16), and doing whatsoever is right in our own eyes (Deut. xii. 8). And if dulness and stupidity are sometimes excusable as natural and irremediable defects, there can be no excuse for either, when it is wilful and obstinate, and, as it often happens, really cherished through his own vanity by the dunce or the blockhead.

But this ENCOURAGEMENT OF DEFECTS is not given so freely to the external as to the internal apprehension. Men will be at the pains to sharpen, clear, and improve the former by all means, and a variety of contrivances they will have to direct and assist them in it—a trumpet for the hearing and a glass for the seeing apprehension, both of them creditable to human ingenuity. These helps they will have, being also glad enough to avail themselves of them when necessary, and sorry enough sometimes to feel their growing importance. But they do not value so much the inward sight and hearing, nor take the same pains to regulate and assist these properties as they bestow on the others. Therefore it is when persons are wanting to themselves in

this respect, that their folly becomes truly objective ; while themselves are consequently obnoxious to punishment, as above intimated, and frequently in suffering a third condition, to be presently mentioned.

In short, there are two sorts of persons who may be equally deficient in apprehension ; but one, from choice and the other from necessity. They who are naturally deficient in the several particulars of intellect, or who have no opportunity of improving them, must necessarily continue ignorant in proportion to such deficiency, and then their necessity, as usual, when unprovoked, may acquit them of guilt : but, by far the greater number of the ignorant are so by choice, either of their own or of their friends for them : being first spoiled children, and then grown fools without any necessity or excuse. And how many of this sort do we observe in every class ! how many, even among the more learned, who prescribe to themselves, either from laziness or diffidence, certain bounds of thinking, which they observe as religiously as if it were impious to go beyond them ! We find that the haters of useful knowledge are liable to be punished in their temporal estate for such hatred, and that very deservedly, by men of sharpened intellects, of intellects sharpened, if not by learning, yet by practice in adversity ; who also deserve to be punished for the misemployment of their advantages in this manner with a similar fatuity. And there may be good reason, why the grown fool's parents, pastors, and masters, should also suffer with him, and bear a part in his maintenance, disgrace, and insignificance, as well as in his imbecility and want of exertion : if they should have to maintain their children to the third generation, they may thank themselves for it.

We talk of grown fools and *grown up folly*, however, sometimes without knowing its full stature, or what a height the property may grow to with such encouragement as the above-mentioned : but of this we may be sure, that the generality of mankind only come into the world

to learn to be fools; and all the wit they learn after they are four years old is but a departure from wisdom according to our Saviour's idea (Matt. xviii. 2, &c.), though he do not say so much. Now, by Generality we may understand in this case about ninety-nine in the hundred of men, and of women rather more, according to the idea of King Solomon, or, as he stiles himself, the Preacher: "Behold, this have I found, (saith the Preacher,) counting one by one to find out the account; which yet my soul seeketh, but I find not. One man among a thousand have I found: but a woman among all those have I not found" (Eccles. vii. 27, 28). And if, for one's own credit, one should be glad to reduce the complement, for the credit of divine revelation, and one's own, likewise, in another respect, one would not pretend to do it.

Such, then, is the frequency of this moral disease of folly; while, as a further aggravation of the case; besides its frequency, as well as loathsomeness, danger, and inconvenience—nothing can be more incurable than the species of full grown, systematic, and determined folly here understood. Our Saviour considers it as a most obstinate disease (Matt. xxiii. 17): and king Solomon in another work observes, "Though thou shouldest bray a fool in a mortar among wheat with a pestle, yet will not his foolishness depart from him" (Prov. xxvii. 22). These are great authorities; from which it would seem as if it was no part of our duty to attempt the instruction of a decided fool. And what seems more to the purpose, our heavenly Preceptor has also commanded us not to trouble ourselves with such teaching. "Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine" (Matt. vii. 6), said the Great Master. But if we must needs be teaching, as it is the way with some people, LET US ENDEAVOUR TO TEACH THOSE WHO HAVE MORE WIT THAN OURSELVES, or more grace, rather than those who have less.

2. If we consider next the folly of *Falsehood**, we shall find, that it may be primarily divided into two sorts or kinds by the circumstances with which it is attended; being, 1 simple lying, when there is no direct appeal to an heavenly witness on the occasion; 2 aggravated, when the falsehood is accompanied with such an appeal, being then properly called Perjury. Only the first of these can be considered among immoral actions or accidents, the second belonging to another class of unrighteous characteristics, i. e. the ungodly, with which it may be more properly connected. And with respect to this first mentioned characteristic or the property of lying, as it is properly called, justice will also require a farther and a farther distinction; as first with regard to its subject, or source—between involuntary or unavoidable, and voluntary or needless: also, secondly, with regard to object or end—between lying with a good object, a bad object; and either none at all, or none of any consequence.

1, There are several ways by which true, or at least true meaning men may, and do often become accessary to the dissemination of falsehood as well as others: of which ways some are voluntary, being what one should hardly expect from true men; and some involuntary, which may be expected of all sorts. And viewing both ways successively, it may be well to consider the *involuntary* first: which will needs happen, and that too in such ways as true men and no fools cannot avoid sometimes any more than others, as for example,

—1, By *ignorance* in the point, or partial information: when either some extraordinary case arises, or the subject happens to be more skilled in some particular sciences than in the general science of wisdom or truth.

—2, By *prejudice*: which is a more common way than ignorance, and more common too than men, who are all more or less subject to its influence, may generally imagine.

* See Sermon 22, "The Fate of Ananias."

—3, By *enthusiasm*: when people are overdriven, as we may say, in the way of righteousness; being made “righteous over much,” or “making themselves over wise” (Eccles. vii. 16) as the Preacher expresses it; that is, not rightly and truly wise according to the true style or genuine tenour of righteousness.

—4, By *the love of novelty*, a natural mania disposing the subject to prefer new doctrines continually before old truths, before truths well established and sanctioned by experience; thus throwing him back again into darkness and error as fast as he emerges from them. For to those who are in the way of improvement darkness must be novelty: but who would imagine, that to such it could ever be agreeable?

—5, By the great highway of *an evil principle*, taking in all the rest—cross roads and all, and conducting immediately to the metropolis of falsehood. For there are two of those great ingulphing highways in the world: one leading to “all truth;” as He says, “I am the way, and the truth, and the life” (John xiv. 6); and again, “Howbeit, when He, the Spirit of truth, is come, He will guide you into all truth” (John xvi. 13)—the other way leading to ALL FALSEHOOD, the broad way leading to destruction (Matt. vii. 13), which is that above mentioned; prepared in the captivity of the human understanding and its natural possession by the Enemy of mankind. An alien to the kingdom that gave him birth, false, ruthless, and un pitying, “he was a murderer from the beginning and abode not in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own; for he is a liar, and the father of it” (John viii. 44). The first lie upon record must be attributed entirely to him, as it is (Gen. iii. 4): but what share he may now have in all falsehood, or in all the lies that are telling continually, it would be hard to say; because the greater part of lying and falsehood in the world belongs to the other, i. e. to the volun-

tary species perhaps : and who can say how far a man may have a will of his own in this chequered, half captive and half emancipated state ?

2, And this *voluntary* species of lying also may be distinguished again, especially into three others, if we will, by the criterion of end or object ; as 1 lying with a good object ; 2 with a bad one ; 3 with none at all, or none however of any consequence as aforesaid, although with a good will, it may be, to the practice.

—1, Time was when the first of these, or lying *with a good object*, was more common than at present, though always too common when tinged with deceit. For there is no severity in considering every sort of deliberate lie with this colouring, however plausible its object, as one of the old sort : and it would not be just to except even the prettiest of the kind ; which are your *pious frauds* ; though uttered by the ministers, and ostensibly in the cause of truth. Indeed the pious frauds which were resorted to originally for the service of the church are much of a piece with the impious frauds by which it has been since undermined, and also enslaved in a great measure, by the crew of mammon. Fraud is fraud, whether it come from a primitive father or a modern prelate ; and a lie is a lie, whether it be a black one or a white : A LIE IS DETESTABLE EVEN IN THE MOUTH OF A SAINT. The pious fathers did not foresee perhaps a state of society when their pious frauds would not go down, as in the days of Gothic ignorance : or one should think they would not have lied so much, which must have been a painful effort for some of them, and to so little purpose. A time may be anticipated when a few excellent divines and not more strict than charitable critics who have been cast into the shade by the pretended orthodox for the freedom and sincerity of their doctrine, will be sought out again and appealed to as paramount authority in the church ; while those orthodox dissemblers shall go into the obscurity which they all deserve, and many of them have found already.

Meanwhile, the safest way in any case is to tell truth, and particularly in a good cause: as lying will not help a good cause, (we may be sure of that) and a bad cause does not deserve it. "For (says our blessed Saviour) there is nothing covered that shall not be revealed; and hid that shall not be known" (Matt. x. 26). A lie is as sure to be exposed sooner or later, as it is to hurt the cause for which it was fabricated at the time of its exposure. The most formidable engine or contrivance that even its infernal enemy was ever able to bring to bear against the truth, as it is in Jesus, was that of tempting some of its brightest ornaments to lie for the same, or at least to dissemble more than was meet. For these pious frauds may shake the authority of the church with some to its very foundation; no one knowing, where to draw the line between truth and falsehood in this department. Yet ought we to believe that infinite Wisdom is able to supply a remedy for this as for every other grievance in the way of its servants; and, that whatever temporary advantage may be allowed to lying, the inherent force of truth will finally prevail against the whole sort; whether it be the lying of friend or foe, and for a good end, a bad, or none.

What constitutes the crime of lying, in cases like the forementioned, is the deception attending it independent of the end: but it may be possible to lie without deceiving, or to deceive without lying; and with this disjunction either way, lying in many cases may be excusable, in some even commendable. Thus, for example, in disguising medicine for children, to make them take an ungrateful good we deceive them awhile, it is true, but we tell them no lies, nor leave any false impressions. And after the same manner sometimes by *dissembling* the truth for a while we may serve the cause of truth in bringing it out with greater effect; a method that is practised in the most innocent conversation, and not without good precedent; as in the example of our Lord himself (Luke xxiv. 19–28; John iv. 16; vi. 6, &c.), of Joseph, who was a

type of our Lord (Gen. xlv. &c.), and of others like Joseph for rectitude and sincerity. It would be irrelevant to mention such examples as that of Abraham (Ib. xii. 11), or of Isaac (Ib. xxvi. 7), or of Jacob (Ib. xxv. 29; xxvii. 18; xxx. 37, &c.), because it may be thought, that in these particular instances there was more than can be expressed by simple Dissimulation, or paralleled by any thing in the life either of our Lord or of his type aforesaid; and because the forecited instances may also be deemed sufficient. For making due allowance in cases where a wholesome reserve, or even a degree of dissimulation may be proper, to simulation and lying in no case—no not in cases like those just alluded to, will Christian Modes of thinking and doing ever submit: and these examples alone, to go no farther, may be sufficient evidence, that THE OLD DISPENSATION WANTED RETOUCHING, OR AT LEAST SOME NEW SECURITY.

As for lying without deception; if that were never allowed, we must silence our poets, and call to order the most instructive fabulist. Even the parables of our blessed Saviour would be condemned in that case, and judged, like himself of old, UNFIT TO LIVE (Matt. xxvii. 22; Acts xxii. 22). But the greatest liars will be found among those who pretend to such a rigid sincerity. And therefore the Wise man's sentence on this head, "Use not to make any manner of lie" (Ecclus. vii. 13), must be received with some allowance; namely, not to overdo it. "For the custom thereof is not good" (Ibid.): or else we must own, that all fictions are not lies.

—2, It is to be observed, that the whole of the fore-mentioned is what we call voluntary lying, if lying it may be called, with a good object; as for lying *with a bad object*; it can hardly be needful to censure a fault which every one condemns already. Wherefore leaving that, it may be enough to consider only the third and last enumerated species of lying; which is,

—3, Lying *with no object*, or with none however of any

consequence. Of such a species are the marvellous accounts given us by travellers in regions unknown or but little frequented, to which as we are not likely to go, we do not seem much concerned in their strange peculiarities: of such a species is the random talk of some, who would have more wit than to talk at that rate if they had travelled more: of such a species in short, are idle lies of every description, *useless and insipid lies*; lies that neither edify like those of the fabulist by supposition, nor amuse like the poet's by invention; but silly, dull, barren, unprofitable, unedifying, unentertaining lies. And lies of this kind, if they do nothing else, may reflect some injury perchance on their author; they cannot hurt the reputation of one who has none to be hurt, but may that of one who has, being tolerably considerate in other respects, if he should be inconsiderate enough to fail in this. For one idle sally, or foolish exaggeration, literally received, may be enough to ruin in a moment the reputation for sincerity that has been acquiring for years. Which shews, that lying only in this mild degree is to be answered for; while there can be no doubt of the more violent; whether more owing to the liar or to his evil principle, whose guilt his agents will always share with him in proportion to their instrumentality; as the utterers of base coin are wont to share with the coiner.

3. To speak more particularly of these two parties, the coiner and utterer of base coin in the Kingdom; one usurping the authority of the Sovereign, and the other an accomplice in his treasonable purpose—or of any other shade or notion of the evil principle and his infatuated victims would here be premature; as their mention properly belongs to the head of relations, at which we are, though nearly, yet not quite arrived: but of a general effect of this sad conjunction it may be worth while to take notice by the way, as we have noticed many more specific in the fore-mentioned evil objective characteristics, whether on incidentals or on constituents. And this is an evil effect

or *Condition*, as aforesaid, that extends to every department of the Kingdom from lowest to highest, though being in the highest most apparent. It is a general frustration or perversion of the object's own views and expectations by his own wilful determination to realize them in a way in which they are not to be realized—in his own way, or in any way but the truth: and especially for this reason, v. g. because the evil principle, whose will he makes his own, was a liar and a murderer from the beginning, and “abode not (himself) in the truth” (John viii. 44). For every suicide is a murderer; and this when completed is decidedly such a case—to wit a case of suicide, or self-destruction; as it was remarked by Infinite Wisdom, speaking in the first person to the self-destroying Israelites, “O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself!” (Hos. xiii. 9.) And also by an eminent apostle “Let no man say, when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man. But every man is tempted, when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed” (Jam. i. 13, 14).

Generally considered therefore that evil effect, case, or condition, will be as before defined, a case of suicide or self-destruction; although, as breaking out, or making its appearance more particularly in the highest or intellectual department, it is more properly and particularly named therefrom by the term *Infatuation* or Captivity. Its subject is one who according to the prophet “feedeth on ashes” (Isai. xlv. 20): and it is the same with him in smaller respects as in this great respect of his soul's salvation. Indeed, to be consistent, so great an object as this should be the last that he thinks of: let him think most of his highly esteemed incidentals, as he will, no doubt,—to wit of his, or some other person's Gentility, Wealth, Honour, and such Importance or Respectability, as these things are able to bestow: he may even value himself upon his merely personal beauty, strength and activity; but he must not, to be consistent, either trouble or exult

much about the higher subjectively good endowments, consisting in an happy disposition, with a clear apprehension, firm memory, sound judgment, free will and heavenly imagination; much less with any of the excellent objectives or different species of righteousness that may be founded on any of the fore-named incidentals, or constituents either; as Honour and Honesty, Bounty and Hospitality, Manliness and Dignity, Diligence and Industry, Temperance and Chastity, Charity in any shape, Modesty and Humility—by no means; but least of all, that which would set him right if he had it, FAITH—properties which all together constitute the genuine worth, or as it is said “true riches” of our highly favoured and distinguished species.

Moreover as the captive or infatuated subject’s aim is mad, so will his method be likewise. It is not enough for the wretched mortal, to prefer every thing in a wrong ratio, but he must pursue it also by a wrong method. Is it for example gentility, that he prefers? the obvious method of a genteel, or even honest connexion, does not suit him. Is it wealth? he will ruin his own father and family; extorting what he can from the domestic funds, to lavish it upon strangers in the way of what he calls pleasure, rather than cultivate the common interest, or add one doight to the patrimony by his industry and exertion. Consequently, if he should be studious of importance in the eyes of the world, he will in that too, and in every other way that he attempts, take that sort of method that is precisely best calculated to defeat his purpose, and make him contemptible and ridiculous. Thus having such views as are none of the wisest, he goes constantly to work in such a way as to make them a plague to himself.

Were a man’s infatuation, or captivity, of the subjective kind only; though that may not be without guilt somewhere, it might still be more tolerable, whether it extended to the moral or physical department. For such captivity is not restricted to the higher departments of the

Kingdom, but apt to spread downward; as may be collected from our Saviour's expression of "a daughter of Abraham whom Satan hath bound, lo these eighteen years" (Luke xiii. 16), attributing her personal affliction to this spiritual captivity or evil possession. Neither is such infatuation like that of an hopeless passion towards some unfeeling object; in which case likewise it may be more unfortunate than criminal: but this is a guilty infatuation, arising from an habit of foolish or criminal indulgence, which its subject shall have learned perhaps from some falsely called Friends, first by means of holidays and plumcakes, then of silk gowns and excessive remittances, to the ruin of a sense of duty, and of the power of application—to say nothing of the high position and exalted motives to be derived from our baptismal engagement, if well understood. For, as our Saviour told the misdeeming Jews, "If ye were blind ye should have no sin: but now ye say, We see; therefore your sin remaineth" (John ix. 41)—it is to those who are wilfully blind; who are taken captive by the devil at his will, and not much against their own; who neither care to escape, nor to recover themselves out of his snare; who seeing, see not; or see wilfully awry—that the meaning of an immoral captivity applies. In this captivity therefore a few important distinctions are found worth regarding, being also alluded to in Scripture, as of an evil captivity.

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| | { | 1, willing: as for example, "Like the deaf adder, that stoppeth her ears" (Ps. lviii. 4). "This people's heart is waxed gross, and their ears are dull of hearing" (Matt. xiii. 15). |
| 1, felt..... | | 2, unwilling: as for example, "And that they may recover themselves out of the snare of the devil, who are taken captive by him at his will" (Tim. II. ii. 26). |
| 2, unfelt.... | { | —"Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of" (Luke ix. 55). |

The first and last of these three species, or the willing and unfelt, do not either of them present any very interesting point for the observer; but in the second, consisting of captives, like a David or St. Paul, as conscious as unwilling, and the weaker the more resolute—gathering courage from despair, there is a matter worth regarding; a matter as interesting, it may be supposed, to an heavenly spectator, as ever any mortal lists, show of wild beasts, or feast of gladiators, could be to the vain children of the earth.

* But the importance of this doctrine of captivity, and the weight of the affliction to which it relates, is not to be here fully appreciated: it is a topic that will be worth referring to among the Memorabilia of the moral department when they come to be reviewed. And then also other evil conditions, of which some now follow, may be found to compare with the present, and with some likewise by which it is preceded.

CHRISTIAN MODES.

PART I.

THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN CHRIST.

CHAPTER VI.

EVIL OBJECTIVE CHARACTERISTICS.

SEC. III.

IRRELIGIOUS—ON INCIDENTALS.

1, Profanation.—2, Sacrilege.

“Will a man rob God?”—MAL. iii. 8.

THE property of irreligion or ungodliness in general may be stated as the opposite of religion or godliness above described; and as that is righteousness, so this is unrighteousness—with a view to God, more properly called *Sin* or *Ungodliness*, as at present. We know that all the offences which are proscribed by law in any state must be offences against the authority by which that law is made and upheld: and so likewise every offence in the kingdom of God, or every action that he has proscribed will be, however indirectly, an offence against God, and generally come within the meaning of Ungodliness; but some offences being more immediately directed against the divine Majesty than some, will therefore be more particularly signified by the expression; as in an earthly state some

offences being particularly directed against the sovereignty, are therefore called *Majestatis crimen*, or Treason. Whereby it may appear, how "all unrighteousness is sin" (John I. v. 17) or ungodliness, but some more directly than some.

The share that is taken in the production of evil generally by the sole Author of good has been already intimated; and it may now be further observed, with respect to the cause of objective evil particularly, and of that sort more particularly in such cases as reflect more directly on that Good Being, that whatever share the ungodly sinner may have therein, the greatest stroke towards its consummation at last is given by God himself; who, if He be not the Author of sin has certainly more to do with its constitution or formation than any other authority. For what can constitute the form of sin in thought, word, or deed more clearly and decidedly than the divine law by which it is prohibited? This is the drift of St. Paul's argument in Rom. vii., where he gives a practical illustration of the doctrine of One Supreme Intelligence, being the author of both good and evil; as making good by evil and evil by good in the law of life. "Wherefore the law is holy, (says he) and the commandment is holy, just, and good. Was then that which is good made death unto me? God forbid! (Not the law, or the commandment, which is good, was made death unto me) but sin, that it might appear sin working death in me by that which is good; THAT SIN BY THE COMMANDMENT MIGHT BECOME EXCEEDING SINFUL" (Rom. vii. 12, 13). "For we know, that the law is spiritual" (Ib. 14) says he. Or we may know it, if we will: and avoidable ignorance being one species of folly, can be no excuse for sin; as one species of unrighteousness is not to be palliated or excused by another; This makes it worth while for a person to understand somewhat both 1 generally; 2 particularly; and 3 more particularly, or in detail, of that sin which is made so exceeding sinful by the commandment; not with a view to practice how-

ever, but to avoid it; as sin is made sin, not by an observance of the law, but by a defiance of the same. And

First, considering the matter *generally*; we shall find the several forms of sin or ungodliness to be rather more spiritual than intellectual, and more of the aversive than of any other cast of spirit; as might have been observed with regard to immorality, the other branch of unrighteousness. We have seen before, how "love is the fulfilling of the law" (Rom. xiii. 10): and now we may observe on the contrary, how hatred is its infraction, and particularly when directed against the forementioned adorable Object. "For God is love" (John I. iv. 8). Every contravention, therefore, to the dictates of love is unrighteousness, whoever may be its direct or immediate object; but with the Fountain and very Principle of love for its object, such contravention is nothing in the world but positive ungodliness, whether it be expressed in deed or in thought, in action, or in simple aversion, and a part or constituent of the hostile subject. It is one of the acts or accidents composing the property or habit of turning from God—for such acts or accidents, being naturally reproductive of themselves, as before observed of the subject, there cannot naturally be one of them alone; and its extent is to be estimated by the frequency or prevalence of the habit of aversion in this respect, and the value, greatness, or extent of the matter averted: of which the first may be incessant, in fact, as well as power, and the second equivalent to all the properties, whether incidental or constituent, which the subject may happen, either to own outwardly, or to comprehend within the limits of his own existence. But,

Considering in the next place *particularly* in what this ungodly aversion, or this turning from God, may consist, we should recollect what THE TURNING TO GOD or delighting in Him has been defined; namely, as a delighting in godlike properties, or in properties which are attributed to God, that is in his attributes; (for God does not consist of properties) such as righteousness, mercy, truth, &c.,

to all which a man may be; and naturally is averse. And he is not averse to them, partially either, nor in any single respect; but in all their particulars—and in all his own likewise, whether of body, mind, or fortune; also in all times and in all places—in short, no aversion can be more complete than this of the natural man to his Maker. His body, mind and fortune are invariably turned in a wrong direction and averted from God, the author and giver of each: in his mind he hates God, in his person he opposes Him, or flies from his presence, while with his fortune he also bribes or compels others, as many as he can, to do the like. Wherefore the state of nature is justly described as a state of hostility to God; “Wherein (says St. Paul to some of his gentile converts)—“Wherein ye walked according to the course of this world, according to the prince of the power of the air, the spirit that now worketh in the children of disobedience; among whom we all (Jews as well as gentiles) had our conversation in times past, in the lusts of our flesh, fulfilling the desires of the flesh and of the mind; and were by nature the children of wrath even as others” (Eph. ii. 2, 3).

It matters nothing to say, that a man is not always shewing this aversion to God and goodness; or that he is not always staining himself with such exhibitions of folly, injustice, cruelty, falsehood, oppression, lust, impiety and the like, as are most proper to denote the same, for he has it, if he does not shew it; as personally he is always falling, though he may not always be breaking his neck, because God keeps him out of this extreme calamity. And when St. Paul wrote “Among whom we all had our conversation in times past,” &c., he could not name one, himself not excepted, but might also have had his conversation among the children of wrath at that moment. Of this unpleasant truth we may be farther persuaded, if we

Thirdly, consider the subject *more particularly, or in detail*, as we did its contrary, the good objective class of godliness; observing this time, 1, how the said ungodly

aversion is shewn or exercised, 1 on the incidentals, 2 on the constituents of this divided kingdom; though in fact they are all one, namely, ungodliness exercised on incidentals, and ungodliness rankling in constituents. But still distinguishing as well as we can, and considering at present evil objective characteristics on the first head only; the effect of the natural aversion of the Creator, or of the aversion to Him in a state of nature before mentioned, will appear to be such, that not only the Creator and his attributes, or properties as we consider them, are hated for their own sakes, but persons and places otherwise indifferent are also hated on their account. So the persons of the regenerate, or of those in whom the love of God predominates, will be odious to the natural man for the sake of their benefactor, as he tells them—"The children shall rise up against their parents, and cause them to be put to death. And ye shall be hated of all men for my name's sake" (Matt. x. 22), that is—the servants will be hated expressly, if not avowedly, for the sake of their Lord. And even the house as well as the household, the house of God as we call it, THE PLACE WHERE HIS HONOUR DWELLETH, shall also be odious to the natural man, just as either would be dear to the regenerate, for his name's sake. "Their device is only HOW TO PUT HIM OUT WHOM GOD WILL EXALT" (Ps. lxii. 4): and while these endeavour to engross the temples which godly men have erected to the honour of their Maker for the gratification of appetites long since renounced, other haters of God would knock to pieces, if they could, and "break down all the carved work thereof with axes and hammers" (1b. lxxiv. 7): just as the device of the regenerate is not only how to fulfil their religious engagement, but also to honour and exalt the persons and places most dear to God, or which savour most of his presence; and David, as before cited, for one who says, "O pray for the peace of Jerusalem: they shall prosper that love thee. Peace be within the walls, and plenteousness within thy palaces. FOR MY

BRETHREN AND COMPANIONS' SAKES, I will wish thee prosperity, Yea ; BECAUSE OF THE HOUSE OF THE LORD OUR GOD, I will seek to do thee good" (Ib. cxxii. 6, &c.). " And they shall build the old waste places, they shall raise up the former desolations, and they shall repair the waste cities, the desolations of many generations" (Isai. lxi. 4).

The distinction of *ungodliness on incidentals* may be governed 1, by the property implied, whether it belong 1 to the subject, or 2 to the object of ungodliness ; as whether a man employ 1 his fortune, credit and other incidentals against the essentials of religion, or 2 his strength and talents and other essentials against the incidentals of the supreme Being ; such as his name and notion with the persons, places, and things consecrated to Him. Misconduct in relation to such incidental property of either side, v. g. of either the subject or object of transgression, will be ungodliness on incidentals ; of which there do not seem to be more than two kinds, or degrees as they sometimes appear, and these not rigidly distinguished in common discourse.

§ 1. The first kind is *Profanation* ; when the sacred property or incidentals consecrated to or by the divine Object above mentioned are violated, dishonoured or abused, but not spoiled, stolen, embezzled, or otherwise unlawfully transferred from the sacred use for which they were designed, to the use of the spoiler or his dependents. But the profanation of sacred incidentals though generally less, may be as criminal as their stealth or spoliation in some cases, and exemplified also by chance in cases in which these cannot : a man cannot steal a temple for instance ; but he may profane it, as we learn by some remarkable occurrences in the history of the temple of Jerusalem ; among others, that by Antiochus for one (Maccab. II. vi). No spoliation of sacred property can be more base and impious than such an instance of spoliation as that : it savours of an unmixed spirit of contempt and aversion towards the Supreme Being to whom such places are consecrated, and

will admit of no palliation. It were vain to allege a superstitious or idolatrous use of the place profaned: for if any religious place is clearly devoted to idolatry or superstition, it may be pulled down or applied to a purer use, or a flock of sheep might be driven through it. But however the Deity may be disparaged by a false, pitiful or ridiculous opinion of Him, he needs not to be assailed through any place of worship; no villainy should ever be practised to degrade even a superstitious place, much less one that was dedicated, like that famous temple, to the worship of the only God.

In strictness a church or temple is profaned more or less by any misbehaviour in it during divine service; also by any remissness or inattention at such times. So is the name of God profaned at all times and in every place when and where it is "taken in vain." Taking the Lord's name in vain is the commonest case of profanation or ungodliness on incidentals: and THE COMMONEST INSTANCE OF THIS IS PRAYER WITHOUT A JUST FEELING AND DUE PREPARATION. Whereupon it may well be said, "If thou, Lord, wilt be extreme to mark what is done amiss, O Lord, who may abide it? (Ps. cxxx. 3.)

Indeed, without any special judgment for the occasion, as the accident to Eutychus (Acts xx. 9) may be considered by some, offences of this kind appear to be visited but too surely even in the common course of events. For, to go no farther, praying inadvertently, or as before expressed, without a due preparation of mind, is often found to be a main cause of foolish and inadvertent talking; no very light fine, seeing it is taken from our constituents, and from some of the best of them: it would be much easier for us to be fined in the pocket. Which may suffice to be said of the first sort or degree of ungodliness on incidentals, v. g. Profanation, consisting chiefly in villainy and abuse of the same.

§ 2. *Sacrilege*, the other sort, is one that turns more on fraud and violence towards such objects than on those other qualities: when it will not seem material whether

the object be a person or thing. So that striking a priest, for example, in the exercise of his holy vocation, or tearing the gown from his back would be deemed a sacrilege, as much as seizing or stealing the sacred property and utensils confided to his use. We need not go farther than the Antiochus before mentioned for an example of this sort of evil characteristic : nor yet so far either in fact, having had an Antiochus of our own within the last four hundred years—a sacrilegious spoiler, whom the pitiful pretext of abuses could never screen from the merited censure of all his fellow-mortals who had no particular share in the plundered property ; much less from the vengeance of that Almighty Being who owns himself “ a jealous God ” (Exod. xx. 5) : and the beginning of his punishment was clearly seen in the continual depravation of his constituents ; the end being placed beyond our observation.

CHRISTIAN MODES.

PART I.

THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN CHRIST.

CHAPTER VI.

EVIL OBJECTIVE CHARACTERISTICS.

SEC. 4.

IRRELIGIOUS—ON CONSTITUENTS.

1. Infidelity and Misbelief.—2. Self-justification, &c.—3. Wilfulness and Scepticism.—4. Swearing and Perjury.—5. Doating and Superstition.—6. Polytheism and Idolatry.—7. Apostacy and Atheism.—8. Blasphemy and Impiety.—9. Reprobacy and Perdition.

“Therefore shall they eat of the fruit of their own way, and be filled with their own devices. For the turning away of the simple shall slay them, and the prosperity of fools shall destroy them.”—PROV. i. 31, 32.

HAVING considered the decidedly evil and chiefly aversive characteristic, Ungodliness, in relation to incidentals, or to things necessarily without the adversary or hating subject, we are now to consider the same in a nearer relation to the same, i. e. in relation to its constituents or things within, which are engaged as principles against their divine Object. And the best order that we can observe in relation to this unpleasant theme will be nearly the same—and its heads likewise, only reversed—with that observed for its pleasing contrast, godliness on constituents.

§ 1. Following this order therefore, the first characteristic we meet is the antithesis to faith and fidelity towards God, here meant to be denoted by the compound term, of

Infidelity and *Misbelief*: as infidelity in its usual acceptation will signify only a want of faith; and that is far short of the evil characteristic; which taken in a religious sense or with reference to God, must not be understood as any simple property, but rather as a scale or progressive system containing various sorts, shades or degrees; the very lowest sufficiently formidable, and the highest, or top of the class most completely so. For infidelity may be either simple or extreme; the first when there is only a failure in respect, duty or allegiance without a division or transfer of the same; the second when there is not only a failure in duty or allegiance towards God, but also a division or transfer of the same in favour of some other object as aforesaid.

1. The first of these two sorts has also its shades or varieties often worth considering: of which one is mere *Apathy*, and would be like the infidelity of a brute, if brutes were capable of such a failing. But another shade is rather more sentimental, without being at the same time at all more rational; because it is a defect in reason, to overlook our supreme Object in the course of the services that we perform daily. And how often do we find men who are not devoid of feeling, nor of utility either in their generation losing the benefit of all their services and sufferings for want of faith in that divine Object, or by not acting and suffering upon a religious principle, motion or beginning! Men for example, who shall give bread, and what is more, employment at the same time to hundreds, without any idea of getting bread—that is to say, enduring bread, for themselves thereby—alas; how often are they found!

But what seems still more deficient and disrespectful in this way, to say nothing of infidelity, is the want of purpose that we often observe even in acts, offices and works especially subserving to religion. It is bountiful—it might gratify the attention even of a celestial spirit to see, if he could only see, as we do, the singers go before, the minstrels follow after: and not look also, as we cannot so well, into their hearts, and see them

going like a pack of bell-horses, or some going and others sleeping by the way. It does not become any one to judge severely in a case of this kind, as we have not too much faith any of us; but it may be doubted, whether singers in reciting a part of the divine service which they may have conned with the most creditable attention, do not display sometimes as little attention in the performance; whether the different trades and artisans employed in providing the necessary books and implements for the service of the church; whether the painters, gilders, braziers and others employed in decorating the same; whether the very persons too employed in raising the sacred edifice—the stone-cutters, the masons, the carpenters—nay, whether the lessees of the tithes, with the collectors also, and their assistants—do not all frequently overlook the supreme Object of this very useful and elaborate as well as pious preparation; or, if they ever think of Him, think not of Him for aught but filthy lucre; as the silversmith, Demetrius, and others of his craft at Ephesus appeared to think of Diana, the great goddess of the Ephesians (Acts xix. 21, &c.).

Whatever may be done without faith God can have nothing to do with. It cannot be said, that works of this kind have so far the nature of sin that they were always better omitted; but it may be said, that they are fruitless to their performer; not being properly done to God, their rewarder. Others may both do and suffer as much and as well as those who are affianced to God in Christ, except in point of faith; yet both do and suffer to no purpose for themselves: for (as St. Paul says) “without faith it is impossible to please him” (Heb. xi. 6). And also when we are wretched enough to incur the displeasure of our Almighty Lord, there is no possibility of mitigating its effects without faith. Braving these effects is never the way to mitigate their severity: “But who regardeth the power of thy wrath? (says the Psalmist) for even thereafter as a man feareth so is thy displeasure” (Ps. xc. 11).

It is not because apathy or the mere absence of faith may be considered a venial offence, for the consequences above mentioned prove it to be otherwise, that such a species of infidelity is here set down in the lowest degree; but because of its correspondence with the character of that degree before stated, namely as not necessarily implying any positive or directly offensive act or outward demonstration of crime against the divine Majesty. And the same character may also be applied to the property in several unbecoming aspects which is here applied in its absence, namely that of not being a positive demonstration or explicit offence against the divine Majesty under such aspects, though serious enough by implication for its place among the ungodly or irreligious sort of characteristics. And this may be evident from the consideration of two or three cases, whereby it will appear how the presence of faith may become as criminal and as much infidelity as its failure or absence, and even worse; as for example,

2. The *familiar*, unbecoming faith of some enthusiasts; which is not faith, for one thing; but impudence. It is like the credit which some forward fellows are apt to afford their superiors on earth; a credit admitting of no distance between the parties related in it; a truly anomalous credit! But the distance between earth and heaven one should think were enough to keep off the multitude, and that the Kingdom of Heaven above should not be liable to suffer violence, nor the violent allowed to take it by force because they are a set of unmannerly hypocrites. There is a consistency in credit as well as in character, and one should answer to the other, or it cannot be just. It is a spurious credit that magnifies its object beyond measure, expecting or thinking of the same more than circumstances warrant; or perhaps deifying, as it were, some pitiful creature of the earth: and it is an *injurious* credit on the other hand, that expects or thinks worse of its object than it deserves, or more familiarly than consists with good manners. Of the first of these extremes there is no danger in the faith or

credit we may offer to God : there is no danger of amplification here ; but there may be some, of detraction ; as by expecting his patronage in a bad cause for example. This may be expected of men, but must not be expected of God : and indeed it is wonderful how some professing to believe in him can expect to prosper under the auspices of an Almighty Being whose acknowledged purity and perfection are so unfavourable to their prospects. It is almost a wonder, they do not think of this sometimes : but no wonder, that such persons should also think too familiarly of God in other respects when they can think Him capable of so much indifference to propriety ; or rather, of such an unworthy condescension.

3. We find instances of misbelief similar to this mentioned in Scripture sometimes by the expression of *tempting God* ; and it may be perchance with a mixture of contempt, as in the sneer of the malefactor who suffered with Jesus materially and in place, but not intellectually and in spirit, like his believing companion ; when the sneerer said to him, " If thou be the Christ, save thyself and us " (Luke xxiii. 39). Though there might have been some earnest even in his sneering, as such a mixed conception is not unnatural, being what they call half in earnest and half in jest. It was the faith of a thief : and many, very many, it is to be feared, there are with about the same proficiency at present—(that is, with no further conception of their creed) who would not like to be called thieves ; though we cannot call them honest professors, unless they would like to take more pains to understand and act up to what they profess.

4. This therefore may certainly be enumerated as another instance of misbelief, and of *impudent faith* too ; which may be added to the familiar aforesaid.

5. The believer, or subject of faith, whatever he may expect from the Object or Rewarder, must not expect anything either injurious to his character, or prejudicial to the interests of his other dependents. Should the most forward and zealous of all God's servants expect to monopo-

lize his favour, (which he could not) he must expect it with both of these ugly conditions ; and his faith must be very *fond* at least, before he can bring himself to such an unreasonable expectation. Or if a man should only desire more than a common share of the divine favour, infinite as it is, for himself, without any thought of sharing it again with others, he must be uncharitable, exorbitant, a decided misbeliever, and, as such, a proper subject for disappointment. This monopolist that would be of the divine favour is too narrow-minded, too sordid and ignorant, to entertain so liberal a sentiment as true faith, or a proper sense of his relation to God. For the more extensive any relation of finite intellectuals may be, the fainter will be their perception of the particulars of such relation. Hence our relation to the society without our walls will not be felt like our relation to the little society within, and still less sensibly will the universal relation that we bear to God and his creatures generally be felt, than any particular relation within doors or without—and the same naturally transcending the powers of a comparatively enlightened and benevolent spirit cannot be expected to lie much in the way of a sordid monopolist.

6. To give this case also a name, without calling it too hardly, let us call it *silly*.—A silly misbelief is what we often hear of; and no misbelief can be more silly than this; being such again as the first-mentioned case for fondness and familiarity. Such too is—

7. A *divided* faith; by which is not meant a faith in God divided by any medium, nor faith in any other object on God's account; either of which might consist with a right faith or faith uncorrupted; but to faith partly in God and partly in some opposite authority and interest, or a faith resting one while on God, another while on some other object; now on him, perhaps, now on the world; now on God's providence, now on the misbeliever's own sagacity; putting their trust one while in horses and chariots, another while remembering the name of the Lord their God (Ps. xx. 7): as in the humbler walks

of life many are apt to calculate their security rather by the length of their purse; they also taking care to remember the name of their nominal Lord at the same time, of course, both night and morning.

The piety of numbers is much too *politic*; halting in the midst of its career like the piety of Balaam the son of Beor (Num. xxii. xxiii. xxiv.), and of that other disobedient prophet at Beth-el (Kings I. xiii), and of king Saul (Sam. I. xv. 9), and of many such who might be thought of; which if it be not a strange misbelief because it is common, is one however that might be characterized by a worse epithet.

8. A *forced belief* is also a Misbelief, being without any root or foundation, either in spirit or intellect, in conviction, or in evidence; but violently taken up or violently sustained when declining, either of which is unnatural but not unexampled, nor yet hard to imitate. For it is certain, that a man may harden his heart, so as either to believe any thing apparently, or disbelieve it as he will: but let him give his heart a fair trial, for "the heart is deceitful above all things" (Jer. xvii. 9), and he shall find that it is not always believing in God; but sometimes it is, sometimes not; and his own deeds may demonstrate as much to him who, next to God, must know them best, that is—to himself.

9. Another sort of misbelief or imperfect faith is one that may be called *premature*, from its having been taken up without due consideration and conviction; which may be likely enough, IF THE DOCTRINE SHOULD EXCEED ONE ARTICLE. Men have been known to confess, fight, kill, and be killed, for ten, twenty, and more articles at once before now, who wanted the necessary inclination, opportunity or talent to examine one: and men have been known as forward to run away as to fight for this sort of misbelief sometimes. This St. Paul might have known by the Galatians for example, who heard him and owned themselves convinced by his doctrine: but their con-

viction, was evidently sudden and premature, soon caught up, and soon laid aside; as may be gathered from his expostulation with these precipitate professors. "I am afraid of you, lest I have bestowed upon you labour in vain (says he to them). Brethren, I beseech you, be as I am: for I am as ye are; ye have not injured me at all. Ye know how through the infirmity of the flesh I preached the Gospel unto you at the first. And my temptation, which was in the flesh, ye despised not, nor rejected; but received me as an angel of God, even as Jesus Christ. Where is then the blessedness ye spake of? For I bear you record, that if it had been possible, ye would have plucked out your own eyes, and have given them unto me" (Gal. iv. 11, &c.).

10. Another sort, but not worse than others, as it may be reckoned an *incipient faith*, is the mere assent to divine truths, such as the being and attributes of God, his judgment, providence, and the like, without much feeling: which is very near to the first mentioned case of apathy; if not to dissent or doubting. For faith in God, to be perfect, should be consenting as well as assenting: yet this often precedes the other, if it does not contribute to the same; which makes it somewhat, to have only so much as an assenting faith; seeing consent may follow. So it happened to our Saviour's first apostles, and afforded a striking example of both sorts of faith to future believers, namely, of an assenting and consenting faith: when these were required to believe, and doubtless did believe, many things of him being on earth; also ate the new Passover with him, which is what we call Receiving the Lord's Supper,--and all in their unenlightened state, i.e. with a mere passive or assenting faith. But after our Saviour's ascension and the descent of the Holy Ghost, being excited in a superior manner, and enlightened with heavenly wisdom, they had a thorough sense and lively comprehension of the mystery of the kingdom of God in Christ: and then their faith was both assenting and consenting;

fall, perfect and assured. A rather comfortable prospect for us,—not entirely, but rather; because our Saviour tells us, as he told others, “Except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of Heaven” (Matt. v. 20). It is impossible, that the religious of our day should be more conformable or acquiescing in their national mode of worship, than the scribes and Pharisees of our Saviour’s time were; also for any one to know, whether his faith will ever be more lively and consenting than theirs, so that we have not much room to boast: and if our faith should never rise beyond the characteristic here intended, we must die in unbelief, or in a FASHIONABLE MISBELIEF; which amounts to the same in effect.

11. Finally, to conclude this sample of misbelief with another fashionable sort, and much of a piece with the preceding, if it do not rather deserve the name of Infidelity than of Misbelief—as common a sort as any, is faith without works or obedience; which they call a *dead* faith, and may therefore be similarly called a *fatal* misbelief: being naturally vapid, inconsequential, and unproductive, without savour, without fruit: and in short, hardly deserving the name of Faith or Belief. For what a man truly believes, he will as inevitably practise, if he can; HIS PRACTICE BEING REGULATED AND DESCRIBED BY HIS BELIEF. “And why call ye me Lord, Lord, (asks our Saviour,) and do not the things which I say?” (Luke vi. 46). This is a sort of credit that one man would not thank another for, and very different from what we owe to God; as however great our reliance and expectations may be towards Him, they should not interfere with other dues that he requires, and also has a right to exact from us. It seems like adding insult to infidelity, to believe in God and his word, without doing thereafter: to believe, that he enjoins this action, that forbids, patronizes and approves this sort of conduct, to that is decidedly *averse*; to believe thus on either hand, without a corresponding at-

tempt; but, it may be, the reverse. Servants who should conduct themselves in this idle and insolent manner towards some masters on earth might expect to be well striped for it.

As infidelity or misbelief in this simple degree is chiefly a want of faith, and faith, as before observed under that head, is the pure gift of God, and utterly beyond the scope of our own acquirement, it may seem hard too, that a "servant which knew his Lord's will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, should be beaten with many stripes" (Luke xii. 47) for such neglect; when so much more than knowledge was required for performance, and much of that also out of his reach: but may not the same consideration be equally applied to want of stature, strength, and even of common necessities? We must needs suffer more or less for the want of only one of these inferior commodities, although its attainment should not have been placed within our reach by an overruling Providence; and if men are liable to suffer only for want of one of the least of these, what should hinder them from suffering likewise for the want of so important an article as faith in every degree; and especially when, as it most frequently happens, they have brought that want upon themselves by their own misthinking perhaps, or misdoing? "For the grace of God that bringeth salvation hath appeared to ALL men" (Tit. ii. 11): whether they chose to see it or not.

But our acts of faith may be run out to sin, and become extinct, as well as the properties of love, respect and obedience. We see numbers in the world who are seemingly incapable of either of these properties: who are so abominably selfish, that they can neither love another, nor respect themselves; neither pay much deference to the authority of others, nor yet be very well satisfied with that of their own corrupt inclination: and it may be the same with their faith. They have trusted themselves too much; and now they are quite listless: they have run out their faith to vanity, instead of drawing out their soul to the hungry

(Isai. lviii. 10): they have done believing; and will never believe again without a new creation.

By some of those who would reply against God, (of whom more hereafter,) it may be alleged, that our insensibility or indifference towards Him is a natural consequence of our having never seen Him: but it is also natural to consider our earthly parents and benefactors, whom we have seen, with the same eye of indifference, if not with ingratitude. It is well known that gratitude and sensibility, the ingredients of faith, are not natural to man at present; that they were and ought to be so, we know and feel too sometimes; but so they are not at present. And we now meet with a very few men, to whom it might not be said as it was to the haughty king of Babylon, soon after the example that had been made of a predecessor in his dignity as faithless and unfeeling as himself, "And thou, his son, O Belshazzar, hast not humbled thine heart, though thou knewest all this" (Dan. v. 22). For he was evidently one of those gentiles who walk, according to the phrase of St. Paul, in "the vanity of their mind; having the understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart" (Eph. iv. 17, 18); and not because they have not seen their proper Object of worship. For (as St. Paul likewise observes) "the invisible things of Him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead: so that they are without excuse" (Rom. i. 20); and, it might be added, also without remedy as long as they shall continue in this state. Neither faith nor fidelity towards God may be expected from one of that darkened, unregenerate class; on the contrary, from various causes besides his natural alienation, he will still degenerate, and be farther alienated from God continually: among which extraordinary, or rather, resulting causes the following may be enumerated.

1, An inordinate *fear* and dread of human observation, a pusillanimous habit of concealment towards man, as if he was every thing. This will make us forget by degrees that universal and penetrating observation, which we may indeed forget, but cannot elude.

2, A principal *trust* and reliance towards the same quarter, more dangerous if possible than fear. Indeed it is hard to conceive, how men reckoning so much on each other as many are found to do, can have any reliance on God, or think much of any relation to him. And if men cannot take his word for any thing; if the honour of being related to him as friends, as children, as his chosen, be not worth any thing, where may be their faith, and whence is this high endowment to be expected? "How (said our Saviour to the mercenary Jews)—how can ye believe, which receive honour one of another, and seek not the honour that cometh from God only?" (John v. 44.) It is impossible, that men can believe while they labour under such a wretched infatuation: their judgment is all awry; their dependence is a broken reed. How can men help them in such a case? "The apostles said unto the Lord, Increase our faith" (Luke xvii. 5), believing in God with him: and believers may help believers truly in this respect; but from unbelievers unbelievers cannot get what they have not. For "no man hath seen God at any time: the only begotten Son which is in the bosom (or confidence) of the Father, he hath declared him" (John i. 18): and here is all their remedy; in this principle, or beginning.

It appears then, that people cannot be innocent in simple infidelity or unbelief, still less in misbelief, and less again in other shades or degrees of ungodliness: to be now considered.

§ 2. Among such other shades or DEGREES, as they may be rather called, the first that claims our attention is the offence, or sin as we may call it, of *self-justification*, or what in Scripture has been called *a replying against God*: which may not be thought much by some, yet deserves in

fact to rank higher in the scale of ungodliness even than the place here assigned it. For a man cannot pretend to justify himself under any real affliction of divine providence without impugning the justice of its Author. The matter is, to know first what constitutes a real affliction, or when the affliction may be real and irremediable, before we venture to stand up against it, if we should ever be bold enough to do so; and that we cannot know without knowing its divine Author's intentions. But supposing an affliction to be real, or taking for granted that it is so, "O man, who art thou that repliest against God?" (Rom. ix. 20.) "For who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been his counsellor? Or who hath first given to Him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again?" (Ib. xi. 34, 35).

The most usual way of replying against God however, or of self-justification, as it is here called, does not consist in taxing his providence or equity for the past, so much as in arrogant expectations towards them for the future. Alas; how many half taught Christians do we find, who are no wiser than to keep a sort of running account with the Deity, as they think; a debtor and creditor account of their merits forsooth, if not of their misfortunes! One hardly knows what class of irreligious offences this should be referred to. It would be called most likely the Pelagian heresy: but Heresy is rather too mild a term for it, namely for the offence of self-justification, or of those who can arrogate to themselves the credit of ~~WORKS EITHER FALSELY CALLED GOOD, OR FALSELY CALLED THEIRS~~: though if one calls it not Heresy, one should hardly know what to call it. For one cannot call this offence, however unchristianlike, downright apostacy; as the thought of pleasing God by our supposed deserts will seem much better than not caring whether he be pleased or not; which is the case of apostacy, and a very common case too, unfortunately.

But how this sort of account is looked on by God, may

be gathered from the example he has given us in the history or apologue of Job; a righteous sufferer, whose misfortunes are not a little aggravated by the cruel and odious imputation of pretending to justify himself before God (Job iv. viii. xi. xv. &c.); whereas nothing could be more contrary to his habitual sentiments and expressions. "How should man be just with God? (would he say) IF I JUSTIFY MYSELF, MINE OWN MOUTH SHALL CONDEMN ME: if I say, I am perfect, it shall also prove me perverse" (Ib. ix. 2, 20). And so it seems too indeed by another saying of the holy probationer's, "Let him take his rod away from me, and let not his fear terrify me; then would I speak and not fear him; but it is not so with me" (Ib. 34, 35). As much as to say, I would if I dared: but I know, whom I have to deal with. Perhaps the thought of the moment might not have been strictly correct: and the saint had his admonition for it (Ib. xxxviii. 2; xl. 2, &c.). Human nature will needs cry out; she must complain, she cannot hold: "But God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above that ye are able; but will with the temptation also make a way to escape, that ye may be able to bear it" (Cor. I. x. 13). For such involuntary and sometimes unavoidable replying against God, allowance may be made: but that does not seem altogether of the sort here alluded to; which, as before observed, is more common than the other, and that too even among Christians—it may be sometimes for want of a more pious feeling, sometimes for want of a more Christianlike education.

§ 8. In a third, and consequently deeper shade of the same characteristic, there does not appear the same room for palliation, or excuse, as in some cases of the last mentioned offence, from the different way in which it originates. Such is the infidelity, or rather *Wilfulness and Scepticism* of those in whom the principle of faith declines by habit, or never flourishes "through the deceitfulness of sin" (Heb. iii. 13); an effect which St. Paul notices; warning his followers accordingly; "Take heed,

brethren" (Ib. 12): that is on account of the slowness, the stealing secrecy with which this fatal spirit creeps in upon us. Such is also the wilful infidelity of those who love darkness rather than light; and that notwithstanding they bear in themselves an evidence of the truth, if they could but see it, through this very predilection—a common infatuation of freethinkers that would be; who cannot receive any truth that is proposed by God's word, or as the Word of God, without a gigantic evidence; but any thing else, with as little evidence as you please: and so he tells them, "I am come in my Father's name, and ye receive me not; if another shall come in his own name, him ye will receive" (John v. 43). Thus, for example, the chymist will allow flesh to be flint; and cannot believe, that the Word was made flesh; the metaphysician can admit the combination of good and evil properties in his own person, but not of the principles of these two opposite characters in the power and authority of Another; the geologist can believe, that the world made itself, or was made by chance, or never made at all; but being told by the infallible word of God, Who made the world, and how it was made—will take leave to doubt it. And why should this sort of people, chymists, metaphysicians, geologists and the like so generally believe what is most opposite to the word of God—and to plain sense at the same time likewise perchance, as aforesaid, if it be not to attest and exemplify by their conduct to the plainest apprehension an important truth, for the discovery of which we are indebted to divine revelation; to wit, that MEN DO NOT GENERALLY CHOOSE THEIR OPINIONS BY REASON, BUT BY AFFINITY? "And this is the condemnation (says our Saviour) that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil" (Ib. iii. 19).

The chymist ought to know something of affinities, certainly: and knowing too, as he might if he would, that men are naturally corrupt, he needs not be surprised to

find a corrupt heart producing in himself a corrupt belief; so that, whatever may be his natural or regularly acquired talents, "except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God" (John iii. 3), if he should ever think of looking for it. And the ungodly crew of Antichrist are at wonderful pains to discourage even the general principle of belief in religion without any particular reference to this sort or that, by denying its foundation altogether; as if there was no room for certainty respecting this, whatever certainty there may be respecting the foundation of other sciences. These enemies of the truth are aware, perhaps, that the principle of faith in religion being once admitted, the only question then would be, Which is the religion for choice? That question fairly argued would soon overturn all opposition, and lead directly to an adoption of the faith in Christ. "The haters of the Lord should have been found liars" (Ps. lxxxi. 16), and particularly in proscribing the principle of faith, while themselves are the bigots of scepticism and wilful unbelief—bigots of unbelief and slaves to a misnamed freethinking—slaves to mock freedom—slaves, voluntary and ignorant—whipped, because they wish it; and tormented, fiercely tormented, without so much as knowing it—a wonderful medley, if the same be rightly considered. For in good sooth, they are but a heap of paradoxes: **FREE THINKERS AND FREE WILLERS WITH CAPTIVE HEADS AND HEARTS**; blind to every plausible reason, deaf to every friendly persuasion, enemies to all rational control, heady and high-minded, if not traitors (Tim. II. iii. 4), impatient of every yoke but that of their infernal captor. So wretchedly are they deceived, and so ever to be; unless, as St. Paul expresses it, "God, peradventure, will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth; and that they may recover themselves out of the snare of the devil who are taken captive by him at his will" (Tim. II. ii. 26).

The first step therefore to freethinking is an admission of the principle of faith in opposition to that of scepticism,

which is the devil's proscription of faith. We must understand such a thing as the existence of a credible authority in religion somewhere, and not conclude too hastily that all men are liars (Ps. cxvi. 10). It is only among liars, that such a conclusion reigns, and ought to reign; for there it is reasonable enough; but in the purified kingdom of God, which is the kingdom of God in Christ; there can be no room for it: his servants or subjects can afford a safe and ready credence to each other: as the Master tells them, "Freely ye have received, freely give" (Matt. x. 8). Therefore, Self-will and scepticism must be more grating to their observation as well as more foolish than some of the ills we have passed.

And whatever sceptics themselves may think of the innocence of doubting, they would not think it necessarily harmless, more than any other evil which they are kindly warned of by the Word they choose to doubt. For if their habit of doubting were harmless to others, which it is not always, its indulgence cannot be thought harmless to themselves, if we only consider what they get by it, which bears no comparison with what they lose. For they get a deadly habit—that is what they get. They who wilfully weaken and dilapidate the monuments of their own understanding, are not aware of the disease they are contracting in that very sensible part: which, however mild it may be felt in the beginning, when it shall be no more than irresolution, perhaps—and that is not very pleasant, has room to become most excruciating; like other evils, which take their rise in essential properties, and grow together with good, as one might say, on neutral ground.

The subjects themselves, therefore, have reason to think worse of this evil generally than of those by which it is preceded. And if we farther notice the shades and degrees of evil in relation to the Best of beings, we shall find them always growing more and more foolish in fact as well as more serious in consequence the farther they are traced.

It may improve our acquaintance a little with the subject, if means too are taken into consideration, and if it be distinguished, somewhat hereby, as well as by facts and effects or consequences; beginning for example with the means of speech—"a little member" (Jam. iii. 5), as St. James says, but not the least mischievous, as he also proves; and considering next the means of intention, generally termed the heart, though this be first in effect, as that by which the same little mischievous member is set in motion, and so ill directed.

§ 4. Of the UNGODLINESSSES OF THE TONGUE, as we may call these evil objectives, there are two that seem nearly related, or they may be thought only one in fact; to wit, *Swearing and Perjury**. For as mere oaths, i. e. extra-official, wanton, and superfluous, are clearly proscribed by the Christian covenant, a Christian man can never swear in this manner without perjury, being already sworn to the covenant. The most common case of vain swearing, as it is called, being merely used for expletives in conversation, is happily now growing out of fashion, and seldom heard, except from such persons as are either too ignorant to be cured of the vice, or too insignificant to recommend it by example, so that one might almost predict its speedy abolition without the ungrateful aid of censure or reprobation. And the abominable vice of *false swearing*, without being a whit less common, is still more generally reprobated. For it seems that false swearing can be practised and reprobated at the same time, as well as another false part that shall be nameless. False swearing, &c., may not be practised quite so much, in consequence of a smart reprehension now and then, as it would be otherwise; and so far they who have taken the pains to reprehend these abominable practices may deserve some thanks from society proportioned to such pains, especially if they were happy in their manner, and more especially if they had

* A subject that is treated of more particularly in the Author's Kingdom Sermons, No. 22, "The Fate of Ananias."

the happiness to afford a corresponding example at the same time, an example corresponding with their doctrine.

One very common case of false swearing among professing Christians, which may not have been sufficiently, and never can be too severely reprehended, is a carelessness of solemn engagements contracted in the name and under the auspices of, what they own for the Highest Authority in the universe; as first the baptismal, by which they are solemnly affianced to that authority, and * next the matrimonial, then the sponsor's part in baptism; all engagements that were better left alone, than subjected to this profane abuse. They were better left alone, not only in reference to the Divine Object of such abuse, but also in reference to its unhappy subjects: who, if they have ever learned what is meant by the blessed Trinity, must be unhappy in not having learned at the same time, to regard this high relation with more faith and reverence.

§ 5. Adverting next to the other specific means of ungodliness, or to another specific sort of ungodliness founded upon or arising out of such means, v. g. out of intention aforesaid, we shall find ample room for vain swearing in the character of *Superstition*: by which is not to be understood any particular property in the kingdom, so much as a mixture of many ingredients; *religious Doating* for one, the root of which has been already considered. And a very prevalent foible it is with many honest persons; who are pretty well to do, go to church regularly once a week, and once perhaps to meeting, filling up the rest of the time between their worldly avocations and a little godly gossip, not being so much engaged with that but that they can find some time for this. We should be cautious however of suffering our religious sentiments to evaporate in words without meaning, or in an empty meaning either.

* Perhaps this occasion of perjury shall be anticipated by some of its preliminaries. Indeed people can hardly be aware of all the snares of this sort that are laid in their way; an enumeration of them might be interesting, and suggest room for further improvement in relation to superfluous oaths.

There may be convenient ways enough of easing the mind when it is overcharged with ascetic ideas: and another way there is too of much the same kind; being, like the forementioned characteristic of vain swearing, decidedly an abuse of speech, besides this abuse of intention towards God. It is an abuse of speech as present, and of intention as absent, when people would seem to converse with God as idly as they talk of Him with each other; which was not an uncommon practice among the Jews, nor much to be wondered at considering their election by God; who, however, did not spare his rebukes on that account. "This people draweth nigh unto me with their mouth, and honoureth me with their lips, (said He,) but their heart is far from me" (Matt. xv. 8). And still such a superstitious inattention, however disgusting, may be aggravated, and is too often, by an addition that one should hardly think possible, if experience did not shew it to be so when superstition is mixed up with scorn, and election rewarded with insolence. "And though they say, The Lord liveth; (said He) surely they swear falsely" (Jer. v. 2.) "But draw near hither, ye sons of the sorceress, the seed of the adulterer and the whore; against whom do ye sport yourselves? Against whom do ye make a wide mouth, and draw out the tongue? Are ye not children of transgression, a seed of falsehood?" (Isai. lvii. 3, 4.)

All our attentions to the Deity having either no meaning or only a bad one, like the samples now produced, are certainly false and superstitious in themselves, and must needs be very odious to their divine Object. The last mentioned sort indeed can never be meant for his acceptance, and the former also we are assured, that he will not accept. "To what purpose is the multitude of your sacrifices unto me? saith the Lord. I am full of the burnt offerings of rams, and the fat of fed beasts" (Isai. i. 11). "Thinkest thou, that I will eat bulls' flesh, and drink the blood of goats?" (Ps. l. 13.) "Why dost thou preach my laws, and takest my covenant in thy mouth; whereas thou

hatest to be reformed, and hast cast my words behind thee?" (Ib. 16, 17).

This assuming manner is much too common among God's elect, as we often find it among other favourites; which makes a distinction between ELECTION and SELECTION, or between the "Many called," and the Chosen few necessary in that case. "For (as our Saviour declares) many be called, but few chosen" (Matt. xx. 16). "Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them" (Ib. vii. 20), says he. And such a manner too, which is here called religious doating, any one may acquire by mere forgetfulness or inadvertency; not perceiving, that there is always an enticement even to simple infidelity—the idol, Self; which steals by this means into his highest reverence, dividing the empire of the kingdom with its lawful Sovereign. Meanwhile the transition from this sort of superstition to a worse is very natural: from thinking ourselves in such high favour with God for nothing, we shall soon begin to persuade ourselves, that we may do as we please with him, or get him to do any thing; as there have been those formerly, whether there be such or not at present, who had a notion of bribing the Deity with offerings and shrines, to connive at their open cruelties or secret abominations. But notions such as these are more than simple infidelity, are more than wilfulness and scepticism, more than doating and common superstition; and if they are not as much a part of idolatry as covetousness or any other evil appetite can be, they have at least a very strong tendency to that or something worse. "For God hath not called us unto uncleanness, but unto holiness" (Thess. I. iv. 7): and the holiest person or thing that ever was called is not a thing to be idolized or compared with him who called it to the state in which it is found.

§ 6. If we take a nearer view of this last mentioned sin, *Idolatry*, we shall find that it may be distinguished into species several ways, and especially by its objects, being 1 real, 2 representative.

1. By its *real* objects the sin of idolatry may be divided into two species, 1 personal, 2 material, agreeing with these two sorts of objects. And

1, Among persons, false men will generally be found the false gods, or objects of *personal* idolatry; no true man ever caring to stand forward in this manner, that is for personal worship. And besides this class, there is also in many parts of the earth a notion of infernal beings, as objects of worship. Of either of these sorts of fleeting personages to which their immortal Creator is equalized or even postponed by unthinking devotees, myriads have long ceased to exist; while others never had any existence, except in the fond imaginations of the said devotees: but whether these objects or any of them ever existed, will not signify aught in the character of the property under consideration: equalizing and postponing the Supreme Being to that which is highest under Him, or to that which is lowest, or to that which is not, will amount to the same effect; it is equalizing and postponing One who has no equal to nothing. And, judging between persons, it must be owned, that in all the world, as far as it has been discovered, God is not only compared to man, but oftener equalled than preferred in consequence of such comparison, and oftener still, postponed than either; that is inwardly and really in thought and in deed, and considering a man's foreign properties to be a part of him, as they are usually considered. For a proof of this may be mentioned the criminal liberties that are taken in God's presence beyond any that the offender would presume to take before a human witness infinitely less perfect and observing than God: which alone might be sufficient evidence of the fact; to say nothing of other symptoms, as our remissness in addressing him, and inattention when he is addressed, and the general want of a respectful feeling towards him, so much to be deplored, though not so much to be wondered at. For in this lifeless state men are scarcely able to perceive even the slender proportion of worth that is sometimes to be

found among themselves; and the principle by which we honour our lawful rulers and other superiors on earth being when carried to a higher pitch the same by which we honour God, if we have not this principle in a lower degree, it is not to be expected that we should enjoy the same in a higher; as St. John says with regard to another principle, the love of God. "If a man say, I love God (says the holy apostle) and hateth his brother, he is a liar; for he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how can he love God whom he hath not seen?" (John I. iv. 20). So no man can honour God, and not honour his brother; although a stupid reverence for externals may be felt without much esteem for either.

2. After the personal objects and kinds of idolatry by such objects should also be mentioned one *material* sort of idolatry, with its material object; and no mean favourite, no feeble competitor for the supremacy, either. Being but a lump of earth in fact, he is yet an allegorical potentate of no common celebrity, usually remembered by the title of MAMMON; and if we were to investigate the subject, it would be found that this material object of idolatry was more honoured in the world, than any personal object of worship whether human or divine, reigning there almost absolutely if not universally.

2. But there is also another way of distinguishing this wretched characteristic by its *representative* objects, whether they be places or things; as 1, temples, mountains, and groves; 2, relics of persons and things natural; with paintings, statues, monuments and other specimens of art: which may all be excellent in their kind, and deserving the highest encouragement, but not any thing like religious worship. This is proper idolatry in the commonest acceptance; and among all the wild propensities of a depraved nature, there is none more strange and stupid than this passion; which has reigned more or less in every age of the world since the first, and still continues not only among barbarous nations, but if reports be true,

among some of the more civilized. Or perhaps it may be about half and half with the latter; half worshipping the Lord, who is with them "as a Mighty terrible One" (Jer. xx. 11), and half worshipping certain impotent deities that hang on their necks, or stand in their closet; thus combining the worship of their penates with his worship, as formerly among the better sort of heathens it was not unusual to combine his worship with theirs; a natural preference being given in either case to the gods of the household.

It is in this manner that idolatry operates against true religion: and not in this manner only. For sometimes, by being thus combined with idolatry, the little that there may happen to be of true religion in any nation or state shall perish by chance with its idols; as in the case of either a human or an infernal invasion extraordinary—the idols, with all their paraphernalia, being cast into the conqueror's fire perhaps in the one case; and before the fest of Infidelity, which is also a "spirit of burning" (Isai. ix. 4) in the other. Or, it is possible, that in the case of an heathen invasion the God of Israel may be adopted by the conqueror, in the same partial manner as he was by those whom Shalmaneser, "king of Assyria, brought from Babylon, and from Cuthah, and from Ava, and from Hamath, and from Sepharvaim; and placed in the cities of Samaria instead of the children of Israel" (Kings II. xvii. 24). This motley assemblage, it seems, had soon just cause to fear the God of the country, as they esteemed Jehovah; and saw the propriety of getting a priest from among the captive Israelites, to "teach them the manner of the God of the land: and he taught them, how they should fear the Lord." But nature, or something else, taught them at the same time, how to equalize him with their superstitious deities; "Every nation made gods of their own, and put them in the houses of the high places which the Samaritans had made; every nation in the cities wherein they dwelt. So THEY FEARED THE LORD, AND SERVED THEM

OWN GODS" (lb. 27, &c.). So too in after times upon the frequent and formidable irruptions of heathen hordes on the Lord's new inheritance, this adulterating system, this equalizing of the One True God with many false gods, and occasional postponing of Him to them, went on again the same as ever with only a change of names—NAMES CHANGING, BUT THINGS REMAINING.

And now it may be thought, Whatever would become of the faith of many superstitious states in Christendom, if the images of their saints, or of the virgin Mary, or of the Son himself, or of the blessed Trinity should come to be thrown into the fire and burnt, as others have been before, by rude conquerors, like those of the fourth and fifth centuries in Europe? One might imagine some idolatrous hero exulting in the success of his gods over these hereafter, somewhat in the strain of the Assyrian, or of his general Rabshakeh, before Jerusalem, "Where are the gods of Hamath and of Arpad? where are the gods of Sepharvaim, Hena, and Ivah? Have they delivered Samaria out of mine hand? Who are they among all the gods of the countries that have delivered their country out of mine hand, that the Lord should deliver Jerusalem out of mine hand?" (Kings II. xviii. 34, 35.) As for the gods of Hamath and Arpad, of Sepharvaim, Hena, and Ivah; whether it be Nergal or Ashimah, or Nibhaz and Tartak, or Adrammelech and Anammelech by name, or however the same may be called, they are all gone by long since, with Jupiter, and Mars, and Odin, and the rest of them. And who can say what others may not go likewise, if not before any mortal conqueror, yet before the spirit of infidelity now so rapidly diffusing itself through Christendom?

For there is undoubtedly as great danger accruing from idolatry even in the right faith, the faith of Christians, as there was in the superstitious and polytheistic faith of the Babylonians, the Cuthites, the Avites, the Hamathites, and others before mentioned; while the effect in this case

would be more serious: for these nations had not perhaps any faith that was much worth keeping, but here is one most precious in danger of being cut off with, and by reason of, the idols that are palmed upon it, if they should happen to be cast into the fire as aforesaid. And hence perhaps came the injunction of prospective Wisdom to the ancient Israelite, "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth: thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them" (Exod. xx. 4, 5).

§ 7. In another stage infidelity being carried to a still greater extent, or running from one extreme to another, as from excess to privation, will from polytheism and idolatry become *apostacy* and *atheism*: the former of which has gone so far as to renounce his allegiance to God; while the latter will even make bold to dispute his existence; or if not his existence, yet his creation, word and providence. Wherefore one would think that these two classes of infidels or species of infidelity, the apostate and atheist, or apostacy and atheism, were the very extreme points or pillars—the Calpe and Abyla of ungodliness; admitting of no room either for modification on the one hand, or aggravation, on the other: but in fact they admit of both. For with regard to modification only; (leaving their aggravation to another degree) 1, a man's apostacy may be transient and not constituent; being perhaps the effect of a disordered imagination, or of the temporary prevalence of some natural illusion; or proceeding from invincible ignorance: and 2, his atheism, which is much the same thing, may be rather inferential than direct or express: it may be more perhaps than the man himself is aware of—a very common case: or it may be theoretical only, and not practical; or practical, and not theoretical. And in either of these cases a man's atheism, however dangerous and almost irremediable, will still be incomplete, and therefore not quite hopeless: or however, it will not be the same as if a man was at once

both an atheist and an apostate; and that both theoretical and practical, being alienated from God both in thought and deed. For there will then remain but one step more, to fill up the measure of infidelity and ensure its subject's perdition; being a degree beyond apostacy and atheism, or otherwise the aggravation of these characteristics before alluded to, which is,

§ 8. *Blasphemy and Impiety*—for the subject, to profess with his mouth what he has dared to think in his heart and attempt with his hand—even to blaspheme the High Authority which he dares oppose, to offer impieties instead of prayers, and execrations instead of thanks; perhaps to set his face against the order of Providence and the methods of divine goodness; corrupting, seducing and destroying continually as far as his means will reach, like the enemy of mankind; and, like he too, merely for the sake of mischief; pursuing evil for its own sake, and from an aversion to good.

And now the case is become hopeless, like the last stage of insanity. For every shade of ungodliness must be accounted as madness in its degree: but when a man is gone so far in impiety as to insult, oppose and blaspheme his Maker intentionally, he must be decidedly, and not SUBJECTIVELY, but OBJECTIVELY MAD. Indeed blasphemy itself appears to be rather a common symptom of insanity in the natural or subjective department; and shall it be thought less insane in the objective or moral? If a poor wretch who is unconscious almost of every thing around him proclaims his derangement by senseless oaths and imprecations, shall they who are truly conscious of every outward object be thought less mad within, when by their actions as well as words they brave the authority of the Creator? There is a characteristic illusion at the bottom of one of these disorders as well as of the other, that is, at the bottom of impiety as well as insanity; according to which their respective subjects, the impious and the insane will reason, it may be very shrewdly, on either side. Thus

the insane person, or subject of madness, taking himself to be emperor of the east, and shrewdly consulting his dignity, will crown himself with straws accordingly; while the bolder blasphemer or subject of impiety, feeling as if he could set aside death and judgment, will fly in his Maker's face, and crown himself with cursing.

A man defying Omnipotence after this rate is like a child on a step bragging to the passers by—Ah! you cannot touch me; but more like the unhappy maniac, as before observed. And certainly one of these characters, namely the maniac and the blasphemer, cannot be thought less insane than the other; since the disorder of both proceeds from one root, which is pride. Pride begets impiety; and, by a regular gradation, madness becomes its punishment. Thus pride first robs a man of the principle of respect, then of his judgment, then of his piety towards both God and man; and then turning inwards upon the man himself, or making him exclusively the object of his own wrong, it robs him again like a canker, first of one blessing, then of another—first of his self-esteem and approbation, then of his comfort—his peace—his reason; and in time, of every righteous, happy and amiable characteristic. Therefore pride or the power of Lucifer, is certainly at the root not only of blasphemy and impiety but, as before observed, of unrighteousness altogether in whatever respect it may be named or considered; whether moral or religious, spiritual or intellectual, or any of their combinations.

§ 9. What else can be required then, or rather apprehended, as likely to ensure the *Reprobation* and *Perdition* of the subject, but so complete an alienation from God as may be produced by our arch enemy with this simple engine of pride? one thing we may say; which is the divine permission, and another also previous to that in the order of cause and effect, which is the wretch's own determination. Being determined not to believe and repent, he shuts his eyes against evidence, and hardens his heart against con-

viction; he offers his hand to Lucifer, and God allows him to take it†.

* And now considering the several stages or degrees of unrighteousness as they have just been enumerated in succession, we may perceive how it is heightened or aggravated continually by accumulation, how sin is the cause of sin as naturally as putrefaction is the cause of dissolution, and how sin proceeds from cause to consequence: thus, to wit:—

1. "EVERY MAN IS TEMPTED WHEN HE IS DRAWN AWAY OF HIS OWN LUST AND ENTICED.

2. "THEN WHEN LUST HATH CONCEIVED, IT BRINGETH FORTH SIN.

3. "AND SIN WHEN IT IS FINISHED BRINGETH FORTH DEATH" (Jam. i. 14, 15).

Such is the doctrine of an eminent apostle, showing how the distemper of sin or unrighteousness diffuses itself by degrees through the different regions or spheres of the Kingdom within; from lust to thought, from thought to sin, from sin to suffering, even to the extreme suffering of death. And our own experience may also prove, that the course of evil as here described is but too sure. But unfortunately "he who has the power of death, that is the devil" (Heb. ii. 14) has also art enough to keep off interruption in its progress. If there be a good example in the way, he will not have it credited. If one should venture to expose that fatal distemper, and his efforts to foment it; he will raise one up an host of persecutors, that will terrify one if they can, and if one shows the least symptom of terror, overwhelm one. A minister shall inquire into the disorders of his congregation with the views of a charitable physician, and not with the severity of a censor or the spleen of a misanthrope—to find out and heal, if possible, the distempered subject; not to rankle the disease, or aggravate his sufferings: and some may choose to be

† N. B. More of this doctrine in Kingdom Sermons—No. 4 particularly,

healed, but not if the devil can help it; neither shall the minister escape clear, if he can lay hold of him. For this arch enemy has often the address to poison a remedy for corruption, and out of that which should be good, to extract new matter of evil. "It is written in the prophets, and they shall be all taught of God" (John vi. 45): but he will not allow any but himself to teach if he can help it; or if he do, it will only be with an insidious purpose of hardening the hearer, and increasing his condemnation by inducing him to reject a minister from God.

There are however some plain criterions for the probationer whereby one of only moderate capacity may nearly ascertain for himself what is wrong, and ought not to be done by him; as well as what is right, and what he ought to do—e. g.

1, Let him go to Christ and learn; which according to the forecited passage he will infallibly do if he have any natural teaching from God: as he there says, "Every man therefore that hath heard, and hath learned of the Father cometh unto me" (Ibid.): and elsewhere, "No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him" (John vi. 44). Where by ME he evidently means his doctrine, a transcript of the Eternal Word issuing from the Father by him; which none can touch or apprehend, but by the will of God. And that will being also thus described, it follows necessarily, as before observed on the other side of the argument*, that with his permission a man may look into the doctrine or abstract of that Word, and learn what is unrighteous or revolting to the will of God *generally*, as well as what is agreeable. And where *further particulars* may be required, or this rule not appear sufficiently explicit, (for no general doctrine can possibly reach, neither is it in the nature of an abstract to apply particularly, to every case of conscience,) there we have the use of inference with the light of the

* Vol. I., page 262, and following.

Word and a proper application of the understanding, to supply any further information that may be required. For example ;

2, The two main divisions of unrighteousness are by the will of God, as we have seen, immorality and ungodliness; and to ascertain the presence of either in a doubtful case, suppose some action or attempt ; after consulting the Word of God and seeking to him by prayer, let a man consider WHAT WOULD BE THE AGGREGATE EFFECT IN SOCIETY of such an action or attempt, if it were to be common ; which is like viewing the same with a magnifying glass ; and that will enable him, to detect the evil wherever it exists by its consequences, even in a doubtful case. But in most cases there can be little room for doubt, if they are viewed *habitually* in this manner, and according to the rule of DOING AS WE WOULD BE DONE BY (Matt. vii. 12).

Thus ; let a man begin with the effect of transgression first in its lowest department, the department of incidentals ; and consider what would be the effect of universal cupidity or universal plunder and theft, but continual murder and fruitless executions. Then let him carry his observation forward to the higher department of constituents, and consider first what would be the effect of transgression on the same scale among spiritual properties ; as of universal turbulence, drunkenness, fornication and other impure practices ; perhaps his consideration of such practices on such a scale would lead him to anticipate a desert. Still advancing another step, let the querist consider with regard to faults founded on intellectnals, what would be the effect of universal infatuation, prepossession, delusion and universal folly in short of every kind ; but universal darkness and chaos, or dissolution of the elements of this upper region of the earth, as it existed before the addition of spiritual and intellectual to its material properties in the beginning, while the earth was a mere residuum "without form and void ;" BEFORE THE SPIRIT OF GOD HAD MOVED UPON THE FACE OF THE WATERS, OR EVER THE WORD

CAME FORTH FOR LIGHT (Gen. i. 2, 3). But if the querist, being a man of moderate capacity, as before supposed, would venture, as he might, to make a further effort, to pass on from earthly to heavenly considerations, and forecast the probable effects of universal practice in any one species of ungodliness, or of universal guilt in any respect tending immediately towards the supreme judge of guilt himself, its inevitable Observer and Avenger; as the effects of universal profanation, sacrilege, infidelity, perjury and atheism, blasphemy and perdition; would he not then begin to think of something below, and to anticipate an universal Gehenna? "For the tree is known by his fruit" (Matt. xiii. 33), and may be down to his lowest posterity. SIN IS A TREE "YIELDING FRUIT AFTER HIS KIND, whose seed is in itself upon the earth." And of this we may be satisfied without much trouble by the simplest inference: observations on this broad scale made only by the unaided light of reason (much more with that of revelation too) may suffice to show and demonstrate the tendency of evil characteristics of this objective class, in other words, of unrighteousness, to every man enjoying so much as a moderate capacity; and that will include most even of its votaries or subjects; "so that they are without excuse" (Rom. i. 20).

And here let us leave the doctrine not only of ungodliness, but of the evil objective characteristic or unrighteousness altogether; having deduced the same from its beginning perhaps to its farthest extremity. For let us hope, there can be no farther overflowings to scare us, no pains of hell, no snares of death to overtake us (Ps. xviii. 3, 4) beyond those above described. It was an awful epoch, if it be not thought so much of, when this moral devastation began; the world being thereupon infected with evil through the fault of one man: for this was the birth of mischance. An awful epoch was it too when the consequence of that beginning grew to such an end as the general deluge; a dire catastrophe of which less is also

thought, than of many ancient facts less certain as well as less important: for this was the second crisis of suffering; which appeared in the maturity of unrighteousness. But a third crisis or epoch and a more dire catastrophe we know is preparing, and will come when sin shall be no longer sufferable; though He who tolerates it for the time alone can know the length of endurance, and when that fatal termination will arrive. Meanwhile; as St. Peter writes, "The Lord is not slack concerning his promise, as some men count slackness; but is long suffering to us ward, not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance" (Pet. II. iii. 9). And if we were really free to choose, as please it God, we may be in good time! we should feel little hesitation between the two species of objective constituents, the good and evil, or between righteousness and unrighteousness; and as to "what manner of persons we ought to be in all holy conversation and godliness," to meet a crisis like that which he describes. We should not think much of sacrificing any vicious pursuit, nor the means of it either, to our general safety in such a case. Wherever our temptation might happen to be—in the eye, the hand, the foot, or where else, we should think it better to cut off the traitorous member from its communion with the body, than to suffer the evil principle to establish itself in that member, if it could not be defended: for its occupation would be a deadly blow, and its defection a crime against the community. "Therefore (says our Blessed Saviour) if thy right eye offend thee, pluck it out and cast it from thee: for it is profitable for thee, that one of thy members should perish, and not thy whole body be cast into hell. And if thy right hand offend thee, cut it off and cast it from thee: for it is profitable for thee, that one of thy members should perish, and not thy whole body be cast into hell" (Matt. v. 29, 30). In general it is to be wished, "That there may be no schism in the body, but the members should have the same care one for another; and whether one member suffer, all the members suffer with it; or one member be

honoured, all the members rejoice with it" (Cor. I. xii. 25, 26). But when the question is brought to this issue, that either one member is to be mortified for all, or all must suffer for that one through the swift spreading contagion of sin, its solution will be obvious enough, "Let not sin therefore reign in your mortal body, that ye should obey it in the lusts thereof; neither yield ye your members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin; but yield yourselves unto God as those that are alive from the dead, and your members as instruments of righteousness unto God" (Rom. vi. 12, 13),

THE STUBBORNNESS AND THE OBTRUSIVE FAMILIARITY, if one might so say, of an evil property once indulged, is beyond every thing; and makes its indulgence, if but momentary, a matter of the most serious concern. Every one knows, that among other properties of evil properties this also is one, that they are more easily admitted into the body than expelled thence; which is what makes them so particularly cumbersome, and such intolerable companions. We know, that not one of them has ever been completely ejected, from the time it first found its way into the human system; and it must be within every man's observation and experience, how evil properties of the several kinds before mentioned, if repressed for a time, will only start up and break out the more obstreperously thereafter; as if the devil only waited till a man began to dream of his emancipation from any of them, to give him an evidence of the contrary. We can hardly be aware, how much of the restlessness and inquietude and love of change so common to human nature, is owing to the troublesome presence of those evil properties; but the universal appetite now mentioned may be clearly made out and exemplified in many instances as a sign thereof. It is like the trouble of a captive soul longing to be released from "the body of this death," and crying as it were continually, "O wretched man that I am! WHO SHALL DELIVER ME?" (Rom. vii. 24). We are always

fancying new things, new habitations, new faces, &c.; but it is a NEW SELF and a new inward state, according to the Psalmist's petition, "Make me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me" (Ps. li. 10), that we want; and not a new set of incidentals, as a new name, new house, new acquaintance, new situation, new office, or new any thing without. We want "to be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God" (Rom. viii. 21). We may think, it is the law of God, that makes us in such a strait between duty and inclination, his beneficial control that we want to be rid of: but it is the spurning of his control, and "serving the law in our members," that makes us so restless as we are at present, and also threatens heavier consequences for us hereafter.

Whoever shall venture to act against the rule of righteousness in either department, v. g. of thinking or doing—or in either relation, v. g. of morality or godliness—will draw upon himself a responsibility that he is bound to rue for the rest of his life; or until by God's grace through Christ he be mercifully brought to a sense of his error and the beginning of a new existence. And besides that real, inward and most serious affliction, he must either have been a very moral character in his former days, or be favoured with a particularly firm reputation, who can elude the trouble and discredit that worse men, or less reputable will heap on him too if possible, only for an experiment of this sort. Most truly and significantly therefore is unrighteousness branded in Scripture with the name of Folly: and Solomon, the king of preachers, as well as wisest of kings for a while, thought so much of this correspondence, that he was at some pains to comprehend it; as he says, "I applied mine heart (and that was no desultory attention) to know, and to search, and to seek out wisdom, and the reason of things, and to know the wickedness of folly" (Eccl. vii. 26); meaning of course Objective Folly, or the Folly of unrighteousness.

And it was a worthy task even for such a preacher as Solomon, to consider and expose this matter thoroughly; though one of a very inferior capacity to Solomon's may comprehend enough of the same, to make him out of conceit with it.

*** The distribution of characteristics might be extended through other relations, as well as the subjective and objective to which it is here confined, and particularly through the mediate, in the same proportion or plenitude as the relations themselves are hereafter enumerated. Then we might have a third class of characteristics: which, not being a neutral class, for then it could not be characteristic, but coming between the two forementioned, and partaking of either might be the longest of the three. For in this class would be indicated the means of attaining or avoiding any of the particulars in those, as it might be desired; which means would consist in the properties either aiding or opposed to the particulars so to be attained or avoided. But, as there would be no new matter in this class—not a single new characteristic to be proposed, and as the only end that such a classification could answer, the indicating of means between characteristics already mentioned, as aforesaid, is to be gained as well perhaps by a simple consideration of the two extreme classes now surveyed—it would not seem worth while to pursue such a class merely for the sake of uniformity, or effect.

For truly they who are exercised in the Mystery of the Kingdom may find higher objects, than a treat for the imagination. They cannot be ignorant of the NATURAL CAPTIVITY of all mankind, without a single exception; and that, to such a power as it is really horrible to think of: neither can they be ignorant of the steady progress, or declension rather, that is making naturally from bad to worse, and, as it may be said, from misfortune to perdition, in consequence of such captivity—the sin of their first parents becoming in them by degrees an abyss of guilt, as a mere speck on the skin at one's birth may grow to a foul and

fatal ulcer before death. Whence it becomes a solemn duty with all who have a due sense of the general calamity; and especially with those who are appointed for the purpose, to labour with all the might they have, or which their prayers can procure, to convince the inexperienced of the natural ascendancy of the evil principle before mentioned; showing them, as our Saviour showed his disciples, James and John, what manner of spirit they are of, and how sadly captivated—as to their noble understanding more especially, whether in respect of apprehension, memory, judgment, will, imagination, or of several, PERHAPS OF ALL, the intellectual class together, besides the spiritual, a shade lower; and the material, lower again; the captivity of which would seem a natural consequence of that of the superior. And by the same token it will also be a duty not only for teachers by profession but for learners likewise, being all captives themselves, to make this natural captivity and general infatuation a ground of tolerance, if not of sympathy, towards those in whom the tyranny of the recreant spirit, the prince of the power of the air, is most rife and flagrant: “in meekness instructing those that oppose themselves; if God peradventure will give them repentance to the acknowledging of the truth: and that they may recover themselves out of the snare of the devil, who are taken captive by him at his will” (Tim. II. ii. 25, 26).

It is on this principle, that every true Christian will be apt to reason, and feel, and do what he can in the case of another; knowing well what it is by sad experience, and having often had but too good cause to bewail his own captivity to some of the evil crew, who are all recreants. For he has not forgotten his own anxiety in former times to get away, to change his situation and be enlarged; thinking foolishly, that the straitness or captivity that he felt related to his outward, whereas it truly related to his inward condition—the redeeming angel of Israel, “in his love and in his pity” (Isai. lxi. 9), drawing and tearing him off from himself, or from the evil influence to which he was subject. This he has been led by degrees to perceive and comprehend. And now he can

look back and be surprised, though long since enlisted as "Christ's faithful soldier and servant," to find that he has really been in battle—his own soul the prize; the Holy Spirit, his friendly captor; the evil one, his hostile invader. He remembers the formerly unheeded presence and gracious protection of that, his troublesome occupation and stubborn possession by this; occasional abandonment as it seemed by the good, continual re-entrance and re-possession by the wicked; with the gradual expulsion, as he hopes, of this, and the growing empire of the first mentioned in his thoughts and affections. He can remember the growth of evil with his growth, the barrenness of a captivated understanding, the perversity of a froward heart, and all—which is most remarkable, GOING HAND IN HAND WITH A PREDILECTION FOR INFIDELITY AND AN AVERSION TO THE TRUTH AS IT IS IN JESUS, AND A FORGETFULNESS OF HIS SWORN ALLEGIANCE TO GOD BY HIM. This the experienced Christian will remember of himself, and consequently make allowance for others; happy to acknowledge the hand of his Redeemer in this precious victory, and that dire illusion dispersing before the bright beams of his Gospel, and the faith in him, which was but as a grain of mustard, growing to a tree (Matt. xiii. 31).

It is much to be lamented, that ever any conscious and unwilling captive justly loathing and despising himself on account of his unworthy subjection to the arch rebel should not have the grace to know it, and be reconciled to God and himself in Christ, THE PARLEYING GROUND, with consequent newness of life. For it has puzzled many who had not learned the secret of this contention from Scripture, to account for such powerful effects on their spirit either way, and also for the general inequality of intellect perceivable in themselves and others, particularly in those who are called men of genius. They have been at a loss to imagine, however it may happen, that the same understanding shall be at one time so free and enlightened, and as it were full of preternatural conceptions, and at another time so heavy and clouded and barren: but more

at a loss to imagine, how the same heart or principle as they considered it, should be inclining at different periods, and sometimes with very short intervals, perhaps only in two seconds, to objects so opposite as good and evil. The hypothesis of one philosopher respecting these difficulties was that of a pre-existing state, which shews itself occasionally in spite of circumstances, through the gloom of the present; and no bad guess either for an heathen, understanding Freedom by pre-existence, and captivity as our present state. And, as they ought to know more than heathens, the doctrine of captivity itself was not indeed unknown to believers under the old dispensation, as appears from different passages and expressions like that of Solomon's for example in the beautiful introduction to his Proverbs, "Surely in vain the net is spread in the sight of any bird" (Prov. i. 17). But the fathers who lived under such dispensation only apprehended this captivity as an incidental of the Kingdom, not as an hereditary taint and evil constituent, or not so clearly however as it is or might be apprehended by most of those who live under the Gospel—or new dispensation. For David too says something about being shapen in wickedness and conceived in sin (Ps. li. 5): but now this unlucky birth or conception is no longer a secret; now it seems an acknowledged fact, that EVERY CHILD OF ADAM IS BORN IN CAPTIVITY TO THE SAME EVIL GENIUS BY WHICH HIS FATHER WAS ENSLAVED; now the seniority of good to evil is more evident and intelligible to every simple Christian, than it was to Grecian sages. And many a Christian professor also with no more consistency of conduct than as if he were an heathen, has now "more perfect knowledge that way," and a much more perfect test for his knowledge than the wisest of them—in the Gospel; as a key to his experience, which they wanting grew old to no purpose. For if the word be not only "very nigh unto thee" (Deut. xxx. 14) through thy Christian education, but by a rare chance also outwardly discerned, the Spirit may be either distant or unperceived, and consequently the spiritual or inward effect of, the

Word: and then whatever thy life may have been, thou shalt still have but too much reason to exclaim with St. Paul, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? (and may'st thou be able to add with him) I thank God through Jesus Christ, our Lord" (Rom. vii. 24, 25).

It is absurd to suppose as the Quietists would have us, that St. Paul or David either, or any other saint of old was free from the persecution of the devil, or altogether from his odious captivity and the incumbrance of sin too in this life: it is contrary to the acknowledgment of these holy men themselves, and contrary to reason and experience: their fond or fanciful admirers might as well expect a saint to be released from the property of gravitation, as from that of misinclination. Moreover with this misinclination and its ill effects, however limited by divine grace, there will also be a degree of sin requiring on the one hand continual supplication for mercy; on the other hand mere yielding grace, strength, or new life for repentance, and amendment for the future, as well as pardon for the past; and between both a continual mediation and atonement by one who "shall divide the spoil with the strong; because he hath poured out his soul unto death; and he was numbered with the transgressors, and he bare the sin of many, and made intercession for the transgressors" (Isai. liii. 12).

The longer any one lives in the world, the more he will be convinced of the beauty and solidity of this gem of Christian-doctrine, our natural captivity to an evil principle or genius, with the universality of the affliction, and the criminality of the cause, and the fearful consequences. Therefore Christian, "Keep thy heart with all diligence" (Prov. iv. 23); as the wise man advises—or maintain the freedom of thy principal constituents by all means; as his saying may be paraphrased. And it is really wonderful how deficient men generally are in this respect; suffering their best constituents, whether spiritual or intellectual, to be captivated continually by the most trifling and improper objects, or repulsed by the most contemptible; to

be run away with or driven away continually by some evil phantom; to be violently overborne and driven out of all bounds by objects and occurrences that hardly deserve any attention in comparison with their proper concerns. For what is it that troubles our soul continually and makes it such a very pandemonium sometimes, if not those haughty, turbulent, and insatiable dispositions which have been imposed on us like fetters by our infernal tyrant, and which it is a direct and principal object of Christianity to remove?

In countries where wild beasts and beasts of prey abound men are vigilant enough to repel their attacks and keep them within bounds: but they would be even more vigilant and apprehensive towards the motions of their own heart, if they could be duly sensible of its league with the enemy, and its treacherous inclination towards him. And not only treacherous inclinations, but treacherous aversions too they would be apt to withstand, if the devil would permit; by observing their approaches or beginnings and resisting them afar off in the name of the Lord, or in obedience to his will, and with a simple trust in his protection to enable them to maintain their spiritual life and liberty against all opposition.

But there are two opinions unfortunately respecting the bounds of spiritual freedom: and some who think to stretch them farthest are found to contract them most, by putting themselves under two horrid tyrants, the world and their evil genius before and to be mentioned, instead of submitting themselves to the auspicious rule of one kind Benefactor, whose service is perfect freedom. If however these same two tyrants be not their god, or if they can assign any other authority than these, and the wicked world with them, for their conduct, or if there be any other rule or principle of thinking and doing, which they have adopted in their wisdom, besides what these can supply—why one should be glad with two mules' burden of earth from the country where they live—but not that of

one might worship with them (Kings II. v. 17). And as for migrating their way; it is out of the question with one who has too many duties and too agreeable under the covenant, and too great expectations from the same, to be likely to leave it for nothing.

* * * The whole subject of the Kingdom has now been considered and exposed after the method at first prescribed: and it is hoped, that more than common capacity will not be required for those who wish it, to comprehend the whole or greater part of the doctrine; namely, first of the essential subject of the Kingdom, whether incidental or constituent, and next of the characteristic founded thereon. The individuals composing these two departments, the essential and the characteristic, are differently named in reference to their natural distinction, and also to the different views that may be taken of them; as for example of those composing

1 the *essential* Department, and being

1 generally ;	2 with a religious view ;
Qualities,	Gifts,
Faculties,	Endowments.
Talents :	

2 the *characteristic* Department, being

1 good ;	2 evil ;
Virtues,	Vices,
Graces,	Faults,
Accomplishments :	Failings,
	Blemishes,
	Defects, &c.

Of these all the different sorts of properties in the Kingdom with a mixture of intellect, as well those which might have been mentioned as those which have been, consist. And these sorts of properties being most peculiar to man will particularly characterize him as a subject or sample of the intellectual Kingdom. But on producing this sample some explanation or apology may be required, and espe-

cially with a view to guard against what appears a rather common misconception respecting the subject which it serves to indicate; as well as to obviate two or three objections of the same foundation, which may occur to those who do not seek objections where there is so much appearance of novelty, e. g.

1. It may startle some, to find the subject of the Kingdom of God in Christ, which they are wont to consider, and very justly, as including every sort of creature whether known or unknown, exemplified as it were to the full or perfection only in one. But this hesitation may be removed by a simple reference to the definition of the Kingdom as given above*. The greatest difficulty is to be felt on two or three other points, and two especially which may be considered as cardinal in relation to the doctrine, because they seem peculiar: which if they really were, the greatest difficulty should be felt by the person proposing them. And these two points may be shortly stated as the **ACTUAL CONSTITUENCY** of the Kingdom, and the **LATENCY OF ITS CONSTITUENTS**: which making together the principal ground of objection in this part, will accordingly require an united retrospect with a view to the agreement, disagreement and reconciliation of these objectionable points with common opinion; the form of such retrospect being consequently a parallel of the doctrines and their objections, with a concurrent attempt at solution.

2. To judge therefore from the common mode of speaking, one would suppose that **COMMON OPINION** respecting the composition of a subject, and consequently of the Kingdom for one, proceeded, as far as opinion can proceed to be common, on a different hypothesis from that of actual and latent constituency, or of **ACTUAL CONSTITUTION** and **LATENCY OF CONSTITUENTS**, which has been introduced above, and regularly followed through all the premises

* Vol. I., p. 19.

hitherto; the common opinion or hypothesis on this head seeming as follows, namely;

1, That every *living* subject, at least, essentially consists of a certain principle, basis, or foundation, by way of a substratum or nucleus for the reception of its specific properties: but whether the said substratum be spiritual or material, COMMON OPINION is not agreed; though it rather inclines perhaps to the latter condition as being most obvious to common perception.

2, Having thus established a convenient sort of property-machine, or machine for making properties; the next thing will be to supply the same with a suitable apparatus of springs, wheels and other powers; which COMMON OPINION perceives or apprehends in the faculties, the talents, the gifts, &c., before enumerated, for the purpose of preparing and issuing its treasures, like those issued by the presses in a mint: which agrees very well with the idea of a material principle or *substratum*. So that

3, Clearly the principle or foundation of a subject must be one thing, and its properties another, or the subject one thing and itself another; the said properties, which are itself in fact, being only related to the subject either as additions or productions, and not as constituents: while

4, The accidents of a subject, whether substantive or transitive, so far from constituting either its *substratum* or superstructure, that is, any part of it, are of quite another nature: and

5, The said accidents, whether substantive or transitive as aforesaid, and of the latter sort whether inverse or direct, may be continued or discontinued at the pleasure of the subject and its relations, without affecting the identity of the subject; whereby we may understand as much as this, namely,

6, That the aforesaid principle or *substratum*, generally considered as material, however it may be hid and buried in the properties whether essential or characteristic before

described, is indeed the only real subject: and to perceive the same simply and without disguise, all those properties in which the subject is here held to consist, and by means of which it is thought to be perceived must be removed, the whole tissue or covering of them must be pared away, before we can get a thorough view of the skeleton.

Such would appear to be the COMMON OPINION either directly or by inference on every living subject at least, to judge from common expressions; which compared with the doctrine before delivered will amount to this without exaggeration; namely, that the actual subject, or subject of acts, independent of their accidents, as their production, publication and perception—that which has hitherto been proposed* as the sum and foundation of everything, must be nothing; and nothing has any foundation: there can be no such thing as reality, because the only type in which we can see or perceive any thing has no other foundation or existence than the acts in, and by means of which it is perceived: there is no real man nor real Maker; no real creation, nor Creator; in short there is really nothing either to doubt or to believe; and the man who believes this does not really believe it. Thus COMMON OPINION has a secret tendency not only to atheism but also to universal scepticism, with which indeed atheism is generally attended; it would dissolve the bonds of creation, and reduce the constituents of a subject to appendages, and their basis to nothing; and all from the progressive effect of a single misconception, making two things of a subject and itself; because, perhaps, a subject and its notion or image are two things. But so are a subject and the Word by which it was made likewise; the subject existing in the midst, as it were, between these two, namely between the Creative Word and its notion or perception: where not only “that which is made” may be apprehended in its constituent acts, but the Author like-

* Especially at Vol. I., pp. 52 and following.

wise by that which is made ; as the Apostle also observes in a passage before cited. "The invisible things of him from the creation of the world being clearly seen and understood by THE THINGS THAT ARE MADE, even his eternal Power and Godhead" (Rom. i. 20). In some future stage of our existence, whether it be the next or another, such an intervention may not be necessary to that sublime perception : "For (as the same Apostle also observes) now we see through a glass darkly, but then face to face ; now I know in part, but then shall I know even as also I am known" (Cor. I. xiii. 12) : and even then too it will be by *accidents* in the main, no doubt ; though it may be more directly than at present, as God also knows his creatures.

It would greatly assist their perception of any subject, if people could be more alive to the importance of that simplest constituent, namely acts or accidents, as the real principle or foundation of all ; distinguishing at the same time, as they ought, between the accidents of a subject and *THEIR* accidents or modifications, which are two things, though named alike ; and though similar, independent of each other—because it is their confusion frequently, that leads to the awkward distinction before mentioned. Thus in the case of the wind for example ; blowing is an accident of the subject, and also its essence ; but being excited to the degree of overturning houses and plantations, lifting the waves above their natural boundaries, and covering the deep with wrecks and wretched spectacles, is an accident of the accident driven to excess, and not of some unaccountable substratum considered either as a person or thing ; either as the pneumatic deities, *Æolus* or *Euroclydôn*, *Boreas*, *Auster* and others ; or else as some earthly effluvium. For although blowing be inseparable from the wind, as the wind from itself ; yet these lamentable excesses, and that destructive force, if it be characteristic, will not make an essential part of the same or be necessarily included therein : and again, if the sun occasionally scorches, this will be an excess too in some climates, and

not the genial accident of which its most obvious property, heat, consists. For the sun can warm without scorching, and the wind can blow without overturning houses and everything; so can many properties exist in virtue and effort where they do not either in effect or perception. And so again on the other hand; motion, which is the life of the air, may be suspended as easily as the life of an animal by him who is the Author and Continuer of both. And the lustre of the sun, a property that consists in habitual shining, may be suspended likewise by him "who maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good" (Matt. v. 45). But all these are accidents, modifications or contingencies upon accidents; which may also be overruled, or heaped upon, again and again, with accidents upon accidents for any number of times, without affecting their identity. The primary acts are accidents, as well as the secondary: and the secondary or supervening are accidents, as well as the primary. The habitual shining of the sun is as much a series of accidents as its eclipses, revolutions, and rotations; nay, even its solidity is as much a series of accidents as its creation, or any alterations that may happen in the glorious orb during its continuance.

These distinctions being duly observed may enable a person to separate effects from principles, and give him thereupon an idea of realities without a substratum, or however *without* any other, than the DIVINE WORD, BY WHICH THEY ARE FORMED; AND POWER, BY WHICH THEY ARE UPHELD; that is GOD IN CHRIST "UPHOLDING ALL THINGS BY THE WORD OF HIS POWER" (Heb. i. 9). And although the constitution of properties by accidents may have a particular appearance of novelty, and that of integral subjects by the same still more, the doctrine is not unsupported by good common evidences; as by that of language for one, and especially of the oldest that is known, according to which the terms for properties, and for subjects likewise, are usually derived from the terms for the accidents composing them, like the properties and subjects

themselves from these fundamental accidents as aforesaid. Indeed, to pursue the analogy of language; properties and accidents are herein considered so much akin to these subjects and each other, that in many cases we have but one term, a sort of family name, to denote them all; as creation, animation, production, composition, and many other words of the same termination, signifying at once the act, property, and subject, or substance, of either. And nothing can be more perfect in its kind, to wit, as an example, than creation, the first of these; since it implies the most comprehensive act and the most comprehensive subject imaginable in one particular, being the whole creation and the whole act or process of creating all that is created.

On a further examination one might also be gratified to observe, that the difference between the common view of the nature or composition of a subject and that which has been here described, is not so wide and irreconcilable as it would at first appear. What makes this seeming difference at first is, the common and not ill-conceited method of deducing particulars from an abstract or assumed foundation, contrary to the natural method above proposed. It begins with a vague idea of its subject: and then, conceiving so many parts therein—which it does by means of certain criterions, and of these others again, and again too, if necessary—it renders the subject more definite at every step—dilating, or in scripture language *manifesting* its particulars continually by one regular analysis; until at last the simplest constituents are brought up, and prove to be the same with those before alleged as the substance of properties, v. g. acts or accidents. In this manner does COMMON OPINION prove against itself, that the reality of every subject is neither more nor less than what it imputes as appendages; the schools also stand corrected, and their *proprium* and *accidens* must either unite, or change places.

To illustrate this proof by an example: let the subject supposed be the earth, an abstract in every one's mouth, a subject that every one has A VAGUE IDEA of, and of which

no one can expect more than a vague idea, until he be removed from it: yet by certain criterions we divide this abstract subject into parts which are more definite than the whole to our perception; these parts we divide again into others, and these again continually until we come to a positive existence, which is not until some of the constituent properties of the subject are discovered, in the acts of which they consist; and then these may be combined again into elements, elements into parts, and some parts into others of various denominations and degrees, until we arrive at the notion of a whole more satisfactory than that with which we began, though abstract enough at last. Or taking for another example Man, which is a subject made up, like others, of many successive combinations of its first principles; the common method would be, to conceive in the first place an abstract of the whole; which is man: and this it divides first into two parts, the material and immaterial, or body and soul, each part again into simple combinations called elements, those of the last mentioned part being the mind and the will, for example: which are divided again, the former into gifts, talents, faculties, and abilities; the latter into passions, feelings, appetites and the like. And so our analysis descends by degrees to the very principle from which the forementioned construction, or synthesis as they call it, sets out. And, while some perhaps may be loath to admit the principles so-described to be the same with those they contemplate, it will not be an easy matter for them to think of any other, or otherwise of the other, that is, immaterial part.

One might therefore be allowed to dissent from all that idle doctrine of a *substratum*, and its natural inference of spiritual engines, vehicles and what not; as if talents, faculties and the rest above mentioned were vehicles of particular properties in this department, or engines whereby the processes they denote are conducted—and to protest against it. In good sooth, there is no room for any such conceits, nor yet to conceive the possibility of any one

vehicle of any property in any department existing one moment without some of those peculiar accidents which make up by repetition the property for which such vehicle, call it a mere property, habit, power, capability; or a quality, feeling, appetite; or a talent, faculty, gift, whichever suits best—is to be substituted. For where in all the intellectual department would be the faculty, gift, or talent of apprehension without the act of apprehending, or of memory without remembering, or of judgment without judging, or of will without willing, or of imagination without imagining? A man cannot have the property without its exercise, any more than he can have its exercise without the property, or faculty either: he can no more have the property or faculty of apprehension, for example, and not be apprehending, or any other particular property or faculty, and not be exerting it, than he can have the general property or faculty of life, and not be living.

Indeed the apprehension is a part of human life: and though it may be let or hindered on one or more sides; as on one side by blindness, on another by deafness, and on all sides by age, casualty, or disease—as the latency of a subject does not affect its identity or existence, this property will still be itself in every direction; even as a man's gravitation will be the same when he is standing on a precipice, as when he is falling from it; or as the flowing of water, which is its gravitation, will be the same, whether it stand in a pond or run in a brook. Objects and opportunities may serve to develop our inherent properties, as they may be assistant to sight and fluidity, but cannot give these properties. Let the sluices of opportunity be opened, when objects offer; give us leave, or only make it possible: say to any of the above mentioned constituents thereupon, as Elisha, the man of God, said to his emissary, "Then open the door and flee and tarry not" (Kings II. ix. 3); and you shall presently see what is in us—suppose some good quality, or some baleful passion in the list before enumerated—by that which comes out,

and comes too without the help of faculties, or any adventitious means whatever. Among the various properties which it has pleased the Creator to weigh out to us, and mingle variously in our specific nature or composition, the highest in the kingdom of which we have any knowledge or conception; some, for example, appear at once, as breath and appetite; some are gradually developed, as taste in many ways; some will remain dormant nearly, or it may be quite dormant to the last; and it is not improbable, that in the highly compounded mass of human ingredients, there may be both better and worse than any of the above mentioned, or any yet known to ourselves; but no innate faculties, as there are in brutes; no nest building, for example, before we are hatched. Indeed it happens, as if we were descended from an immaterial state, that WE HAVE NO NATURAL IDEA OF ANY MATERIAL WORK, NO INNATE SENSE OF ANY EARTHLY CONCERN; if we have here our innate songs of heaven, though dormant like Judah's in Babylon (Ps. cxxxvii), and some faint innate sense too of heavenly rectitude perchance, like the sense of light on a disordered retina: These are the extent of our natural traffic; all beyond these is to be gained from the stores of Revelation and experience, and added to the properties before enumerated; it being clearly a purpose of the Creator, that we should have a considerable hand in forwarding (or else defeating) the effect of our own creation.

But, as for a faculty, whether *innate* or acquired—a faculty—to shew more particularly what it means, and so to determine, if possible, the question of its reality, or existence and wherein it consists—a Faculty will consist in the exercise of different properties as well natural as acquired, together; the presence of the will, if not of the memory and judgment likewise, being indispensable. Indeed it will hence appear, not only how faculties consist, but also what may be their position or predicament in every respect: as, that their logical position is between

properties and elements ; their moral within the bounds of possibility ; their metaphysical, a degree among the arts and sciences. Taken collectively, faculties would not be a bad translation for *RECTOR ANIMUS*, which we read of ; individually taken, they are properties drawn from obscurity and elevated to the dignity of primates by the might and according to the primitive determination of the Creator ; as it is said, " He taketh up the simple out of the dust, and lifteth the poor out of the mire, that He may set him with the princes, even with the princes of his people " (Ps. cxiii. 6, 7) : and yet are not these faculties of the consequence of which they are generally supposed. In short, the virtue and existence of faculties can only be considered as temporary and occasional, depending on the requisition or allowance of their Author : in what then may their facultyship or essence consist, if not in a misnaming of properties, and a substituting of combinations or results for principles by reason of their being more apparent ?

If therefore one should be asked, What is it that apprehends ? one might answer without recurring to the hypothesis of a substratum of any sort, or faculty either, The apprehension : if, In what does the apprehension consist ? In apprehending. And so of other properties, or faculties as they are oftener considered, if it should be asked, What is it that remembers ? it might be answered, The memory, and not the imagination ; if, What that imagines ? the imagination, and not the memory ; if, What is the memory ? the act of remembering continued or repeated : if, What the imagination ? the act of imagining. If it should be observed, That we do not remember any one particular continually, that sometimes the memory will fail for a season, sometimes altogether ; and then, What might have become of this essential constituent ? it may be answered, that the memory is superseded in one case by an antagonist property like the leaves of a clasped volume, and dissolved in the other like a volume burnt to ashes, but though dissolved, not totally extinct. Whereupon it may

be said again, to prove the doctrine of a *Substratum*, that sometimes the latent recollection of things past will shew itself surprisingly after a lapse of years, in dreams, and even in waking intervals amidst all sorts of distractions. And if any thing could prove this rooted prejudice to be sound doctrine, that observation might avail somewhat towards it: but that will not signify either, as any recollection, whether spontaneous or arbitrary, occurring after a lapse of years will not be different in kind from the recollection of a moment; which stands on the same footing, and differs from a simple apprehension only in the way of a double reflection. By the sight and apprehension objects are reflected continually long after their departure, perhaps after their formal existence; but this will not effect the cause or foundation of the property; nor prove, that a ten years' recollection comes from another quarter than the recollection of a moment.

But say now, If it were possible to conjure up other properties in ourselves besides recollection, and spiritual properties as well as intellectual; would not that be satisfactory to prove the existence of A SOMEWHAT IN US, as a spiritual substratum, or a living principle more primitive than these properties? By no means, there is no necessity for any such admission: these properties may indeed be conjured up where they exist, but no where else; nor even there except by coexisting properties, which are as necessary to the spell as its object, or the property sought. Thus, WISDOM may be raised from the deep by application; and COURAGE, therefore, called philosophical, may be summoned from its retreat by wisdom. Even when oppressed by some material influence, courage lies prostrate, tossing and writhing in palsied agony, one word of wisdom may suffice to raise the patient, or make him take up his arms and march. Or is FAITH the property required? a prayer will bring up that by bringing down grace; as once, when the Lord required this tribute of his apostles, and they of him the means to pay it.

“Have faith in God” (Mark xi. 22), said he; “Increase our faith” (Luke xvii. 5) said they. Lord, make a way for our faith; that the same may grow, and rise up, and spread like a palm-tree. The hallowed principle is pent up in our hearts among worldly cares and vexations, and has, moreover, to contend with a fatal propensity to unbelief*: but there it is, thy image shews it; and walking with thee is the way to increase it. “Lord give us faith”; or say, if it be dead, as thou once didst to Lazarus in the tomb, “Come forth” (John xi. 43).

Then if we suppose these properties to be existing together originally in abeyance, we need not suppose the help of faculties to account for their appearance; nor yet, either a tomb for their quiet reception, or a place like the outside of the captain’s tent at Ramoth-Gilead, or a certain principle, or any other sort of substratum for them to expatiate in; as they may all exist pretty evenly together by the effect of apposition or mutual support, like the stones in an arch, or the stalks in a field of corn. Whatever faculties may be therefore in birds and beasts, in man they are most obviously acquirements, and in relation to the present, earthly state, especially. For it is not meant to be denied, that faculties might either be created in this state or communicated from another, which may be either better or worse than this. And whether the said faculties be regarded either as gifts or acquirements, they cannot in either case be regarded as principles. It would be a nice and difficult distinction, if one should endeavour to trace it thoroughly, yet decided enough in some respects, between constituents which are natural or inherent in the subject, like our natural appetites, and constituents which are not natural, but acquired by the natural, or grafted on them somehow in either department by means peculiarly adapted thereto; as in the intellectual by learning, in the moral by observation, in the mechani-

* Supra, p. 246.

cal by practice. By exercise with proper helps in every department, the properties necessary to the same may be improved into faculties : which being so formed, that is, by an improvement on nature, and assimilated thereto, may be deemed accordingly so many good characteristics of the subject, or so many good *characteristic constituents* : but no constituents of the essential kind : for NO VITAL OR ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLE CAN EVER BE ACQUIRED.

Therefore, as our Saviour asks, "Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit unto his stature?" (Matt. vi. 27,) so it might as well be asked, which of you by taking thought can add to mind or soul one property more than it shared in virtue, mode and embryo at his birth, or the properties they combine? It is true, a man by taking one property might take another also through the property of accumulation, which our Saviour has observed too in speaking of the mystery of the Kingdom, the subject here spoken of. "For whosoever hath to him shall be given, (says he) and he shall have more abundance" (Matt. xiii. 12). Thus, by taking or else recovering the particular property of faith, a man may be enabled also to recover one more general which he has lost. But that is not done either without a new sowing, or birth (John iii. 3) wherein the gift of faith is first received ; and by faith, the farther "gift of God, eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord" (Rom. vi. 23).

Which indicates another property of constituents not particularly mentioned with them, yet as well worth regarding as either their latency or actual constituency, and at the same time one to which COMMON OPINION does not so much object, being their continual fluctuation both in latency and in effect : which fluctuation will also imply other properties ; as subjugation, alteration and extinction, with liberation, renovation, increase, and others necessary to its composition. Only by the simple oppression or suspension of one constituent, others may be brought forward, and a new character given to the subject without

any essential alteration or addition; thus the simple property of fear being suspended, will make way for either good or evil daring; and this daring suspended again, with man for its object, or in deference to man, will exemplify hypocrisy; with God, the exalted grade of faith; which likewise with the spirit and sentiments of our Lord superadded will form or prepare by degrees the perfect constituent of sanctification, so called from its holy influence on every member of the community in which it is received and domesticated, leading on still to the effect of eternal life before mentioned; as St. Paul intimates to the Corinthians, thus, "Of him (i. e. God) are ye in Christ Jesus, who of God is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption" (Cor. I. i. 30); and also to the Thessalonians, where he says, "We are bound to give thanks alway to God for you, brethren, beloved of the Lord; because God hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit, and belief of the truth" (Thess. II. ii. 13): And what with one thing and another, or, as the Apostle says, "For which cause" among many miscarriages we may be comforted with these reflections under all circumstances. "For which cause we faint not: (says he) but though our OUTWARD MAN PERISH, YET THE INWARD MAN IS RENEWED, DAY BY DAY" (Cor. II. iv. 16).

So one part is an atoner, or compensator rather (if the expression may be allowed) for the other. Considering indeed the natural association and communion of properties assembled in the subject, with their perfect approximation throughout, and how nicely they blend with each other, so as to be scarcely distinguishable where they meet, we may generally give the credit of a single constituent to the whole, speaking of the same accordingly in such a way as if it were the act of all. Thus for example, we say, a man hears; though we cannot mean that his fingers hear any more than his toes, or that his eyelids hear, or that he hears generally, that is, all over: And

though different parts appear to have their different functions; as the ear, that of hearing, and the eye, of seeing, yet is not on the other hand their share in these functions exclusive either. No more are thirst and repletion properties of the body alone, but the soul has its share of both also; as it had also need, if the inward man is to be RENEWED daily: no more are the objects of either part peculiar; the highest being equally an object of both body and soul according to that expression of the Psalmist, "O God, thou art my God, early will I seek thee. My *soul* thirsteth for thee; my flesh also longeth after thee in a barren and dry land where no water is. My soul shall be satisfied even as it were with marrow and fatness, when my mouth praiseth thee with joyful lips" (Ps. lxxiii. 1, 2, 6). It might be well for the soul, if incidentals were constituents in this case: and in some cases better not; as when "our soul is filled with the scornful reproof of the wealthy, and with the despitefulness of the proud" (Ib. cxxiii. 4).

These are figurative expressions certainly: and it has been partly the effect of such expressions for every complex constituent to be regarded in the light of a basis or substratum; which a complex constituent cannot be more than a simple, nor the whole of any subject more than one of its complex constituents; while the truth will not literally admit of either a general or particular basis for properties, but that every one of them stands on its own performance, or the individual acts whether latent or extant of which it consists. And when we say, a man sees or hears, speaking generally of the whole body, person, or subject, it must be understood figuratively as the whole for a part, and not literally as if the whole body were an eye or an ear. For "if the whole body were an eye, where were the hearing? if the whole were hearing, where were the smelling?" (Cor. I. xii. 17.) We know that the several properties or members united in the body or subject, are infused and combined together in the wonderful order

in which they find themselves by the Word of God; and by the same we being also made numberless distinct combinations are "all baptized into one body, by one Spirit, whether we be Jews or Gentiles, whether we be bond or free; and have been all made to drink into one Spirit. For the body is not one member, but many." (Ib. 13, 14); nor yet one principle or basis, but a mass of constituents. And every past concession notwithstanding, to the doctrine or necessity of a *substratum* for these members or properties farther than what they either afford each other or derive from above as aforesaid, or to any other self for the subject, than the accidents composing the said members or properties, we cannot subscribe. Effects so vast and wonderful as we perceive in the human economy, could not happen, to be sure, without a cause or foundation somewhere; but that is not in the subject: "God hath tempered the body together" (Ib. 24); but the body or subject itself is only an heap of accidents, and cannot tell which is undermost, or where its obvious constituents have their beginning. So much for FACULTIES too!

It might puzzle any one who can entertain the fond notion of such an inheritance, to explain the difference between a subject and its sum or constituents; as for example, between the soul and what are called its Faculties. Or if it be denied that the soul is composed of its own faculties, let such a one tell us of whose or what Faculties, or of what else it consists. Or if he find it easier, let him define to us the difference between the moral man and his works. St. John says, "He that doeth righteousness, is righteous" (John I. iii. 7); and the doctrine of characteristic constituency cannot be more clearly expressed; let such a fond reasoner therefore as the reader aforesaid, tell others if he can, how they may be righteous without doing righteousness, or at least intending it; also what is meant by the common expression of a man dying full of good works, if it do not mean that he was made up of good accidents at the time of his decease. Let the man tell us

if he can, what may be the difference between a human life and a human being; or between life and living, or between the life we now lead and us who lead it; because people are apt to consider the one as a perfect thing, and the other as a thing in occurrence; or rather as a series of occurrences. They who maintain such a distinction should be able to tell us in what the difference consists: and in the mean time we may be allowed to confound these two subjects, or to understand them only as one in two states, the perfect and progressive; and to see or apprehend the moral and intellectual properties of man IN HIS PARTICULAR ACTIONS AND SENTIMENTS, or in that twofold life, the inner and outer above described. For as the existence of a tree is bipartite, being half above the earth and half beneath, the same life running through both without a division, and being only a chapter in the series of accidents which began with the creation of trees, and will end in their final combustion, so it is with a human subject actually and in the sight of God: TO HIS ALLSEEING EYE the life within and the life without, are but two parts of one existence; the same existence running through both, and comprehending the whole species from first to last.

Thus actions premeditated are wishes indulged; and wishes indulged are actions premeditated, though they should never take effect; as our Saviour has declared in relation to one species, lust; saying, "Ye have heard it said by them of old time, Thou shalt not commit adultery: but I say unto you, That whosoever looketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart" (Matt. v. 27, 28). And so by the law covetousness is equally prohibited with theft (Exod. xx. 15, 17); the two equally proceeding from the root of evil, by an evil eye, with lust and each other. The eye is a branch of the subject, the heart its root, and all that springs from this root will be the same in every branch, whether it incline toward lust or theft or any other vice particularly. "For (as our Saviour says again) of thorns men do not

gather figs, nor of a bramble-bush gather they grapes" (Luke vi. 44). We should take care therefore what constituents we plant, sow, or cherish. "FOR WHATSOEVER A MAN SOWETH THAT SHALL HE ALSO REAP: HE THAT SOWETH TO HIS FLESH SHALL OF THE FLESH REAP CORRUPTION; AND HE THAT SOWETH TO THE SPIRIT SHALL OF THE SPIRIT REAP LIFE EVERLASTING" (Gal. vi. 7, 8).

Again; if through nature, weakness, or singular inadvertency, we should happen to have admitted, as no doubt we have, many weeds or evil ingredients into our heart, and thence into our lives, besides the ruinous abundance with which the heart was originally saturated; and the work of the eye, the hand, the feet, the head, of every member in short, through life has been only a regular prolongation of the wicked part which began with us (Ps. li. 5); there must be something thought of like eradication or repentance for the evil, as well as a guard against its recurrence: and the mode of that part has been much mistaken, as well as its measure underrated. For, not to go over again the doctrine of repentance, which was stated to consist of two parts—that is undoing as well as unthinking, it may now be proper to observe, that being, as we are, members of a body, the process cannot be completed in our own identical person; but the health of the body too will require another process like COUNTERACTION; before the member that has been restored to life by repentance can derive any nourishment from the root. Therefore if a man seeing, or believing a brother to be in the way of perdition, with a probable chance, be it never so slight, of drawing him off, will not be at the pains to attempt it, which may be done without much parade or ostentation; by meekly shewing him his error and warning him of the consequence, after having experienced the divine grace himself, that man's part will be very imperfect, and very ungrateful. Without endeavouring to extend to others the merciful conviction and reformation which have been extended to him, he must not flatter himself with the

expectation of any farther consequence, than the little temporary advantage that he may derive from his own improvement—he must not think of escaping the future punishment of his half repented faults and follies ; for that partial advantage only lays him under a new obligation to divine Providence ; and it may be said, a very partial obligation too, compared with what it would be, if he could only be made the happy instrument of a single recovery among those who had fallen like himself.

Oh the base ingratitude of such a return for the favour that we have received ! And considering also how we are all liable to be partakers of other men's faults by OMISSION, as well as by commission—by connivance as well as advice, would not the same be imprudent in this respect, as well as ungrateful and imperfect. From the communion of kind, which is very strict in the human race, and grows stricter by new relations continually, it is to be apprehended, whether even the better sort may not be sunk and degraded judicially as well as influentially by those next below them. Wherefore it is of consequence, to prevent them from sinking deeper in guilt, as we would prevent one who had hold of us from sinking in the waves.

The part here supposed is very analogous to that which every upright Christian owes to a falling brother—NEVER TO LET HIM GO, IF HE CAN HELP IT, NOR TO GO WITH HIM—part enough for all his faith, love, and vigour ! Especially will it be a difficult part, if the wretch should happen to be your equal any how, not to say, your superior, from the natural expectation of those who are our equals in some respects, that we should be theirs in others. In this relation, therefore, a great deal of tenderness and perseverance will be required on the one hand, as well as a great deal of caution on the other. And perhaps you may succeed so far with some as to convince them, that it is a more friendly part in one of their equals, to help them out of trouble, than to fall into it with them ; as either of them would think, if he had fallen into a slough, and you should

happen to be passing with a plank on your shoulder. For then, which do you think that he would rather, that you should extend your plank to him and help him out, or throw down the plank at once, and jump in with him that you may both meet an horrible death in the black mud, sinking together.

For Christ's sake therefore do what you can to save your brother, and for his sake, and for your own—"Brethren, if any of you do err from the truth, and one convert him, let him know, that he which converteth the sinner from the error of his way SHALL SAVE A SOUL FROM DEATH, and shall hide a multitude of sins" (Jam. v. 19, 20).

END OF THE FIRST PART.

CHRISTIAN MODES
OF
THINKING AND DOING.

PART II.

CHRISTIAN MODES.

PART II.

RELATIONS OF THE KINGDOM.

CHAPTER I.

SUBJECTIVE OR SUPREME,

GOD.

1. Of Relations.—2. Subjective supposed—3. Subjective real, or Supreme.

——“to make all men see, what is the fellowship of the Mystery.”—
EPH. iii. 9.

§ 1. THE *Relations* of the foregoing subject, and accidents likewise, might have been exhibited severally and in succession, with the several particulars to which they belong as the same were exhibited. And to a certain extent this has also been done as it was proposed, namely, in the minuter details of the subject, but in the leading points it could not without dismembering the same entirely, nor yet without much needless repetition. For this reason the principal relations will now be given in a continued series and close order, and the accidents* likewise some time or other, if not now. Considering, however, the

* N.B. Some of these have been given already in the Sermons before referred to.

subject of relations in general for a moment before we descend to particulars, we ought here to remember severally their parts and kinds.

1. We have already had occasion to notice the said *Parts* by the way, and especially these three; namely, subject, medium, and object, with their relation to each other, in our primary view of the subject *, considering the subject as the chief member in every relation, or chief of the parts therein related. And CHIEF this part may well be considered, as originating, or producing at least, and existing by the act to which its partners owe their existence: that is, when they have it. For there can be neither medium, nor object without a subject; but may be a subject without either of these, it being their senior, and of all relations in any case the only self-existent. It is like the first of every species, inclusive of that by which it is included, as Adam, for example, of the human race; and may, therefore, justly challenge a precedence, above all its correlatives, and over the forementioned medium and object especially; as may appear in only this one example of the three united, namely, “If he called them (3) gods unto whom (2) the word of (1) God came” (John x. 35): shewing how 1 from God, 2 by means of the divine word, 3 was derived a multiple object called GODS from their resemblance or communion so produced. And this must be thought a very unequal relation certainly; whether we regard the number or quality of the correlatives in either part †: of which more will be to be observed hereafter. Such, therefore, are three out of four of the parts that are in every perfect relation, namely: subject, medium and object, being here selected, as most to the purpose, together with

2. Three principal *Kinds* of relations derived therefrom and accordingly denominated; as 1 subjective, 2 mediate,

* Vol. I, p. 51.

† Strictly speaking, in the first part here exemplified there is no correlative.

3 objective. And the way in which these three kinds are derived from the forementioned parts is, by the supposition aforesaid; which makes, first, the subjective to be superior, and in a manner * Parent to the other two; next, the mediate to be a partaker of the subjective and equal likewise in respect of that relation, though inferior in respect of its relation on the other side; that is, thirdly, the objective, being opposite to one and inferior to both.

The example of the relation above cited may serve to explain the kinds of a relation as well as its parts, for the explanation of which it was given; thus, first, there is God, the Subjective of the relation or kingdom, formed as aforesaid; then, the ministering Word, his equal as God, but inferior, generally speaking, as united to the objects of the divine authority, or some of them, on the other side; being thirdly, the multitude or mass of the objective force (John xv. 19); which will be more and more objective, the farther it is removed from the Ruler, or Subject and Subjective of the Kingdom. For in every relation of the kind, that is to say, in every kingdom, whether divine or human, there will be the Ruler, and perhaps Founder; first, and next, as rule must be by ways and means, like other operations, either a military, a civil, a spiritual, or a mixed constitution, which is the Word in that respect, as the medium of government, and its mediate relation; and lastly, as there can be no government without objects or opponents, there will be also a suitable objective force or counterpoise for the same to act on.

Or, as a farther illustration and more verbal, to suit the argument; the use of the Preposition in grammar (which is the doctrine of Words) being to denote a relation of any sort, the three parts of a relation before mentioned, and kinds, which are taken from them, likewise, may be similarly indicated by three of this kind, being, 1 Of or From; 2 In, With, By or Through; 3 On, To, Over, Upon or

* So the subject itself will be of the subjective; as all parents are of one.

Against; whatever a subject is, 1 of or from being related to it subjectively; whatever a subject is 2 in, with, by, or through—mediately; whatever 3 to or upon—objectively; as for example:

Subject, THE KINGDOM	{	1 Of God, 3 over all.
		1 Of God, 2 in Christ,
		3 over all.

Whence it appears that,

1, God is related to the Kingdom *subjectively*, as being over all:

2, Christ *mediately*, as that in or by, which God is over all.

3, All *objectively*, as that over which God is medially by Christ and his—

And all the prepositions in use, with their different qualities and affections, may be referred, perhaps, to one of these heads, being in the relation of government nearly, if not precisely, equivalent to the three above mentioned; namely, 1 superior, 2 equal, 3 inferior: which, as they will generally obtain in kingdoms, so especially in the Kingdom of God in Christ extending over all, as well natural as civil, that was ever created. For every created being has two sides, as far as we are able to observe; one looking upward, the other downward; one higher, the other lower; one sustaining, the other sustained; possessing, in one respect, the air of a weight or dependant, in another that of a prop or support, and at a certain medium blending with the two. Whence the relations of such created beings may also be distinguished into three kinds, namely, the superior, equal, and inferior aforesaid; but in the uncreated Being of God—the Prop and Support of the universe, there can be properly but one kind, which is the first mentioned.

He still holds the balance of the universe, however it may happen to incline. Originally also reason and inclination, judgment and apprehension, and indeed all the properties and elements of the kingdom, both singly and

collectively taken, were so nicely poised by Omnipotence, that the slightest intimation of its divine pleasure was enough to turn the balance any time, and give to any accident its due preponderance: and then the Creator may be said to have ruled his own, DOMESTICALLY, or in righteousness; as he will again hereafter, according to the prediction, "A King shall reign in righteousness" (Isai. xxxii. 1). But, as we are informed, and have also too much reason to believe, during that happy period, a certain property, not indigenous, either offered itself or was offered to the choice; and choice, being free, unfortunately embraced the same, a WEIGHT instead of a support, and instead of a prop, a no easy YOKE: whereby choice lost its freedom, and other properties of the kingdom were subjected also to THE BURDEN OF A SLAVISH CHOICE. And now there is no constitution so equally poised that it does not decline from that Word to the unfavourable side: so that we find something more than a bare intimation of the divine pleasure, now necessary only to trim, not to say, turn the balance: and with those who have the happiness to enjoy that something, the scale will vibrate very differently from what it does with those who have it not. Forgetfulness and contrition, surprise and humility, shame and charity, yielding and fidelity, failure and prayer, falling and faith, weakness and strength, defeat and victory are common alternatives with those who have that SOMETHING, no property of man but the gift of God; while with others there shall be no vibration; but the scale ever on one side inclining only from bad to worse; from forgetfulness to obduracy, pride, contempt, cruelty, infidelity, despair, apostacy, and their fruits—remorse, anguish, and eternal disgrace.

Therefore, it cannot be necessary to understand a several power, spirit, or ruler for every sort of property or accident, characteristic, more especially, in the Kingdom, as we have lately seen*; when one may be enough to make any of

* P. 218. In the original, the author says—

them predominate even against nature, or the present course of ascendancy : nor so well worth while either, as to know what this one property, or that Something before mentioned may be, with the way to win and enjoy it : or first, that something, not being any constituent of the kingdom, or contained therein, as just supposed, what may be *That without* which is it. In order to which, it will be proper to divide the sphere of this relation into two parts, 1 imaginary or supposed ; 2 real or supreme—or, if such a distinction may be made between shadows and realities—into that which is not, and that which is. It may seem like inverting the order of conceptions to regard first that which is not : but it will be the sooner dismissed.

§ 2. Following, therefore, the track of erroneous supposition, we find the presence of a subjective or supreme relation imputed to two several spheres or departments, the internal and external. And

1. Whatever may be thought elsewhere in the universal Kingdom, an idea has certainly prevailed among its human subjects of something like a real government in or among themselves, for one portion or province ; but without any reference either to the primeval state of righteousness before mentioned, when they had a free access to the tree of life, or to the regenerate state in which that access, and consequently the righteous or domestic government, is restored. Hence, or from this preconception, is all that we hear and read of reciprocal action in that province, or of a man's acting upon himself ; as in self-abasement, self-accusation, self-command, self-conviction, self-correction, self-denial, self-devotion, self-esteem and dependence, self-examination, self-humiliation, self-improvement, self-knowledge, self-love, self-possession, self-preservation, self-reproach, with other actions not so worthy of self-government ; as self-admiration, self-adoration, self-delusion, and others of the sort. Hence also is what we hear sometimes of people's outdoing themselves ; which is not

so common a part, however, as that of outwitting themselves, betraying themselves to their great enemy, yielding themselves a prey to his infernal machinations, selling themselves to wickedness and folly, with many other parts like these; which, being acts at first, by repetition, form properties, as aforesaid*, and these by combination, grosser constituents, making, as it were, a second nature. And a second nature this evil habit is to us, no doubt; but still the account of it as above, seems only a way of naming or considering the subject. For what is self-improvement, but learning and discipline? What is self-command, but temperance? What self-abasement, humiliation, reproach, loathing, and the like, but repentance? What is self-examination and knowledge, but retrospection and consciousness? What self-love, but prudence and discretion? What self-devotion, but piety or philanthropy in perfection? Or, on the contrary, what is self-admiration, and even adoration, with self-delusion and the like, but vanity and selfishness; but fondness and foolish doating?

It does not therefore seem worth while, to make a particular case of either of these properties; still less, a particular class for their joint accommodation. Yet the world will have it, that there is such a subjective in the subject as above intimated; or, to speak like the world, and think like Common Opinion, such a self-government in man—as if he were self-existent! But this SELF SUPPOSED SELF-GOVERNMENT has also been divided into several departments; and that variously too, it may be with different views; as one while into brute and rational, another while into spiritual and corporeal; sometimes also implicitly, if not expressly, as here divided—into material, spiritual and intellectual: besides which the fertility of Common Opinion, ever more prone to imaginative than to demonstrative science, has also found us a conductor with his

proper court or peerage for each of these departments ; as of the

DEPARTMENT.	CONDUCTOR.	PEERAGE.
1 Material	Vital Principle	Vital Properties.
2 Spiritual	Ruling Passion	Passions, Feelings and Appetites.
3 Intellectual	Ruling Principle	Faculties, Talents, Gifts, Abilities, &c.

In this manner, somehow, if not precisely, are the fond subjects of the human republic apt to class and distinguish its members, while, to complete the system of Common Opinion, not only a particular chieftain has been understood to govern each of these three several departments, the material, the spiritual, and the intellectual, with their several and respective orders of nobility—the vital properties, the passions and appetites, the faculties, talents, &c., just exhibited : but A GENERAL OR LORD CHIEFTAIN must also be supposed, as one principle over all : and that not to be any foreign prince or potentate either ; but one of the three perhaps, whether first, second, or third.—Such is their fondness, and the fondness of Common Opinion ! And not only so : but that general Chieftain, being a principle at the same time, will, according to the same hypothesis, also present the very germ, source, or beginning of our existence—the very centre, spring, or PUNCTUM SALIENS of the human being. Concerning which distinguished chieftain, or internal subjective, as it would appear, if his identity consist in aught besides the constituents above described, a man might be glad to know somewhat ; as there are those who have lived in his reputed neighbourhood, it may be, nearly a thirtieth part of the 'Christian era by the favour of divine Providence, without ever perceiving, or being able to perceive the footsteps of such a material, spiritual, or intellectual chief, as it may happen, ruling and living independently in the kingdom any where ; as one might every where, those of a higher Principle that rules universally in the kingdom, and lives as universally without.

Yet, according to the tenour of Common Opinion above

intimated, a living subject, as the human, for example, is of itself a mere passive machine, a sort of dead weight, as it were; and requires to be set in motion like a time-piece, or any other piece of mechanism, by its proper spring or momentum however designated. And thus it would be said, that human life was a certain process carried on either in, or by means of a certain machine, its prime, if not immediate conductor,—being the distinguished chief-tain aforesaid, and one of the three above mentioned; whose several pretensions to the dictatorship, it may now be interesting to consider successively, and first those of

1. The *Vital Principle*: concerning whom it may be asked, Whether is the whole process of life carried on by the said Principle, or only a part; and what part, if it be so? Because the Principle, if it be a principle, does not seem to have done with the human machine when it stops; but has still to superintend or effect certain changes that will happen in the same, and many more changes happening WITHOUT by means of the same, or by means of its animal properties, now released from the body, that is, from each other. But himself, now without house and home, what can the Vital Principle hope to effect with his divided attention? Well may an ignorant person be excused for not understanding what philosophers mean by their Vital Principle, or however they came to think of it! Perhaps they thought, they had discovered the Principle by its gradual retreat in superannuated and worn out subjects or combinations; just as we discover a Will-o'-the-wisp, by his dancing away from us over the moor continually. But on the grounds before assumed*, if they are correct, there can be no occasion for supposing the existence of such a principle, to account either for the process, or termination of life; not for the process certainly, if we understand all the properties combining life to be inherent in the subject or combination, which is the doctrine of

* Vol. I. p. 56.

latent properties now alluded to ; nor yet for the termination of life either on the principle of actual constituency, if, without recurring to casualties, we understand all the acts of the subject to be precisely numbered, or his properties measured; which amounts to the same and has been likewise alluded to*.

For the life of any animal, vegetable, or mineral, consisting only in a regulated assortment of acts, or in a peculiar combination of properties, as shewn above, and in the same way that any particular concord may consist of some certain sounds, or a colour of tints, or a liquor of fluids—the diminution and failure or subtraction of any one essential property would be enough to account for the decay and dissolution of the whole ; as one sound wanting will be enough to dissolve a concord, or one tint a colour, or one fluid a liquor. Indeed, in this last-mentioned case, we have a very fair analogy, not only of the effect but also of the commencement of the union or assemblage of properties included under the idea of life, as well as of their dissolution by means of the three several fermentations that a liquor is subject to, v. g. the vinous, the acetous, and the putrid : where we see in the first a generous preparation matured, in the second this preparation changed and vilified, in the third the same dissolved, corrupt and putrid.

Such is the general life of man, as well as of each in particular ; and whether the account before given of it be philosophical or not, the last-mentioned hypothesis clearly is not moral. It is the doctrine of the ungodly, according to that beautiful compendium of wisdom ascribed to King Solomon, “ reasoning with themselves, but not aright.” “ For we are born (say they) at all adventure : and we shall be hereafter as though we had never been.” For the breath in our nostrils is as smoke, and a little spark in the moving of our heart : which being extinguished our body shall be turned into ashes, and our spirit shall

* Vol. I. p. 59.

vanish as the soft air" (Wisd. ii. 1, 2, 3). So a man has only to get rid of his vital principle, to send that "little spark" like a scape-goat into the wilderness, which he may easily do; and then all the cares and troubles that he has heaped together, with all the reproaches of conscience, and all his apprehensions for the future "shall vanish as the soft air" in every direction, and never meet again. But human wisdom as well as divine Revelation will teach us how, not only "the souls of the righteous are in the hand of God" (Ib. iii.), "but the ungodly shall be punished according to their own imaginations" (Ib. 10). Their fellow constituents, those which have here been enumerated together, can no more get rid of one than of the other: the very meanest of the material class can no more get rid of the evil imaginations with which they are associated, than they can get rid of their punishment; nor of their punishment than of their evil imaginations. "When thou lettest thy breath go forth, they shall be made, and thou shalt renew the face of the earth" (Ps. civ. 80).

2, With regard to the pretensions of the second chief-tain, our *spiritual* head, or the *Ruling Passion*, as they call him, to the supremacy in this mortal state; we know his powers, however great, to be also limited both abroad and at home, being

—1, *Abroad*; no more than a match for either of his rivals, namely, the Vital Principle or material chief, and the Ruling or intellectual, singly, but subject to both of them in nearly if not in quite as many cases as those in which he commands. The Ruling Passion may indeed propel the blood into a man's cheeks, or drive it back; brace every nerve, or unbrace it; conjure up instantly either smiles or tears; inflict blushes, tremors, convulsions, death on the Material Chief: and on the Intellectual he may inflict prejudices, errors, stupefaction, delusions and madness or idiotism; either of which may be regarded as a severe calamity in the intellectual depart-

ment. All this he may do, and more perhaps; but not without an equal liability to severe reprisals on either hand for every advantage so asserted. We know, that the Ruling Passion has himself a ruler in every contingent and in every kind of expectation: every change in the atmosphere is enough to raise or depress him; a trifling rheum, or a touch of the gout will make him crosser than he was; a very natural disappointment will make him more distrustful of divine Providence; a very inconsiderable advantage, more confident in his associates.

Then on the other hand; as it would be hard upon this, or upon any other chief, to experience nothing but disadvantages from without—he is liable to be corrected sometimes by the properties that he meets abroad; which may be a very great advantage. Thus, if a timid spirit, the ruling passion of many, prevails occasionally over genius, and taste is strangled in the birth by diffidence; education is known in return to subdue, if it cannot eradicate, our natural timidity, and a latent taste to be excited by due encouragement to overcome in time the opposition not only of diffidence but of other passions, and correct them likewise. And many other examples might be adduced if necessary, to shew the equiponderance of foreign potentates and properties with this abroad: while if we look

—2, At the order that prevails in the spiritual government *at home*, we shall not find any rule direct in that part either: but all reciprocity as before; no one member of the government predominating entirely over the rest, or which has not its turn of subjection. Take first the love of life for example; or the principle, as it is called, of self-preservation, which is said to be the first law in nature; and see, if this governs invariably. We should find if we were to examine, that this principle, with all its undoubted advantage over others of the same department, is nevertheless decidedly reciprocated; has its regular antagonists, and is subject not only to peers in other departments, but

also in turn to other members of its own. Let us ask then,—

Does the love of life or principle of self-preservation govern charity, which our creed upholds beyond every other gift? Generally it does, but not always. Does it govern pride, revenge, ambition, and other properties equally bad and unsocial with these? Not so often, unfortunately, as it governs charity. Therefore, supposing for argument's sake, some other property to be the Ruling Passion; let us consider, if any of the forementioned may be thought to govern the love of life more completely than that governs them. If pride, revenge, and ambition did, there would be no proud, vindictive and ambitious cowards. And as for charity; it is very questionable, whether many instances can be cited of its subduing the love of life, though we happily know of one that is too advantageous for mankind to be forgotten by any of them. Sometimes, indeed, "that most excellent gift" called Charity will preponderate, and it may be rather decidedly in some particular instance—oh, why will it not for ever, and that not in a particular instance only, but in every instance as it ought! For most frequently in this unhappy state the diametrical opponents of charity prevail against it. And inferior characteristics to some in point of weight are also found to have their turn in this reciprocity, the characteristic constituents founded on incidentals influencing those on constituents immediately above them, and higher still by their means; as frugality, for example, induces bounty by means of plenty; and by means of bounty most excellent charity, as bounty often begets liking. An influence so beneficial though proceeding from the lowest quarter is not to be regretted: but its influence is oftener exerted in a contrary direction; where the effect of extravagance is observed in subduing generosity, and promoting penury first; then, by means of penury, dishonesty, insensibility and others of that class; then by their means the hard heart, the heart fitted for plunder and bloodshed.

For the forementioned effects on either hand would seem to flow consecutively, or as it were of course, in the line of moral causes: which, as moral causes are not natural, would seem to indicate another sort of chief in each of the forementioned departments, than either the Vital Principle or Ruling Passion aforesaid. And if the chief ruler among the passions especially, whoever he may be, is not absolute, nor constantly efficient either, even in his own sphere, and dignity, but is subject to the reciprocal influence of his colleagues, as they to his, we need not wonder considering how his authority is wont to be disputed by his own family and dependents. For no chief can ever expect to rule among chiefs who does not govern his own dependents, to rule in a foreign state who does not govern at home: so that the Ruling Passion, whether *at home* or *abroad*, does not appear to be that lord paramount which many take him for; and we are yet to seek for an authority of that kind. Consider we therefore,

3; The principal indigenous authority in the third named department of the Kingdom, to which a superiority over the others in point of worth has just been imputed, and must be also generally allowed; though such superiority, as we often find in private examples, MAY NOT BE ATTENDED WITH SUPERIOR INFLUENCE. And let us observe particularly, how far this intellectual chieftain, with his superior worth may challenge the supremacy here spoken of; the same having indeed been partly recognized before now, as dictator or prime conductor, by his proper title of *Rector Animus*, and latterly perhaps of *Ruling Principle*; by which it would appear as if the element of intellect was constantly and necessarily lording it over the other two. Where we are to consider 1, the external ascendancy of this chieftain compared with that of either of the others, and also of both in succession; and 2, its internal rule after the order before observed. And

—1, The *external ascendancy* of this Ruling Principle with respect to

1. The *body* or material department is unquestionably great; and cannot be otherwise with such a force as he commands: for by one of his corps, the Will only, he can rule and order any outward, material, or visible motion of which any member of that department is naturally capable; and by the help of one or two more properties, as the memory and the imagination for example, he can command such motions of the body and its members as they were naturally unequal to. The way in which these partners or ministers of the intellectual government produce their effect in the material department is as great a mystery as that of creation by the Word of God, at the same time that as a fact its certainty is no less. Yet have they all—not only the will and the memory, but the CREATIVE imagination, and indeed Animus himself altogether, no natural ability to add to the body, or material class, a single essential property, nor a single inch of stature, as our Saviour queries, “Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit unto his stature?” (Matt. vi. 27.) Neither can the mind abstract or deduct one essential property from that class, without its helping against itself like an unnatural insurrectionist. For if the mind should contemplate any mutilation or privation of the body, as it is wicked enough sometimes to contemplate even a robbery of the whole beautiful order of life—still the service of the hand will be indispensable, and ever has been, except in one instance*. While on the contrary, no fact can be more certain and obvious than the opposition to intellect so often complained of on the other hand; which proceeds not from any particular action, effort, or influence of the body; but from the same generally through the effect of its natural corruption,

* That of our Saviour's spontaneous decease (John xix. 30), noticed in Kingdom Sermons, No. 8. And though we are not *naturally* able, yet with the same supernatural ability with which he died, we may both die and rise again like he; and not only so, but add likewise to our stature in the same voluntary way continually, as long as we live: of which more hereafter.

and occasionally through some malformation, mutilation or partial disease, the effect of which on the mind is as real and sensible as it is unaccountable. So that there shall be a reciprocity between these two departments and their rulers, the Ruling and the Vital Principle ; if on one side the momentum be so very inferior to that on the other, and more like the *VIS INERTIÆ* than any active principle. And yet

=2, We find it is in the more equal and kindred sway of *ANIMA VIVAX*, that is of the soul or spirit, that Rector Animus is to find either a rival or an helpmate : for there is also the proper sphere of its attention and influence. Indeed its benignant empire over the passions and other spiritual constituents cannot be questioned, the same being a subject of positive experience founded on the different order that reigns in sleeping and in waking : while on the other hand, the advantage or occasional ascendant given to spiritual properties by a suspension of the intellectual is also deducible from other phenomena, and particularly from one allied to the last mentioned ; which is the determination of the blood to the extremities in sleep, or rather its release from an attendance on the head, evinced by their deriving more warmth from a little sleep sometimes than they could from a large fire.

But if this release may be deemed a vacation for the spirit, it is none for the imagination, or the memory ; but rather a new term, to judge from the consequent bustle in these as well as in other departments of intellect. For the mind itself too being a very complex subject, any one member of it may be lulled for a time either by the influence of soft spirits, or by the retirement of the aspirates ; and that, while the others shall be only the more active and out of themselves as it were. So we find, that any member, or any particular office of the same, may be disordered or deranged, producing an insanity or unsoundness in respect thereof, while other members of the mind shall continue AS SOUND AS USUAL at least. And from such

partial lulling as aforesaid, proceeds that partial sleep called dreaming; which differs so little from a waking excursion of the fancy or imagination, that it may be deemed only a rather unusual indulgence of this determined runagate beyond the bounds of recollection, another intellectual agent by means of which our ideas are linked to realities, and the straggler is recalled. Then the imagination having reigned long enough for his turn, the central or collective authority comes forward, Rector Animus will rise indignant and dispel its illusions—its impositions, as we may call them, on the flesh, the spirit, and the understanding itself; freeing every member included under these several heads at once, and particularly under the last mentioned. But in the mean time, what visions and phantasms are conjured up by the riotous spirits, what extraordinary recollections are brought forward by relapses of the memory, as formerly observed*. If the intellectual ruler have the general lead, as he deserves, it cannot be denied, that the SPIRITUAL EMPRESS will have her turn likewise: so that it would seem almost as if these two rulers, the Ruling Principle and the Ruling Passion, one for minds and the other for spirits, governed like the sun and moon daily and nightly by turns; or at least, that their influence was alternately more sensible and prevalent over each other, though not absolute or exclusive in turn, like that of the sun and moon. By day indeed and in waking the influence of the animal spirit, or spirits as it is oftener said, will not be so clearly perceived—how can it, while “the greater light” is above the horizon? but in its proper time, and particularly in sleep as aforesaid, its influence cannot be hid through the imaginations, which are sometimes highly ingenious, but oftener vain, deceitful, impure, frantic, and wearisome; as becomes a disordered state. Of these phenomena in our sleep, we may be sensible enough as we awake; but never, what fools, sinners,

* P. 278.

dupes and despondents that awkward empress or leader, the Ruling Passion, is really apt to make of us in our waking moments; much less what it would, but for the control of the Ruling Principle, within and of SOMETHING MORE without.

Yet the influence of either of these two classes of constituents over the other is not without its advantages for the general good; as of properties in the spiritual department to excite imaginations, recollections, and other considerable effects in the intellectual; and vice versâ, of properties in the intellectual department to excite or allay feelings, passions and appetites in the spiritual, as occasion may require. And thus severally too, as well as collectively, the beneficial influence of an intellectual property over a spiritual, or of this over that, may be clearly perceived sometimes, and should be gratefully acknowledged, though it may be sorrowfully too by chance; as when the levity of youth, which it is painful to remember, may be corrected by knowledge, and its conceit by experience; which however does not happen invariably: for oftener "knowledge puffeth up" (Cor. I. viii. 1), as the Apostle observes; aggravating and augmenting the levity of the subject, instead of correcting; and the experience of a long life will not serve to shake its deep rooted conceit, but rather to confirm it: so that, in spite of the continual overreaching and discomfiture that he is made to sustain, the foolish subject shall still continue to regard himself as one of the wisest of men. And in this manner is the Apostle's saying often verified, "Evil men and seducers shall wax worse and worse, deceiving and being deceived" (Tim. II. iii. 13); deceiving others, and being themselves vastly more deceived by the old serpent that puts them upon the trade of deception. So, to mention another example, "joy shall be in Heaven over one sinner that repenteth" (Luke xv. 7); but in many more cases, the intellectual powers may invoke the tears of the spiritual for an incorrigible associate in the lower depart-

ments, as St. Paul confesses from his heart, and from the testimony of his own experience. "For I delight in the law of God after the inward man: (says he) but I see another law in my (inferior) members warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members" (Rom. vii. 22, 23).

Hence it would appear, and experience also justifies the observation, that the Ruling Passion being more nearly related, or however standing nearer to the Vital Principle or Material Chief, derives some succour from its department, and that the Material Chief also, humble as he is, will have his share in the general administration by giving his tone to the spiritual, and to the intellectual a subject for consideration. And hence too in short, or between the influence of one and another, are produced those diversified modes or moods, to which the subject is liable, and which serve to replenish the heavenly kingdom with thoughts and sentiments; as the alternate influence of the sun and sky to replenish the earth with her valuable productions; more than as if there were no alterations, no moods, NO CHANGES OF THE WEATHER.

—2, Also *internally*, among the several concurring powers of intellect, a mutual or reciprocal subjection and government may be observed; as where may they not indeed among created subjects? The mind being so complicated a system as we have seen, contains among other properties that of obedience as well as that of direction: how then can it be said generally to direct, when one of its parts is simply to obey? Apprehending too, another very material principle for the mind, is not directing; no more is judging, no more is imagining, no more is remembering; but willing is somewhat like it, and of this action kept up and continued is formed the property of direction or government. If apprehending and judging should be combined, as they may be by chance, with direction, it would be direction with understanding and judgment; if not, as it more frequently happens, we should have direction

without them. Add to which, the direction of affairs is not the only part of government either: the checking or restraining part, or the ordering what must not be done, is quite as essential a part of government as the directing or ordering what must be, and the directing as that. Thus the checking power or property, which some may think to be master, is counterbalanced by the directing, which others may think master; as the directing is by the checking.

—To consider, while we are upon the subject, the title of another insite ruler or two to the supremacy of the Kingdom; there is

1, The particular principle of *Conscience*; one belonging to this same intellectual department, and which must be allowed a precedency among all the heavenly tribe, as that by which the will of the Creator is especially communicated to his intelligent creatures. For the voice of conscience is the voice of God. Of its precedency in the Kingdom by right we therefore cannot doubt: but this is still confined chiefly to the intellectual department, and only like that of a *PRINCEPS INTER PARES* at the best; i. e. supposing them to yield: but so far from their yielding always, conscience itself is not secure against the insults of folly in many shapes, nor exempt altogether from the lower influence of passion and appetite. And if the intellectual state was to be thoroughly searched from beginning to end, we should hardly find one property that was not similarly balanced with another, to keep and be kept by it, instead of only keeping or ruling in its native department. Neither

2, If we look to a more general authority of the internal sort, shall we find the case much improved, as to *Habit* for example: which as an internal ruler seems to bear the widest if not the most absolute sway of any petty chief in either department; namely, either in the material, spiritual, or intellectual aforesaid; modelling and remodelling each after his wont: and not only remodelling too, but transposing, actually transposing parts from one member,

and even from one department to another; as the part of the eye for example to the hand, and, what seems more wonderful, that of memory to the whole or to any particular member of the body; which are often found to supply or even to set aside the use of memory by habit. Thus, WE OFTEN FIND THE THEORY OF AN ACQUIREMENT SUPERSEDED BY ITS PRACTICE, like that of a natural action, so far that what was learned by rule can only be performed in time by habit, or as we say by rote, without the ability to describe its process any more than the process of breath or reflection; the body, or member particularly interested, also acting the part of monitor as well as director, and suggesting when, as well as how, the part ought to be performed. But IF HABIT BE SECOND NATURE, IT IS HOWEVER SUBJECT TO CIRCUMSTANCES, as well as the other potentates.

And we have so far considered only instances of a single competition, rule or reciprocity among the intellectual and other sorts of them; whereas sometimes one will draw on another for several degrees, and the struggle or race shall be between many; as for example, between folly, conviction, and repentance—between folly in an hundred shapes seeking opportunity, or perchance an oversight pressed by recollection, and that again by an unpleasant conviction, followed hard in its turn by repentance. St. Peter has broached a pleasanter series of concomitants, where he talks of keeping up to one property two or three others, which it is but too apt to distance. “And beside this, giving all diligence (says he) add to your faith virtue, and to virtue knowledge, and to knowledge temperance,” &c. (Pet. II. i. 5, 6). But for those who desire such a competition, a more interesting cannot be devised than that which St. Paul proposes to all who may happen to suffer under any evil provocation, to “OVERCOME EVIL WITH GOOD.” “Be not overcome of evil (says he), but overcome evil with good” (Rom. xii. 21.) And he shews them by his own example too, how they shall set about it. “So

fight I, (says he,) not as one that beateth the air: but I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection: lest that by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be a castaway" (Cor. I. ix. 26, 27).

So a man has properly two parts to fight: one straightforward against the malice and aggressions of others by kindness and obligations, to overcome evil with good; another inward, that he might not be overcome himself by his own innate malice, pride, lust and general propensity to aggression. The inward combat is as clear as the outward: the action and re-action of a moral life is as clear as the systole and diastole of the heart from which these two parts are said to proceed; one being the part of determination, the other of temperance. But neither of these two parts can be imputed literally as it is figuratively, nor the whole heart either, as its own ruler or subjective: there being essentially but one Real and Original Subjective, as we shall find; but one *Primum Mobile* in the Kingdom for, and over all.

For while temperance orders appetite, who may be said to order temperance? Shall it be said, Temperance? Then is the Kingdom a government without knowledge; temperance being a more spiritual property. Or shall it be said, Judgment? Then were the Kingdom a government without life or spirit; as there is not necessarily much animation in judgment, but commonly little, and in general the less of it the better. Hence the course of victory, even with so careful and strenuous a combatant as the forecited Apostle, while keeping the inward foe under and fighting the outward foe differently from one that beateth the air, will be far from straightforward; and his self or domestic sway no more certain than the course of his outward rule and jurisdiction; but, if he have any goodness belonging to him, will be like an house divided against itself. There is no one property, element or part in the human constitution, nor yet within human reach either, known to us, that influences or acts upon the rest

and is not influenced or acted upon in return ; therefore no ruling part, element or property like the thing we would signify either by the Vital Principle, the Ruling Passion or the Ruling Principle ; or by those subordinate faculties which are commonly imagined, or by any other denomination of rulers in any department of the Kingdom. If the intellectual properties act upon the spiritual, or the mind upon the body, the spiritual act likewise on the intellectual, or the body upon the mind. Moreover, as we have seen the several departments of body, mind and spirit being all very complex and comprising very different principles in themselves are all of them liable to the same rotatory sort of government within as without : so that even in the departments all is not straightforward rule and subjection, to say nothing of our chief government.

Nay even its dependencies, the very circumstances with which it has surrounded itself or been surrounded by Providence, are known to usurp an extravagant authority over the Kingdom, as before intimated*, in many cases. For we are all creatures of habit formed by nature of circumstances occurring in the order of Providence. And hence comes the saying, that habit is second nature ; because nature determines the choice of habit, and is replenished by congenial circumstances through all her dominions, whether in the animal, vegetable, or mineral department according to the affinities of the subject. The very herb of the field has its habit, as well as the beast that lives upon it ; but such habit may be changed by circumstances. We read of grass growing upon the house-tops (Ps. cxxix. 6) : and we see men too sometimes set just as high above their natural sphere by circumstances ; while others again shall be equally indebted to the sphere, the society and the circumstances of the place, local circumstances they call them, for the development of estimable qualities ; which, but for these incidentals might have passed their present existence in latency along with their owners.

They may not be seen immediately to do so much sometimes: but the incidentals, by which we are attended and visited have under the rank of Externals their occasional ascendant, and rule by deputy, namely by the notion we have of them, if not by themselves, as the Apostle observes, or rather queries to his followers, "Know ye not (says he) that to whom ye yield yourselves servants to obey, his servants ye are to whom ye obey; whether of sin unto death, or of obedience unto righteousness?" (Rom vi. 16.) How many evil properties depend on wealth? how many on power, reputation and the like? how many on the more humble supply of dress and diet? It may be their image, or rather our notion, that reigns and not they; whence the worship paid to such incidentals is called idolatry or image worship (Col. iii. 5): but still they reign in and over the heart that entertains them; and have all of them their evil influence, if they have not their good, by this medium.

Indeed all intellectual government must necessarily proceed by the medium of an image, as all spiritual must by another medium: for there can be no immediate government in this intermediate state. But so far is this from yielding any advantage to the doctrine of self-government, that nothing can be more decidedly against it. Let a man flatter himself with the idea of governing himself as he will, and let him name what he will for his internal principal or chief, the proper subject of self-government—of this he may be assured, "that the way of man is not in himself; it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps" (Jer. x. 23). Neither in man, nor in any other intellectual being, besides THE HIGHEST, does there exist such a property as self-government or command in the degree alluded to. In the Name, in the Word, in the Spirit of the Lord—in any form of the divine Principle a man may govern himself, but not in his own form or self.

It cannot be denied that there are in Scripture *seeming* authorities for an internal or self-government, and authorities that would be decisive if they were real; as for exam-

ple, 1 in the forecited passage of the epistle of St. Paul, where he says "I keep under my body and bring it into subjection" (Cor. I. ix. 27): as if such subjection was almost a matter of course; also 2 where our Saviour says, alluding to his followers, "For their sakes I sanctify myself, that they also might be sanctified through the truth" (John xvii. 19). But it is to be observed, that when St. Paul says *I*, he means "NOT I, BUT CHRIST WHO LIVETH IN ME" (Gal. ii. 20): and when Christ says *I*, he means NOT I, BUT THE FATHER THAT DWELLETH IN ME: "The Father that dwelleth in me, He doeth the works" . . . "AND AS THE LIVING FATHER HATH SENT ME, AND I LIVE BY THE FATHER, SO HE THAT EATETH ME, EVEN HE SHALL LIVE BY ME" (John xiv. 10; vi. 57). The drift of these expressions, and of others which there are to the same effect, is quite opposed to the notion of an original, internal, or self-government in man; clearly showing that the power, authority and government within him, whatever it may be, is either mediately or immediately derived from another source, and also indicating the direction in which such power, &c., is to be met, and embraced.

Let a man govern his incidentals therefore if he can, his house, his cattle, garments, gold:—for he cannot protect these either at all times against fire and sickness; against thieves, moth and rust: but he must not pretend to govern his constituents; whether intellectual, spiritual, material or mixed: for if they form him, they do not belong to him ever the more for that: and every man is much mistaken certainly, who ever dares to call his soul his own; as his soul, and body too, will be the property either of his captor or his Redeemer,—of his Redeemer, let us hope; being bought with a price, and redeemed, not with corruptible things as silver and gold,—but with the precious blood of Christ, "as of a lamb without blemish and without spot" (Cor. I. vi. 20; Pet. I. i. 18, 19). And if it be not so with a man, it will be the worse for him.

But was it not enough for the inventors of a human

autocracy or internal government, to have one chieftain for their purpose ; but they must have two, three, or even four of them, all co-ordinate and co-efficient ; and not partial rulers either, but all commanders-in-chief ? They had better certainly have kept out of this dilemma. For a question will here naturally arise, as to which may rule of them ? for if One, then not all ; or if all, then neither. If the question were concerning superiority instead of supremacy, its meaning would be more consistent ; as there may be a superiority many ways without supremacy, and even without a particle of authority : and so ; if one principle or part do not immediately control another, it may through the ordering of divine Providence render its subject or depositary vastly superior to the subject of another, and enable him to think or do things greatly beyond that other's ability. The subject of sound judgment, for example, will be vastly superior to the subject of mere appetite, and strength of intellect to mere strength of body : on this head there can be no question ; since all history and our own experience may inform us, how much greater ends are to be accomplished and honours acquired by the two first mentioned means or principles than by the two last, and how little chance of success these last mentioned can have in any general competition with the others. But we are considering of causes and not of means, of chiefs and not of instruments, of subjective and not of mediate relations ; and we have ransacked every part of the Kingdom and considered every principle in the same, to discover if possible a first cause or real subjective, but so far in vain. All the causes or chiefs that have yet come up will appear to have no lasting effect : they are all as fleeting as the subject they are supposed to actuate, mere shadow upon shadow, a transient set altogether. We have seen * how the subject with all its constituents is dissolved by one general property ; which is death, and might therefore be deemed the commander-in-chief, rather than any of the foremen-

* Vol. I. p. 175.

tioned, if he had not found a commander himself in the Subject of the Kingdom (Cor. I. xv. 54). And as it is with the subject of this disbanded host, so likewise with the leaders; "as with the people, so with the prince," or each of them: the Vital Principle, Ruling Passion and Ruling Principle will all and each of them depart together with their constituents when Death makes his appearance. For all our leading, as well as following constituents properly so called, both come and go together continually: they all came into the world together: they will all go out together; and, when it shall please God, all come into it together again: for no positive, real and lasting ruler can be found among them. The question is not about a reciprocal and occasional preponderance, which has been acknowledged; but of a constant and direct supremacy in any one member of the incarnate Kingdom, of one ruler over all with a subjection to none, even for a moment; THE LASTING RULER, THE FIRM OCCUPIER, THE REAL SUBJECTIVE RELATION: and he is not to be found in the Kingdom; he is to be sought farther,—though "thy name also is so high; and that do thy wondrous works declare" (Ps. lxxv. 2).

2. Thus it has been shewn, and rather circumstantially, that no one constituent of the kingdom of either sort, that is either material, spiritual, or intellectual, before mentioned is primary cause to another, or preserves a constant sway therein; but all stand alike in the relation of cause and effect, of lord and servant, father and son, master and pupil, counsellor and client, benefactor and obliged. As we cannot at the same time, however, help thinking that all the said constituents are more absolutely headed somehow, this notwithstanding, both in their rule and subjection; it is necessary to suppose some higher subject by which this general part is sustained, and on which not only the alternate prevalence and submission of individual properties depend, but the union and dissolution, or life and destruction, as well as creation and renovation of the whole collectively.

Some have thought that Fate, and some that Chance, both fabulous deities, was the great universal subjective that creates, rules, dissolves, and restores every object of either act—namely, creation, &c., to the extent of all imagination or conception. And some, without deciding for either cause, may conclude that one of them must needs be the real, because they are so opposite; for nothing can ever be more precise than that, or more indifferent than this: while there are others, who will rather decide against both, denying the supremacy of either; and others again who cannot help regarding one of these fabulous deities as a poetical device for the TRUE SUBJECTIVE—an item of the presence of the Only God: poets being rather apt to take such liberties with his glorious image.

§ 3. Having thus sought for one relation, the Grand Subjective, in two several spheres or departments of the kingdom, that is, internal and external, without finding any thing like it, but what is imaginary and supposed, let us go on still to observe its evident existence by the following circumstances.

1. In the first place, that relation will be *internal as well as external*: it being impossible that one can rule universally without ruling essentially, or in the whole without doing the same in a part. “For thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity, whose name is Holy, I dwell in the high and holy place; with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit, to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of the contrite ones” (Isai. lvii. 15).

2. From the idea before given of the superiority of good to evil in an universal relation, it may be inferred that the subject sought will be as *perfect in goodness as in authority*, and that he can be equalled in that respect no more than in this; whence the saying of one who knew what he said, “THERE IS NONE GOOD BUT ONE, THAT IS GOD” (Matt. xix. 17). He is, strictly speaking, the only good Subject in Himself; and consequently in the same sense

also the only Author of good to others. The apostle says, "Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above"; as "that most excellent gift of charity" for example: and we may add, every common and every accessory gift likewise, as the rain and sunshine (Matt. v. 45); and, in short, every good thing of every kind, common or uncommon, subjective or objective, incidental or constituent; though we appear to enjoy some of the constituent and objective sort more particularly by gift, and of the incidental and subjective by permission. Thus, for example, faith and repentance with new light and life we enjoy by gift; the same being so much by all of it more than we enjoy naturally, or have any natural right to expect; while breath and locomotion, with other common blessings of the subjective class, as the incidentals, wealth and sunshine, for example, we enjoy naturally, or else by transfer and permission; so very much do they seem a mere matter of course. So every positive good is derived from one source, and every negative as well as inverted good likewise. HE WHO BLESSES US WITH EVERY DIRECT ADVANTAGE IS THE SAME WHO BLESSES US AGAIN BY EITHER AVERTING OR INVERTING EVERY EVIL WITH WHICH WE MAY BE THREATENED; that is by either warding it off, or turning the same to good account for us. Therefore, whatever doubts some may have with respect to the origin of evil, respecting the Good Subjective, or the Author and origin of good, all seem to be agreed who believe its existence: neither can there be any doubt among them, that the God or Grand Subjective of the Kingdom is likewise the Sole Author of all the real good that is in the same, or ever was, or ever will be. They will own with our Lord and St. James, that all that is good must spring from the goodness of God, and spring as freely as the produce of the earth in place; although he allows much good to be cultivated, and makes his free gift the reward of cultivation, according to that beautiful view of it in the Psalms, "THOU MADEST ROOM FOR IT; and when it had taken root it filled the

land: the hills were covered with the shadow of it; and the boughs thereof were like the goodly cedar trees. She stretched out her branches unto the sea, and her boughs unto the river" (Ps. lxxx. 9, 10, 11). So that the Essential Subjective of the Kingdom is clearly identified with the Characteristic, making one God or Grand Subjective, the Head, Ruler, Source, and Chief of all good and all being. And we may be happy to observe that,

3. There can be properly *but one* Subjective or Chief too, both in and over all the kingdom; not one internal and one external, nor one good and one evil as some have imagined, which would be very inconvenient for us: but ONE IN, AND OVER ALL; GOOD FOR ALL, AND ESSENTIAL TO ALL, THAT HAVE ANY LIFE OR GOODNESS IN THEM. "It is he that hath made us, and not we ourselves" (Ps. c. 2). It is he that has formed all our lasting properties both of body and soul, and poised them so nicely, as we find, among themselves and against each other; producing the admirable effect of health in either part. And when any irregularity, or undue preponderance occurs in either body or soul, why need we betake ourselves to an opinion of inherent faculties, or of any foreign either, to account for circumstances that must necessarily follow; as when a vessel, yielding to the preponderance of our blood, or the momentum with which it is impelled, produces apoplexy in the one, or our faith yielding to the preponderance of vanity produces atheism in the other? And he who gave all by his word can take any property of the kingdom, or all at once out of it again by the same means. Then what would courage be, if it were no longer counterpoised with prudence; or bounty, without discretion; or learning, without humility; or even that beautiful charity, without modesty; or (returning to the ground of this digression) what would opinion be without reflection? They would either be nothing respectively, or different from what they are. For take away prudence, and courage dies; it is no longer courage, but rashness; take away

discretion, and bounty yields to waste—humility, and learning yields to pedantry: let go modesty, and lust will strangle charity (Matt. xxiv. 12)—reflection, and opinion is blinded by prejudice: Where then may be the ruler? Finally, let but one grand counterpoise, the divine influence, be wanting; and away go all our properties that are worth having at once. So true it is, as the apostle says, that “by grace ye are saved” (Eph. ii. 5 and 8): and “ALL THINGS ARE OF GOD” (Cor. II. v. 18). But,

4. If all things are of God, then is God himself to be mentioned as *not of any kind*: though to have an imperfect conception of this incomprehensible Object, we adopt the purest and most authorised epithets, saying with St. John, “The Word was God” (John i. 1); and with the Word himself, “God is a Spirit” (Ib. iv. 24). God at the same time being either only by person or presence; as he is the Father, a son, or a HE. And if one does not know how to barely mention this Supreme Relation and that alone, how shall one presume to describe both the Relation and his? Indeed, otherwise than in person, or as it were by representation, the Deity or God is not to be mentioned, nor applied to, nor even thought of. The Great Universal Being by whom they consist is the Chief of all intellectual spirits; but not a Chief of the same nature with any that consist by Him. God is the Word or Chief Intellectual, but not like other intellectuals: “God is a Spirit,” but not like other spirits. And, therefore, one hardly knows how to mention him under either head; nor yet to call him a Person in the general sense of the word; neither to designate him as an element of his own Kingdom, or by any other general expression that is applicable to any other subject, even to any of real existence. For these are all his creatures; and it does not seem consistent to designate the Creator by any expression, however pure or sublime, that we apply to the creatures; nor yet to describe under the same conditions, One who has nothing in common with them; being “WITHOUTEN QUALITEE

GOOD, AND WITHOUTEN QUANTITEE GREAT." Men are intellectual spirits as well as those which have no mixture of earth, or flesh and blood, in their composition : and of them, as well as of other created beings, we may discourse particularly, as they have now been discoursed of generally; distinguishing first between the essential and characteristic, then between the incidental and constituent subject of each; either of which may also be divided, or distinguished again, if required, like the general subject.

—But if in contemplating the only principal Subjective we can distinguish generally, 1 that which is incidental to the Same, 2 that which is constituent, and 3 its foreign productions, the same may be thought a great point, and worth attempting in this place especially, as its order directs.

1. *Of incidentals* the most obvious to an inquirer, if not the most important, will generally be the same in relation to the principal Subjective himself as in relation to any that He has formed—to the Creator, as to any of his intelligent creatures. Each will have his Name, Notion, and Other property in a general view : but on looking farther into particulars, we perceive no affinity nor resemblance between those of the one and the immensity of the other : so that one can hardly help wondering to see what one does sometimes ; namely, to see the creature so high as he makes himself ; dispensing titles, gifts, and graces here and there, on the right hand and on the left, with as much caprice, partiality, and self importance as if he were himself at least a minor deity ; not remembering his trusteeship, as he ought, and the account that he is to give hereafter to some One else. " For promotion cometh neither from the east, nor from the west, nor yet from the south. And why ? God is the Judge : He putteth down one and setteth up another He sent redemption unto his people ; He hath commanded his covenant for ever : HOLY AND REVEREND IS HIS NAME " (Ps. lxxv. 7, 8 ; cxi. 9). And with reverence this incidental, being usually

the first for consideration, is now therefore to be considered.

1, There are among others, two sorts of *Names* answering to two sorts of persons before mentioned, being 1 universal and absolute; which denotes the entirety of the subject without allusion to any other, as if there was no other subject in being; 2 partial and relative, characterising the subject either by some particular property or circumstance belonging to it, as 1 * Jacob, 2 † Judah, for example; or else, by its relation to some other subject, as Eve by her relation to posterity, or the living. And as these several characteristics are implied or expressed either in one word or more, the names of this sort will be either simple or compound; that is—simple, when the characteristic is implied or expressed in one word, compound when it is expressed by more, the addition in this case being properly termed an epithet. From the first naming of persons to the present, the second mode appears to have been most usual; as any one may have perceived who has been in the habit of considering how the families of the earth are named. All the circumstances of the subject; as birth, rule, and residence, person, office, pursuit, and every other that can be conceived almost, with almost every conceivable relation, have been taxed for significant names, since “men began to multiply on the earth”, and to extend their acquaintance, particularly with each other. And truly the enumeration of the sons of men does not appear deficient in either kind; that is in either the absolute or the relative.

—1, For if the relative kind be the more numerous at first, *the absolute* is always overtaking it, as the relative names losing their original significations by time and descent, glide imperceptibly into that class. So Adam, for example, a name denoting originally its object's extraction or compo-

* Truly and literally, *Heeler*.—Sarcastically and figuratively, *Circumventor*.

† Commemoration.

sition, is now absolutely applied without any such reference: and so absolute, or as it may be said, Arbitrary, names are sufficiently multiplied; which otherwise had been uncommon, even in our numerous race. In designing or endeavouring to conceive such an absolute and universal name for one Object according to his due, or, as it is said, to "give the Lord the honour due unto his Name" (Ps. xxix. 2), every mode that has been mentioned, and every mode that can be devised might fairly be tried without effect, or only with that of multiplying names that He will not acknowledge; so great is his Notion or Image beyond all conception, and his Name beyond expression! For how can men express absolutely what they can only apprehend by means of a relation? It is said, that Adam gave names to all things that were created in the world; "and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof" (Gen. ii. 19). But neither Adam nor any of his posterity were able to find an appropriate, that is an universal and absolute name for their Creator: therefore Moses asked, and the Creator was pleased to concede such a name for himself: in which no part of his divine image was omitted, nor any relation expressed or implied. "Moses said unto God, Behold, when I come unto the children of Israel, and shall say unto them, the God of your fathers hath sent me unto you; and they shall say to me, What is his name? what shall I say unto them? And God said unto Moses, I AM THAT I AM: and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you" (Exod. iii. 13, 14). "And God said moreover unto Moses, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, The Lord God of your fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob hath sent me unto you: this is my name for ever, and this is my memorial unto all generations" (Ib. 15).

=1. This then is the first, most peculiar, most appropriate, universal, and absolute name of the Great Subjective of the Kingdom, *Jehovah* or *I am*. There is no com-

parison implied in I AM, as there may be found in every other name, nor yet any limitation that may be removed by the help of an epithet, nor any defect that may be cured by the help of an honourable adjunct, as others may be; for this name is so perfect in itself, that it cannot be improved by composition; one can add nothing to it, that would not take from its significance, or present an absurdity. Thus, if one should talk of the Universal Jehovah, it might be asked, Where is the particular? If of the Only, Who ever heard of another? if of the righteous, Where is the unrighteous? if of the True, Where is the false? &c. In short here is a name that can apply to no other object, that precludes all comparison, defies any improvement. As a paraphrase, the Apocalyptic designation of God "which is, and which was, and which is to come" (Rev. i. 8), must needs be held correct; but fades amazingly in effect before the quaint I AM. All the three several tenses or times here applied to the divine Subject will not together afford that lively notion which is afforded by the bare understanding of the present alone in the same. I AM FOR EVER would be nearer the meaning: but there is no room for comparing any other expression or conception with that of I AM, simply and alone.

The same may also be regarded as the only name for the same Object that is not of human invention perhaps: of which sort, though some have been authenticated by the adoption of inspired writers, and canonized, as it were, by their insertion in the sacred text; nay, though one or more of them has been occasionally substituted for the great I AM in translation; yet it does not appear, that any other name has been directly admitted by the Object himself, or especially referred to by his servants the prophets, like this which He signified to Moses as the name of his choice, "I AM"; meaning "the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob," according to the passage above cited. This name therefore is here asserted as the only proper, universal, and absolute name for its divine Author.

=2, The sacred name of Jehovah, however, being translated from the language that is consecrated by its production into others, was corrupted and lost in them or rendered by other terms, it may be, of nearly, though not precisely the same import. Of these *Zévs*, from *Záw*, the meaning of which is to live, may be remembered for one; differing as more limited and specific than the meaning of הוה, the root of Jehovah and its corruption Jovis, which is simply to be or to exist. And such being the difference of the root, such, of course, will be the difference of its derivations from first to last; as the stream cannot be expected to be purer than the fountain.

=3, The *Deity* and the *Divinity*, for example; are names of this derivation, being in themselves at the same time most worthy however of their object, and highly expressive; inasmuch as they denote the same by more than one attribute, and that He is more than a living person, or than the first person living.

=2, Passing from the one, universal, absolute, and preeminent name of the One, Universal, and Preeminent Being, and from others similarly of an absolute and universal to those of a partial and *relative* signification, let us consider some of these likewise in the order of their sense and construction, without distinguishing between such as occur in Scripture and such as do not, if their meaning be worthy of their object, and their use have been sanctioned by those who respect him, by those who "join themselves to the Lord, to serve him, and to love the Name of the Lord" (Isai. lvi. 6). The following are proposed as examples of the partial and relative names of the Deity, as well simple as compound, taken from his relations and attributes.

=1, Of all the relative names that have been vainly applied by mankind in their several tribes and generations to express an object that is inexpressible, the least vain perhaps, because the most expressive, as signifying not only the essence, but the quality and foundation of his

supremacy is that adopted by the Teutonic,—the adorable Name of *God*; i. e. Good: Good as he is absolutely in his own perfections, and Good relatively in their consequence, as an infinite blessing to the creatures. This name has also the advantage of a simple.

=2, The most ancient compound, and it may be more ancient than even the first mentioned simple root, Jehovah or Jove, since it particularly became the lips of the first of us, is that of God the Father, or “the Living Father” (John vi. 57). JUPITER among the heathens: which being wickedly perverted and blasphemed in after times through the corruption of mankind, came by degrees to signify more of a devil and the father of a diabolical race; such as Mars, Bacchus, Apollo, and other objects of Pagan superstition: the most hellish notions being thus connected with the purest titles of God and Children of God. The object therefore of the first born and only begotten Son of God upon earth was, to restore as a foundation of righteousness the name of GOD THE FATHER to its primitive meaning; not as the God of Israel only, nor yet as the Father of one man or another, much less of such as Mars and Bacchus; but as God of all the nations of the earth, and Father of all the children of God in his line, affinity and description, whether incarnate before or after; —to the meaning intimated by St. Paul, when he speaks of “One God and Father of all: who is above all, and through all, and in you all” (Eph. iv. 6). And from this commencement, we date accordingly the restoration of the Name of God among us, with all its attendant blessings.

=3, Another relative name of the same divine subject may be derived from the relation and attribute of sovereignty alone: which will signify more than goodness with some, v. g. with those who are able to make a distinction between goodness and greatness, or the characteristic and essential subjective, which others find impossible. Therefore, whatever stress the former sort may lay on this

expression, Lord alone will not serve for God with the latter; nor properly denote the Great Subjective: while "God", being the proper characteristic, will signify alone both God and Lord.

In a general way, God and Lord are applied indifferently to the same divine object; and indeed it does not appear, that they have ever been distinguished from each other in use with constancy and precision: but it may be observed, that if God and Lord had not some distinct as well as concurrent signification, they would not be used as they are frequently in apposition; their apparent signification being that of goodness in power, or the union of supreme being with supreme goodness, as aforesaid.

=4, *Heaven*, by whatever figure it comes to be so applied, will serve likewise as a simple term in most countries where the subject is acknowledged, and they say in some, as in China for instance, literally, or without any intended figure. But if by such means, that is by the use of a figure, Heaven may signify only the divine authority, it will answer the purpose alone as well as Lord; either being very convenient as a proper name, one in the material form or mode, the other in the personal. Accordingly, it is not unusual to hear of Heaven directing, ordaining, decreeing particular dispensations; also of the Will of Heaven, the Children, Kingdom, and other similar associations.

=5, *The Creator* is a name that ought always to be remembered, and also in a peculiar manner, with reference to the subject; being applied to his creatures less for their agreeable novelties than for their originality in mischief, trouble, confusion and other hateful productions, and productions most opposite to those which we must needs ascribe to so faithful and bountiful a Being as the Lord our Creator.

Other names there are still formed by different figures; some for example by that called Synecdoche, as

=6, *Providence*: where the whole subject is indicated

or expressed by only one property—a property however abounding in others again, as wisdom, goodness, equity, and the like—also by ellipsis, as

=7, &c., The *Almighty*, the *Highest*, or *Most High*, *Eternal*, &c.: where the subject is severally expressed by a peculiar adjunct, by an adjunct as peculiar to God as God itself:

All which names are liable to be remodelled or compounded together, forming upon the whole such a collection of names for the One Great Object of our heart and voice, that if numbers could express his image, one should think there were names enough for it of mere human invention only: or if the number of the names could act as a guard to keep men in awe of his Majesty, it would be somewhat for us. But the force of the name of the Lord is a moral force only: it is not magical, as some appear to think, nor physical like theirs; nor universal, like that of his voice; but it is the force of faith, the same sort of force as an absolute monarch finds among men; such a force as results from the concession of its objects, or of its subjects rather;—as moral force, though exercised by one, must always belong to the many over whom it is exercised in virtue, though not in equity after it has been once freely conceded. The force of the Name of the Lord is the force of power, authority, dominion, as before explained under those heads; and not the force of gravitation and repulsion, or of any foreign property whatever: it is the force of concession, a force that belongs to the conceders, or rather to Him who bestows and creates it. “For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God” (Rom. xiii. 1). Such is the power of this one Great Name, and in the first mentioned form of the same especially.

But in alluding thus to the superiority of one form of the sacred Name above all others by which men endeavour to denote the Object of their supreme adoration, and of their common dependence, there is no necessity for undervalu-

ing or disparaging any others that have been framed by mankind with sobriety, sincerity, and the respect due to so great an Object. For while the Lord Almighty has given himself a name that is above every name, and men have given him more, he is still so far from being displeased with their liberty, that he has sanctioned many of these names by the dictation of his Holy Spirit, as before observed. Some men have had their trifling, if not superstitious conceits, about the name of God: but God himself is not tenacious of words: he is no respecter of words any more than of persons: he only requires, that his Name, however expressed, should not be willingly taken in vain by any one. For an abuse of the Name of God is but another word for the contempt of his sacred Image, that being only another medium or presence of the Deity in the next degree to this; as may be gathered from different expressions in Holy Scripture, proposing the Name as a representative of the subject. Thus we meet with such phrases there as Calling upon the name of the Lord; also honouring, fearing, remembering, praising, giving thanks to the name of the Lord; of the Lord God, the God of hosts, the Lord of Israel, of Jacob, &c.; in which the Name would appear to signify alike with the named or with the object assuming the same, or on which it is bestowed. So it appears in that votive passage of the Psalmist, "The Lord hear thee in the day of trouble: the Name of the God of Jacob defend thee, &c." (Ps. xx. 1, &c.), and in many other passages that might be mentioned.

Therefore, let not the name of God be despised in any other tongue for its singularity or uncouthness. For what says the Prophet? "With stammering lips and another tongue will he speak to this people" (Isai. xxviii. 11). The Name of God is to be hallowed in every tongue and in every form, "from the rising up of the sun unto the going down of the same," for the reasons before assigned. And the importance of that name, and the benefit thereof to those who rightly use it being so great,

we need not wonder at the account that our Lord has made of its credit in requiring his followers to pray for grace to hallow the same (Matt. vi. 9) : which is almost like worshipping it. For the incomparable form of prayer, in which we supplicate our heavenly Father to make his Name hallowed upon earth is preceptive throughout, and divinely preceptive too, as it is written again, "And they shall be all taught of God" (John vi. 45). So he teaches us not only in the forecited passage, but in many others, to hallow his name—in some likewise, to hallow his notion, house, and other incidentals, on account of their relations to him, or for his sake.

2, For as the name of God through all its diversity and numerous modifications is most important to mankind in the part of doing or their outward life, seeing that by its means all their most considerable engagements with each other are contracted, cemented, and preserved, the ends of justice and charity are promoted, the powerful are restrained, the weak supported, and the deserving encouraged, the prosperous are admonished and the unhappy comforted; so his *Notion* or the knowledge of Him is the most important medium with mankind of right thinking or the inward life; the soul of their secret transactions, at once the check and mainspring of their deepest devices, "the rod and staff" by means of which, being proper for all, the members of this invisible kingdom are generally enabled to admonish, restrain, and correct; or to commend, encourage, and reward each other. Thus memory checks exultation, fear restrains the eagerness of concupiscence, and conscience chastises the severity of judgment, by means of this powerful notion variously combined; while on the other hand faith commends humility, hope encourages self-denial, love rewards fidelity, and all by means of this notion of an all-seeing, invisible God, or his Image.

The knowledge of God is his notion, the object of this notion his Image, the possession his presence, the enjoyment heaven, the foundation God. His name alone

does wonders, his notion more, his presence everything : and yet so indispensably necessary are these three types to each other, that their common object is not to be perfectly embraced and acknowledged even in our highest or intellectual department without the consent of all. For the One only God being also infinite will needs have only one Presence ; but the Kingdom consisting of several departments, as matter, spirit, and intellect above described, will receive that Presence by as many distinct mediums, doors (John x. 9), or avenues, as it were, formed out of each respectively ; as the outward weight or impression of the object for one, the spiritual for another, the intellectual for another : which last mentioned medium is highest or chief, as the only medium of the Image and productive of its effect or impression on the spiritual department ; but not necessarily, since the same may proceed also immediately from the subject as another species of presence.

In a combination of spiritual and intellectual properties each one is important to the rest, if it be good, as enriching the combination with its presence ; but the importance of that which reflects the divine Image to any combination whether human or angelic, must be greater than the importance of any other property or conception in either department, not only on account of its intrinsic worth, but also on account of the lustre or credit and of the weight or efficacy that it contributes to every particular with which it is united. And this a person might easily imagine if he would only consider the effect of the aforesaid notion when added to any other member of the confederation besides those abovementioned, and what that confederation or body must be when not only its members or constituents, but incidentals likewise are all subject to the divine Image through our imperfect notion or knowledge ! It is not possible indeed for this notion to reside either with men or angels, let them be good or bad, and not be followed by a sensible effect on their inward life answering to the character of the same, or to the original to which the same is allied and from

which it is derived. With the children of God this notion is full of comfort and edification; with others it will be a source either of inveterate obstinacy, or bootless alarm; so that not only men who belie their conscience, but "the devils also, believe and tremble" (Jam. ii. 19).

For as the natural character is a medium of observation whereby objects are severally made to appear as they do, the spiritual character, which is the divine Image before-mentioned, will appear differently or produce different notions in observers of different characters being also different mediums, according to that passage in David's celebrated psalm of thanksgiving, "With the merciful thou wilt shew thyself merciful; and with the upright man thou wilt shew thyself upright: with the pure thou wilt shew thyself pure; and with the froward thou wilt shew thyself unsavoury" (Sam. II. xxii. 26, 27). And besides the character of the observer it is clear, that there must be also other mediums of observation between him and his object in this case: all that he ever hears, reads, or rightly conceives of God is a medium; Christ is a medium, the Holy Ghost is a medium: and more especially these two, though properly subjective, are unitedly to us, Christ as intellectually, the Holy Ghost as spiritually discerned, a perfect medium of the otherwise as inaccessible as insupportable Presence of the everliving God.

But the Image of God being only One; as every notion refers to One, we may call it one notion infinitely multiplied, the notion of this supreme incomprehensible Being; just as we call the map of Jerusalem one, or the plan of the temple one; while there may be a great number and variety also of each. We talk of the notion of God as we talk of the name, and might of many other subjects in an abstract sense, making but one of each, his name being numerous at the same time, and his notions numberless. The abstract notion of God is that now considered as preparatory to one more specific. And as the name of God is designed to express and to be as it were an image of his

notion, or of the best that we are able to conceive, so ought his notion to be an image of his image. But if the invention of an appropriate name for One so high above all was so difficult, and a task so far above human ability, much more must the notion of his living image be: and if God only could afford to the tongue of man a name worthy of his image, it cannot be possible for any other being to convey to man's heart a worthy notion of his wisdom, goodness, truth, and other excellent perfections.

“ Oh that I knew where I might find him ! (says one of the sages of antiquity) that I might come even to his seat ! Behold I go forward, but he is not there ; and backward, but I cannot perceive him : on the left hand where he doth work, but I cannot behold him ; he hideth himself on the right hand, that I cannot see him ” (Job xxiii. 3, &c.). “ Verily Thou art a God that hidest thyself, O God of Israel, the Saviour ” (Isai. xlv. 15) : says another. While another says, “ Thou art about my path and about my bed, and spiest out all my ways. For lo, there is not a word in my tongue but thou, O Lord, knowest it altogether. Thou hast fashioned me behind and before, and laid thine hand upon me. Such knowledge is too wonderful and excellent for me, I cannot attain unto it ! Whither shall I go then from thy Spirit, or whither shall I go then from thy presence ? If I climb up into Heaven, thou art there ; if I go down to hell, thou art there also : if I take the wings of the morning and remain in the uttermost parts of the sea ; even there also shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me ” (Ps. cxxxix. 2, &c.). It must have made the case of these good men so much the more disheartening, to consider, that the object of their supreme regard should be so near them as he was, and yet not be to be seen ; as if he hid his face from them angrily, and had cast his servants away in displeasure (Ib. xxvii. 10). And rightly considered there would not be at this present time any circumstance more capable of troubling a happy lot,

or aggravating a wretched, than the distance he still keeps with us: as to complete our misery, **EVEN THE MISERY OF SUCH A RELATION CANNOT IN THIS BEASTLY STATE BE FELT AT ALL BY ANY ONE AS IT OUGHT TO BE!** Truly, therefore, at last, the general indifference of mankind to this sort of knowledge is more remarkable even than their ignorance.

Then to attempt at such wonderful and excellent knowledge, or to gain an adequate notion or conception of the Supreme Being under such circumstances, would appear not only vain, but very presumption and insolence: and does too sometimes. Sometimes when one only catches a slight impression, a mere glimpse as it were, of the infinite superiority of his glorious Image, to any human conception, one is startled, one's senses recoil at the thought, one's flesh trembles for fear of Him (Ps. cxix. 120): it drives one almost to despair,—to abhor one's self, and repent in dust and ashes like Job (Job. xlii. 6), to think that one should ever have dared so much as to lift a thought towards Him. On the other hand for our encouragement in this train of contemplation; the way of the Tree of life is not so strictly guarded (Gen. iii. 24), as it was; the prohibition to inquiry is not so absolute; the darkness in Zion is not so thick; “the dimness shall not be such as was in her vexation, when at first He lightly afflicted the land of Zebulun and the land of Naphtali, and afterward did more grievously afflict her by the way of the sea, beyond Jordan in Galilee of the nations. The people that walked in darkness have seen a **GREAT LIGHT**; they that dwell in the land of the shadow of death, upon them hath the light shined” (Isai. ix. 1, 2). It is not so bad a case with us at present as it was even with the wisest men of antiquity: when there could nothing be seen like God upon earth; no intellectual measure that could be applied to the infinity of a divine Image, no living copy of the Same, no medium whereby it could be satisfactorily perceived; but the whole earth almost lay plunged as it were in spiritual darkness;

may, generally drowned and steeping in vice and ignorance, as much as it was once with a flood, when the waters were on the face of the whole earth" (Gen. viii. 9).

There is a tradition by one of the Fathers respecting this general ignorance of the true God and the embarrassment it necessarily creates in every reflecting mind—of an eminent philosopher, who being desired by the king to favour him with a notion of the Deity, was fain to put him off from time to time on account of the difficulty of the undertaking, and to give it up at last in despair: which coupled with another trait that is recorded of the same philosopher, may suggest good matter for a mystic observation. It is, that a magnificent utensil of gold, and great workmanship, whether in the shape of a cup, a table, or a tripod, having been providentially discovered at Miletus, and decreed by the state as an offering or prize to the best informed,—and most likely on the subject alluded to, as the most generally important; it came first to Thales, their countryman, the philosopher aforesaid, and also perhaps in consequence of the forecited adventure. Who modestly declined the prize in favour of another sage, his cotemporary; as did this again in favour of a third; and others likewise successively, until this honourable token had passed the whole round of seven cotemporaries who have all gained a memorable name for wisdom. The last of them thought he could not do better than return it to the first: but Thales, on second thought, was induced to lay the cup, table, or tripod before the shrine of Apollo, the god of wisdom, at last, as its fittest destination.

And truly if men were sensible of the difficulty and importance of that question of the king's above mentioned, they would be ready always to pass it on from one to another perpetually, INSTEAD OF BEING MANY MASTERS. "For in many things we offend all" (Jam. iii. 1, 2). But let men pass the question as they would,—if the question should travel all over the world, it must still revert to the same point at last. "For what man knoweth the things of a

man, save the spirit of man, which is in him? Even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God" (Cor. I. ii. 11). Considering therefore some of the attributes of Apollo, the fabulous deity aforesaid; and

1 His filiation, as a son of Jupiter, that is translated, of God the Father;

2 His quality, as the source of light and life upon earth; also

3 as the fountain of wisdom, and especially of what may be called the supplemental or restorative sort; and

4 as the patron of verse and melody; lastly considering

5 His achievements, as the destroyer of the great serpent especially; considering these several coincidences, it may be thought no common providence that directed the offering of this cup, table, or tripod where it was offered at last, as a prize for the knowledge of God in what was at that time a pagan state.

What a happiness it is, if men could but know it, to come after these mystical occurrences, and compare them with the glorious dispensation to which they refer! and also to have in our time just such a measure and medium of the Image of God as our forefathers wanted in "That which was (as the Apostle St. John writes) from the beginning; which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled of the Word of Life. For the Life was manifested; and we have seen it and bear witness, and show unto you that eternal Life which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us" (John I. i. 1, 2);—and that which St. Paul refers to, "But God, who is rich in mercy, for his great love wherewith he loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ (by grace are ye saved) and hath raised us up together, and made us sit together in heavenly places in Christ Jesus; that in the ages to come he might show the exceeding riches of his grace in his kindness towards us, through Christ Jesus" (Eph.

ii. 4, &c.) ; and that which had often been alluded to before, as by the Psalmist for example, particularly where he says, "O think upon thy servant as concerning thy Word, in which thou hast caused me to put my trust. The same is my comfort in my trouble: for thy word hath quickened me" (Ps. cxix. 49, 50). For being thus animated, encouraged and directed by divine Revelation, however diffident of our own natural ability, we begin to enter into the Spirit that "searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God" (Cor. I. ii. 10); and to feel thereupon as Israel is expected to feel again when the veil shall be taken from their heart. For "the Lord is that Spirit: and where the Spirit of the Lord is there is liberty. But we all with open face beholding as in a glass the glory of the Lord, are changed into the same image, from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord" (Ib. II. iii. 16, &c.). So St. John, the beloved disciple of our Lord, likewise reminds the brethren in his first epistle, of the happy change produced in them by their present conformity to the Image of God, and happier still to be farther produced by their farther transformation. "Beloved, (says he) now are we the sons of God. And it doth not yet appear what we shall be: but we know, that when he shall appear we shall be like him; for we shall see him as he is" (John I. iii. 2): being an implicit declaration, that the divine nature is only to be apprehended, like any other, by means of the affinity with its object which we have with God through Christ: who was himself both God intrinsically, and extrinsically the Image of God; or God by origin, and his Image by derivation.

With such helps and encouragements we may hope to discharge in some measure and according to the model of Christ THE DEBT OF A JUST NOTION which every intelligent creature owes to its Creator; and which however constituent with the creature, we are now regarding as one of His incidentals. There being as before signified nothing in this life so important to a sound understanding as the knowledge of its Author; and the greatest pains that we

can possibly take for such knowledge being also nothing compared with only a chance of its acquisition—it is still possible that we may take those without this, if such should be the will of God; or this without them, if he pleases: but if by any means we may attain to his notion with a suitable feeling, or a conviction equal to our information, it may be hailed as an inductive evidence of better things being yet for to come; and satisfactory likewise; as a small return of and for what has been already received from him to whom we hope to return altogether. “For we are his workmanship created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained that we should walk in them” (Eph. ii. 10).

3, To indicate the *other Property*, or species of property of the same Lord or Owner hereabout; all the constituent properties in man, which is the man altogether, are incidental property of the Creator, and that two ways; by production and right; as the useful properties of a clock are incidental properties of its maker in both respects until he divests himself of that which is alienable, the property of right, or possession. And as the ingenious mechanic imparts to the materials combined in this production other properties than his own, mechanical instead of voluntary motion; so the properties which the Creator imparts to his creature man, or to any other creature, are not his own except as incidental, neither can be since he has properties only of this sort. For he creates whatever he gives us or puts into our composition very evidently; as even wisdom, righteousness and truth, properties most worthy of himself: and the Creator cannot be what he creates. THE MEDIUM IS OF HIMSELF; and by this Medium he is invested with every kind of incidental property above mentioned. Therefore however incongruous it may seem to attribute any evil property to God in an absolute way; yet we consider him to be relatively and indirectly, or, as we say *mediately*, invested with all; just as the MEDIUM OF WISDOM, RIGHTEOUSNESS AND TRUTH himself

was invested with all; and with evil constituents too, with sin and sorrow as well as chastisement and adversity, for our sakes, as it was predicted, "Surely he hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows. . . . He was wounded for our transgressions . . . All we like sheep have gone astray, WE HAVE TURNED EVERY ONE TO HIS OWN WAY, and the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all" (Isai. liii. 4, &c.). Hence the only sort of divine property that we are able to conceive is incidental: and there are no properties of his creatures whether good or evil, incidental or constituent in relation to them that do not belong to the Creator in this manner on the principle aforesaid.

To be sure, when we speak of property in general as the right of any one, we naturally mean that only which may be worth having, forgetting that which is not: and in speaking of God's particularly, we also mean the same, though it is well known, that there may be property likewise of an opposite description, which if his of right is not of his ordering, but rather of his prohibition. Therefore it will here be necessary to make a distinction of his other property into such as we owe him, and such as we do not; into such as we may be proud to own, and such as we ought truly to be ashamed of; that the good and this the evil incidental property of the Subject in this respect.

—1, And speaking of the former sort, that is of our good and creditable property of both sorts *God's good and due incidentals*, what the builder of the famous temple at Jerusalem alleges in his dedication to their divine Object, "all things come of thee, and of thine own have we given thee" (Chron. I. xxix. 14) seems highly applicable to what has just been observed, namely that the property of any work or production must belong to the author or artificer, except a sale, gift, exchange, or some other sort of transfer can be proved to the contrary. And when an author has parted with his work, if it no longer appertain to him as an incidental, the property and consequent credit or

reproach of production, with the operation or ability that gave birth to his work will adhere to him as long as he lives perhaps,—the work as an incidental, the operation as a constituent. Therefore to “God from whom all good things do come,” the whole honour of their production will always belong with a claim on their objects equal to all the good they receive,—the sum of their existence with all its sweets. While the gain is ours, and the benefit, and the enjoyment; all the honour and ability, the right and property not only of every outward or incidental good, but of every good ingredient in our composition will rest eternally with its author; a considerable portion of the latter sort also bearing his name under the ample designation of Godliness. The worship, faith, devotion, conscience, love, fear, resignation and obedience of his rational creatures, with every sort of moral perfection likewise, which does not immediately relate to him, may be reckoned as so many good, due and worthy portions in the general doom or property of the Creator, although we cannot describe them as originally incidentals of any one, being as they are properly, and most properly, constituents of the Kingdom: they are his incidentals, the Kingdom’s constituents, and of all constituents the most indispensable in either respect. If the Creator had less of such constituents, his doom would be so much the more contracted in its fairest quarter, he would be himself so much the poorer; and the diminution or abstraction of these constituents from him, if possible, would be a robbery so much worse than sacrilege as the property taken was more valuable than its objects, consisting in outward things.

Among these, for an example of the divine incidentals due from mankind to their Creator, the house of God with its accompaniments have been mentioned, as the foundation either of piety and devotion, or of profanation and sacrilege: and when the right or value of such incidentals is mentioned, it may not be amiss to observe, that the spirit or intention with which it is offered, and not the use or importance of any article however ne-

cessary it may be to our devotions, is what signifies with him. So much was intimated by our Saviour to the woman of Samaria, when he told her that his Father was to be worshipped elsewhere than either at Jerusalem or in Mount Gerizim (John iv.). And so much as this the proto-martyr St. Stephen also seemed to intimate, when after mentioning in his discourse to the refractory Jews the tabernacle of Moses, which was the first kind of erection in Israel for public worship and communion with its Object, and then the temple which David proposed and Solomon was happily allowed to execute, he adds, "Howbeit the Most High dwelleth not in temples made with hands; as saith the prophet, Heaven is my throne, and earth is my footstool; what house will ye build me? saith the Lord; or what is the place of my rest? hath not my hand made all these things?" (Acts vii. 48, &c.) "The Lord's seat is in heaven" (Ps. xi. 4): that is in the midst of every essential good, as the sphere of happiness and holiness. His seat is in the midst of righteousness; and as much in the mildest, as in the most striking species; not more in the High and Holy Place, than with him also that is of a contrite and humble spirit. "Righteousness and judgment are the habitation of his seat" (Ib. xcvi. 2). From these and similar expressions it may be inferred, not only where God is pleased to be found, but also how, namely in the way of humility and contrition, of judgment and righteousness; as it is said by Isaiah, "In the way of thy judgments, O Lord, have we waited for thee, the desire of our soul is to thy name and to the remembrance of thee" (Isai. xxvi. 8). Such is the Kaaba of Israel: which St. Paul likewise alludes to, speaking of holiness, "Without which (says he) no man shall see the Lord" (Heb. xii. 14). For holiness is the region of his Presence, the atmosphere in which he breathes, the radiance of his Person, the odour of his Spirit.

Such are the good and worthy incidentals of the divine Subject, and not only of the sort answering to house and

fortune with mankind : which are solid or substantial properties, but also of the nominal and notional or ideal sorts answering to a worthy name and notion. And now, if we would consider

—2, Of substantial offerings of an opposite description answering to house and fortune with us, which are *falsely* and *injuriously* attributed or ascribed to God, we may find them in cases like these ;

=1, When splendid titles and immoderate incomes are employed to corrupt his ministers, and seduce them from their duty to God and his people : not being dedicated, sincerely to God ; but nominally to Him, and sincerely to Mammon ;—making puppet-priests, men of straw, no spiritual ministry but tools for the temporality. Give him sincerely the best of your works in every way ; temples as high as you please : but if you think to appropriate palaces and principalities to his ministers, you will not have too many of them for your political necessity. This is one case of evil property for the divine Object, its *worldly or political appropriation* : another case will occur.

=2, When the house of God is devoted to *superstition*, and his provisions to the pampering of an ignorant, idle and insatiate priesthood. “Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them (Matt. vii. 20, &c.). For it has been the way of that sort from the very beginning of their craft, to cry out, a house for one god ! A grove for another ! or if it were only an oak ! and more recently, an house for our Lady ! for St. Thomas, or St. Anybody ! also, Money for God’s sake ! Bulls, sheep and goats for the Most High ! Mitres, crowns, purple and gold for his poor servants ! Also corn and wine, and venison in abundance ! “GIVE FLESH TO ROAST FOR THE PRIEST !” (Sam. I. ii. 15), and all on account of One who utterly disclaims it. “Thinkest thou that I will eat bull’s flesh, (says he) and drink the blood of goats ? Offer unto God thanksgiving, and pay thy vows unto the Most Highest” (Ps. l. 13, 14).

Therefore if any person, or any number of persons united,

would monopolize THE GOOD THINGS, as they consider them, above mentioned, it must be for themselves, and not for him. Let them acknowledge these incidentals for their own, and ascribe to him what is of more consequence, "the life which is more than meat, and the body than raiment" (Matt. vi. 25); those appetitive properties especially by which the outward acts of intellectual and mixed as well as of purely spiritual and intellectual beings are regulated, and those outward acts by which their appetitive properties are demonstrated. Or if these daring usurpers will needs have constituents as well as incidentals out of the Kingdom, let them take such only as become them; let them take all the worst with their owners, a party stamped all over with evil characteristics: and there is no fear of their touching the good with theirs; for they are the property of our heavenly Father, "and no man shall be able to pluck them out of (his) hand" (John x. 29).

If it were desirable to insist more particularly on this evil, undue and unworthy species of other property, i. e. other besides the divine name and notion which have been considered in this relation, it might also be distinguished into the same two varieties as the good, worthy and due were, namely inward and outward with regard to the subject from which they proceed, being both of them opposite to those above mentioned in all their particulars,—all aversive instead of appetitive, and painful instead of pleasant. Respecting which evil species one is sorry to observe, that while they are more common than the excellent species above mentioned, they are likewise more proper or constituent with regard to those from whom they proceed, and in respect of whom they may also be divided again into two other portions; one the offering of those who were never subjects of God's special Kingdom, being like the toll or tribute taken from strangers; the other the offering of those who had been, or at least had professed to be such. In the former of these is included every species of blasphemy and contempt that may be expected from such

unhappy creatures by the general term of Atheism: and in the latter every species of infidelity, treachery, disloyalty and rebellion by the general term of Apostacy; all uniting again under the more general name of Ungodliness, of which enough has been already said. So let us pass inward, proceeding from the incidentals of the Subject to his constituents.

2. The notion or simple reflexion of the Deity being so far beyond any human conception, it would seem a vain attempt to dive still deeper into the mystery of the same, and endeavour to describe its particulars or *Constituents*, whether considered as insite or produced. For, 1, If considering these particulars first as *insite*, we should begin with describing the properties of this ineffable subject under the appellation of attributes, as they are usually named, what were this but to dignify most arrogantly the properties of mankind by ascribing them to God? if to describe the elements of the Godhead, what were that, but multiplying words against God? (Job xxxiv. 37) if the parts, what could be more paradoxical and absurd? Why it might be said hereupon, that as God made man in his own image (Gen. i. 27), so would vain man make God in his. But man walking in a vain shadow is surrounded with paradoxes. Instead therefore of pursuing a too familiar analogy between the Creator and one of his creatures, because something of the kind is allowed by authority and sanctioned by common usage; the more becoming part would be to attempt an apology rather for the practice. And if, looking with carnal eyes towards the Father of spirits, and deriving our notion of his heavenly Being from an earthly image, we ascribe to him all the members of the human body whether intellectual, spiritual or material, and one sort of them belongs to him as much as another, it is because we cannot conceive or discourse of him in higher terms: therefore we must either forget him quite or think of him as we can. But if, in employing the highest terms, we here own at the same time their inaptitude and unwor-

thinness, we do not exactly the same with those who use them in an unqualified sense; if our terms be defective, they are not so opprobrious; and if we walk in the midst of shadows, they are not so vain.

For we disclaim all comparisons between God and ourselves in fact, while we use them in speech, and as our only resource. We own that the highest properties we can ascribe to God, while they are ours, or only within the limits of our conception, cannot be worthy of him, and that no ingredients however exquisite in the composition of a passive, fleeting, finite creature can possibly enter into the Being of his impassable, infinite and eternal Creator: for their place or position can only be in the creature, as their right and origin are with the Creator. And with this understanding, if we should describe him thoroughly in all the particulars of a human being as well sensitive as intellectual; if we should describe him with the visible organs of seeing, hearing and smelling, as well as with the invisible of memory, thought and volition, which may be presumed to have their appropriate organs as well as the others, and we cannot attribute these results even to God without the means also whereby they are produced; if in short we describe God by man, or the Maker by his work, as the mind of an author is described by his book—though God has no more resemblance to man at present than the mind of man has to four and twenty letters; yet with this understanding, and understanding likewise the resemblance in one case as well as the other to be merely symbolical, there can be nothing in the practice either irreverent or absurd, nothing in which we are not borne out by the example of Holy Writ, and what is still more by the example of the sacred Object to which it most immediately refers.

We are told that God created man in his own image, and taught to cultivate this resemblance by one who must have known the feasibility of the attempt from the experience of his own affinities: we are also as-

sured by one who had the mind of Christ, that it was the original intention of the Creator, that some of us should be conformed to the image of his Son. Therefore having the sanction of his example and this assurance, let us proceed, but still with becoming humility, in our comparison: all the method that will be required has been proposed already in the exposition of the human subject, or of the Kingdom of God incarnate which is here figuratively transferred to the divine Subject or Government: and all the particulars that we expect to develope are a tissue of negatives; proving distinctly, that God is not man, nor any thing like one.

The human subject for example was described to be a succession of acts, or accidents in its first principles, these forming properties by repetition, which form elements by combination, as these form parts by composition: and if we consider and compare the divine subject accordingly, we shall find in the first place, that principles being specifically the same with their compounds, and compounds with their principles, the Supreme Being cannot consist of acts: for every act will have a beginning and ending; which he has not, nor yet either of them; being eternal without any period or distinction of existence. And by the same rule that God consists not of acts, he cannot consist either of their combinations or aggregates: so that we should not need to go any farther to disprove the analogy in question were that our only object; but there is something to be learned by contrast, and we have occasion here for every help. Therefore, proceeding from simple to the first or simplest class of complex constituents; if we can impute any thing like properties to the divine Subject, it must be chiefly by negation and contrast upon the strength of our own; and so far we may impute them after a manner, as for example. Finding in our own constitution such essential properties as these; namely, 1 divisibility, 2 limitation both in time and space, with 3 their consequent personality, we may by a negation of the same, which will be un-

avoidable on a just comparison, impute to the divine Subject an opposite property for each, or more than one perhaps; as 1, Unity and Indivisibility; 2, Eternity; 3, Infinity; 4, Incomprehensibility; 5, Impersonality; &c. And so considering these supposed constituents in succession:

—1, Unity, the first mentioned may be considered, like many other subjects, or like subject itself, either as a relation, or as a property, or as either indifferently, being in strictness what may be termed, a relative property: in which sense it is here imputed as the first and most memorable of the Highest Subject in the universe: being, if it be a property, the only one that can be ascribed to the same but what is either negative or incidental as well as relative. And such unity may here be primarily distinguished into two sorts or senses by its different application or aspect; one regarding the centre of the relation, and opposed to division, &c., the other its circumference, and opposed to seclusion, &c., one being more proper, the other more common; one more of a property, the other more of a relation.

—1, Unity, in its *proper* sense may be defined, the coherence of a subject within its natural limits where there happen to be any. And of such unity we find different sorts determined by its subject, or that of which it is predicated; and particularly as the subject may be either

single	or	plural,
integral	—	divided,
simple	—	compound,
pure	—	mixed,
uniform	—	complex.

And the present Subject being wholly of the sorts first mentioned, namely single, integral, simple, pure, uniform—neither plural, divided, compound, mixed, nor complex—the proper unity in him, or his proper unity, will be also that of singleness, integrity, simplicity, purity, uniformity, and not that of plurality, or division, or composition, or mixture, or complexity—of singleness, which is the same with

Oneness, Loneness, or absolute Unity—of integrity, which is the same with Indivisibility—of simplicity, which is the same with Peculiarity—of purity, which is the same with Perfection—of uniformity, which is the same with Divinity. The unity of the Subject therefore, considered as a property, will be in sum or substance singleness, oneness, indivisibility, peculiarity, perfection, Divinity; and consequently, of that sort only which can be asserted of no other subject or concrete. To abstract properties, as wisdom and truth, righteousness, goodness and others attributed to the Subject or not, the same sort of unity may be ascribed as to him: but he is an operator and not an abstract in himself, however abstracted to mortal, or to any finite perception. And such is the proper, characteristic, and unparalleled unity of the Great Subjective of the Kingdom—THE LORD OUR CREATOR AND PRESERVER. But there is also with him,

=2, A *common* unity on the other hand,—a relation that will include, as well as exclude other subjects; of which the included, having severally each his proper as well as common unity, all will meet under one common notion and general designation in a community or communion.

The difference between these two principal relations, or sorts of unity, namely the proper and common, is nearly equivalent to that between a simple or single, and a complex or aggregate person before described *. And of both these sorts we have examples every where: indeed we have perhaps no example of one sort, not excepting Unity itself, without the other. So that it would seem as if there was no absolute seclusion in the universe, or not in the kingdoms of nature however. For it is not to say, Spirit, but even Light itself, will have its partakers; and consequently, its common as well as proper unity: millions of independent atoms float in every ray and partake of the same, being all fairly absorbed in light, without impairing its unity. So many rays too as there are in the light of the

* Vol. 1. p. 129.

sun, they do not hinder the unity of its effulgence ; so many luminaries as there are in the heavens, they do not hinder the unity of light. Ascending to an higher principle than the sensible light, even to the intellectual, to the light of wisdom ; we also find in this one precious characteristic an example both of the property and the relation of the property, as an indivisible and illimitable characteristic ; of the relation, as a limitation of the same, first within itself, making only one thing of wisdom ; and next an extension of the same, including both persons and things, as wise kings, judges, counsellors, and men of all sorts, who have been compared to the luminaries partaking and mutually reflecting a sensible light, or the effect producing it, above (Dan. xii. 3), with all their wise acts, laws, institutions and other productions. Or taking a commoner subject for our example, we have in the abstract, manhood as proper an unity as in wisdom, or light, or any other abstract ; which proper unity is not disturbed by the common unity of Peter, James and John appearing in this nature, any more than their proper unities on the other hand are disturbed by the common unity of mankind. For whatever diversity there may be found between Peter, James and John in other respects, in their natural constitution or manhood they will yet be one. So likewise the unity of the divine nature is not disturbed by any number or plurality of persons who may be associated in the same or blessed with its communion,—neither can be, as it is necessarily indivisible. Indivisible is its species ; *Indivisibility* is a part of its nature ; indivisibility is to be reckoned among its essential properties, as among the properties of wisdom, light, life and other abstracts, of either of which there cannot be two, though either one of them may be shared by many.

Here is also this peculiarity to be observed in the present case, that the property itself is perfect as well as the example or subject ; making the same property to be two things in God and in man or any other being ; as the unity

in man is divisible, in God not: consequently the latter will have in fact but One Person, or rather none, but AN UNIVERSAL UNMODIFIED ABSTRACT, as God. There neither are gods distinct from other gods by birth or circumstances; neither is there one god individually distinct from another; as the god of one nation, or of one art, fate or quality, or of two of them, or of any thing else, or of any number of things whatever: but ONE GOD FOR ALL: God universal and alone: God, the only One. Among all those who are "partakers of the divine nature" (Pet. II. i. 4) not one is a god, as among the partakers of human nature every one is a man. Even the Father himself is not a god indefinitely: but he and all his children are severally persons, types or representations of One; who is not an individual, special or general person either; but an universal or abstract, as formerly defined.

Every subject therefore with all its train or production* may be considered either in unity, in duality, or in a more complex relation; as for example, 1 God alone; 2 God and man; or two persons of God, or any other two, EXCEPT two GODS, on account of his peculiarity aforesaid. For other subjects may both change their proper unity, and multiply their common—by distinction and division; as man for example, who was created in unity, becoming two by division, thus exchanges in the first place his unity for duality: then by one birth for trinity, by another for quaternity, and so on through different degrees of plurality, till he arrives at multiplicity; which is now a form or condition of his nature, v. g. of the nature of the universal or abstract man,—a numerical property of his; as sleep may

* Although the Deity be the only whole and sole Subject, or perfect proper and unalterable unity in the world, That which alone neither has nor can have any equal or correlative, it is no uncommon solecism with divines, to talk of "The Father and the Son in the unity of the Holy Ghost:" as if this was the fountain of their relation, instead of being as it is, only one correlative springing or accruing together with them from THE UNITY OF THE GODHEAD.

be a physical, or judgment a moral. In man the unity of the subject may be disturbed many ways ; by the loss of some element, as reason ; or of some property, as imagination ; or even by the loss of a single thought ; and equally so by the acquisition ; but in God nothing is ever lost or acquired, changed or diminished ; his unity was never made, nor can ever be broken ; is neither casual nor arbitrary, but necessary and habitual. BEING BY BEING, THE ONLY SELF EXISTENT, GOD IS ALWAYS ; AND ALWAYS ONE—THE FOUNTAIN OF PROPERTIES, CONSISTING OF NONE.

For though we say, “ God is a Spirit,” meaning One of many ; it is no more than to say God is a Judge, a Saviour, a Rewarder, or any other common character. He may be characterized as a Judge, as a Spirit, or as One of any other kind in a common way of speaking or for the sake of argument ; but truly and philosophically can be only of that kind of which there is only One. For he is all his kind : there is no other God but He ; nor other kind of God. There can be no other ; as infinity presents no distinction. In Heaven and earth, in highest and lowest ; in best and worst ; in matter and intellect ; in angels and men, He is One. In millions, in units ; in worlds, in atoms ; in all things, in any thing, He is One : In commanding and obeying ; in ordering and executing ; in judging and expiating, in condemning and suffering, He is One : One and the Same : One everywhere ; at every period ; in every subject ; and under every circumstance. For there is only He from whom all proceeds : among all the diversity in which he is pleased to shew himself he is always the same ; and THERE IS ONLY HE ; no other god, no degree of gods, no sort, nor variety. He is the Only God ; as in all, so likewise to all the world. And while the nations have generally entertained an absurd notion or belief of some petty authorities in heaven like demigods, they have more generally acknowledged ONE ABOVE ALL, though by different names ; and all worshipped ONE ; though some with more truth and intelligence,

than others: as St. Paul told the Athenians, "Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, Him (the Same) declare I unto you" (Acts xvii. 23).

In this relation Unity will be nearly the same with Universality; and what St. Paul says again in the way of one is no more than Hezekiah said or implied according to Isaiah in the other, "There is none other God but One" (Cor. I. viii. 4), says St. Paul, "O Lord, God of Hosts, God of Israel, that dwellest between the cherubims; THOU ART THE GOD, EVEN THOU ALONE OF ALL THE KINGDOMS OF THE EARTH: Thou hast made heaven and earth" (Isai. xxxvii. 16), said Hezekiah. So David says, "THE NAME OF THE LORD IS PRAISED FROM THE RISING UP OF THE SUN UNTO THE GOING DOWN OF THE SAME" (Ps. cxiii. 3). And while engrossing this relation makes the Subject One externally to all the world, the peculiarity of his internal relation by the indivisibility aforesaid will make him likewise peculiarly One in himself. Man is many in one, the devil is many in one: but God is only One in One inversely or internally, as directly or externally he is one in many. He is one in himself, and One to all the world: which is a peculiarity that cannot be ascribed to any other subject or being. The unity of the Godhead therefore will amount to the same effect as the being of one God; and the belief of such unity, as just observed, is more common than many suppose, and much more than some would be willing to allow who are fond of magnifying their own orthodoxy at the expense of other men's credit for piety.

This doctrine of One universal God then being so common, is also carefully guarded every where in Scripture against wilful perversion or misapprehension: as indeed it ought to be, considering how many passages there are in that compilation from which a several personage of the Deity might otherwise have been inferred. For example, without this precaution the God of Hosts, and the God of Heaven there mentioned might be taken for two distinct

deities like Mars and Jupiter; much more the God of hosts, and the Merciful God, Our heavenly Father, &c. So might the universal God in every country and kingdom in which he has a different name be taken for a different god; or if it be only from corruptions of the sacred name like one before alluded to*: but among all the absurdities of polytheism as long as the same shall be acknowledged separately for the One SELF-EXISTENT, which is the same as ONLY God; the God of all the countries in the world, and of all the worlds in being,—there can be no great danger of a rival deity. Yet it was no easy task for the sacred writers to avoid some appearance of such an error; while they described continually a celestial agent interfering in the destinies of Israel, and ruling the fate of that highly favoured republic by means of other inferior angels or agents. In this arduous task they have succeeded however through the guidance of the same agent, by constantly identifying that Agent himself with the universal Being of God; so keeping close to the simple doctrine of the divine unity, and never impeaching nor oppugning that doctrine by any expression that could be fairly so construed.

This doctrine then we might have believed on such high and consistent authority, though we had not also the consent of reason and experience for it, as we have most decidedly, and with such circumstances as no one who has ever considered them, can long doubt. But they who ever think of two beings, one supremely good and the other supremely evil equal and independent of each other, cannot so much have an idea of One simply Supreme: no more can they who think of many supreme beings presiding over as many different concerns, or in as many different spheres however denominated: because such beings can be considered as supreme in one point only, if in that; whereas our idea of God is, that of ONE

UNIVERSALLY SUPREME, and not in any particular respect or respects: of One above all that are good and all that are evil; above all that shine in peace or in war, in wisdom or in judgment, in prudence, or in skill; above all that excel or govern in Heaven, earth, or hell. Supremacy is indivisibility: and if God has no equal in particular spheres or concerns, still less has he in the sphere of the universe. There cannot indeed be an example of two supremes in any particular concern or sphere; as two kings or two consuls in a government, or two masters in a business, trade, or profession: for though equal in respect of each other, they must both be subject still to some law or compact; and that again to some power or sanction, which, or its subject, is the real supreme. How then can He, the Only One, who is above all law, have an equal on any account, or in any respect; as he says himself by the prophet, "To whom will ye liken me, and make me equal, and compare me, that we may be like?" (Isai. xlv. 5). As well might there be two abstract properties of any kind; as wisdom, or light, or love, as two supreme beings over the whole world.

—2, But this unalterable unity is not the only peculiar attribute of Divinity, there being another obvious even to a finite understanding, to wit, *Eternity*: and it is obvious in this manner; namely, that no understanding, of course, can have any knowledge of its own beginning; however sensible some understandings may be of their own growth, and apprehensive of decay: and that ignorance alone would seem good evidence of the divine property or attribute of eternity here alluded to. For if the mind be unconscious of its own beginning, it will then follow that the mind began, as directly as if it remembered the event; unless we are to suppose a translation of the mind from one sort of thing to another: but, as far as we know ourselves, every tittle of us, however minute, from the simplest act or constituent to the greatest and most complex, will seem to have its beginning and ending: there cannot be so much

as a thought, but comes and goes, and is a subject of time ; therefore the whole must be a subject of time likewise, and come and go like these ; and not long about either, but quick as thought itself almost. " For what is your life ? (says St. James) it is even a vapour that appeareth for a little time, and then vanisheth away " (Jam. iv. 14). To have no beginning, we must know it ; and that can only be the privilege of One to Whom we owe our existence. Thus the eternity of the Creator may be obvious to that which he has created, through a consciousness of its own creation. In other words, our own beginning will necessarily suppose the existence of One who never began. " It is He that hath made us, and not we ourselves " (Ps. c. 2). And,

—3, Space too being only another predicament correlative with time, it will follow that He who has no limitation in respect of this, can have none either in respect of that : hence his *Infinity* with its consequent, ubiquity, or omnipresence, and other attributes that are too well known to need repetition, and better known, unfortunately, than they are remembered. And yet these attributes seem to remind us mutually of each other all the while ; so closely are they connected, and as it were linked together ; being alternately like a converse or consequence to each other. Thus, for example ; as the divine attribute of infinity is equivalent, only in a different line, with eternity, so

—4, The *Incomprehensibility* of the Subject to any other than himself will be a direct consequence of his eternity. For the whole of this state being peculiar to himself, there could be no one but himself to comprehend him in the beginning or, rather before any : whence his natural incomprehensibility is evident. And though one would not pretend to dispute the possibility of the Creator's forming a creature adequate to this comprehension, yet considering his forementioned property of Infinity, and (to our conception at least) the total impossibility of two infinities, while nothing less than infinity can comprehend

that which is infinite ; his incomprehensibility farther than his back parts, as Moses was allowed to view Him (Exod. xxxiii. 23), may thence be clearly inferred. The train of his divine Majesty may be seen by a singular favour : but the front or outgoing of the same, not ; “Thou canst not see my face : (said He) for there shall no man see my face, and live” (Ib. 20). Much more therefore will personality, literally understood, be deemed incompatible with the nature of the divine Subject in all the forementioned respects ; and,

—5, The attribute of *Impersonality* be unavoidable ; namely, in respect of the Subject’s unity, eternity, incomprehensibility and infinity ; as may appear by comparison, and

=1, In respect of his natural unity and indivisibility. For if there were other subjects of this kind, that is to say, other gods, which we know there are not ; although in that case the condition of a rational individuality, like that of angels or intelligent spirits, might apply ; the species of individuality considered as personal could not. But there being no distinction in divinity, no other subject as we call it, but a perfect unity, it is hard indeed to conceive how there may be in this respect what we literally understand by Personality.

=2, Still harder, if possible, is it to conceive this kind of individuality in respect of the second property above mentioned with its companion and consequences, namely, in respect of the eternity and infinity of the divine Subject, with his consequent omnipresence and ubiquity, according to the definition of a person before given. It may be, that God shall be presented or represented in the narrow limits of a human person ; but that will not make God a person, and give him a limitation, if it make such person his human representation, and give him a relation to Infinity : or should He be presented in a spiritual or angelic medium, as he is, no doubt, much oftener than in a human, that would not make him a person, even if angels or spirits were persons, which they are not ; but such spiritual or

angelic medium his spiritual or angelic representation. As our idea of personality, however it may be abstracted in the sequel, is originally taken from a material form or circumscription with its several properties, including gravitation or confinement, also limitation, visibility, palpability, and other objects of sense; if every other positive property had not been denied, we could never think of such a one for that infinite and incomprehensible Being, "who (as St. Paul writes) only hath immortality, dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto; whom no man hath seen nor can see" (Tim. I. vi. 16): "whom the Heaven and Heaven of heavens cannot contain" (Kings I. viii. 27): and who, therefore, as any one may suppose, is not to be contained within any human, that is partly material, nor within any other fluctuating and finite dimensions. Every individual person is the boundary of his own existence, is a measure to himself, the measure as well as the presence of an intellectual being, and consequently of the whole of that being: therefore, as the being is infinite in this case, so will his measure or person be, that is INFINITE—or in other words NONE, no measure nor personality, but impersonality and infinity. So that we can have no idea of an infinite person; and besides this and the other grounds before mentioned, still seem to have more for not receiving, nor endeavouring to imagine or conceive a case so inconceivable; as

==3, For one, that the impersonality of the Supreme Being just mentioned as a necessary consequence of his incomprehensibility, may be considered as more than a consequence, or in the same view. For, to say that a subject may be incomprehensibly personified or presented, would itself be as incomprehensible a proposition as ever was uttered; seeing that Presence necessarily implies comprehension somewhere, if not with every object to which it occurs.

And literally, in short, there is no such person as the person of God, any more than there is literally such as the person of man, of the poor, of the mighty, of any other

class before enumerated*, or of any single property either which is still more abstract and indefinite; as of Wisdom, Truth, Nature, Providence and others that are wont to be personified. The first man was a person, and the whole kind a person in him, because there were other kinds co-existent with him to which his presence was an object: but what object would the Presence of God be to any observer before it pleased his Goodness to make one? Then, as one man may be personified, or personally presented to the world in his mortal birth, so may God to mankind in his, and also in the issue or outgoing of his Spirit and being with its honoured objects, or those to whom he is so presented. Yet God personified, or in person, either way, is very different from God considered as a person. And since we have not even any IMMEDIATE APPREHENSION of the Deity, as we may have however imperfectly of other objects—neither can have through the absence of perceptivity with every other positive property in him, as aforesaid,—the negative of personality must be applied to him, as well as that of comprehensibility, finitude, divisibility, and the rest; although in our manner of speaking, many a good property is mentioned with their Author, as if he had made himself.

—6, Among such imaginary constituents of divinity the property of *Love* may be mentioned also for one. And if any one property can be more real or constituent than others,—if any one in particular may be regarded as the fountain or parent of all that are good and estimable, if one peculiarly of God, it is love; love older than the creation of the world, more stedfast than its foundations, more capacious than its dimensions; love, immutable love, eternal, divine, extending from the Father to the Son; “For thou lovedst me before the foundation of the world” (John xvii. 24) says he—and through him to others; “that the love wherewith thou hast loved me may be in them,

and I in them" (Ib. 26). Love is a bond of union *inversely*, or among themselves, to all who are born of God; and to others a line of demarcation that cannot be broken through. "For love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God" (John I. iv. 7, 8). So says the divine St. John: and again, "GOD IS LOVE: and he that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God and God in him" (Ib. 16): that is incidentally, however, and not essentially—*incidentally* like an occurrence; and as it were by reflexion. For as a mirror opposite to the sun is full of his image and glorious influence, so men who walk before God are full of his resemblance, and "being changed into the same image from glory to glory," as it was said before, reflect with increasing lustre his divine attributes on all around: of which attributes this is a principal. And, therefore, it is well said by St. John, as above, "We love God because He first loved us," and chiefly in blessing us with that most excellent gift. The cause is with him; the effect with his most favoured creatures. With him is the cause of love, not the love it causes; according to that expression, "With thee is the well of life; and in thy light shall we see light" (Ps. xxxvi. 9). And upon the whole; though it is impossible to conceive a nearer affinity between the human nature and the divine than what appears in this particular instance, yet it is far from being a real one, or one that will help us to an adequate notion of the divine Subject.

And if from that remarkable saying of St. John, as well as from other expressions in Scripture, it should still appear that love is more essential to the Deity, or more like a constituent than its compeers, whether following or preceding it in this comparison; a little farther reflection may shew, that with Him this property is not even incidental, to say nothing of its constituency, whether essential or characteristic: for example,

=1, In the first place *love accruing or incidental*, to

its object shall begin perhaps with the quality of a mere impression : in a higher degree it shall amount to what we call Suffering : and it might be increased to an extreme, or, as we say, a burning Passion : much more also with a Being that had no bounds. But God is universally acknowledged to be impassible, as well as infinite ; and must consequently be as incapable of loving immediately as of hating, however our ignorance may oblige us to speak on this head.

=2, *Constituent love, or love latent* and preceding its object, being understood simply and alone, or unqualified, is indifferent, is mere appetite ; and may therefore be either good or evil, consequently no characteristic : while

=3, The effect that prevents it from being the incidental property of an impassible Subject would much more prevent it from being *essentially* constituent of the same. Neither will it avail to say, that the divine love is a particularly pure and perfect species, capable of suffering neither pain, nor disappointment, and therefore not to be ranked among passions ; as the purest love may be the most painful by chance. For what species of love can be more pure and perfect than that of a father for his children ? One would think, this were the very counterpart of the love that God must feel for mankind : indeed, it is expressly said, that “ like as a father pitieth his own children, even so is the Lord merciful unto them that fear Him ” (Ps. ciii. 13). But no fear can restrain the innate depravity of mankind so far that it will not shew itself sometimes in relation to the Best of beings : and let him tell who can, of any more painful feeling than a father’s love for ungrateful children, or any that would be a more probable type of the divine, supposing such a passion possible. St. Paul observes that “ love is the fulfilling of the law ” (Rom. xiii. 10) : and as far as doing good may be love, God for ever blessed is love in effect ; but it will not follow therefore, that love is God, or only a divine consti-

tuent;—unless it can be shewn, that demonstrations are principles, and effects their own causes. He may inspire some of us with just enough of this excellent gift to make us long for more, and so far is love acquisitively, v. g. to us, but not therefore love essentially, any more than fire is heat essentially, because it is heat to us, or we find it warm.

—7, The same may also be said of other properties that men derive from their UNPROPERTIED FOUNTAIN; as *Power*, might, majesty, or dominion; which seems to be expressly intimated as the foundation of a resemblance between God and man in the account of man's creation. For example, "God said, LET US MAKE MAN IN OUR IMAGE, AFTER OUR LIKENESS: AND LET THEM HAVE DOMINION over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. So God created man in his own image" (Gen. i. 26, 27). "Let us make man in our own image", said he: and that was how he did it. Which would seem a very sufficient ground for imputing the property of power, might, majesty, and dominion to God; namely, the same appearing a property of man, and the very same in which he is here understood to resemble Him. But without resting this point upon inference, the property of power is positively ascribed to God by the Psalmist in many places, especially where he says, "God spake once, and twice I have also heard the same; THAT POWER BELONGETH UNTO GOD" (Ps. lxii. 11): and negatively also by an apostle, where he says "THERE IS NO POWER BUT OF GOD: THE POWERS THAT BE ARE ORDAINED OF GOD" (Rom. xiii. 1). And farther than that we read likewise, that God is a Spirit: but power and spirit have been shewn to be synonymous; so that being one he must necessarily be the other likewise: which would make it appear as if power was not only a property of the Godhead but a constituent. It is

not with God a fleeting shadow as with men, and built chiefly on concession, but like a regular constituent, a constant, ever freely flowing property.

Freely flowing truly; and also to be a constituent property when water shall be a property of water, and the stream a property of the fountain: in the mean time, power will not be a property, but an emanation of the divine Being. All power is of God: it is not simply, nor in any degree, without excepting omnipotence, a part of that Being; nor yet originally a matter of creation like its objects, nor a consequence of creation either like the new powers, or created spirits: but a plain mode, continuation, and correlative of Self-existence.

—8, It may be thought, that some of those superior characteristic properties which are founded on power, being decidedly constituent with those who enjoy them, though power is not, may also be attributed to God as constituent properties. Of these first, *Mercy* and goodness, for example, may be thought as constituent with Him, as with us: and no one can doubt their worthiness to be embodied in the highest nature. It may also be observed, that these are not passions, whether painful or pleasant, but either active or substantive properties, as they happen to exist either in latency or in operation. And when people have established, as they may think, a general likeness or parallel between the divine and human constitution in respect of these properties, they may go on to discover likewise some more particular resemblance; as for example, considering the caprice with which these godlike properties of mercy and goodness are exercised on earth, and how often the princes of the earth are seen to take again with one hand what they bestow with the other, these false reasoners may expect to find the same capricious exercise of mercy and goodness in God as in man: more especially, when they recollect the example of Job and others who have been exalted to the highest pitch of prosperity by divine goodness, only as it were to be thrown

down again, and amply endowed with every worldly blessing only to have it taken away again as one would think, and as they appeared to think (Job, ii. 10; Ps. cii. 10). So that, to fulfil our Saviour's precept on this head, "Be ye therefore merciful, as your heavenly Father is merciful" (Luke vi. 36), we should at this rate only be required to give and take away again to be as He is in this respect, and He as we, of course; the same merciful property with all its peculiarities, being equally a constituent of both. It may be worth while therefore to observe the inaptitude of this comparison from beginning to end, and how, not only the mercy that we justly impute to God is no constituent of his, but neither likewise the consequent inconsistency and caprice here alluded to.

=1, Not to dispute upon terms then, as whether mercy be an active or a passive property, in its latent or substantive state, we must allow, that it is one of the multitude of appetitive constituents which God has created, and of which one may as well be imputed to an impassible Being in this light as another, the grosser feeling of love, as the more exalted impression of mercy; for MERCY IS HIS DEVICE AND IMPRESS, but not his constituent.

=2, With respect to the capricious exercise of mercy seemingly observed both in the adverse fate of good men like Job and others, and also in the opposite lot of "the ungodly which prosper in the world" (Ps. lxxiii. 12); we may be satisfied, that the Judge of all the earth will do right (Gen. xviii. 25),—and not only what is right, but kind, and merciful, with regard to the just: "Thou, Most Upright, dost weigh the path of the just" (Isai. xxvi. 7). And the wicked, however they may seem to thrive under his protection, are only protected for the sake of others, and not for themselves, like oxen fatted for the slaughter; while the righteous in depression are gathering for themselves an eternal REWARD in the increase of righteousness, their heavenly Father having graciously condescended to gild his favours with that flatter-

ing epithet. So in the case of Abraham for example, when he promises to bestow Himself, the greatest favour of all, he says, "Fear not, Abram: for I am thy shield, and thy exceeding great REWARD" (Gen. xv. 1); also in the case of David and others (Ps. xvi. 6; lxii. 2, &c.). "But thy loving kindness and mercy shall follow me all the days of my life (says he): and I will dwell in the house of the Lord for ever" (Ib. xxiii. 6).

—9, But *Judgment*, justice and rigour, other properties of the same foundation, that is to say, of superiority or power, have none of the air of that class which we call passions or feelings. And if the two last mentioned, justice and rigour may be considered rather as modes or consequences of the first-mentioned judgment, judgment itself will be as positive a property as any in the Kingdom, and its constituency also more obvious in this particular acceptance than in the broad meaning that is usually assigned it. For we are not here to understand the property or habit of comparing subjects generally, but of comparing only innocence and guilt, with their respective liabilities. And if any one act can be more positive and specific than another it is this sort of judgment, which may issue in a word; while its consequences shall be perhaps very lengthened and complicated. Wherefore it may be said, If SUFFERING cannot enter or make any part of an impassible subject, still such DOINGS, whether substantive or direct, as like this of judgment, have a share in suffering may be deemed constituent even of such a subject. But that must be a fallacy; as with men even in a prejudication, where the object, the prosecutor and the evidence may all have no weight, something else will: and it is the same with all the acts of the creature; there are none that may not be referred to some cause or accident, without which they would not be; and hence their constitution by accidents as aforesaid. But not so the Creator: the First Cause or Creator alone can be said to be by being, and not by constitution. Even life itself is too

complex a notion for the purity of his existence, and cannot be imputed to him without a figure; no more can any single act, which with creatures will make a part of their life; but suffering and death may as well be imputed to him in the nature of constituents, as life and happiness; all being equally of him.

Doctrine like this may seem altogether incomprehensible to many; and no wonder, considering the incomprehensibility of the Subject of whom it is predicated: but the consequences to be drawn therefrom would be equally incomprehensible and more wonderful, if the simplest of simple constituents should be allowed in the case. The safest way therefore is, not to say more of Jehovah than we know of Him; but to be more governed by what we do know than, we, are sometimes. "For God is in Heaven, and thou upon earth (says the Preacher), therefore let thy words be few" (Eccles. v. 2). So much as this may indeed be conceded, that the official character of the divine Judge is formed like that of any other by his judgments, as other parts of his relative being are formed by other relative acts; though of his absolute or essential being we cannot concede, because we do not pretend to know any thing. "But Wisdom is justified of her children" (Matt. xi. 19): as it was said by the first of them. And that is another of those lofty attributes, which the present comparison includes.

—10, *Wisdom* then, understanding thereby Right Wisdom of course, that is Righteousness or Truth, is almost another name for the Deity; as, for example, in the passage last cited: therefore, continuing our parallel, it may be worth while to consider now, how far even this great principle, the details of which have been lately described, can be imputed to the subject as a constituent. And if we could conceive a possibility of the Great First Cause consisting of properties, especially of any that we know of, or of which we can have any notion, it would certainly be of some such as these which are the perfection of

thinking and doing. But a single reflection on the nature of the said properties will suffice to shew, that neither of them, that is neither wisdom nor right wisdom, which is truth, can make any part of the divine Nature or Being in itself. For God made them both. There was no such thing as wisdom before any objects, nor as right wisdom, before any bounds, nor as truth before the existence of correlatives: all which God determined and created with a prodigious host of intellectual spirits to know, feel, and pursue them; and unto man he said, "BEHOLD THE FEAR OF THE LORD, THAT IS WISDOM; AND TO DEPART FROM EVIL IS UNDERSTANDING" (Job xxviii. 28).

God therefore could not be that which he made. Even a man, as before observed, is not what he makes: if he were, a man might be a carved image for one thing, and several men also partake in this one article of mock essence; the smith working with tongs and hammers, the carpenter with rule, line, plane and compass (Isai. xlv. 12, 13). And at that rate, the Maker of all concerned,—of the smith, carpenter and all, may be an image as well as the carver or any of them; since He makes those who make it. We should observe the great distinction between making and doing: for a man is not what he makes, but what he does and suffers; and God is neither making nor doing; He is that He is. As Pilate answered, "What I have written I have written" (John xix. 22); so God "I am that I am" (suprà): being by being, as writing is by writing. He only is alone or self-existent; besides Him all is combination: there is not one creature without another, nor one action of one creature that is not supported by another, or in which one creature from highest to lowest is the only party concerned. There is not therefore any absolute BEING—the only substantive act, with any but God. With Him indeed it is: THE CREATOR ONLY is in strictness; the creatures all subsist—first by each other, and finally by Him. And among all the creatures there is not one that can say, as He can, "I am" simply with-

out any reference, or independent of every other subject: as for example, Without air to breathe, without fire to warm, without earth to tread, I am. Without a beginning, I am: and I am without end. "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever the earth and the world were made, Thou art God from everlasting, and world without end" (Ps. xc. 2). HE ONLY IS, AND ALL THE WORLD BY HIM. He is made (if one might so say) by what he is: and not by what he makes, nor yet by what he does. In Him is the making and doing of every thing, yet no constituent of his; no more is any thing that is made or done: for example, the sun shines; but God made the sun. So the sun shines by God: but the sun cannot be God, nor God the sun: And when we say, "God is light," we mean acquisitively, as said before of love. "LET YOUR LIGHT SO SHINE BEFORE MEN, THAT THEY MAY SEE YOUR GOOD WORKS, AND GLORIFY YOUR FATHER WHICH IS IN HEAVEN" (Matt. v. 16).

* As a corollary or consequence or the doctrine of the divine constituency, or rather INCONSTITUENCY, if one might be allowed the expression, now advanced, it may be well to pass an observation on the egregious absurdity of the Epicureans whether old or new: if it be only to shew what absurdities men are liable to encounter in their descent when falling, as we all naturally are, from God. For justly observing that nothing comes of nothing, they proceed first to infer, that every positive species must also come originally of its kind or likeness in the same way; as for example, something of every thing, and every thing one of another in all their varieties continually: the first consequence of which is a clear denial of creation, and the next of any Creator besides that which is seen. So they say, "*Est Jupiter quodcunque vides,*" or God is whatever you see; consequently whatever you see must be God. Whereas in the enlightened sense of Revelation, not whatever you see only, but "all things that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible" (Col.

i. 16) are—not God however, but OF God (Cor. I. xi. 12); the same happening two ways 1 directly, 2 indirectly; and the first also either immediately or mediately; so that there are in all three ways, 1 directly and immediately, 2 directly and mediately, 3 indirectly; in one or other of which all things are of God. To speak distinctly of productions occurring in these three several ways:

1, Those of the first sort or *direct immediate*, must be in or with God as well as of, and consequently divine. For as true as it is, that nothing only comes of nothing and that something is not every thing, so true is it, that only one sort ever comes immediately of one, which must be one with it, and what comes not immediately, another even when it comes directly; of which a carved image, the production lately mentioned, may be an example. Let us consider therefore what it is in an image that properly comes from the maker, and what not: for what proceeds from him immediately is all that is properly of him, or all his proper contribution; as for example the labour and design: wherein is exemplified this first kind, or the direct and immediate production of God.

2, But, to exemplify the second sort, perhaps even the design was not originally this image-maker's: if so, it merely passes through his mind, and is no more a part of him than the food that passes through his body; when the labour, or perhaps only the employment of such labour, will be his proper contribution or production. So likewise while all that we see or can conceive must proceed from the great Artificer of the universe, and consequently all must be of him, we are yet to remember, that it is the universal purpose and admirable consent of parts with the power by which they are created and combined that proceeds directly and immediately from him, and is therefore properly his; not that which proceeds but *mediately* however *directly*, still less indirectly,—not any dissenting purpose, nor any insulated or contravening part. Thus the part of an honest shepherd is directly, but mediately by Christ, a part beginning in God: while that of a rebellious angel is a

part in the universe, and yet no part in its Author; for though a part in the universe, it is not an universal part, as every operation of the Creator must be, be it never so minute; a sparrow cannot fall on the ground (Matt. x. 29), nor a drop of rain either without him. He is with all and in all, though we see but too much that is not all in him, nor able to claim any connexion with him either.

3, Then by means of this illustration we may also be able to distinguish not only that which is directly of God both 1: 2 immediately and mediately, but also what is of him *indirectly* and it may be oppositely, like the rebellious part just alluded to. For if the original mode or design of that angel was directly of God and immediately too perhaps, as well as the power (Luke iv. 6; John xix. 11), the angel was not immediately nor his rebellion by means of the power delivered to him even directly, but indirectly and oppositely of God, of whom are all things.

Blind as men are therefore, they may be able to detect the fallacy of that atheistical conclusion "Est Jupiter," &c., or that because all things are of God therefore they must be God; that is more than divine: for only let the power of God to make something new be conceded, and the possibility of his external relations or of things that are not God is proved. If for instance, not to repeat any of the superior examples before mentioned, the Creator has ever made, endowed or afflicted any creature with properties that he had not himself; say gravitation, limitation, palpability and other material properties, or the spiritual and intellectual properties of folly, shame, and remorse; though the design and also the power of such creation is of God and in, yet the effect or production itself will be only of. The effect therefore may be thought to be generally without, at the same time that it is of its Author; while the power and design by which such effect is produced are also of; but in, and not without him; being therefore in and with God, they must be considered to be God; not indeed as constituents, because he has none,

but as counterparts and correlatives, whether we consider them in their origin or egress; just as a man's thoughts are internal before publication, and external likewise after; or only constituent before, but incidental likewise after, when reflected in print; being first in and afterwards of their author or subject, together both in and of.

Whatever we may consider therefore as being both in God, and of, we need not hesitate to style his immediate production,—and whatever comes by this, his mediate, direct; as by the first his Power and Purpose, and by the next all their immediate effects, among which are to be reckoned especially those excellent properties of rational and intellectual creatures by which they approximate towards the character of the First Cause, or, as St. Peter expresses it, “all things that pertain unto life and godliness, through the knowledge of Him that hath called us to glory and virtue. Whereby are given unto us exceeding great and precious promises; that by these ye might be PARTAKERS OF THE DIVINE NATURE, having escaped the corruption that is in the world through lust” (Pet. II. i. 3, 4). For such as the Deity is in himself, such is he likewise in every relation; such as the purpose of the Deity is in his Mind or Conception, such is it likewise in publication; and such as the power is in his Spirit, such is it likewise in production. “For the Word of God is quick and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discernor of the thoughts and intents of the heart” (Heb. iv. 12). “There are also diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit; and there are differences of administrations, but the same Lord; and there are diversities of operations, but it is the same God that worketh all in all” (Cor. I. xii. 4—6). As the feelings and sentiments of one man entertained by another or by many others, will still continue to be the feelings and sentiments of that one;

so the Spirit of God, who is all Spirit, and the Mind of God, who is all Mind, being in the world will still continue to be God and with God in the world, as out of it or before the world was made. Divinity is Divinity all the world over, and much beyond it: Divinity is always God, here and every where; and in all time, as well as before and after. Therefore every subject being of its subjective in the same manner generally as its constituents are of the subject, so will it here be particularly of the Subjective of the Kingdom, the Universal Subjective. "For of him, and through him, and to him are all things."

On the other hand, what a subject is not in himself he cannot be in his mediate productions; as that which never made a part of its subject or author before production cannot become a part thereby, or on being produced. For the subject does not consist of its secondary productions at any rate, if it do of those in which they originate operating; and, it may be, reflected, in them. The revealed Will of God for example, which we have in the form of commandments and declarations is an habitual production of God, who always wills, and always the same: but the form in which we have that Will is a production of the Will itself; as our acceptance of it is a part or property of our life reflecting the Will of God, though by a very imperfect image, being a third or fourth rate production, and as different from its divine Author and Original as any one thing can be from another of the same general quality or character. So a man may be the original author of misery to others, before he has felt it himself, by falsehood or by violence; as God will soon or late be the Author of repentance to him by his judgments: in which case, as the man would consist, not of misery, but of falsehood or violence in the first place; and in the next, of repentance; so God would consist, not of repentance, but (as far as he can consist of any thing) of judgment in the first place, and in the next, of glory and worship, reflected perhaps

by the new life of a sinner through Jesus Christ; "who of God is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption" (Cor. I. i. 30).

So far as the aforesaid mediate production can be one with the First Cause by reflexion, the same may be conceded to the visionaries above mentioned; and more, if they think it would serve their argument, in that it is not so easy to distinguish the Creator from his productions, as to distinguish one creature from another, to the existence of which that one is only instrumental; because a production *AB ORIGINE*, like all the Creator's, is more entirely of its Author than a partial production compounded of ready materials, like all the creatural or artificial productions, can possibly be. To make this apparent, let another example be supposed.

If then one in authority should frame and utter an edict to any purport whatever; the framing and uttering would constitute a part of the great man's life, and consequently of the great man himself. But this it would not be of him exclusively: for to every edict other matters are requisite besides framing and uttering by means of which it may also be identified with the lives of others. If, for example, such edict be only received in the ear, it will be a part of the hearer's life, and consequently of the hearer also as well as of the speaker; and he perhaps not the real maker. So here are three partners already to the edict; in which the vehicle of sound, the ambient air, will also have some property, if nothing else. And if the edict be committed to writing, the scribe together with his pen, ink and paper, will have a property in it. If the edict is to be enforced by arms or eloquence, soldiers, orators and others will "divide the spoil with the great": and in fact, if there was nothing else to divide it with, the man in authority must divide the production with the patterns of his own conceptions, not one of which originates with him in this or in any other case. But how may it be on the other side of the question? There is not a power nor

property in the universe but what is of God, either directly or indirectly, from first to last, in all its forms and combinations. That power of gravitation which rules the planets in their orbits is the same which precipitates the autumnal leaves, and divides with other properties the honour of directing their fall: and that glorious light which radiates from the orb of day is not essentially distinguished from the solitary heath-borne ray that glimmers in a cabin. So is the greatest and the least effect imaginable equally of God. No edict is ever uttered but by his means, nor heard, nor registered, nor enforced, nor opposed; no, nor yet conceived by any means, the means of which are not of his entire production, as much as the original pattern of the ruler's conception. It is all of Him, and through him; "for of him, and through him, and to him are all things" (Rom. xi. 36). A man's own children cannot be so much of him, as all things are of God.

But what does that signify; or to what purpose do these examples and concessions avail, beyond that of demonstrating the great and intimate share of the Creator in every production? Not a jot it must be owned, towards identifying the Creator with his creatures: more especially when one considers the effect of opposition in many, and how many gainsayers there are of the human as well as infernal species, who have nothing to do with him, whatever he may have to do with them. And, in short, if the omnipresence of the Deity could not be explained in some other way than that of the Epicureans above mentioned, one would rather leave the question as an inexplicable mystery, or even as an irreconcilable paradox; one would submit to a perfect nonplus, frustrate every principle of reasoning, and give one's reason to the winds—rather than accept a conclusion so derogatory to the Subject. Thanks to God, however! there appears no necessity for offering any violence to our understanding on this occasion; and to reconcile the difficulty aforesaid may not be too hard a task for any one, the

premises being duly considered. The Christian mode of philosophising thereon, or Jewish in perfection, is light and rational, and very different from the heavy, semibarbarian Greek of any school whatever. It refers every form and beginning to the Will of God, as described by his Word; having no other wish, than to repose on that Will so described; "committing itself to Him in well doing, as unto a faithful Creator" (Pet. I. iv. 19); and never dreaming of plastic powers, nor rotatory, nor atomic, nor powers of any other sort, besides the WORD OF GOD and powers thence proceeding; whereby "the heavens were of old, and the earth standing out of the water and in the water" (Ib. II. iii. 5); and not only that, but by which every drop of water in the world has its prescribed form, course, and consistency.

And so, having taken a general view of the divine Subject in the least complex of his imputed constituents; here let us dismiss an inquiry, which could not have begun without a share of diffidence that must be justified by the inferiority of its execution; and wherein have been considered the supposed properties, more properly called Attributes, of the Deity; not entirely, but by samples or selections, and with the help of a comparison that is only fertile in negatives. For it does not seem necessary to enter into the detail of elements, parts, &c. in this instance, as one should on ordinary occasions; first, because the Godhead does not appear to be a subject that one might venture to scan with technical precision; and next, that having taken away the foundation of such parts, &c. in the course of our inquiry, and placed the subject above them by denying its composition or consistence of properties like other subjects which all consist by this, a detail of the kind would seem as irrelevant as unbecoming.

To bewail our ignorance of God, thrust out as we are from the light of his Presence and plunged in woeful darkness, is more becoming than to dogmatize, or even to seem to know any thing concerning an object so superior

to human conception—beyond that which he is pleased to reveal in his Word and in his Works or foreign productions; though we cannot help turning our thoughts and discourse, as He turns our hearts when he turns them towards himself.

3. Now the *Works* of that Real Subjective may be divided into three principal spheres or departments; Nature, Grace, and Providence, which are made thereby: that is to say, the spheres or departments are made by, or composed of the works. For example: first the natural department of God's universal Kingdom may be proposed, and designated in one word, by its characteristic property, i. e. Nature, for the Kingdom of nature; then the other two likewise, simply by the terms, Grace and Providence, for the Department of Grace and the Department of Providence. And to either of these three departments to which we may turn our attention, that beautiful eulogy of the Psalmist will equally apply, "THE WORKS OF THE LORD ARE GREAT, sought out of all them that have pleasure therein" (Ps. cxi. 2).

1, But of these three departments it would seem, as if we were more sensible to the existence, and more alive to the beauty of the works of *Nature*, than of those of Grace and Providence; though we be poor admirers, and very inadequate of the charms of either. For the foundation of beauty being a just design every where, or in every department, the same is most obvious perhaps in the visible works of nature; being there an instinctive preference conferred by the Creator for our direction to that which is just and appropriate. Nevertheless, our estimate of the same must be always imperfect, until we are so far improved by good observation as to be able to comprehend more than we perceive naturally of the purpose of the divine Artificer in any production. And if the Creator himself, who pronounced the whole of his work to be good, yea, "very good" (Gen. i. 31), without an egotism on making it, can delight in reviewing its charms,—the

charms of Nature, his work, they must be great indeed, and far beyond all human comprehension, however improved by art; so that the wisest of us can hardly find time to admire sufficiently but a small part of the same in the course of their lives; much less those frivolous spectators, as there are many in the world who have no time for any thing but vanity, nor eyes to contemplate a scene that has charms to please even the Author of the universe. "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament sheweth his handy work" (Ps. xix. 1). "The earth is full of thy riches" (Ib. civ. 24). If, therefore, a man can have any excuse for idleness in the active state that is here assigned him, it may be, to look upon these two scenes, the glory of the heavens, and the lovely face of nature, and acquaint himself with some of their endless charms and proprieties.

As for the defects in nature, which some would rather dwell on; they exist only in distinction, being real advantages in combination,—like musical discord in harmony, or like the difficulties in Scripture, by which our faith as well as judgment or criticism is occasionally exercised. This too, v. g. Scripture is another work of the Author of the volume of nature: and as Scripture is divided into two principal parts, the Old and the New Testament, with its Apocalypse, and A BEAUTIFUL APOCRYPHA; so the volume of nature may be divided into the celestial and terrestrial, with its Adyta too, and ITS APOCRYPHA like the other, including many anomalies and other particulars that seem to belie their origin.

2: 3, Therefore, the department of Nature being so ample as it is, and so full of its secrets or adyta, may be thought to include the other two likewise of *Grace* and *Providence*; though by use its utmost limits are extended to the verge of reason in the ascending line, with—for its subjects, chiefly things visible, and who can pretend to see through so much only as that interesting department, in which men are constituted sub-governors by a divine

ordinance (Gen. i. 26 : 28) ; but which in their own instance, or self-government, at least they have terribly abused ; receding from nature in the first place, but now unfortunately following. For what men call receding from nature, is now in truth neither more nor less than growing upon it, that is upon the old stock ; till they begin to ripen, fall, and rot. So by a moral necessity the common growth of mankind, if not arrested by grace and newness of life, must be constantly from bad to worse : because, by the original determination of Providence, there is a natural chain of causes, wherein happiness and misery do necessarily follow good and bad actions without any farther interposition of the same : and if this chain is ever to be broken or interrupted, it can only be by the same Almighty power by which it was cemented, and what is called a miracle, being an act contrary to nature. This FORTUNATE INTERRUPTION (fortunate so far as it respects the evil) does, we are happy to believe, in fact, exist : not however through any change of cause and effect, but through a renewal of the subject by means of which the chain is removed or a new one presented ; so that we may now say, a NEW SUBJECT, A NEW CHAIN. The child that was born and brought up, it may be to man's estate ; will now begin to live. This is a work of divine mercy ; its means, faith, and repentance towards God—issuing in good works, and a new creature, the foreordained and inevitable consequence.

* May it be forgiven, if any thing is said in this, either undue orderogatory to his holy name !—the design of what is written latterly being, to shew how these three principles or governments in One co-operate : as NATURE MAKES CHILDREN ; PROVIDENCE, MEN ; AND GRACE MAKES THEM AGAIN. But still it will all be of One : for he who makes men, and new makes as well as sustains them, also makes the means namely : nature, grace, and providence. So we may make a distinction of men into natural and artificial in this respect ; the first being neither better nor

worse than Nature made them, the latter both ; that is both better and worse, better by God's help, worse by their own, as shown above : and THE WORST WORK THAT ANY MAN CAN MAKE IS A BAD SELF.

In the beginning of the world " God saw every thing that He had made ; and behold it was very good " : God sees the same now : whatever he makes now is good, is *directly* of Himself. And we should see too as He sees, if we could see all : but, as the apostle says, we now see only in part (Cor. I. xiii. 12) ; we are blind to universals, and know no more of the mind or counterpart of their Author, than brutes know of ours. " O, the depth (says he) of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God ! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out !" (Rom. xi. 33.)

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME.

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